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The  purpose  of  my  thesis  is  to  examine  the  relation  between  the  human  and  the 
divine  in  the  Homeric  poems,  and  define  thereupon  the  limits  of  human  and  divine 
responsibility.  To  this  end  I  particularly  focus  on  the  Homeric  concepts  of  fate  and  divine 
justice,  as  these  are  expressed  mainly  by  the  terms  poipa  and  SiKYI.  Nonetheless,  since  the 
Greek  terms  do  not  always  coincide  in  their  semantics  with  the  respective  terms  of  any 
modern  language,  it  is  regarded  as  necessary  that  the  field  of  each  term  be  defined  prior  to 
the  examination  of  the  concepts  themselves.  Similarly,  issues  such  as  morality  and 
Homeric  ethics  have  to  be  raised,  since  they  form  the  basis  upon  which  any  discussion  of 
Homeric  thought  can  rely.  The  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  employ  the  two  basic  ideas  of  fate 
and  divine  justice  each  in  a  discrete  manner,  and  this  requires  that  each  poem  be  examined 
separately.  A  comparison  between  the  two  works,  necessary  for  a  more  overall  idea  of  the 
Homeric  world  and  the  Homeric  compositions,  is  incorporated  in  the  chapter  on  the 
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3 Introduction 
The  main  interest  of  my  dissertation  lies  with  Homeric  man:  his  own  perception  of 
his  position  in  life  and  his  subsequent  reaction,  as  a  result  of  this  perception;  roughly 
speaking,  that  is,  his  responsibility.  But  since  the  Homeric  world  is  doubtless  one  of 
intense  religiosity  -  even  if  not  the  religiosity  to  which  our  Western,  post-Christian 
mentality  has  got  us  accustomed  to  -  it  is  inevitable  that  any  examination  and 
interpretation  of  Homeric  man  has  to  take  into  account  the  Homeric  gods  as  well,  and 
man's  relation  to  them.  The  reason  behind  this  necessity  is  quite  simple:  to  the  initiate  of 
any  religion,  the  divine  forms  an  inextricable  element  of  life  and  thought,  and  nothing  can 
be  seen  but  in  the  light  of  his  relation  to  the  divine  forces  that,  even  if  imperceptibly,  still 
all  too  powerfully  pervade  life. 
Thus,  it  seems  that  human  responsibility  is  defined  first  of  all  and  to  a  large  extent 
as  against  divine  responsibility.  '  The  order  of  nature,  as  perceived  by  the  initiate,  demands 
a  clear  distinction  between  the  human  and  the  divine,  between  the  self  and  the  unknown 
other,  the  boundaries  between  the  two  being  fixed  and  inviolable.  According  to  this  natural 
order  man  is  what  god  is  not:  he  has  limited  powers  of  knowledge  and  perception,  limited 
1  See  Griffin  (1980);  Clay  (1983)  139-141;  the  lines  most  characteristically  reflecting  the  divide  between 
mortals  and  immortals  are  E  440-42:  4päCEo,  Tu5Eºbrl,  Kai  XäýEO,  it  eEo  otv  110'  EeEXE  $poVEEIV,  ErrE1 
oü  TIOTE  45Aov  öuoiov  I  äeaväTwv 
TE  eEcSv  xauat  EPXouövc  v  TE 
ävepc 
irc  v. 
4 physical  strength,  and  more  important,  a  limited  life.  2  His  mortality  is  what  essentially 
differentiates  him  from  divinity;  for  the  gods  may provide  one  with  more  knowledge  or 
strength,  but  they  can  never  redeem  one  from  death.  Death  is  the  one  limit,  the  one  truth 
that  no  man  can  ever  escape  or  neglect. 
But  human  responsibility  is  also  defined  by  divine  responsibility.  Obviously,  not 
everything  in  life  is  caused  by  man;  life  includes  an  immeasurable  number  of  elements  and 
forces,  over  which  only  naivety  could  hope  for  or  claim  control.  Yet,  this  simple  and  not  at 
all  surprising  statement  is  the  cause  of  extreme  frustration,  when  it  comes  to  be  applied  to 
human  life  itself.  For  man,  despite  his  attempts  and  his  wishes,  despite  even  his 
presumptions,  often  realises  that  he  can  never  have  total  control  over  his  own  life,  the  life 
which  he  himself  believes  to  be  leading,  supposedly  being  characterised  and  defined  by 
him. 
True,  man  is  well  aware  of  his  limits,  but  he  is  further  aware  of  an  essential 
paradox  of  life:  he  may  be  a  weak  and  helpless,  almost  hopeless,  prey  to  time,  nature  and 
life  itself,  yet  at  the  same  time  he  is  a  free,  powerful  agent  as  well,  capable  of  deciding  and 
acting,  and  facing  the  consequences.  As  for  the  nullification  of  his  plans,  he  is  ready  to 
ascribe  it  to  the  divine  forces  with  which  he  has  invested  life.  Thus,  all  the  events  for 
which  he  is  not  responsible  he  interprets  as  the  result  of  divine  action  and  interference  with 
2  True,  for  distanced  and  dissociated  onlookers  like  ourselves  it  seems  that  the  gods  are  a  consequence  of 
man's  perception  of  life  and  not  vice  versa,  that  they  are  a  human  construction  born  out  of  and  affiliated  to  the 
ideology  of  the  particular  society;  thus,  one  could  reverse  this  statement,  and  say  that  god  is  actually  what  man 
is  not,  putting  more  emphasis  on  the  moulding  of  the  divine  by  man  and  according  to  man's  own  dispositions, 
values  and  even  interests;  yet,  I  prefer  to  approach  the  subject  from  the  perspective  of  an  initiate  for  whom  the 
divine  is  temporally  prior  to  the  human. 
5 human  affairs.  For  the  divine  is  believed  to  have  the  power  not  only  to  intervene  in  human 
life,  but  also  to  define  its  course,  imposing  thus  its  will  as  inevitable.  At  least,  this  is  the 
explanation  that  the  initiate  is  willing  to  offer  for  the  irrational  and  otherwise  inexplicable 
turnings  of  life.  Behind  this  reasoning  one  can  detect  a  natural  human  tendency  to  invest 
all  aspects  of  life  with  reason;  if  man  is  not  himself  the  cause  of  certain  events  or 
situations  in  life  or  in  nature,  and  if  no  cause  can  actually  be  found  and  named  in  his 
surrounding  environment,  then  there  must  be  some  force,  invisible  and  imperceptible,  and 
more  important  incomprehensible  in  its  reasoning,  yet  all  too  powerful,  that  motivates  life 
itself;  a  force  doubtless  greater  than  and  not  as  limited  as  man  himself. 
It  becomes  clear,  I  hope,  why  the  examination  of  the  idea  of  the  Homeric  gods3 
and  their  interrelation  and  interaction  with  man  is  essential  if  we  are  to  understand  man's 
idea  of  himself  in  the  Homeric  poems.  Not  an  easy  task,  certainly,  for  the  Homeric  gods 
are  multifaceted  and  complex,  a  conglomerate  of  diverse  religious  as  well  as  literary 
elements.  Yet,  it  is  against  the  backcloth  of  this  complex  divine  world  that  Homeric  man 
seems  to  define  himself  and  the  limits  of  his  life.  Every  single  idea  of  his  world-view, 
every  attitude  of  his  towards  life,  seems  to  be  related,  positively  or  negatively,  to  his 
conception  of  the  divine. 
3  The  application  of  the  term  `Homeric'  should  be  defined  at  this  point;  it  does  not  correspond  to  any  one 
particular  age  or  reality  other  than  the  reality  of  the  poems  themselves,  which  is  obviously  a  fictional  reality. 
The  term,  therefore,  has  a  restricted  meaning,  implying  only  the  world  of  the  poems  and  offering  no  secure 
basis  upon  which  any  conclusion  for  a  factual  reality  can  be  reached.  True,  a  factual  world  does  indeed  exist 
behind  Homeric  fiction;  but  this  world  we  can  hardly  define  in  time  with  accuracy.  The  term  is  also  used  for 
the  sake  of  convenience,  when  a  reference  to  both  poems  is  made,  a  distinction  being  deemed  at  that  point 
unnecessary. 
6 I  have  just  said  that  a  religious  outlook  on  life  entails  that  the  divine  and  the  human 
represent  two  distinct  spheres  of  action,  the  boundaries  between  which  are  clearly  cut;  and 
that  the  divine,  being  definitely  more  powerful,  is  the  force  that  causes  all  the 
unpredictable  changes  in  life  that  are  not  determined  by  man  himself.  Both  of  the  Homeric 
poems  share  this  basic  principle  of  religion:  despite  the  constant  interaction  between  the 
human  and  the  divine,  despite  even  the  heroes'  unique  position  in  humankind,  it  is  made 
more  than  clear  that  the  two  elements  can  never  intersect.  However,  divine  interference 
with  human  life  has  as  an  inevitable  consequence  man's  dependence  on  the  gods.  In  the 
Homeric  poems  themselves  it  is  more  than  frequently  that  we  witness  this  intervention  of 
the  gods;  it  forms  an  inextricable  element  of  the  plot,  as  the  gods  may  fulfil  at  times  man's 
plans  or  wishes,  supporting  his  endeavour  physically  or  emotionally,  or,  at  times  prevent 
him  from  attaining  his  end,  changing  the  course  of  events.  Man  is  conscious  of  the 
possibility  of  divine  intervention,  which  he  relates  to  his  own  natural  and  inherent 
weakness  and  limitation,  and  which  certainly  leads  him  to  the  painful  conclusion  of  life's 
uncertainty.  But,  however  intense  and  great  man's  dependence  on  the  gods,  it  is  certainly 
neither  absolute  nor  passive;  that  would  not  be  realistic  in  a  work  of  literature,  and  it 
certainly  would  not  be  possible  in  life  itself.  Despite  his  lack  of  control  over  life  in  most 
cases,  man  has  to  face  his  own  weakness  and  fragility;  for  he  has  to  survive  and  live. 
Inevitably,  certain  questions  emerge:  is  there  a  reasoning  behind  gods'  intervention, 
which  could  make  this  intervention  predictable?  And  what  are  the  implications  of  this 
reasoning,  if  it  does  indeed  exist,  for  human  responsibility?  How  does  man  react  to  this 
concept?  What  are  the  limits  he  decides  to  accept  as  a  result  of  the  gods'  limitless  action 
7 and  interference  with  his  life?  In  other  words,  how  do  divine  action  and  responsibility 
circumscribe  human  action  and  responsibility? 
Two  ideas  that  seem  of  great  significance,  and  will  therefore  be  examined  here  in 
detail,  are  that  of  uoipa  or  fate,  and  that  of  divine  justice,  usually  connected  with  6  Kn. 
Moira,  the  vague  and  obscure  power  that  is  believed  to  define  man's  life  to  a  great  extent 
and  determine  his  death,  is  inevitably  related  to  the  divine;  it  often  appears  to  be  identified 
with  the  Homeric,  Olympian  gods,  but  even  when  it  functions  as  a  totally  independent 
power,  it  is  still  a  power  external  to  and  independent  of  man,  and  therefore,  of  divine 
quality.  Defining  human  life,  it  also  defines  the  human  perception  of  life:  if  life,  or  at  least 
certain  events  of  life,  are  already  determined  and  planned,  the  question  of  human  freedom 
of  will  and  action  is  inevitably  raised,  alongside  the  question  of  man's  reaction,  in  practice, 
to  such  a  belief.  4 
Divine  justice,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  idea  that  allows  us  to  raise  some  further 
questions  concerning  the  behaviour  of  Homeric  man.  What  is  the  nature  of  divine 
intervention?  Is  it  the  result  of  the  gods'  concern  for  righteousness,  which  they  sanction 
with  their  own  righteous  behaviour?  Or  is  it  rather  a  matter  of  chance,  actually,  of 
The  question  of  freedom  of  will  and  action  is  certainly  not  raised  in  the  Homeric  poems  -  at  least  not  as  such; 
Homeric  man  never  appears  to  wonder  about  the  degree  or  quality  of  his  freedom  in  life,  or  to  regard  his 
dependence  on  the  gods  as  a  suffocating  restriction.  The  absence  of  this  question  from  Homeric  thought  can 
be  interpreted  in  two  ways,  the  one  not  necessarily  excluding  the  other:  it  may  be  simply  because  Homeric 
man  does  not  feel  restricted  and  limited  by  divine  action  or  intervention;  partly  because  of  piety,  partly  because 
of  necessity,  man  cannot  but  accept  this  power  on  his  life,  and  distinguishing  in  a  way  two  planes  of  truth,  live 
his  life  as  best  as  he  can.  At  the  same  time,  one  could  say  that  Homeric  thought  is  not  as  elaborate  yet  as  to 
perceive  and  formulate  in  language  the  subtle  implications  that  this  particular  religious  belief  has  on  human 
decisions  or  actions.  Either  explanation  could  be  seen  as  being  the  cause  of  the  other:  one  could  say  that  an 
idea  does  not  exist,  and  therefore  is  not  expressed,  as  long  as  man  feels  no  need  to  express  it,  but  one  could 
also  say  that  an  idea  may  exist  in  man's  thought  in  a  vague  and  non-articulate  form  up  until  the  moment  that 
thought  and  language  become  so  elaborate  as  to  be  able  to  express  it. 
8 haphazard  decisions  taken  light-heartedly  and  on  no  principle  at  all,  following  capricious 
wishes  or  whimsical  demands?  And  if  the  gods  are  just,  does  this  necessarily  entail  that 
human  behaviour  is determined  by  the  fear  of  this  justice,  and  evaluated  only  in  terms  of 
divine  response?  To  what  extent  can  a  belief  in  divine  justice  determine  man's  decisions 
and  actions,  how  does  it  define  his  freedom  of  will?  In  other  words,  does  divine  justice 
function  as  the  sanction  of  human  propriety  and  righteousness?  And  can  Homeric  man 
actually  rely  on  the  gods'  justice,  as  a  principle  that  is  inevitable  and  unquestionable? 
Human  responsibility,  then,  will  be  examined  here  in  relation  to  divine 
responsibility,  on  the  basis  of  the  idea  we  form  of  the  latter  through  the  ideas  expressed  by 
uoipa  and  61''cr1  and  through  the  concepts  of  fate  and  divine  justice.  With  only  minor 
exceptions,  each  poem  will  be  examined  separately;  there  are  differences  between  the  Iliad 
and  the  Odyssey  that  seem  to  require  such  a  structure.  These  differences  I  interpret  mainly 
as  the  result  of  the  different  function  and  purpose  that  each  poem  has,  as  becomes  obvious 
from  the  vital  narrative  requirements  that  are  peculiar  to  each  of  the  two  plots,  and  as  it  is 
only  natural  that  each  poem  should  project  a  different  outlook  on  life.  The  chapter  on  the 
Odyssey  will  also  examine  the  relation  between  the  two  poems,  since  certain  comparative 
conclusions  should  be  drawn. 
A  term  which  will  be  featuring  fairly  often  in  the  examination  of  Homeric  thought 
is  morality.  It  will  prove  relevant  to  the  discussion  of  the  gods'  behaviour  to  one  another 
and  to  the  mortal  heroes,  but  it  will  also  prove  of  importance  to  the  definition  of  the 
Homeric  concepts  of  ioipa  and  SiKq.  We  are  accustomed  to  using  the  terms  fate  and 
justice  for  the  ancient  Greek  terms  poipa  and  SiKTI  respectively;  still,  it  is  perhaps  silently 
9 acknowledged  by  most,  if  not  all  scholars,  that  the  ancient  Greek  terms  have  implications 
that  differentiate  them  sharply  from  the  terms  of  any  modem  language.  IiKrl  appears  to  be 
of  a  narrower  meaning  than  any  of  its  modem  equivalents,  while  uoipa,  on  the  other  hand, 
seems  to  denote  more  than  a  plain  concept  of  fate,  and  to  have  moral  connotations.  More 
important,  the  two  terms  appear  to  be  closely  related  as  regards  their  semantics,  conveying 
what  Palmer  calls  a  `peculiar  concept  of  justice  and  judgement  as  the  respect  for  certain 
limits'.  5  The  actual  examination  and  interpretation  of  the  poems  themselves  will  be 
delayed,  therefore,  as  two  introductory  chapters,  the  first  on  the  concept  of  morality,  and 
the  second  on  the  terminology  related  to  the  concepts  of  fate  and  justice,  are  deemed  a 
necessary  precondition  -  especially  since  they  are  of  a  rather  general  character,  and 
relevant  to  both  poems. 
Before  I  enter  the  subject  proper  of  my  thesis,  I  add  a  few  words  on  the  nature  and 
function  of  the  poems.  The  issue  of  epic  poetry  is  indeed  vast,  and  that  of  Homeric  epic  in 
particular  even  more  so.  The  Homeric  Question  is  certainly  to  persist,  however  much  we 
wish  for  the  opposite,  and  one  finds  oneself  in  an  extremely  awkward  position  when 
having  finally  to  confront  it  and  repeat  the  vague  and  oblique  statements  of  thousands  of 
years.  Are  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  the  work  of  one  single  poet,  or  should  we  assume  that 
each  poem  should  be  ascribed  to  a  different  composer,  as  Xeno  and  Hellanicus  thought?  6 
s  Palmer  (1950)  161f. 
6  D.  B.  Monro  (Homer's  Odyssey:  XIlI-XX,  v.  II,  Oxford  1901,325)  first  pointed  out  that  the  Odyssey  never 
refers  to  the  events  narrated  in  the  Iliad,  a  view  ususally  known  as  `Monro's  Law'  which  was  later  expanded 
by  D.  L.  Page  (The  Homeric  Odyssey,  Oxford  1995,149-59),  who  argues  that  the  poet  of  the  Odyssey  did  not 
know  the  Iliad  at  all,  and  that  the  two  poems  actually  belonged  to  two  different  poetic  traditions;  Eustathius, 
however,  in  his  rrpooiunov,  explains  the  absence  of  cross-references  as  a  deliberate  choice  of  the  poet:  ä  yap 
Ö  1TOITjTrC  EKEL  EV6ÄUTTEV,  evTaQOa  rrpooav6TrX6pcoae,  a  view  to  which  one  can  subscribe  even  if  different 
authorship  should  be  accepted  for  each  poem.  For  Odyssey's  awareness  of  the  Iliad  and  relevant 
bibliography 
see  Rutherford  (1991-1993);  also  Schein  in  Schein  (1996)  3-31. 
10 And  is  it  possible  that  each  poem,  a  work  of  such  extent  in  a  non-literate  period,  could 
have  been  composed  by  one  single  person,  or  are  the  poems  the  outcome  of  continuous 
and  successive  re-workings  and  re-compositions  of  a  basic  nucleus,  or  even  the  result  of 
stitching  together  various  distinct  smaller  poems? 
For  the  second  question  I  would  follow  the  unitarians;  minor  inconsistencies  apart, 
since  they  can  be  explained  away  on  the  grounds  of  the  oral  formulaic  quality  of  epic 
poetry,  the  poems  are  too  coherent  in  their  structure  and  aim  to  justify  an  analytic  view; 
our  awe  at  the  scale  of  these  compositions  is  not  sufficient  a  reason  for  us  to  dissect  what 
is  obviously  a  well  functioning  unit.  The  first  question  seems  doubtless  more  difficult  to 
answer;  differences  in  style  and  language  are  generally  accepted  to  be  indicative  of 
different  poets,  while  differences  in  terms  of  ideas  seem  also  to  point  in  this  direction.  It  is 
certainly  not  possible  to  decide  to  which  poem  the  figure  of  Homer  corresponds;  8 
considering  that  in  antiquity  Homer  was  believed  by  some  to  be  the  poet  of  the  whole  epic 
cycle,  it  seems  only  plausible  to  assume  that,  when  finally  Homer  was  relieved  from  this 
responsibility,  the  two  most  prominent  poems  were  confidently  and  indisputably  ascribed 
to  him.  On  the  other  hand,  the  mere  fact  that  antiquity  perceived  the  two  compositions  as 
7  For  a  more  detailed  outline  of  the  views  expressed  on  the  Homeric  Questions  and  relevant  bibliography,  see 
Garvie  (1994)  3-18. 
For  the  existence  of  Homer  I  would  agree  with  Finley  (1978:  15):  `Homer  was  a  man's  name,  not  the  Greek 
equivalent  of  "Anonymous",  and  that  is  the  one  certain  fact  about  him.  Who  he  was,  where  he  lived,  when  he 
composed,  these  are  questions  we  cannot  answer  with  assurance,  any  more  than  could  the  Greeks  themselves'. 
For  an  entirely  different  view  see  Nagy  (1996),  West  (1999).  The  question  of  the  poems'  oral  or  written  form 
of  composition  and  transmission  is  also  crucial  in  Homeric  studies;  see  Kirk  (1962)  177ff.,  A.  Parry  (1966), 
Lord  (1968);  also  Garvie  (1994)  15-17.  As  Kirk  observes  (1962:  186),  `any  theory  accounting  for  the 
transition  of  the  Homeric  poems  from  oral  song  to  written  text  is  conjectural,  so  that  it  becomes  a  matter  of 
choosing  according  to  our  taste  and  our  intuitive  calculus  of  probabilities'.  I  would  believe  that  some  form  of 
writing  was  used  for  the  composition  of  the  poems,  the  transmission,  however,  being  accomplished  orally  for  a 
long  time  after  the  composition,  thus  calling  for  the  `edition'  by  Pisistratus  or  his  son  Hipparchus,  which  aimed 
at  providing  a  standard  version  of  the  poems.  The  use  of  writing  is  combined  with  the  occasion  of  the  Odyssey 
by  Garvie  (1994:  171)  -a  remark  that  I  would  regard  as  applicable  to  the  Iliad  as  well. 
11 related  in  some  way,  seems  to  underline  their  accord  rather  than  their  discord;  for  the  truth 
is  that  there  is  hardly  any  essential  difference  between  the  poems  that  cannot  be  accounted 
for  in  terms  of  different  circumstances  or  different  purpose  of  composition. 
Which  brings  me  back  to  the  issue  of  epic  poetry.  What  I  would  wish  to  examine 
briefly  is  the  way  in  which  the  nature  and  function  of  the  poems  influence  the  development 
and  exposition  of  theological  and  philosophical  ideas;  or  the  way  in  which  the  principles  to 
which  the  poems  conform  as  compositions,  that  is  their  orality  and  their  literary  character,  9 
circumscribe  our  expectations  and  limit  our  demands  of  the  poems.  If  nothing  else,  I  hope 
that  the  following  discussion  will  prove  helpful  in  drawing  the  comparison  between  the 
two  poems. 
The  Homeric  poems  belong  to  an  oral  tradition  of  epic  poetry,  whose  aim  was  the 
narration  of  the  glorious  deeds  of  heroes  and  gods.  i°  If  a  definition  of  the  term  `epic' 
should  be  given,  one  could  say  that,  roughly  speaking,  the  epic  is  an  oral  composition  of 
narrative  character,  most  often  in  verse  and  of  a  considerable  length,  whose  subject  matter 
is  supposed  to  evolve  around  a  historically  true  event.  ''  According  to  Hainsworth,  the 
9  The  use  of  the  term  'literary',  which  has  obvious  connotations  that  contradict  the  term  'oral',  is  employed 
simply  in  the  absence  of  any  other  term  that  would  successfully  indicate  the  poems'  purpose. 
10  For  the  subject  of  epic  poetry  as  defined  by  epic  poetry  itself  see  1189,  a  337-8,0  266-9,488-90,  Hes. 
Theog.,  99-101. 
1'  True,  defining  the  meaning  and  function  of  epic  is  not  as  easy  as  it  first  appears;  since  "generalizations  are 
made  from  particular  poems"  (Hainsworth  (1991)  2),  and  it  is  the  Homeric  poems  themselves  which,  up  to 
this  day,  are  often  seen  as  the  epic  poems  par  excellence,  we  are  inevitably  faced  with  a  huge  difficulty:  how 
are  we  to  define  the  genre  on  the  basis  of  our  perception  of  the  Homeric  poems,  when  it  is  exactly  for  the 
appreciation  and  comprehension  of  these  poems  that  we  need  the  definition?  This  is  just  another  vicious  circle 
one  becomes  entangled  in  when  dealing  with  Homer:  he  is  our  only  source  for  our  understanding  of  his  own 
poems.  Comparativism  seems  of  great  help,  although  it  may  often  lead  to  mistaken  associations  and 
conclusions.  Obviously,  I  am  concerned  here  with  the  definition  of  the  'primary'  or  'oral'  epic.  For  the 
distinction  between  'primary'  and  `secondary'  epic,  see  p.  16. 
12 formal  root  of  the  epic  is  narrative,  `but  not  just  any  narrative.  The  primitive  phases  of 
most  cultures  provide  myths  and  folktales,  stories  by  which  men  and  women  have  sought 
to  explain  the  world  or  escape  from  its  miseries.  There  are  also  sagas  to  record  success  and 
eulogies  to  commend  it.  The  seed  of  the  epic  is  sown  when  these  are  blended,  given 
metrical  form,  and  cast  into  the  narrative  mode  of  heroic  poetry'.  12 
Heroic  poetry  is,  then,  the  form  out  of  which  epic  poetry  emerged,  the  distinction 
between  the  two  being  made  according  to  their  different  scale  or  length  on  the  one  hand, 
and  according  to  their  different  scope  and  function  on  the  other.  The  term  refers  to 
relatively  shorter  oral  poems,  also  known  as  heroic  lays,  which  were  supposedly 
celebratory  accounts  of  historical  events  of  a  glorious  past.  13  It  actually  appears,  as  is  often 
accepted  among  scholars,  that  the  primary  function  of  such  heroic  lays  was  the  narration, 
and  thus  crystallisation  in  memory  and  time,  of  past  events  in  the  life  or  history  of  a 
group:  in  this  way  the  unity  and  even  identity  of  the  group  were  emphasised  and  validated. 
A  heroic  poem  was  originally  'a  chronicle,  a  "book  of  the  tribe",  a  vital  record  of  custom 
and  tradition',  fulfilling  `the  need  for  an  established  history',  '4  and  this  function  seems  to 
survive  in  the  succeeding  genre  of  epic. 
12  Hainsworth  (1991)  5. 
13  The  songs  mentioned  in  the  Homeric  poems  themselves  (I  186-89,  a  325-27,9  73-82,499-520)  are 
probably  representative  of  the  genre;  they  are  short  enough  to  be  sung  within  a  few  moments,  and  they  refer  to 
a  glorious,  yet  not  very  distant  past,  which  they  immortalise.  Demodocus'  second  song  (6  266-366),  relating 
the  life  of  the  immortals,  corresponds  to  another  traditional  form  of  poetry;  as  Burkert  notes  (1985:  121),  both 
the  formulaic  language  of  passages  referring  to  the  gods,  and  the  parallels  between  archaic  Greek  and  Near 
Eastern  poetry  seem  to  imply  the  rather  frequent  presence  of  the  gods  in  traditional  epic  poetry;  the  gods 
could  feature  in  a  poem  alongside  the  great  heroes  of  the  past,  but  most  probably  there  were  also  poems  which 
dealt  exclusively  with  the  gods,  as  Hesiod's  Theogony  seems  to  suggest. 
"  Merchant  (1971)  1-2. 
13 This  historical  basis,  though,  undergoes  inevitable  transformations  in  the  passing 
of  time,  mainly  for  two  reasons:  first,  because  of  the  oral  way  of  composition  and 
transmission  of  such  chronicles;  not  having  a  written  and  thereupon  fixed  form,  the 
account  of  the  particular  events  of  interest  is  conditioned  by  conscious  or  unconscious 
interventions  of  both  the  poet  and  his  audience  as  every  new  performance  is  also  a  new 
composition:  the  former's  memory  and  the  latter's  response  or  demands  are  decisive  for 
the  way  a  poem  will  develop  around  the  historical  nucleus,  since  both  of  them  can  lead  to 
omissions  or  transformations,  as  well  as  additions  and  expansions.  Thus,  although  such 
poems  prove  man's  inherent  fear  and  struggle  against  time  and  life,  the  further  we  move 
from  the  original  composition,  and  thus  from  the  original  event  that  forms  its  stimulus,  the 
less  accurate  the  poetic  account  of  this  event  seems  to  become.  This  is  not  to  deny  the 
historical  basis  of  heroic,  and  consequently  epic  poetry;  the  nucleus  is  definitely  there,  but 
one  should  be  very  cautious  not  to  use  such  poems  strictly  or  mainly  as  historical 
documents,  for  this  is  obviously  neither  their  only  nor  their  most  essential  quality.  The 
historical  nucleus  is  not  immune  to  change;  rather,  it  is  magnified  and  distorted  by  the 
application  of  a  heroic  ideal  and  gradually  expanded  by  the  employment  of  fictional 
elements. 
The  second  reason  that  explains  the  incessant  transformations  of  the  original 
nucleus  is  that  heroic,  and  subsequently  epic,  poetry  do  not  consist  only  of  historical  or 
factual  elements.  As  already  mentioned,  heroic/epic  poetry  is  actually  a  fusion  of  fact  and 
fiction,  as  historical  events  are  intermingled  with  various  myths  and  folktales  -  even  if  the 
latter  are  eventually  invested  with  the  character  of  the  factual  and  an  epic  quality. 
Particularly  interesting  in  this  respect  are  the  implications  of  this  blending  of  sagas,  myths 
14 and  folktales:  for,  obviously,  alongside  celebrating  and  commemorating  events,  it  also 
entertains  and  even  teaches  or  instructs. 
The  Homeric  poems  are  placed  at  the  end  of  such  an  oral  tradition,  which  had 
doubtless  existed  for  a  long  time  before  these  poems  were  composed,  and  whose 
beginnings  can  certainly  be  neither  traced  nor  defined.  16  This  entails  that  a  possible 
original  historical  nucleus  had  already  lost  much  of  its  coherence  and  objectivity  by  the 
eighth  and  seventh  centuries,  when  the  poems  are  supposed  to  have  been  composed, 
simply  because  of  accretions  and  modifications  through  each  new  performance.  More 
important,  it  underlines  the  fact  that  the  Homeric  poems  certainly  lack  the  innocence  of  a 
quasi-primitive  composition;  actually,  the  poet  seems  to  be  quite  conscious  of  the  tradition 
in  which  he  belongs  and  of  his  relation  to  it:  being  aware  of  his  own  status  as  poet  and 
composer,  he  participates  in  the  very  process  of  development  that  his  tradition  inevitably 
undergoes.  Thus,  we  can  see  the  poet  masterfully  using  his  material  by  means  of  allusions, 
additions,  modifications  or  subtractions,  so  that  the  desired  narrative  aim  be  finally 
achieved.  The  poet's  freedom  is  indeed  worth  considering  at  this  point. 
The  Homeric  poems  are  `primary'  epics,  to  be  distinguished  from  `secondary'  or 
`literary'  epics.  '7  The  essential  point  of  differentiation  between  the  two  is  their  way  of 
composition:  `primary'  epics  are  orally  composed,  while  `secondary'  or  `literary'  epics  are 
16  On  the  origins  of  epic  poetry  the  scholars  oscillate  between  the  Mycenean  age  and  the  so-called  Dark  Age, 
their  conclusions  being  based  on  the  language  of  the  poems  and  the  assumed  circumstances  that  led  to  the 
appearance  of  epic  poetry  as  a  genre  that  exults  the  deeds  of  heroes  and  gods;  see  Kirk  (1962)  chapters  5  and 
6. 
17  Merchant  (1971)  vii;  Beowulf  and  the  Song  of  Roland  are  regarded  as  `primary'  epics,  being  distinguished 
from  `secondary'  or  `literary'  epics  such  as  Virgil's  Aeneid,  Lucan's  Pharsalia,  and  Milton's  Paradise  Lost. 
15 obviously  written  poems,  which  are  further  modelled  upon  the  `primary'  epics.  This 
difference  is  of  great  significance,  for  it  implies  a  totally  different  technique  and  process  of 
composition,  which  inevitably  affects  both  the  work  itself  and  its  function.  Thus,  oral  epic 
apparently  lacks  the  complexity  of  a  written  poem,  and  at  the  same  time  it  inevitably  lacks 
the  emphasis  on  the  identity  and  individuality  of  the  poet.  Still,  it  would  not  seem  absurd 
to  talk  of  `intertextuality'  even  in  oral  epic;  for,  oral  poetry  may  indeed  be  self-effacing 
and  impersonal,  yet  this  does  not  entail  that  it  is  also  fortuitous  or  serendipitous.  The 
anonymity  of  oral  poetry  should  by  no  means  be  taken  to  imply  that  the  oral  poets  are 
neither  concerned  with  nor  influenced  by  their  artistic  self-consciousness.  18  Among  the 
works  of  `primary'  epic  one  discerns  the  same  constant  flux  of  ideas  as  among  literary, 
written  poems.  19 
In  order  that  the  potential  of  oral  poetry  become  clear,  the  principles  of  its 
composition  have  to  be  considered.  Ever  since  the  work  of  Milman  Parry,  and  later  of 
Albert  B.  Lord  on  Serbo-Croatian  oral  poetry,  20  it  has  become  clear  that  an  important 
mechanism  of  oral  tradition  is  the  use  of  formulae,  both  linguistic  and  thematic,  which 
facilitate  the  composition  of  a  poem  by  means  of  their  memorisation.  Repetition  proves 
18  Hainsworth  (1991:  43)  observes  that  'it  was  by  necessity,  not  choice,  that  Homer  was  the  most  self-effacing 
of  artists',  obviously  referring  to  the  restrictions  that  orality  entailed  for  a  poet;  `The  themes  and  formulas  of 
the  old  art  of  song  made  it  easy  to  re-create  a  story  but  almost  impossible  to  perpetuate  an  individualized 
conception'  (ibid.  ). 
19  Our  evidence  for  this  intertextuality  within  oral  poetry  is  drawn,  unfortunately,  not  so  much  from  ancient 
Greek  poems  as  from  more  recent  traditions  that,  being  still  alive,  allow  their  examination;  comparativism 
involves  definite  dangers  and  therefore  demands  extreme  caution,  but  it  often  is  our  only  means. 
20  Milman  Parry  first  expounded  his  arguments  in  his  doctoral  theses  L'Epithete  traditionelle  dons  Homere 
and  Les  Formules  et  la  metrique  d'  Homere  (Paris  1928),  now  found  in  A.  Parry  (ed.  ),  The  making  of 
Homeric  verse:  the  collected  papers  of  Milman  Parry  (New  York,  Oxford,  1987).  A.  B.  Lord  followed  with 
The  singer  of  tales  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  London,  1960). 
16 essential  in  a  world  that  knows  nothing  of  writing;  this  is  the  only  means  by  which  both  the 
content  and  the  art  of  poetry  can  be  transmitted  from  one  generation  to  another. 
These  formulae  are  not  as  static  as  they  might  appear  at  first  sight;  in  fact,  they  are 
flexible  enough  to  allow  modification  and  adaptation  to  the  particular  narrative  needs  of 
each  poet.  As  a  consequence,  oral  poems  often  consist  of  elements  of  different  ages  or 
perhaps  also  different  places,  accommodated  in  and  absorbed  by  tradition,  creating  thus  a 
conglomerate  that  can  hardly  be  said  to  correspond  to  one  particular  historical  reality. 
Contradictions  and  inaccuracies  are  inevitable,  especially  since  tradition  and  its  poets  are 
not  in  the  least  concerned  with  historical  accuracy  or  consistency.  With  every  new  poem 
being  a  new  interpretation  of  the  traditional  material,  the  narration  concerns  after  all  `a 
timeless  event  floating  in  a  timeless,  ... 
in  a  non-contextual  world'.  2' 
Tradition,  then,  seems  to  have  an  ambivalent  power  on  its  poets,  exercising,  one 
could  say,  both  centrifugal  and  centripetal  forces:  on  the  one  hand  it  appears  to  provide  all 
the  necessary  material  for  poetic  composition,  around  which  material  each  new  poem  is  to 
evolve  and  develop;  on  the  other,  this  material  exhibits  a  dynamic  quality  that  is  evident  in 
the  very  freedom  with  which  the  poet  handles  and  reshapes  stories  already  told  and  known 
to  their  audience.  If  we  should  confine  ourselves  to  the  use  of  thematic  formulae  in  the 
Homeric  poems,  one  could  say  that  the  very  plot  of  both  poems  is  merely  the  manipulation 
of  a  traditional  theme  for  the  construction  of  an  entirely  new  narrative:  in  the  Iliad  the 
theme  of  a  hero's  X6Xoc  is  transformed  into  Achilles'  u>>v«,  the  powerful  wrath  that 
21  Finley  (1978)  172.  See  also  Finley  in  Emlyn-Jones  et  al.  (1992:  114),  who  opposes  the  tendency  to  treat  the 
Homeric  poems  as  historical  sources:  'True,  we  have  nowhere  else  to  turn  at  present,  but  that  is  a  pity,  not  an 
argument'. 
17 destroys  so  many  lives  and  brings  such  suffering  to  the  hero  himself,  while  in  the  Odyssey 
the  theme  of  voaTOc  is  combined  with  that  of  revenge,  both  of  them  being  then 
incorporated  in  the  heroic  setting  of  the  Trojan  war. 
Two  remarks  follow  on  the  observation  of  the  poet's  freedom.  First,  it  would 
appear  that  the  `literary'  quality  of  the  poems  is  brought  to  the  fore.  As  noted  earlier,  epic 
poetry  aims  at  celebrating  as  well  as  commemorating,  or  even  instructing.  22  The 
sophistication  of  the  Homeric  poems,  however,  their  elaborate  way  of  structuring  the  plot 
and  their  indulgence,  one  could  say,  in  narration  itself  seem  to  prove  that  we  have  before 
us  works  of  literature,  and  however  different  the  scope  or  function  of  this  particularly  and 
amazingly  distant  literature,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  it  enjoys  a  freedom  of  composition 
which  entails  that  quite  often  the  narrative  purpose  proves  more  important  than  the 
purpose  of  historical  accuracy  or religious  or  social  didacticism.  No  religious  idea  proves 
so  powerful  as  to  confine  the  poet's  imagination  and  narrative,  and  no  belief  in  the 
necessity  of  consistency  of  historical  or  other  information  seems  to  determine  the 
unfolding  of  the  plot.  The  narration  of  stories  is  what  mostly  concerns  the  poets,  and  to  this 
end  they  often  have  to  be  self-contradictory.  Self-contradiction  and  inconsistency  have 
often  puzzled  scholars,  but  this  is  after  all  another  piece  of  evidence  of  the  poems'  literary 
character:  the  end  is  the  narration  itself,  and  the  absence  of  any  systematic  thought  exactly 
22  That  epic  poetry  had  a  didactic  function  cannot  be  doubted;  after  all,  it  was  one  of  the  few  means  by  which 
ideas  and  beliefs,  as  well  as  practices  and  customs,  could  be  communicated  in  this  non-literate  world;  see 
Burkert  (1996:  56):  'the  tale  is  the  form  through  which  complex  experience  becomes  communicable';  also 
Hainsworth  (1991)  17;  however,  I  would  avoid  going  as  far  as  Havelock  (1978:  4f)  does  into  arguing  for  a 
primarily  didactic  purpose;  epic  poetry  seems  to  have  been  more  than  a  `cultural  encyclopedia'  (56);  observing 
that  the  poems'  instruction  is  not  only  `literary  or  aesthetic,  but  sociological  and  utilitarian',  including 
`technology,  ...  military  skills...  civic  conduct,  morals  and  religion'  he  then  asks  `is  it  possible  that  ...  although 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  modern  critique  this  view  of  Homer  is indeed  secondary  and  may  even  seem  perverse, 
it  reports  a  role  played  by  the  poems  which  was  in  fact  the  primary  one  they  were  called  to  play  in  their  own 
time  and  circumstance?  '  (7).  See  Macleod  (1983)  6,  n.  2,  on  the  regular  use  of  TEpTrEty  for  epic  poetry. 
18 proves  that  the  exposition  of  such  a  thought  which  would  be  clear  and  perfectly  consistent, 
is  neither  the  immediate  nor  the  primary  aim  of  the  poets.  23 
The  literary  character  of  the  poems,  however,  has  another  implication  -  and  this  is 
the  second  remark.  The  idea  of  intertextuality  was  mentioned  earlier  in  relation  to  oral 
poetry:  orality  and  the  use  of  formulae  do  not  necessarily  entail  that  the  poets  lack  the 
knowledge  of  interaction  between  different  compositions,  performances  or  traditions.  The 
self-effacing  character  of  oral  poetry  is  more  a  necessity  than  a  choice,  the  result  of  non- 
literacy.  It  is  indeed  true  that  the  poets  do  not  appear  in  propria  persona  in  the  poems,  nor 
do  they  ever  seem  to  express  their  own  views  openly,  but  this  should  not  be  taken  to  imply 
that  they  are  unable,  nay  unwilling,  to  offer  a  more  or  less  idiosyncratic  re-presentation  of 
their  traditional  material. 
To  come  to  the  Homeric  poems,  there  are  distinct  differences  between  the  Iliad  and 
the  Odyssey,  as  noted,  which  demand  that  we  should  talk  of  two  different  poets.  As  far  as 
the  ideological  aspect  of  the  works  is  concerned,  it  will  become  clear  later  on  that  the 
concepts  of  fate  and  justice  are  employed  in  a  fairly  discrete  manner.  Fate  is  an  all- 
important  motive  power  of  the  Iliadic  plot,  a  compelling  and  ineluctable  reality  imposed 
on  man,  while  justice  is  only  of  minor  significance;  in  fact,  it  is  never  an  essential  idea  for 
the  construction  of  the  plot,  and  we  only  infer  the  existence  of  the  idea  from  occasional 
and  indirect  references  to  it.  In  the  Odyssey,  on  the  other  hand,  fate  is  only  used  when 
necessary,  and  then  without  having  the  dark  connotations  of  the  Iliadic  fate,  while  justice 
Z3  See  Clay  (1983:  5-6),  who  explains  the  poems'  inconsistencies  as  a  result  of  the  poets'  concern  for  the 
immediate  effect  that  each  scene  would  have  on  the  audience. 
19 is  an  essential  idea  of  the  very  plot.  This  difference  between  the  two  poems  has  often  been 
seen  as  indicative  of  a  development  in  archaic  Greek  thought.  The  Iliad  is  supposed  to 
reflect  a  world  of  more  `primitive'  ethics,  where  both  gods  and  men  are  absorbed  by  their 
heroic  code  of  Tilni  and  dpciij  and  where,  consequently,  it  is  only  natural  that  morality  is 
not  highly  developed  yet,  while  any  idea  of  justice  is  only  elementary;  the  Odyssey,  on  the 
other  hand,  proves  to  present  us  with  a  more  elaborate  sense  of  morality,  both  because  the 
heroes  are  more;  and  more  obviously,  concerned  with  moral  principles,  and  -because  the 
gods  are  now  more  interested  in  human  affairs  in  a  moral  fashion,  and  more  morally 
disposed  towards  human  life,  aiming  at  preserving  a  just  order. 
This  evolutionary  theory,  the  model  of  a  linear  development  of  moral  thought  that 
corresponds  to  the  chronological  order  of  the  poems,  should  be  seen  perhaps  in  the  light  of 
what  has  already  been  said  about  the  poems'  literary  quality  and  the  poets'  freedom. 
Before  any  generalisation  about  the  identification  of  the  poems  with  any  historical  reality 
be  admitted,  the  aim  and  perspective  of  each  poem  should  be  considered.  In  anticipation  of 
the  conclusion  that  is  to  be  drawn  later  on,  let  me  state  here  that  the  differences  between 
the  two  poems  are  to  be  interpreted  as  a  result  of  their  different  function  and  perspective 
rather  than  of  their  different  place  in  this  evolutionary  model. 
Neither  the  oral  character  of  the  poems,  nor  the  necessity  of  a  formulaic 
composition  prove  as  powerful  a  restraint  on  the  poet's  own  will.  This  will,  which,  it  has 
to  be  admitted,  was  largely  conditioned  by  the  demands  of  the  audience,  could  go  beyond 
the  limitations  imposed  by  tradition,  creating  astonishingly  varied  interpretations  of  life 
itself.  The  different  application  of  the  concepts  of  fate  and  justice  in  the  poems  is 
20 accompanied  by  a  different  atmosphere  and  outlook  on  life,  and  I  would  think  that  it  is  the 
latter  that  determines  the  former  and  not  vice  versa.  If  such  an  interpretation  seems  to  be  in 
conflict  with  our  perception  of  oral  poetry,  it  should  perhaps  be  worth  reconsidering  the 
potential  of  this  `primary'  form  of  literature.  24 
24  For  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  poems'  different  perspectives,  seen  in  relation  to  the  oral  theory,  see 
Kullmann  (1985),  who  denies  the  possibility  of  a  development  of  thought  from  the  Iliad  to  the  Odyssey; 
according  to  him,  `The  difference  between  the  two  views  of  religion  is  too  fundamental  to  allow  such  an 
assumption'  (14),  and  the  poems  most  probably  represent  two  independent  but  contemporary  religious 
conceptions. 
21 1 
Homeric  Morality 
Morality  is  a  concept  of  elusive  and,  therefore,  highly  controversial  substance.  The 
vital  issue  regards  obviously  the  qualities  that  allow  an  act  to  be  termed  moral.  An 
exhaustive  enquiry  into  morality  would  certainly  demand  more  than  a  mere  examination  of 
the  criteria  upon  which  the  distinction  between  `moral'  and  its  opposite  may  be  effectively 
drawn,  for  the  question,  as  approached  by  philosophy  at  least,  involves  not  simply  the  act, 
but  the  motivation  behind  the  act  too.  The  problem  is  obviously  much  more  complex  than 
it  first  appears.  I  will  try  to  avoid  any  detailed  discussion  of  the  issues  that  do  not  pertain  to 
the  question  of  morality  in  Homer,  insisting  only  on  those  aspects  that  prove  of  great 
significance  for  our  understanding  of  the  Homeric  world. 
I  will  begin  with  a  basic  distinction  that  Papanoutsos  draws  in  his'H8IKrj  between 
two  uses  of  morality:  '  first  of  all,  morality  is  used  to  define  particular  phenomena  of  our 
consciousness;  thus,  moral  phenomena  form  a  distinct  field  or  function  of  our 
consciousness  to  be  distinguished  from  the  non-moral  fields  or  functions  of,  say,  aesthetic 
or  theoretical  phenomena.  In  the  second  use  of  morality  moral  deeds  (that  is  deeds  that 
accord  with  a  behavioural  norm)  are  distinguished  from  immoral  deeds  (that  is,  deeds 
against  a  behavioural  norm),  in  other  words  we  have  an  evaluation  in  qualitative  terms: 
moral/good  against  immoral/bad  -  an  evaluation  that  the  first  meaning  certainly  lacks.  A 
Papanoutsos  (1970)  367,  n  1. 
22 further  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  morality  and  ethics:  ethics  denote  the  behavioural 
norms  which  are  established  in  a  society  as  a  result  of  the  moral  function  of  our 
consciousness,  while  morality  as  an  evaluative  principle  develops  around  and  is  defined 
against  ethics  or  a  set  of  behavioural  norms;  as  a  consequence,  moral  evaluation  can  only 
be  relative,  determined  by  the  behavioural  norms  of  a  particular  society.  2 
Obviously,  if  we  thus  perceive  morality,  we  can  hardly  characterise  any  type  of 
society  as  amoral.  Homeric  morality  need  mean  nothing  more  than  the  ethics  or  code  of 
behaviour  that  forms  the  basis  of  Homeric  society,  and  this  particular  morality  inevitably 
implies  evaluation,  a  distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  which  functions  as  a  factor  that 
determines  and  at  times  limits  one's  behaviour.  In  other  words,  decisions  are  taken  and 
courses  of  actions  are  accomplished  on  the  basis  of  the  norms  required  by  ethics  and  in 
view  of  the  evaluation  that  is  anticipated  by  the  agent. 
There  is  a  danger  lurking  in  this  last  statement  that  the  conclusion  should  be  drawn 
that  morality  is  just  another  idea  subject  to  relativistic  definitions  or  approaches.  If  each 
society  has  its  own  principles  of  ethics  which  form  and  define  right  and  wrong,  or  moral 
and  immoral,  an  act  is  evaluated  not  against  an  abstract  idea  of  right  and  wrong,  but  rather 
against  the  particular  system  of  values  of  one  particular  society,  its  ethics,  which  provides 
its  own  definition  of  right  and  wrong  by  establishing  what  is  permitted  and  what  is 
forbidden.  Morality,  then,  is  largely  moulded  by  the  values  and  principles  of  each 
particular  society,  thus  assuming  a  particular  character  itself. 
2  The  distinction  between  ethics  and  morality,  or  between  a  descriptive  and  an  evaluative  function  of  the  term,  is 
certainly  a  logical  or  methodological  distinction  which  hardly  ever  has  an  application  in  real  life.  We  can 
describe  or  evaluate  the  ethics  of  a  society  as  observers,  yet  the  ethics  and  the  morality  of  this  society  itself  seem 
to  be  ultimately  one  and  the  same  thing.  This  almost  artificial  distinction  is  necessary,  if  we  are  to  understand  the 
difference  between  the  terms  'moral',  `non-moral',  `amoral'  and  `immoral'. 
23 This  is  indeed  true  to  a  certain  extent;  admitting  the  contrary  would  be  absurd,  to 
say  the  least.  However,  it  seems  that  the  similarities  between  different  societies  are  more, 
and  more  important  than  the  differences,  and  what  actually  hinders  the  perception  of  the 
similarities  is  not  the  difference  in  the  concepts  themselves,  but  the  difference  in  their 
expression.  3  What  is  worth  considering,  then,  is  whether  the  various  principles  and  ethical 
codes  of  different  societies  may  ultimately  be  reduced  to  one  basic  principle  common  to  all 
societies  and  essential  indeed  for  their  existence. 
It  is  more  than  obvious  that  morality  relates  to  society,  it  reflects  a  collective  end  of 
peaceful  and  advantageous  symbiosis.  Rules  are  set  and  codes  develop  in  order  that 
conflict  be  limited  to  the  minimum,  and,  in  an  ideal  society  at  least,  in  order  that  all 
members  of  society  be  equally  benefited.  Morality,  then,  both  as  a  code  of  ethics  and  as  the 
evaluation  of  behaviour,  inevitably  entails  limits  on  the  individual  for  the  sake  of  a  social 
whole,  and  ideally  this  would  signify  mutuality  in  the  relation  between  individuals.  Thus,  I 
would  come  to  the  conclusion  that  morality  corresponds  to  that  particular  behaviour  that 
takes  into  consideration,  either  consciously  or  subconsciously,  the  existing  limits  and 
boundaries  that  define  and  distinguish  my  from  your  vital  field  of  existence;  somehow,  it  is 
the  conditioning  of  my  absolute  freedom  of  action  through  the  acknowledgement  of  the 
existence  of  an  infinite  number  of  circles  in  the  world,  with  an  equally  infinite  number  of 
centres  and  peripheries,  each  circle  representing  the  vital  field  of  an  individual,  which  I  am 
3  By  difference  in  expression  I  do  not  mean  the  employment  of  different  words  for  what  is  basically  the 
same  concept;  rather  I  mean  that  each  society  seems  to  have  different  ways  of  imposing  and  sanctioning 
such  essential  concepts.  If,  as  I  shall  try  to  explain  soon,  morality  is  a  subconscious  social  mechanism  that 
aims  at  stability  and  prosperity,  this  is  doubtless  the  aim  of  all  societies,  whatever  the  sanctions  and  the 
means  they  employ  for  this  aim.  Even  in  a  totalitarian  state,  where  the  centralisation  of  power  seems  to 
imply  that  the  interest  of  one  person  defines  the  principles  to  be  followed  by  the  many,  as  long  as  the  many 
believe  in  those  principles  as  the  means  to  the  stability  and  prosperity  of  the  society,  and  follow  them 
willingly,  we  have  essentially  the  same  principle. 
24 neither  allowed  nor  willing  at  some  point  to  violate.  4  The  social  mechanisms  of 
sanctioning  such  a  behaviour  vary  according  to  the  structure  and  general  qualities  of  each 
society,  yet  whether  by  means  of  shame  or  guilt,  s  or  even  fear,  the  principle  that  is  most 
interesting  is  the  very  self-limitation  within  one's  defined  boundaries  and  the  avoidance  of 
an  offensive  intrusion  to  another's  marked  off  territory.  In  anticipation  of  what  will  follow, 
let  it  be  said  at  this  point  that,  inasmuch  as  a  decision  is  based,  consciously  or 
subconsciously,  on  such  principles,  as  indeed  it  has  to  be,  whether  by  obeying  them  or  by 
defying  them,  I  regard  it  as  a  moral  decision.  6 
Morality,  then,  is  first  of  all  the  limitation  of  the  individual  in  a  society  by 
means  of  a  behavioural  code  that  forms  the  society's  ethics,  and  it  is  also  the 
subsequent  evaluation  of  the  individual's  actions  according  to  his  degree  of  keeping 
within  the  proper  limits  as  defined  by  ethics.  In  either  case,  morality  seems  to 
constitute  a  condicio  sine  qua  non  for  the  very  existence  of  society,  the  absence  of 
which  entails  the  absence,  or  perhaps  the  dysfunction,  of  society  itself;  two  or  more 
entities  can  co-exist  only  after  a  mute,  conscious  or  subconscious,  consensus  to  moral 
limitation  and  co-operation,  and  this  consensus  inevitably  leads  to  the  gradual 
establishment  of  values  and  principles  against  which  an  act  will  be  evaluated.  This 
The  agent's  will  to  act  morally  is  related  to  the  issues  of  motivation  and  intentions,  which  will  be 
discussed  presently;  it  will  become  clear  that  even  when  it  is  supposedly  external  sanctions  of  propriety 
such  as  fear  or  shame  that  define  behaviour,  one  can  be  internally  motivated,  fear  or  shame  having  been 
integrated  into  one's  own  thinking  in  such  a  way  as  to  form  ultimately  a  personal  will. 
s  Shame  and  guilt  may  be  ultimately  very  close  as  regards  their  meaning,  yet  it  has  to  be  admitted  that  they 
have  been  used  in  a  rather  different  way  by  different  societies,  and  have  therefore  different  implications;  it 
is  on  the  grounds  of  this  difference  that  I  distinguish  the  two  here. 
6  According  to  this  approach  to  morality,  I  would  regard  as  immoral  the  behaviour  of  the  suitors  in  the  Odyssey, 
and  in  the  Iliad  Paris'  abduction  of  Helen,  Agamemnon's  arrogant  behaviour  in  general,  however  mitigated  this 
may  be  at  times  by  his  status  as  commander-in-chief  and  perhaps  also  Achilles'  obstinacy  or  rather  obsessive 
self-absorption,  although  it  is  expected,  if  not  demanded,  to  some  degree  by  the  very  code  of  Homeric  society. 
That  this  is  actually  more  than  my  own  personal  evaluation  of  the  heroes  can  easily  be  manifested  by  the  poems 
themselves:  the  evidence  is  both  the  negative  comments  occasionally  expressed  by  the  heroes,  and  the 
unfavourable  characterisation  offered  by  the  poet  himself.  Besides,  I  would  definitely  regard  as  immoral  most  of 
the  behaviour  of  the  gods  -  but  this  is  an  issue  of  a  much  more  complicated  nature,  which  will  be  discussed  in 
due  course. 
25 seems  to  be  the  essential  element  of  all  societies;  what  ultimately  and  fundamentally 
distinguishes  one  society  from  another  is  the  solution  each  one  provides  to  this 
rudimentary  problem  of  co-operation  and  co-existence  that  forms  the  basis  of  a  social 
constitution;  in  other  words,  the  values  that  a  society  employs  as  mechanisms  that  will 
limit  its  members  and  will  ensure  their  moral  behaviour,  their  adherence  to  its  code  of 
ethics. 
One  further  remark:  obviously,  I  do  not  purport  to  use  morality  as  indicative  of  a 
purely  internal  disposition,  according  to  which  the  agent  behaves  morally  out  of  a  genuine 
and  deeply  felt  concern  for  morality  per  se,  and  in  which  case  no  motivation  of  self-interest 
may  be  discemed;  7  consciously  avoiding  any  connection  of  morality  with  intentions  or 
motivation,  I  prefer  to  focus  on  the  act  itself  on  the  condition  that  it  presupposes  a 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  not  because  intentions  are  insignificant  in  any  respect, 
but  because  such  a  discussion  would  entail  a  sequence  of  thought  that  is  alien  to  Homeric 
man.  I  would  tend  to  believe  that  even  when  no  concern  for  morality  per  se  is  discerned, 
behaviour  can  still  be  seen  as  internally  motivated.  The  possibility  of  moral  behaviour 
exists  in  all  societies,  irrespectively  of  the  sanction  employed  in  order  that  moral  behaviour 
be  ensured.  I  take  this  to  be  an  essential  function  of  human  notional  or  emotional 
mechanisms.  Internal  or  external  motivation  is  difficult  to  distinguish  even  in  oneself,  and 
any  attempt  to  do  so  seems  to  lead  to  crude  generalisations  and  categorisations. 
To  come  to  the  poems,  according  to  what  has  been  said  up  to  now,  the 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong  should  be  drawn  against  a  set  of  principles  which 
7  The  idea  of  a  Kantian,  pure  morality,  which  is  supposed  to  eliminate  all  traces  of  self-interest  in  its 
pursuit  of  duty,  has  also  been  criticised  of  a  self-interested  motivation  by  Schopenhauer,  just  as  Plato's 
theory  of  virtue  has  been  accused  of  egoism;  see  Konstan  (1999)  6-8. 
26 would  define  the  limits  and  the  boundaries  of  each  member  of  the  social  group.  The 
principles  of  which  the  Homeric  code  of  behaviour  consists  are  basically  simple 
principles  of  everyday  life  present  in  most,  if  not  all  societies,  such  as  the  respect  that 
must  be  paid  to  the  gods  (A  48-49,503),  the  elder  (I  494-495),  the  priests  and  the  seers 
(A  23),  or  the  dead  (TT  456-457).  Or  they  can  be  principles  that  create  and  are  created  at 
the  same  time  by  the  special  character  of  the  period;  thus,  kingship  is  believed  to  be 
divinely  constituted  and  established,  closely  connected  with  Zeus  himself,  and 
therefore  never  questioned  (A  277-279,  B  196-197,204-206,198-99).  At&&,  in  such 
cases  a  feeling  of  respect  sometimes  connected  with  fear,  is  the  appropriate  behaviour 
towards  a  king,  whether  this  is  Agamemnon  whom  everybody  is  obliged  to  obey,  for  he 
is  ßaaIXEVTEpoc  (A  277-281-,  l  160-161),  or any  other  king  who  is  respected  and  obeyed 
by  his  own  people  (B  213-214;  M  310-312;  TT  269-272). 
Two  other  essential  features  of  Homeric  ethics  are  ixEo(a  -  supplication,  and 
gevia  -  hospitality,  or guest-friendship.  The  two  are  not  unrelated,  since  a  ýEivoc  can  be 
seen  as  an  k  -rrIc  and  an  hKE  can  easily  become  a  gEivoc.  Both,  moreover,  seem  to 
function  as  necessary  principles  in  an  age  of  instability  and  insecurity:  referring  to  an 
essentially  reciprocal  relation,  they  ensure  protection  for  both  parties  by  demanding 
adherence  to  a  series  of  almost  ritual  acts  and  behavioural  norms  of  mutual  respect.  8  As 
Gould  states,  regarding  Mom,  `it  is  a  game  of  life  and  death'.  9  The  sanction  offered 
through  the  connection  of  both  principles  to  Zeus  seems  therefore  to  be  explained:  his 
concern  for  and  protection  of  the  principles  operate  as  the  necessary  means  that  would 
check  a  possible  violation.  10 
g  For  the  ritual  accompanying  iKEOia,  see  Gould  (1973)  75-82. 
9  Gould  (1973)  81. 
10  The  relation  between  Zeus  and  the  principles  of  iKSaia  and  fevia  is  discussed  in  pp.  189,193. 
27 `IKEQia  does  not  form  a  major  issue  in  the  Iliad.  The  references  to  it  certainly 
exist,  but  they  are  never  extensive,  nor  do  they  have  any  particular  function  in  the  main 
plot.  "  In  the  Odyssey,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  essential  part  of  the  poem's 
perspective:  the  hero  often  appears  in  the  capacity  of  an  iKirr  c,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  violation  of  the  principle  is  one  of  the  main  defects  in  the  behaviour  of  the  suitors. 
Along  with  the  emphasis  on  iKEQia,  and  in  line  with  its  less  heroic  viewpoint,  the  poem 
finds  the  opportunity  quite  often  to  underline  the  importance  of  a  proper  behaviour 
towards  beggars,  TrrcaXot,  people  who,  for  one  reason  or  another  are  found  on  the  verge 
of  non-existence.  12  Again,  this  forms  a  point  of  criticism  against  the  suitors,  further 
enhancing  the  impression  of  their  impropriety. 
=svia,  on  the  other  hand,  is  especially  relevant  to  the  plot  of  both  poems:  in  the 
Iliad  this  is  the  principle  that  Paris  violated  by  seducing  and  abducting  Helen  (f  351- 
54,  N  620-25).  The  result  of  Paris'  disregard  for  the  laws  of  ýEvia,  the  Trojan  war  itself, 
is  sufficient  proof  of  the  importance  the  institution  had  in  social  life.  In  its  noblest  form 
ýEvia  appears  in  the  Diomedes-Glaucus  episode  (Z  212-236);  in  its  basest,  in  Paris' 
behaviour  towards  Menelaus.  In  the  Odyssey,  as  already  noted,  the  suitors'  insolent 
conduct  in  Odysseus'  house  disregards  both  their  rights  and  their  obligations  as  g 
. 
ivot, 
and  this  neglect  of  the  socially  accepted  norm  inevitably  results  in  their  destruction. 
The  contrast  to  this  behaviour  is  created  by  the  reference  to  Eumaeus'  way  of  observing 
the  rules  of  gevia,  while  another  couple  that  causes  a  similar  antithesis  and  tension  is 
Polyphemus  and  the  Phaeacians. 
11  Gould  (1973:  80)  observes  that  of  the  thirty-five  references  to  supplication  in  the  poems,  ten  are 
obviously  made  to  an  unsuccessful  supplication;  however,  he  opposes  the  view  expressed  by  Dodds 
(1951:  32)  that  in  the  Iliad  suppliants  are  never  spared  (80,  n  38).  As  will  become  clear  later  on,  Zeus's 
role  as'  IKrTrjoioc  is  suppressed  in  the  poem;  see  Dodds  (ibid.  ). 
12  See  Adkins  (1960b)  24f. 
28 "OpKOC,  oath-taking,  is  equally  important  for  the  code  and  is  also  protected  by 
Zeus.  According  to  Burkert,  this  is  `the  one  place  where  religion,  morality  and  law 
definitely  met'.  13  An  oath  in  the  Homeric  world  may  concern  anything;  it  can  refer  to 
the  Greeks'  obligation  to  help  the  Atreidai  (B  186-188),  or  to  the  companions'  oath  not 
to  harm  Helios'  cattle.  Of  interest  is  the  case  of  f  268-301,  when  Greeks  and  Trojans 
take  an  oath  just  before  the  duel  between  Menelaus  and  Paris;  the  oath  seems  to  take 
the  form  of  an  informal  pact:  if  Menelaus  wins,  the  Greeks  will  take  back  Helen  and  all 
the  royal  property  that  Paris  took  away  with  him;  if  Paris  wins,  Helen  will  stay  with 
him,  and  the  Greeks  will  leave;  in  this  case  the  oath  binds  both  sides  to  comply  with  the 
demands  of  this  agreement.  The  importance  of  the  principle  lies  with  its  effectiveness 
in  an  age  of  orality;  as  Burkert  goes  on  to  explain  `oath  is  a  phenomenon  of  language 
which  owes  its  existence  in  the  very  insufficiency  of  language.  The  weakness  of  the 
word  is  the  possibility  -  the  likelihood  -  of  lying,  of  fraud  and  trickery.  The  purpose  of 
oath,  sworn  by  responsible  partners,  has  always  been  to  exclude  lying  in  all  its 
forms...  In  other  words,  taking  an  oath  means  a  radical  "reduction  of  complexity",  in  an 
effort  to  establish  univocal  meanings  and  create  a  world  of  sense  that  is  dependable, 
with  clear  distinctions  between  true  and  false,  right  and  wrong,  friend  and  adversary, 
ally  and  foe'.  14 
The  code  is  certainly  applicable  to  all  social  strata,  yet  we  seem  to  have  the 
perspective  of  the  nobility,  of  the  upper  class  of  the  ayaGoi,  on  which  both  poems 
focus.  The  Iliad  is  exclusively  concerned  with  this  upper  class,  the  only  glimpse  of  the 
lower  classes  being  taken  during  the  Thersites  episode  (B  211-77),  where  we  hear  of  the 
13  Burkert  (1996)  169. 
14  Burkert  (1996)  169f;  cf.  Havelock  (1978)  23. 
29 ugly  and  hopeless  warrior,  the  anti-hero  who  knows  not  how  to  behave  or  speak,  being 
thus  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  great  figures  of  the  poem.  The  Odyssey  finds  the 
opportunity  for  a  depiction  of  the  lower  social  strata  more  often;  either  through 
Odysseus'  false  tales  or  through  the  presentation  of  his  servants,  faithful  or  not,  we 
enter  a  world  that  is  totally  absent  from  the  older  poem.  is  Even  so,  the  Odyssey  is  still 
largely  concerned  with  the  works  and  days  of  the  upper  class,  its  code  of  excellence 
and  its  noble  status  in  society  and  history. 
The  dyaOoi  are  a  group  of  people  distinguished  for  their  äps-nj,  which  means 
their  noble  birth  and  wealth,  and  consequently  their  high  social  status  and  power  -  in 
one  word,  for  their  success.  Beauty  and  wisdom  are  naturally  ascribed  to  this  upper 
class,  as  it  often  happens  that  social  classes  are  seen  in  black  and  white.  16  Similarly, 
extreme  bravery  and  martial  prowess  are  unquestionable  features  of  the  nobles. 
Obviously,  there  is  a  degree  of  idealisation  and  a  tinge  of  poetic  exaggeration,  as 
happens  always  in  the  case  of  heroic  or  epic  poetry.  '7  The  characters  of  the  poems 
belong  to  a  different  age  from  that  of  the  poet  and  his  audience,  their  feats  are  of 
11  1  am  certainly  referring  at  this  point  to  the  main  plot  of  the  poem;  for  references  to  the  everyday  life  of 
the  poet's  own  age  are  found  in  the  similes,  which  offer  the  view  of  a  world  which  is  largely  different  from 
that  of  the  heroes,  and  in  the  scenes  depicted  on  the  Shield  of  Achilles  (1  483-608).  For  similes  as 
referring  to  the  poet's  age  see  G.  P.  Shipp,  Studies  in  the  Language  of  Homer  (Cambridge  1972,  second 
edition). 
16  In  this  light,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Thersites  is  distinguished  for  his  unpleasant  looks  (B  216-19).  It  is 
worth  noting,  however,  that  the  Odyssey  avoids  such  generalisations:  Eumaeus,  Philebus  and  Eurycleia, 
the  hero's  faithful  servants,  are  seen  in  a  most  favourable  way,  and  the  different  emphasis  that  each  poem 
puts  on  the  merits  of  the  upper  class  is  certainly  worthy  of  consideration.  The  differences  between  the  two 
poems  will  be  discussed  later  on;  here,  it  suffices  to  note  that  the  Odyssey  presents  us  with  a  more  detailed 
and  therefore  more  realistic  image  of  society,  even  if  this  entails  a  possible  departure  from  traditional 
standards. 
"According  to  Hainsworth  (1991:  51.  ),  one  of  the  essential  elements  of  heroic  poetry,  from  which  epic 
poetry  derives,  is  eulogy;  `for  eulogy  implies  the  hero  whose  successful  struggles  are  celebrated,  and  none 
of  the  primary  epics  lacks  a  hero...  Naturally  they  [i.  e.  the  heroes]  are  supermen,  and  they  may  possess 
supernatural  powers  or  supernatural  weapons;  but  in  what  may  be  called  his  purest  form  the  hero 
dispenses  with  such  aid...  The  greatness  of  the  deed  may  then  be  made  to  lie  in  its  daring 
....  or  the 
greatness  may  be  altogether  the  hero's,  the  deed  itself  being  unexceptional,  as  when  heroes  who  know 
they  are  doomed  face  death  unflinchingly'.  See  Introduction,  p.  13. 
in incomparable  quality,  thus  justifying  their  claim  to  dpvM'  and  consequently  their  claim 
to  the  realm  of  `heroes'. 
Still,  however  fictitious  this  reality  or  poetic  the  embellishment  of  the  heroes' 
true  nature,  there  seems  to  exist  some  nucleus  of  truth  behind  such  qualities  as  bravery 
and  prowess;  for  they  must  have  been  historically  founded  in  the  fact  that  in  times  of 
war  and  strife  it  was  the  wealthy  and  noble,  with  their  martial  education  and  material 
support,  who  could  mainly  defend  their  people  and  their  rights.  Quite  often  in  the  text 
we  hear  of  a  leader's  responsibility  for  his  subjects  (M  310-321,  _  86-87,1  101-106, 
128-129),  which  responsibility  is  both  an  obligation  and  a  matter  of  Tiurj.  The  nobles 
enjoy  the  privileges  of  their  status  at  the  cost  of  their  fighting  and  defending  their 
subjects  -  or  at  least  that  is  what  they  should  do.  Hainsworth,  commenting  on 
Sarpedon's  words  at  M  310-32  1,  where  Sarpedon  stresses  the  obligation  he  has  towards 
his  people,  finds  that  `these  famous  verses  constitute  the  clearest  statement  in  the  Iliad 
of  the  imperatives  that  govern  heroic  life  and  their  justification.  It  is,  as  Sarpedon  puts 
it,  a  kind  of  social  contract;  valour  in  exchange  for  honour...  Honour  comes  first,  for 
only  the  founders  of  the  dynasties  gained  their  throne  by  first  showing  valour  (like 
Bellerophon,  6.171-195);  their  successors  inherited  their  status,  and  might,  as  here, 
have  to  remind  themselves  of  that  obligation  that  it  entailed'.  18 
18  Hainsworth  (1993)  ad  loc.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  by  the  time  of  the  poet's  age  the  justification  of  the 
nobles'  high  status  and  their  subsequent  Tip6  no  longer  exist;  the  upper  class of  the  eighth  century  has 
inherited  both  wealth  and  power,  and  what  was  originally  an  impetus  for  more  power  and  success,  and 
thereupon  more  security,  has  now  become  a  moral  obligation.  More  important,  one  should  bear  in  mind 
that  although  the  poems  supposedly  reflect  a  distant  and  glorious  past,  they  are  intended  for  an  audience 
which  interpreted  the  plot  most  probably  according  to  its  own  contemporary  perception;  the  heroic 
principles  must  have  been  accommodated  in  some  way  to  the  ideas  of  the  emerging  rröAit.  Besides,  as 
Havelock  rightly  observes,  the  poet  himself  is  based  on  assumptions  about  the  past  and  archaisms  rather 
than  on  reminiscence  and  certain  knowledge,  which  often  accounts  for  the  co-existence  of  incompatible 
elements  in  the  poems. 
31 'Apsrrj  and  äyaOoc,  the  terms  used  in  later  Greek  to  denote  internal,  moral 
qualities,  are  applied  in  Homer  exclusively  to  external  merit  and  success.  19  The  äpEtri  of  a 
man  is  certainly  different  from  that  of  a  woman,  for  each  one  has  to  prove  effective  and 
successful  in  different  fields  of  social  life,  a  point  which  makes  clear  the  rather  flexible 
meaning  of  the  concept  implied.  Moreover,  it  would  appear  that  one's  dpsrrj  is  not  an 
unquestionable  or unchanging  characteristic  of  his,  but  it  may  be  easily  diminished,  and 
under  this  constant  threat  the  preoccupation  and  obsession  with  success  and  material  gain 
by  competitive  means  is  expected  and  justified.  Ttp4,  which  seems  to  refer  to  the  reflection 
of  one's  status  onto  society,  becomes  the  most  crucial  element  of  one's  identity  and 
consequently  the  point  on  which  all  actions  seem  to  focus.  In  this  light,  the  heroes' 
preoccupation  with  public  opinion,  6ijpou  4ä-nc,  and  the  extremely  important  role  of 
ai&Sc  in  Homeric  thought,  seem  to  make  sense. 
Competition  is  a  very  important  element  in  the  life  of  the  dyaeöc,  explained  by 
Adkins  on  the  grounds  of  the  Homeric  world's  organisation  around  the  oiKOc:  20  the 
conditions  of  life  in  a  society  structured  in  separate  olKOl  make  it  necessary  that  material 
success  be  especially  valued;  `time  is  a  necessary  condition  of  life  in  Homer,  in  the  most 
literal  sense  of  the  words';  21  the  apparent  obsession  of  the  Homeric  heroes  with  their  social 
and  financial  status  is  only  the  result  of  a  world  which  lacks  the  social  or  political 
organisation  that  would  provide  stability,  a  world  of  constant  anxiety  and  insecurity. 
19  Adkins  (1960a:  passim)  believes  that  the  terms  retain  some  of  their  original  meaning  in  later  ages  as 
well.  The  etymology  of  both  words  remains  up  to  now  obscure  and  not  particularly  helpful.  A  relation 
between  äpe-rrj  and  Ares,  the  god  of  war,  even  if  not  accurate,  seems  to  suggest,  however,  the 
connotations  of  the  word  and  the  way  it  was  perceived  by  the  Greeks.  As  Palmer  (1950:  150)  observes  `A 
word  has  two  aspects:  sound  and  meaning',  and  etymology  based  on  phonetic  rather  than  semantic 
resemblance  between  words  was  often  the  case  among  ancient  Greeks,  cf.  Pl.  Phaed  99e. 
20  Adkins  (1960b)  23. 
21  Adkins  (1960b)  25. 
32 Competition  is  necessary  for  the  individual,  and  through  him  for  his  o'[xoc,  if  they  are  to 
survive.  22 
This  observation  has  been  reduced  by  Adkins  into  a  rather  simplistic  scheme 
that  can  supposedly  explain  the  reason  why  we  cannot,  and  therefore  should  not,  talk  of 
moral  responsibility  in  the  Homeric  world.  If  competition  is  necessary  for  survival  in 
the  Homeric  world,  and  if,  consequently,  it  is  always  the  stimulus  for  action,  it  is 
inevitable  that  the  quieter  values  of  Homeric  ethics  are  not  similarly  appreciated  or 
acknowledged.  The  preoccupation  of  the  heroes  with  their  personal  äpsTrj  and  Tlpr 
appears  to  diminish  the  importance  of  internal  values,  which  do  not  always  prove  as 
effective  with  regard  to  the  establishment  of  one's  status.  Reciprocity  and  the  principle 
of  do  ut  des  are  decisive  for  the  relationship  between  individuals:  TI  p4  demands  TI  P4  in 
return,  and  an  offence  leads  to  a  counter-offence,  not  out  of  a  concern  for  justice,  but 
out  of  a  concern  for  one's  status,  which  is  thus  confirmed  and  acknowledged.  23  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  results  are  often  more  important  than  intentions,  for  it  is  on 
results  that  one's  TU.  uj  and  status  can  be  based.  This  line  of  thought  results  in  the  rather 
sharp  distinction  between  competitive  and  co-operative  values,  a  polarity  which 
corresponds  to  the  Homeric  reality  only  partly.  This  is  also  the  point  at  which 
philosophy's  distinction  between  different  types  of  motivation  becomes  relevant,  and 
22  This  organisation  corresponds  to  the  world  of  the  heroes  rather  than  to  that  of  the  poet's  age;  however 
intuitive  the  poet  and  his  audience,  it  has  to  be  accepted  that  the  narration  must  have  been  seen,  to  a  great 
extent,  in  the  light  of  the  conditions  of  more  recent  times,  since  a  work  of  literature  is  often 
accommodated  to  the  audience's  own  perception  of  life;  see  p.  31,  n.  18.  Even  so,  the  following 
discussion  on  äpenI  and  Tturj  will  not  be  affected;  still,  it  is  worth  noting  that,  as  soon  as  the  rroaic 
emerges,  the  demands  on  the  individual  must  have  been  more,  and  more  intense,  slightly  modifying  the 
way  in  which  äpETrl  and  TIpil  were  perceived. 
23  When  Achilles  re-enters  the  war,  after  Patroclus'  death,  his  decision  resulted  from  an  impulse  almost, 
his  need  to  take  revenge  and  alleviate  in  this  way  his  pain  and  his  sense  of  responsibility,  the  quarrel  with 
Agamemnon  seems  now  trivial,  almost  nonsensical,  yet  the  reconciliation  has  to  be  conducted  and  the 
offering  of  gifts  is  a  necessary  part  of  it.  For  the  Tip4  both  of  Achilles  and  Agamemnon  is  affected  after  all 
by  this  apparently  formal  act. 
33 Homeric  ethics  appear  to  lack  the  qualifications  that  would  allow  us  to  talk  of  morality 
-  and  the  point  at  which  our  intellectual  memory  proves  dysfunctional  and  misleading. 
Before  I  proceed,  let  me  repeat  that,  as  long  as  an  action  presupposes  a 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  I  would  regard  it  as  a  moral  action,  indicative  of 
the  moral  function  of  human  consciousness;  the  fact  that  the  heroes  are  presented  as 
capable  of  deciding  a  course  of  action  and  behaving  accordingly  is,  I  believe,  sufficient 
proof  of  their  being  moral  agents;  for  the  moral  function  of  our  consciousness  is  after 
all  the  capacity  to  evaluate  a  situation  and  act  upon  a  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong.  24  When  seen  against  the  code  of  ethics  of  Homeric  society,  such  an  action  can 
be  moral  or  immoral,  it  can,  that  is,  be  in  accord  with  the  code  or  it  can  violate  it.  A 
further  distinction  may  be  drawn  between  a  mistake  and  a  moral  error,  although  this  is 
a  very  fine  distinction  indeed,  relating  to  the  motivation  of  an  act  and  the  degree  of 
consciousness  when  perpetrating  a  violation;  the  problem  in  this  case  is  that  mistake 
and  moral  error  can  actually  be  fused,  since  motivation  is  not  always  easy  to  define 
even  in  oneself. 
Adkins's  distinction  obviously  presupposes  an  entirely  different  perception  of 
morality,  which  demands  that  morality  is  not  only  a  matter  of  distinguishing  right  from 
wrong  according  to  the  principles  of  a  particular  code  of  ethics,  but  rather  a  matter  of 
acting  in  accord  with  these  principles  out  of  a  particular  type  of  motivation;  an  act 
which  is  believed  to  comply  with  the  values  and  principles  of  a  society  can  be  termed 
moral  only  as  long  as  it  is  motivated  by  a  pure  and  disinterested  concern  for  morality 
24  Obviously,  I  would  not  agree  with  Snell's  conclusions  that  Homeric  man  lacks  self-consciousness  when 
making  decisions;  apart  from  the  fact  that  Snell's  approach  to  the  Greek  language  seems  unfair,  if  not 
absurd,  it  is  the  assumption  that  a  world  which  is  innocent  of  an  advanced  philosophical  terminology 
should  also  be  ignorant  of  what  I  would  regard  as  essential  qualities  of  human  behaviour,  that  is  most 
puzzling  and  frustrating.  See  Lesky  (1961),  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  9f.,  Gaskin  (1990),  Williams  (1994)  21ff. 
34 per  se,  and  not  if  caused  by  a  self-interested  calculation  of  a  beneficent  result,  by 
prudence,  fear,  or  shame.  25  Not  surprisingly,  Adkins  finds  no  elements  in  the  code  of 
Homeric  values  that  would  support  such  a  morality,  for  it  can  certainly  not  be  denied 
that  any  conceptualised  or  internalised  idea  of  an  abstract  notion  of  morality  is  simply 
absent  from  the  poems. 
I  would  certainly  not  regard  as  illegitimate  an  approach  which  aims  at 
underlining  the  differences  between  two,  or  more,  discrete  ideological  systems;  quite 
the  contrary,  they  are  of  great  importance  and  help  in  our  understanding  of  the  fine 
nuances  of  concepts  which  account  for  the  distinct  ways  in  which  each  society  evolves 
and  the  mechanisms,  social,  political  or  religious,  that  it  develops.  However,  Adkins's 
conclusions  go  too  far:  for  him,  excessive  competition,  and  along  with  it  excessive 
concern  for  public  opinion,  &j  you  4  dTtc,  create  a  nexus  of  values  that  do  not  allow  the 
development  of  the  idea  of  disinterested  action,  and  consequently  the  idea  of  moral 
responsibility;  admitting  that  Homeric  society  does  not  share  our  own  perception  of 
morality,  or  that  it  is  not  aware  of  a  notion  of  transcendental  morality  which  would  be 
more  important  than  success,  is  one  thing,  denying  to  it  morality  altogether  and  the 
ability  to  perceive  the  idea  of  moral  responsibility  is  another;  the  generalisation  seems 
too  crude  indeed,  and  too  unfair  both  to  the  Homeric  world  and  to  the  Homeric  poems. 
More  important,  it  would  seem  that  the  differences  are  not  after  all  so  sharp  as  it  seems 
at  first  sight;  for  the  ideas  which  supposedly  prevent  the  development  of  moral  thought, 
25  Gagarin  (1987:  288)  defines  morality  as  the  'disinterested  concern  for  others',  a  definition  which  is 
obviously  the  result  of  more  recent  philosophical  speculation  and  can  hardly  have  an  application  in  the 
Homeric  poems;  not  surprisingly,  he  finds  only  one  example  of  moral  behaviour  in  the  poems,  the  attitude 
of  the  Phaeacians  towards  Odysseus  (ibid.  );  he  then  proceeds  to  distinguish  offences  in  the  Homeric  world 
into  legal,  religious  and  moral:  moral  offences,  as  well  as  moral  behaviour,  are  possible  only  in  relations 
which  are  not  at  all  defined  by  self-interest,  that  is  relations  towards  guests,  suppliants  and  beggars 
(290f.  ).  By  thus  stressing  the  importance  of  disinterested  motivation,  Gagarin  fails  to  see  that  self-interest 
does  not  necessarily  imply  extreme  and  utter  selfishness,  even  if  this  is  the  way  we  usually  perceive  the 
term;  all  actions  can  be  reduced  to  some  motive  of  self-interest  in  one  way  or  another,  even  the  concern 
for  pure  morality;  see  p.  26,  n.  7. 
35 such  as  competitiveness  or  shame,  and  the  subsequent  concern  for  results,  are  indeed 
ideas  that  imply  more  than  a  vain  obsession  with  success  and  good  repute. 
No  one  can  deny  the  importance  of  competition  and  success  in  the  world  of  the 
Homeric  poems;  nor  can  it  be  doubted  that  moral  qualities  of  any  kind  are  not 
sufficient  a  qualification  for  a  hero  to  attain  success  or  status.  'ApeTrj  denotes  the 
external  qualities  of  the  upper  class,  and  is  therefore  evocative  of  success  and  status; 
competitive  excellences  are  necessary  if  the  established  order  of  social  stratification  is 
to  be  perpetuated,  and  in  this  way  dps  rij  does  not  always  or  strictly  depend  on 
adherence  to  this  code,  which  is  after  all  relevant  to  all  social  strata.  26  This  entails  that 
morality  is  not  the  basis  of  the  upper  class  -  at  least  not  necessarily,  and  certainly  not  at 
all  surprisingly.  If  the  dyaOof  enjoy  the  privilege  of  great  nurj,  they  do  so  because  of 
their  effectiveness  in  society,  as  this  becomes  evident  in  the  results  of  their  actions. 
Morality  or  compliance  with  the  code  may  prove  beneficial  for  their  status,  but  it  may 
also  be  in  conflict  with  the  demands  of  dpETrj,  in  which  case  the  heroes  usually  opt  for 
the  latter.  27  Accordingly,  their  status  is  not  in  the  least  affected  by  their  occasional 
moral  inadequacy:  as  in  most  societies,  the  upper  class  retains  its  status  irrespectively 
of  its  merit  in  moral  terms.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  Homeric  ethics  do  not 
necessarily  owe  their  importance  to  their  effectiveness  in  competitive  terms. 
26  The  support  for  this  statement  certainly  exists  only  in  the  Odyssey,  where  Eumaeus  and  Eurycleia  are 
examples  of  the  ethics  of  the  lower  classes,  which  prove  after  all  to  be  similar,  in  principle  at  least,  to  that 
of  the  upper  classes.  One  could  also  think  of  Odysseus  during  the  adventures,  in  which  case  he  is  not  the 
glorious  king  of  Ithaca,  but  merely  a  nameless  wanderer,  a  suppliant  with  no  rt  nj.  Even  more  important, 
however,  appears  to  be  the  support  provided  by  Hesiod,  who  defends  this  very  morality,  distinguishing  it 
from  the  class  of  the  ayaOot. 
27  Thus,  Agamemnon  refuses  to  give  Chryseis  back  to  her  father,  disregarding  his  position  both  as  a  priest 
and  as  a  suppliant,  for  the  sake  of  his  own  apaTrj  and  Tiutj. 
36 At  the  same  time,  the  poems  lack  a  transparent  moral  terminology  that  would 
easily  justify  a  discussion  on  Homeric  morality;  one  feels  at  a  loss,  when  looking  for 
the  terms  or  the  expressions  that  would  seem  to  support  the  idea.  However,  the  absence 
of  terms  that  can  be  readily  recognised  as  moral  does  not  necessarily  entail  a  respective 
absence  of  the  notions;  and  as  I  have  already  noted  (26),  1  would  regard  that  evaluation 
of  a  situation  on  a  moral  basis,  and  subsequent  determination,  are  essential  mechanisms 
of  human  behaviour  that  cannot  be  denied  to  Homeric  society  on  the  grounds  of  its 
non-elaborate  philosophical  thought  and  language.  Adkins's  lexical  approach  of  the 
texts  has  met  with  the  scepticism  and  criticism  of  scholars,  who  have  tried  to  propose 
instead  a  less  inflexible  and  uncompromising  interpretation  that  would  rely  on  a  more 
overall  examination  of  the  Homeric  terms  that  are  evocative  of  moral  evaluation  or 
appreciation.  28  Considering  that,  I  will  avoid  discussing  Adkins's  theses  in  extenso; 
what  I  would  rather  do  here  is  examine  briefly  three  points  which,  whether  or not  seen 
in  relation  to  Adkins,  are  certainly  important  for  our  appreciation  of  the  Homeric  mode 
of  thinking  about  morality:  the  ideas  of  Tturj  and  ai&k,  and  the  distinction  between 
intentions  and  results. 
First  of  all  Tiprj.  As  noted  (32),  Tiprj  is  the  projection  of  one's  äpsrrj  onto  society; 
in  other  words,  one's  Tiurj  is  proportionate  to  one's  own  dpetrj  and  competing  for  dps  nj 
means  competing  for  TI11j.  29  Now,  Adkins  sees  the  term  in  the  light  of  the  highly 
competitive  character  of  Homeric  society;  he  first  of  all  observes  that  the  most 
28  See  Long  (1970)  and  Dover  (1983),  and  in  most  recent  literature  Cairns  (1993a)  50ff,  (1993b)  and 
Williams  (1994). 
29  Not  all  members  of  Homeric  society  have  the  same  degree  of  TI  P4;  the  more  powerful  seem  to  have 
more  TI  P4  than  the  less  so,  and  this  is  certainly  an  element  that  seems  to  support  Adkins's  thesis  that  Tip4 
should  be  seen  basically  in  terms  of  material  status.  The  gods  are  believed  to  have  more  Ttpt  than  anyone 
else,  as  well  as  more  dpETj  and  more  ßin  (see  1498)  and  this  would  lead  us  to  the  assumption  that  Tipq 
is  after  all  the  degree  of  honour  that  one  enjoys  as  the  expected  consequence  of  one's  position  in  society, 
in  fact  in  any  society.  Power  leads  to  honour,  the  two  being  inextricably  linked.  Adkins's  emphasis  on  one 
only  aspect  of  Tiurj  inevitably  makes  him  disregard  the  whole  for  the  sake  of  the  part. 
37 powerful  term  of  commendation  in  Homeric  society  is  dpETrj,  and  along  with  it  words 
which  are  found  mostly  in  competitive  contexts,  such  as  dyaOöc,  Eo6Xöc  and  XpnOT6C, 
dpE  vwv  and  ßEXTiwv,  apeivoc  and  (3EXrioroc;  30  the  most  powerful  word  of  disapproval 
on  the  other  hand  is  believed  to  be  aio  pöv,  a  word  which  `is  never  used  to  decry 
injustice  in  Homer'  . 
31  Having  set  these  axiomatic  principles,  Adkins  sees  Tiµnj  mainly 
in  its  competitive  and  material  aspect:  `Let  us  take  ...  the  man  who  has  an  oikos  - 
house,  land,  flocks,  goods,  chattels  and  dependants.  Since  Homeric  man  does  not  think 
abstractly,  these  things  are  his  time.  He  has  not  these  things  and  a  position  in  society: 
these  things  are  his  position  in  society;  and  the  fact  that  the  Homeric  hero  must  defend 
them  for  himself  readily  explains  the  emotive  charge  which  the  word  time  possesses  for 
him'  32 
Seen  against  Adkins's  view,  Lloyd-Jones'  interpretation  seems  indeed  more 
sober;  Tiurj  is  now  `honour'  and  as  such  it  is  more  important  than  the  material  gain  or 
loss  that  an  offence  may  entail;  `concern  over  property,  even  human  property,  would 
hardly  have  troubled  the  antagonists  so  much  were  it  not  that  in  their  society  one's 
share  in  booty  reflected  one's  degree  of  time.  Their  [Agamemnon's  and  Achilles'] 
quarrel  is  over  time  and  only  secondarily  over  property'.  33  Somehow,  it  appears  that  in 
this  way  Tiurj  is  not  totally  identified  with  äpsnj,  although  it  is  still  closely  related  to  it; 
the  fine  difference  between  the  two  views  seems  to  lie  with  the  fact  that  Lloyd-Jones' 
approach  seems  to  make  rather  clear  that  an  offence  relates  to  one's  -nurj  more  than  to 
30  Adkins  (1960a)  30. 
31  Adkins  (1960b)  31.  As  Cairns  (1993a:  59)  observes,  the  word  appears  only  three  times  in  the  Iliad,  in  all 
three  of  them  referring  to  the  `return  from  a  military  enterprise  with  nothing  to  show  for  it',  a 
characteristic  example  of  the  `quasi-aesthetic  concept  of  appropriateness'  of  Homeric  thought  (54);  see 
Long  (1970);  Adkins's  assumption  for  the  importance  of  the  term,  then,  seems  to  rely  on  the  prior  thesis 
of  competitiveness,  rather  than  on  the  actual  evidence  of  the  poems.  With  regard  to  this  'quasi-aesthetic 
concept',  see  Cairns  (1993a),  who  has  shown  that  it  can  be  indicative  of  moral  evaluation  and  action, 
despite  its  apparent  reference  to  a  superficial  sanction.  See  also  Dover  (1983)  46. 
32  Adkins  (1960b)  3lf. 
33  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  11. 
38 one's  apcrij,  and  this  entails  that  an  offence  is  not  seen  only  in  its  material  or  financial 
dimension,  not  even  only  in  its  social  dimension,  but  rather  as  an  essentially.  moral  issue 
that  corresponds  to  the  violation  of  limits. 
Ti 
. nj,  then,  is  not  merely  the  expression  of  a  hero's  rather  selfish  need  to 
establish  and  protect  the  limits  of  his  own  existence;  instead,  emphasis  should  be  put 
on  the  fact  that  by  acknowledging  the  TIplj  of  another,  a  hero  acknowledges  both  his  own 
limits  and  the  limits  of  the  other  person.  34  This  is  certainly  a  moral  issue,  both  because  it 
demands  respect  for  the  limits  of  another's  vital  field  of  existence,  and  because  it  demands 
adherence  to  the  code  of  ethics  as  defined  by  the  particular  society.  If  society  deems  it  right 
that  its  members  should  respect  one  another's  dpe  r,  j  and  Tlp4,  that  one's  personal  status, 
that  is,  should  be  largely  defined  by  one's  own  wealth,  by  no  means  should  this  be  taken  to 
entail  that  relations  of  4nXöirr  c  are  exclusively  conditioned  by  considerations  of  self- 
interest  and  gain,  while  the  violation  of  this  principle  is  not  only  a  slight  to  one's  status,  but 
an  act  of  impropriety,  a  lack  of  concern  for  righteousness  as  defined  and  prescribed  by 
society  itself.  The  fact  that  this  essentially  moral  principle  is  not  referred  to  as  such  in 
the  text  seems  to  be  of  little  importance  after  all,  while  the  fact  that  it  is  often 
diminished  into  a  vain  obsession  has  to  do  only  with  the  masterful  characterisation  that 
the  poet  is  capable  of  providing.  35 
34  See  Long  (1970)  137;  Cairns  (1993a)  13-14,87ff.,  (1993b)  161.  Tiutj,  therefore,  should  be  seen  as  the 
province,  more  or  less,  of  an  individual,  his  vital  field,  which  is  defined  by  his  position  and  status  in 
society;  this  is  an  idea  closely  related  to  the  concept  of  moira,  for  which  see  pp.  73-74;  cf  also  0  185ff, 
where  Poseidon  talks  of  the  apportionment  of  power  among  the  gods:  "Mao  -roc  b'  Ep  ioPE  PfiC  (189) 
corresponds  to  iaölopov  Kai  6Nn  rrETrpc  ii  vov  aiop  (209). 
's  The  fact  that  Agamemnon  seems  to  be  concerned  with  his  own  personal  aims  or  interests  more  than 
with  those  of  his  subjects  or  companions  is  in  total  harmony  with  the  characterisation  provided  by  the 
poet.  This  is  certainly  not  the  attitude  of  Sarpedon  or  Hector,  for  example.  There  is  a  plurality  of 
characters,  and  consequently  a  plurality  of  behavioural  responses  to  similar  situations,  and  this  is  what 
makes  conflict  possible  after  all.  See  Dover  (1983);  Cairns  (1993a:  71-83)  on  the  way  in  which  the  heroes' 
different  degree  of  sensitivity  towards  the  code  of  ethics  operates  in  the  Iliad;  for  as  he  rightly  observes 
(49),  'If  aidos  is  an  emotion,  then  its  occurrence  depends  on  the  disposition  of  the  individual  and  on  the 
particular  conditions  which  have  contributed  to  the  development  of  his  or  her  character,  and  so  we  need 
not  be  surprised  if  it  is  not  effective  in  every  individual  or  on  each  and  every  occasion'. 
39 All  violations  in  the  poems  are  referred  to  in  terms  of  Tturj,  or  rather  of  dTtuia; 
accordingly,  adherence  to  the  code  is  also  seen  in  terms  of  TI  nj.  When  behaving 
properly  to  guests  or  suppliants,  one  is  supposed  to  reaffirm  one's  own  Tturj  and 
acknowledge  at  the  same  time  the  Ttuij  of  another.  Violating  the  code  entails  dTINia  for 
the  patient,  but  not  for  the  agent;  however,  suffering  drtuia  makes  one  react  with  Tick, 
the  word  interpreted  most  commonly  as  revenge,  but  implying  actually  any  form  of 
reciprocity.  36  The  reciprocal  quality  of  Homeric  ethics  may  seem  indeed  superficial,  but  it 
corresponds  after  all  to  a  rudimentary  principle  of  morality  and  even  justice  itself.  The 
principle  of  do  ut  des  is  necessary  in  order  that  one's  offended  Tt  nj  be  restored,  but  this  is 
ultimately  a  presupposition  for  social  order  to  be  maintained.  The  principle  could  have 
negative  connotations  if  seen  in  the  context  of  a  system  of  pure  morality,  yet,  if  one 
could  avoid  such  lapses  into  a  more  recent  mode  of  thinking,  it  would  become  clear 
that  there  is  an  essentially  moral  principle  underlying  the  idea.  This  is  the  very 
principle  upon  which  the  human  way  of  perceiving  justice  seems  to  be  based,  even  if  in 
more  modem  legal  systems  it  is  after  all  concealed  by  a  sequence  of  thought  that  is 
supposedly  based  on  a  more  advanced  perception  of  morality.  The  agent  who 
acknowledges  one's  T1.  nj  acknowledges  the  limits  both  of  his  own  and  of  the  other 
person's  vital  field;  accordingly  the  violation  of  this  principle  is  the  violation  of  limits, 
and  such  an  action  causes  reaction  in  a  most  natural  way.  Morality  is  not  exactly 
goodness,  nor  is  it  certainly  love;  it  is  not  an  emotion,  although  it  may  ultimately  be 
conditioned  by  emotions. 
36  For  Tiaic  see  A  37-43,  B  258-90,  f  27-29,  Z  51-65,  A  138-42,0  133-35. 
40 Among  the  nobles  there  arise  relations  of  mutual  recognition  of  TI  P4,  or  relations  of 
4iMTrjc,  which  ensure  both  personal  status  and  social  stability.  Guest-friendship,  f  svia,  is 
an  expression  of  this  very  mutuality:  apart  from  a  good  disposition  towards  guests,  and 
thus  the  establishment  of  an  ever-lasting  friendship,  the  principle  also  implies  a 
reciprocal  relation,  sealed  by  the  exchange  of  gifts,  which  supports  the  dpsnj  and  Tiurj  of 
both  parties.  Through  this  relation  of  rights  and  obligations,  a  bond  is  perpetuated  for 
generations,  which  aims  at  the  security  of  one's  oOKOC.  The  power  of  this  idea  was  such 
that  it  `must  often  have  compelled  one  chieftain  to  take  up  arms  in  another's  quarrel'.  37 
It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  Greeks  decide  to  fight  against  the  Trojans:  by  doing  so,  they 
do  not  simply  establish  their  own  claim  to  dpszrj  and  -n  nj,  but  they  acknowledge  at  the 
same  time  the  äpsnj  and  Tiurj  of  Menelaus  and  Agamemnon  (A  158-160). 
More  important,  äriuia,  failure,  that  is,  to  properly  acknowledge  and  value 
one's  tiurj  may  have  the  least  desirable  results.  Both  poems  actually  evolve  around 
such  a  violation.  In  the  Iliad  the  dTiuia  of  Agamemnon  towards  Achilles  proves 
disastrous  for  Greeks  and  Trojans  alike,  while  at  the  same  time  the  motif  permeates  the 
poem  and  is  always  and  insistently  on  our  mind  because  of  the  ärnuia  of  Paris  towards 
Menelaus,  a  matter  that  after  nine  years  is  still  not  settled;  a  third  occurrence  of  the 
motif  opens  the  poem  in  a  remarkable  way:  the  dTiuia  of  Agamemnon  towards 
Chryses,  which  leads  to  the  conflict  between  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  both  as  a 
mechanism  of  structure  and  as  an  element  of  the  plot.  What  Menelaus,  Achilles  and 
Chryses  have  suffered  is  a  violation  of  their  Tuni,  which  was  not  properly  appreciated, 
37  Kirk  (1985)  on  A  154-56. 
41 and  which  they  now  demand  to  have  re-established.  38  The  Odyssey  also  presents  us 
with  a  case  of  dTiµia:  the  suitors'  excessive  behaviour  indicates  their  failure  to 
acknowledge  Odysseus'  TInj,  for  even  if  they  act  on  the  supposition  of  the  hero's 
death,  their  conduct  is  offensive  towards  the  whole  OOKOC,  violating  the  very  important 
principle  of  gw  a;  their  slaughter,  excessive  though  it  is  in  its  turn,  further  underlines 
the  importance  that  the  proper  recognition  of  Ti  urj  has  for  the  Homeric  world. 
It  would  appear  that  an  interpretation  of  Thurj  as  the  obsession  with  `honour'  and 
prestige  rather  than  with  material  gain  and  loss  seems  to  correspond  more  accurately  to 
the  complex  world  of  emotions  of  the  heroes,  forming  thus  the  material  upon  which  the 
conflict  necessary  for  the  plot  can  be  based.  True,  financial  gain  and  loss  can  prove 
important  enough  to  cause  an  expedition  to  Troy,  or  at  any  rate  a  quarrel  among  even 
the  closest  of  friends;  however,  this  is  not  a  focal  point  for  the  poet.  Achilles  is  not 
angry  for  the  loss  of  Briseis  herself,  even  if  this  is  certainly  a  cause  of  pain  for  him;  his 
anger  originates  in  his  amazement  almost  at  having  been  thus  insulted;  it  is  his  self- 
esteem  and  his  evaluation  of  himself  which  cause  his  excessively  self-assertive 
response,  just  as  is  the  case  with  Agamemnon's  excessive  pride.  As  for  Menelaus,  the 
poet  certainly  suppresses  the  economic  aspect  of  the  war  by  using  beautiful  Helen  as 
the  cause  and  the  end  of  the  expedition:  the  king  of  Sparta  contends  for  his  queen,  and 
only  secondarily  for  the  treasures  that  Paris  took  away  with  him.  In  a  similar  fashion 
Odysseus  contends  for  his  house  and  his  family,  and  it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  he 
38  It  is  interesting  that  once  the  order  is  reversed,  and  Achilles'  n  . nj  is  violated,  the  moment  comes  for  the 
hero  to  question  the  stability  and  credibility  of  the  traditional  code  of  behaviour  (I  316-322).  This  can  be 
seen  as  the  expected  reaction  of  a  man  who  insists  on  his  anger  rather  stubbornly,  but  it  also  forms  an 
essential  point  in  the  development  of  Achilles'  character:  when  the  hero  re-enters  the  war,  he  is  not  incited 
by  a  concern  for  his  status;  instead  it  is  the  pain  at  Patroclus'  loss  and  the  consequent  wish  for  revenge,  as 
well  as  a  sense  of  responsibility,  that  make  inertia  insufferable. 
42 kills  the  suitors  `for  the  sake  of  his  arete,  because  it  would  be  aischron  not  to  do  so',  39 
- 
with  aiaxpöv  implying  a  competitive  failure. 
The  support  for  such  an  interpretation  of  Tiurj  and,  consequently,  of  the  poems 
themselves,  can  be  found  in  the  use  of  üpp«  and  ai&k,  or  rather  dvaiSsirj,  which  are 
applied  in  order  to  describe  the  offences  relevant  to  the  plots.  Now,  Agamemnon's 
dTipta  towards  Achilles  is  referred  to  as  ü(3pic  only  three  times  in  the  poem  (A  203, 
214;  1368),  and  the  word  is  used  once  again  in  the  Iliad  in  relation  to  the  Trojans' 
offence  towards  Menelaus  (N  633);  in  the  Odyssey,  by  contrast,  üppic  is  a  regular 
accusation  against  the  suitors,  underlining,  along  with  äTaOBaXi11,  the  insolence  of  their 
behaviour.  The  limited  use  of  the  term  in  the  Iliad  is  certainly  worthy  of  note,  but  it  has 
to  do  with  the  poem's  complex  issue  of  right  and  wrong,  and  will  be  discussed  in  the 
next  chapter;  here,  it  suffices  to  note  that  the  term  is  used  by  the  wronged  party  of  a 
dispute,  40  it  relates,  that  is,  to  a  subjective  perception  of  a  situation,  not  in  the  sense 
that  this  is  a  mistaken  perception,  but  rather  in  the  sense  that  the  wrongdoer  does  not 
necessarily  perceive  the  situation  in  a  similar  fashion.  As  MacDowell  notes,  vßpIc  ,  is 
an  evaluative  word,  not  an  objective  one'.  41 
Since  an  evaluative  word,  ü(3p«  has  obviously  to  do  with  behaviour  and  moral 
responsibility;  the  reason  why  the  offended  heroes  retaliate,  and  indeed  they  are 
justified  to  a  large  extent  in  their  excessive  reaction  is  the  very  fact  that  the  moral 
39  Adkins  (1960a)  238;  contra  Dover  (1983)  45. 
40  A  214  belongs  to  Athena,  yet  it  is  obviously  the  view  of  someone  who  subscribes  to  Achilles'  reaction.  41  MacDowell  (1976)  21. 
43 responsibility  for  the  dispute  itself  lies  with  their  opponents.  42  There  has  indeed  been 
much  discussion  on  üßptc,  43  into  which  I  would  sooner  not  become  involved;  minor 
differences  apart,  all  accounts  seem  to  agree  that  üßpic  refers  to  excessive  behaviour. 
Another  characteristic  that  I  would  regard  as  important  is  the  relation  of  üßpic  to  TI  P4, 
or  rather  to  driuia,  since  excessive  behaviour  leads  to  disregard  of  another's  claim  to 
riurj.  44  It  is  exactly  in  this  light  that  we  should  understand  the  conflicts  that  form  the 
nucleus  of  each  poem,  and  it  is  certainly  in  this  way  that  TIpj  as  `honour'  seems  to 
make  sense.  The  issues  raised  are  moral,  since  they  refer  to  the  violation  of  proper 
limits;  more  important,  the  issues  are  seen  by  the  heroes  themselves  as  moral. 
True,  one  could  object  and  say  that  Achilles'  subjective  perception  of 
Agamemnon's  behaviour  does  not  justify  such  an  interpretation;  if  nothing  else,  it  is 
only  an  isolated  case,  which  is  in  conflict,  moreover,  with  the  attitude  of  the  other 
heroes,  who  express  no  negative  moral  judgement  against  Agamemnon  during  the 
quarrel;  45  besides,  as  Adkins  notes,  `Qua  more  powerful  chieftain...  he  [Agamemnon] 
has  a  claim  to  take  Briseis  if  he  will;  qua  leader  of  the  Greeks,  he  must  maintain 
himself  as  an  agathos....  The  one  is  permitted,  the  other  is  demanded,  by  this 
42  There  are  certainly  differences  in  the  motivation  of  Agamemnon,  Paris  and  the  suitors:  Agamemnon  and 
Paris  do  not  seem  to  have  the  intention  to  slight  a  particular  hero,  but  are  rather  driven  by  their  passions 
and  egotism;  Paris  is  frustratingly  indifferent  to  the  whole  situation,  while  Agamemnon,  on  the  other  hand, 
easily  lapses  into  a  personal  attack  against  Achilles,  his  arrogance  being  directed  in  this  way  towards  a 
specific  victim.  The  suitors'  case  is  different:  they  seem  to  be  consciously  disregarding  all  the  principles  of 
the  Homeric  code  for  the  sake  of  their  own  interest.  Whether  or  not  one  is  consciously  or  intentionally 
offending  or  wronging  another  is  of  no  importance  not  because  the  notion  of  moral  responsibility  is  absent 
form  the  Homeric  world,  but  because  in  real  life  such  a  distinction  is  of  no  great  importance;  see  Williams 
(1994:  63ff)  on  the  difference  between  moral  and  legal  responsibility.  Besides,  even  if  we  accept  that 
Agamemnon  actually  made  a  mistake,  which  he  later  tries  to  redress,  the  mistake  lies  in  his  miscalculation 
of  the  result  that  the  quarrel  would  have  on  the  war,  and  not  in  his  attitude  as  such  towards  Achilles;  being 
under  the  influence  of  passion,  he  seems  less  `guilty'  than  the  suitors,  but  he  is  actually  deeply  responsible 
for  the  dispute  and  this  is  the  view  expressed  by  other  heroes  too;  for  the  importance  of  self-control 
against  excess  see  1255-56,1107-10. 
￿  See  MacDowell  (1976),  Fisher  (1976)  and  (1979),  Cairns  (1996). 
44  Greene  (1944)  22;  Fisher  (1976)  183;  Cairns  (1996)  6ff.  See  Aristot.  Rhet.  1378b32:  ü(3pac  c  6e 
aTIWa. 
43  "Yßpic  appears  three  times  in  the  poem  in  relation  to  Agamemnon,  exactly  as  many  as  cx  c  xpov, 
Adkins's  most  powerful  term  of  disapproval,  see  p.  38,  n.  32. 
44 competitive  system  of  values'.  46  Agamemnon's  legitimate  claim,  according  to  the 
Homeric  code,  does  raise  a  complex  issue  relating  to  a  conflict  of  forces  or  demands 
within  the  code  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  hero's  character  on  the  other,  and  it  will 
have  to  be  postponed  for  the  moment,  for  it  pertains  to  the  whole  atmosphere  or 
perspective  of  the  poem.  I  will  briefly  discuss,  however,  the  apparent  silence  of  the 
other  Greeks,  for  it  will  take  us  to  the  most  interesting  role  of  ai&k  in  Homeric 
thought.  47 
First  of  all,  quarrels  or  affronts  can  be  quite  common  among  heroes;  48  as  is 
often  the  case  in  real  life  as  well,  the  disinterested  observers  do  not  necessarily  take 
sides  with  one  or  the  other  party;  most  often  they  simply  attempt  to  bring  over  a 
reconciliation  rather  than  put  a  stress  on  moral  responsibility,  since  a  statement  of  this 
nature  would  prove  disastrous;  it  usually  happens  that  both  parties  are  checked,  even  if 
only  mildly,  and  both  parties  are  equally  supported.  The  quarrel  between  Agamemnon 
and  Achilles  is  certainly  exceptional,  for  the  mere  reason  that  Achilles  enjoys  a 
uniquely  privileged  relation  to  Zeus,  which  leads  to  the  unpleasant  consequence  of 
defeat  and  the  fear  of  an  imminent  disaster.  It  would  seem  inevitable  that  the 
dimension  of  the  quarrel  be  sensed  only  post  eventum,  not  because  the  result  of 
Agamemnon's  behaviour  is  necessarily  more  important  than  his  intentions,  but  because 
the  result  of  Achilles'  wrath  begs  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  whole  issue.  For  the 
audience,  who  already  know  the  disaster  that  is  to  follow,  the  unfolding  of  the  quarrel 
46  Adkins  (1960a)  51. 
"I  focus  on  the  Iliad  at  this  point,  because  moral  issues  are  definitely  clearer  in  the  Odyssey,  however, 
the  principles  are  applicable  to  both  poems. 
48  A  typical  example  is  Y'  473-98,  the  quarrel  between  the  lesser  Aias  and  Idomeneus,  in  which  case 
Achilles  intervenes  and  prevents  the  dispute;  here  Achilles  is  a  third,  disinterested  party,  talking  of  a 
vipw  tc  that  the  heroes  themselves  would  feel,  were  some  one  else  involved  in  a  dispute,  and  he  obviously 
avoids  siding  with  one  or  the  other  hero. 
45 creates  a  suffocating  atmosphere  evocative  of  tragedy,  which  offers  in  this  way  a  highly 
perceptive,  almost  sophisticated,  view  of  human  life. 
A  quarrel  with  another  Greek  leader  can  certainly  not  be  a  threat  to 
Agamemnon's  aps  nj  or  Ti  1Tj;  losing  the  war,  on  the  other  hand,  is  obviously  a  threat, 
since  it  entails  a  diminution  of  power.  It  would  be  absurd  to  believe  that  the  two  could 
ever  have  the  same  impact  on  such  an  external  quality  as  status  or  prestige.  However, 
this  does  not  prevent  the  quarrel  from  raising  an  essentially  moral  issue.  Agamemnon 
violates  the  limits  of  Achilles'  Tlp4;  by  taking  Briseis  away  he  disregards  Achilles' 
claim  on  her,  which  implies  his  virtually  underrating  Achilles'  value.  As  noted  (43) 
Achilles  himself  talks  of  Agamemnon's  behaviour  in  terms  of  üßpic:  Agamemnon  may 
not  have  the  intention  to  offend  Achilles  in  particular,  yet  his  attitude  is  offensive  after 
all,  and  it  inevitably  stirs  up  Achilles'  passionate  reaction;  Achilles  also  speaks  of 
dvau&si>7  (A  149,158,  cf.  1372.73),  referring  to  Agamemnon's  lack  of  respect  for  the 
code  of  ethics  itself  which  demands  that  he  should  accord  Achilles  his  proper  TI  P4. 
Achilles  feels  that  he  has  been  wronged,  the  whole  plot  is  evolving  around  his  protest 
against  Agamemnon's  improper  conduct;  he  violates  Agamemnon's  TIprj  in  his  turn,  in 
a  wish  to  react  and  reaffirm  his  own  status,  and  although  this  reaction  is  justifiable  to  a 
certain  extent,  it  is  at  the  same  time  checked  by  the  code  of  ethics:  Achilles  owes  due 
respect  to  Agamemnon  who  is  4  prtpoc,  suet  TAEoveaaty  dvdoot:  t  (A  281). 
True,  Achilles'  protest  stems  from  his  sensitivity  towards  his  own  personal 
-ru.  nj,  and  not  from  a  concern  for  Agamemnon's  improper  or  immoral  behaviour  as 
such,  but  it  is  also  true  that,  when  being  wronged,  one  hardly  ever  shows  concern  for 
the  wrongdoer's  intentions,  and  if  this  should  happen,  it  happens  only  after  one's  anger 
has  been  assuaged.  At  the  same  time,  the  Greeks  do  not  have  a  reason  why  they  should 
46 interfere  with  what  is  still  at  this  point  a  personal  dispute  between  Agamemnon  and 
Achilles,  until  the  moment  when  the  consequences  fall  upon  them  too.  Nestor,  being 
certainly  more  discerning  and  perceptive,  can  anticipate  the  danger,  and  being  also 
older  and  more  respectful,  can  intervene  in  an  attempt  to  avoid  the  anticipated 
outcome;  but  no  one  else  has  the  right  or  even  perhaps  the  wish  to  openly  pronounce  a 
judgement.  If  Nestor  seems  at  this  point  to  be  talking  in  prudential  rather  than  in  moral 
terms,  this  is  not  because  no  moral  issue  is  raised,  but  rather  because  at  such  crucial 
moments  prudence  is  more  effective.  No  other  hero  exhibits  Achilles'  self- 
assertiveness  or  confidence  against  Agamemnon  that  would  justify  a  moral 
appreciation  of  the  latter's  character.  49 
At  1523,  however,  Phoenix  tries  to  persuade  Achilles  to  help  the  Greeks;  until 
now,  he  says,  it  was  not  velsaofT6v  that  he  should  be  angry  with  Agamemnon;  vEusaic 
is  indeed  the  response  that  improper  behaviour  causes  to  a  distanced  observer  who  is 
not  affected  by  this  behaviour,  yet  disapproves  of  it  on  the  grounds  of  its  violation  of 
accepted  norms.  50  Moreover,  by  following  the  occurrences  of  vEIEaic,  we  seem  to 
obtain  a  view  of  the  principles  that  define  behavioural  nouns  among  members  of 
Homeric  society.  Thus,  we  hear  at  T  182  that  it  is  not  VEPEOOI1T6V  for  a  king  to  make 
amends  to  some  one  whom  he  has  first  insulted;  and  we  hear  at  `Y  494  that  one  feels 
vsucoic  when  witnessing  a  quarrel. 
All  three  instances  of  vs{i  oic  just  quoted  are  important  for  our  understanding  of 
the  moral  issue  that  the  dispute  between  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  raises:  quarrels  are 
°9  When  Diomedes,  who  may  be  seen  as  a  more  prudent  counterpart  of  Achilles  (Griffin  (1995)  27),  is 
confronted  by  Agamemnon  (A  370-400),  the  hero  reacts  with  ai&k  (402),  keeping  silent,  and  when  his 
companion  Sthenelus  reacts  in  his  place,  the  hero  checks  him  by  saying  that  he  feels  no  vgpEaic  for 
Agamemnon;  for  after  all  it  will  be  to  him  that  the  outcome  of  the  war  will  be  ascribed  (412-18).  50  See  Cairns  (1993a)  51-54;  (1993b)  158. 
47 disapproved  of,  for  they  can  certainly  lead  to  üßptc,  excessive  behaviour  that  violates 
the  limits  of  another's  TIp4,  and  the  `attempt  to  increase  one's  honour  at  the  expense  of 
another  member  of  the  group  is  occasion  for  veµso«'  S1  Achilles'  reaction,  nonetheless, 
does  not  cause  vFusoic,  for  he  is  defending  his  offended  Tilrj,  and  although  his  own 
behaviour  may  be  equally  excessive  as  Agamemnon's,  the  very  fact  that  he  did  not 
initiate  the  quarrel  operates  as  an  extenuating  argument  for  his  case.  Agamemnon's 
responsibility,  on  the  other  hand,  is  made  clear  by  Odysseus'  reference  at  T  182:  he  was 
the  first  to  transgress  the  limits  of  Achilles'  Tiurj. 
Neµsa«  reflects  the  opinion  of  a  disinterested  and  detached  public,  and  it  refers 
rather  clearly  to  moral  evaluation  of  one's  behaviour;  indignation  is  the  expected 
reaction  of  this  public  when  one  exceeds  one's  own  limits  and  transgresses,  as  a 
consequence,  the  limits  of  another.  This  is  a  matter  that  is  closely  linked,  as  noted 
above,  with  the  idea  of  Thun  as  `honour'  or  the  vital  field  of  existence  of  an  individual: 
my  Tiurj  or  honour  circumscribes  the  freedom  of  another's  actions,  and  vice  versa; 
reciprocity  is  essential  for  the  survival  not  merely  of  the  individual,  but  of  the  social 
group  as  well.  Competitiveness  is legitimate,  or rather  necessary,  but  it  need  not  mean 
amorality,  nor  certainly  immorality. 
Ait&&  is  the  counterpart  of  vipecic  as  the  emotion  that  `foresees  and  seeks  to 
forestall  nemesis'.  52  If  vipsaic  operates  on  the  individual  from  the  outside,  ai&k  is  the 
mechanism  that  operates  internally  towards  the  same  end:  the  inhibition  and  prevention 
of  improper  behaviour.  The  public  is  still  a  point  of  reference;  ai&k,  however,  further 
implies  self-criticism.  As  already  noted  (35),  the  sanction  provided  by  shame  is  often 
51  Cairns (1993a)  161. 
52  Cairns  (1993a)  52.  See  also  Greene  (1944)  19:  Ai&k  and  Neueatc  are  two  forms  of  Oeutc. 
48 believed  to  be  an  impediment  to  the  development  of  moral  thought;  when  one  acts  by 
taking  into  consideration  the  opinion  of  a  public,  the  act  is  motivated  by  a  concern  for 
self-interest,  and  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  proper  moral  act.  Such  a  view 
obviously  disregards  essential  characteristics  both  of  shame  in  particular  and  of  human 
behaviour  in  general. 
Before  I  proceed  with  w86;,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  argument  that  a  self- 
interested  moral  behaviour  forms  actually  an  oxymoron  rests  on  a  very  theoretical 
presupposition  that  would  demand  the  elimination  of  the  self.  But  the  self  cannot  be 
eliminated;  it  can  only  be  limited  within  its  proper  confines.  No  act,  however 
disinterested  at  first  sight,  can  avoid  the  involvement  of  the  self.  For  it  is  through  the 
entity  that  we  call  our  'self'  hat  we  perceive  life,  mentally,  emotionally  and  physically. 
Moreover,  self-interest  can  indeed  refer  to  selfishness  and  self-absorption,  but  it  can 
also  refer  to  the  elementary  wish  for  survival,  literally  and  metaphorically.  How  one 
perceives  one's  own  self  and  how  one  conditions  one's  own  behaviour  on  the  basis  of 
this  perception  is  after  all  a  personal  matter,  determined  by  denominators  such  as  one's 
disposition  or  character,  culture  and  education,  reason  and  will  power.  53 
This  being  said,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  ai&k  should  not  necessarily  be  taken  to 
imply  self-interested  motivation;  nor  should  it  be  seen  only  as  an  external  sanction  of 
human  behaviour.  Once  these  two  points  be  accepted,  ai&  k  appears  to  assume  a 
totally  different  function  in  Homeric  society,  a  function  which  allows  the  possibility  of 
internalised  moral  behaviour  and  therefore  a  developed  sense  of  morality. 
s'  For  the  importance  of  culture  or  education  in  one's  character  see  Aristot.  Rhet.  1370a6:  Kai  yap  TO 
EIAIOUEVOV  WOTTEP  TIE4UKk  i96TI  YIYVETar'  OiOIOV  yap  Tot  TO  Eeoc 
T(j  4ÜQE1;  cf.  Rhet.  1354a7;  Pol. 
1332a40. 
49 Doubtless,  particularly  misleading  for  the  appreciation  of  the  role  of  ai&  c  has 
been  Dodds'  classification  of  Homeric  society  among  the  so-called  `shame-cultures',  as 
opposed  to  'guilt-cultures' 
. 
54  His  statement  that  `Homeric  man's  highest  good  is  not  the 
enjoyment  of  a  quiet  conscience,  but  the  enjoyment  of  time,  public  esteem  ... 
And  the 
strongest  moral  force  which  Homeric  man  knows  is  not  the  fear  of  god,  but  respect  for 
public  opinion,  aidös',  SS  does  make  a  point,  since  we  can  hardly  talk  of  conscience  as 
such  in  the  Homeric  poems,  yet  it  also  seems  to  put  too  great  a  stress  on  the  distinction 
between  shame  and  guilt.  As  will  become  clear  when  examining  the  poems  themselves, 
the  gods  correspond  to  a  peculiar  form  of  justice  which  is  closer  to  the  order  of  nature 
and  life  than  to  an  idea  of  good  as  opposed  to  evil  that  would  indeed  support  man's  fear 
of  their  punishment;  with  divine  sanctions  being  weak,  aT&k  does  seem  to  become 
more  important  and  powerful  a  sanction,  yet  its  effectiveness  should  not  be  taken  to 
result  merely  from  the  `pressure  of  social  conformity';  56  for  ai&cäß,  or  `concern  for 
honour,  even  when  it  is  acute,  betokens  no  simple  reliance  on  external  sanctions  alone', 
and  it  actually  denotes  that  `one  is  brought  to  a  negative  evaluation  of  oneself  in 
respect  of  some  ideal,  and  the  catalyst  may  come  from  within  as  well  as  from 
without'.  S7 
That  w6c  c  is  more  than  a  vain  obsession  with  or  fear  of  criticism  and 
disapproval  has  been  successfully  illustrated  by  Cairns  (1993a);  since  shame  is  an 
emotion,  it  has  a  cognitive  aspect  which  entails  evaluation;  thus,  the  role  it  has  in 
Homeric  society  is  that  of  a  principle  `which  renders  one  sensitive  to  the  general  values 
50  Dodds  (1951)  17-18,26  n.  106,28ff.  For  a  discussion  of  Dodds'  thesis,  as  well  as  of  the  distinction 
between  shame  and  guilt,  see  Cairns  (1993a)  27ff.,  48ff. 
ss  Dodds  (1951)17f. 
56  Dodds  (1981)  18. 
57  Cairns  (1993a)  43,18. 
50 of  society  and  which  inhibits  departure  from  them'.  58  When  it  comes  to  relations 
among  two  'or  more  members  of  Homeric  society,  ai&  k  and  its  counterpart  vEµsatc 
become  the  principles  that  prescribe  one's  action  or  non-action,  thus  underlining  the 
heroes'  deep  sense  of  self-consciousness;  more  important,  they  are  the  principles  which 
prevent  the  violation  of  another's  Tiurj,  which  demand  in  fact  that  the  Tiurj  of  each 
individual  be  properly  acknowledged  and  honoured,  thus  assuming  a  particularly  moral 
meaning.  59 
It  would  appear,  then,  that  ai6aik  does  not  refer  simply  to  one's  concern  for 
fame  or good  name,  but  it  can,  or  rather  it  should  also  be  seen  as  a  mechanism,  social 
as  well  as  notional  or  emotional,  which  can  indeed  operate  internally  as  a  sanction  that 
can  determine  one's  decisions  on  the  basis  of  a  distinction  between  right  and  wrong. 
When  one's  behaviour  is  disapproved  of,  an  essential  appreciation  of  right  and  wrong  is 
presupposed,  even  if  subconsciously;  the  person  criticised  accordingly  appreciates  his 
own  behaviour,  always,  no  doubt,  proportionately  to  his  sensitivity  towards  the  code  of 
ethics.  The  idea  that  other  people  form  of  an  agent  is  not  an  arbitrary  and  haphazard 
judgement  void  of  significance  and  expressed  for  the  sake  of  criticism  itself  - 
allowances  always  made  for  exceptions;  approval  of  one's  behaviour  is  based  on  the 
acknowledgement  that  the  agent  has  acted  properly  or  morally  according  to  the  established 
norms  of  a  society,  both  for  the  one  who  approves  and  for  the  one  who  is  approved  of. 
Shame  entails  more  than  a  shallow  obsession  with  good  reputation,  for  the  painful  truth  is 
that  what  we  are  is  often  defined  by  what  other  people  think  of  us,  this  being  a  reality 
Sg  Cairns  (1993a)  154;  for  the  prospective,  inhibitory  use  of  shame  in  Homer  see  48ff. 
59  Cf.  Cairns  (1993b)  163:  `If  I  can  point  out  that  any  impartial  individual  would  feel  vepeoit  at  a  certain 
course  of  action,  if  I  can  argue  that  you  too  would  feel  vENeats  were  another  to  act  as  you  do,  if  I  can  feel 
vipEoIc  at  my  own  conduct  or  reject  conduct  because  it  is  of  the  sort  at  which  I  should  feel  veueaic,  then 
I  acknowledge  that  individuals  can  endorse,  appropriate,  and  internalise  the  values  of  their  society,  and  so 
it  is  wrong  to  suggest  that  Homeric  man  simply  conforms  to  external  standards  out  of  fear  of  punishment 
or  disgrace'. 
51 which  we  do  not  have  the  sobriety  or  the  courage  to  accept,  while  what  we  think  of 
ourselves  may  prove  to  be  no  more  than  an  illusion.  Our  individual  and  unique  perception 
of  the  world  is  certainly  not  always  in  accord  with  the  reality  that  exists  beyond  the 
limits  of  our  existence,  and  the  opinion  of  other  people  may  often  oblige  us  to  confront 
an  inconsistency.  Applied  to  the  issue  of  morality,  disapproval  of  one's  behaviour  may 
illuminate  the  existence  of  defects  of  which  the  agent  himself  is  not  aware  or  which  he 
is  not  willing  to  acknowledge.  One's  response  to  such  criticism  is,  as  noted, 
proportionate  to  one's  sensitivity  towards  morality,  and  shame  can  become  `a  matter  of 
the  self's  judging  the  self  in  terms  of  some  ideal  that  is  one's  own'.  60 
Dodds'  aforementioned  statement  is  followed  by  the  example  of  Hector: 
Hector,  we  are  told,  `goes  with  open  eyes  to  his  death'  for  he  feels  shame  before  the 
Trojans;  61  in  other  words,  the  hero's  decision  to  die  is  conditioned  by  the  fear  of 
criticism.  The  same  fear  is  supposed  to  underlie  Hector's  decision  to  leave  his  wife  and 
his  son  and  fight  for  his  people  (Z  441-46).  But,  as  Hooker  observes,  neither  utterance 
is  `typical  of  the  way  that  the  heroes  in  general  reason  or  behave',  and  this  is  exactly 
where  the  interest  lies,  in  the  lines'  ability  to  `illuminate  Hector's  own  character  and 
his  role  in  the  Iliad'.  62  Hector  is  most  probably  the  most  integral  character  of  the  Iliad, 
and  this  impression  is  largely  the  result  of  his  sensitivity  to  propriety;  his  is  not  the 
boring,  superficial  propriety  of  someone  who  follows  blindly  the  rules  of  society  out  of 
fear  of  disgrace;  rather,  this  fear  is  part  of  his  very  mode  of  thinking  in  the  sense  that 
what  may  become  the  object  of  criticism  is  essentially  wrong,  and  it  should  therefore 
be  avoided.  No  other  hero  responds  to  ai&&  in  the  same  manner,  unless  we  look  at 
60  Cairns  (1993a)  16. 
61  Dodds  (1951)  18. 
62  In  McAuslan,  Walcot  (1998)  15;  cf.  Cairns  (1993a)  79-83. 
52 young  Telemachus  in  the  Odyssey,  and  it  is  this  response  which  contributes  to  his 
character;  the  poet's  characterisation  proves  again  remarkable. 
Ai6ck  and  vipcotc,  then,  as  well  as  üPpic,  may  be  said  to  be  terms  which  allow 
us  a  view  of  the  Homeric  concept  of  morality.  Excess  is  condemned,  since  it  results  in 
the  violation  of  morality  itself,  and  public  opinion  can  operate  internally  as  the  sanction 
that  conditions  one's  behaviour,  not  necessarily  implying  a  self-interested  concern  for 
status,  financial  or  social,  but  often  denoting  a  conscious  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong,  which  is  the  basis  of  moral  behaviour  and  responsibility.  The  terms  are  used  in 
both  poems  when  the  heroes'  action  has  to  be  seen  in  its  moral  dimension;  ävat&irl 
and  vsIEQic  are  relevant  both  to  Agamemnon  and  the  suitors,  for  these  are  the  terms 
that  evoke  the  principles  that  have  proven  inoperative  in  their  case;  and  these  are 
certainly  the  principles  that  demand  moral  behaviour. 
A  question  remains:  if  moral  behaviour  is  indeed  possible  in  Homeric  society, 
and  if  such  ideas  as  shame  and  public  opinion  or  disapproval  are  capable  of  functioning 
as  internal  sanctions  of  such  a  behaviour,  why  is  it  that  no  distinction  is  ever  drawn 
between  mistake  and  moral  error,  and  that  consequently  results  seem  always  more 
important  than  intentions?  The  question  obviously  relates  to  another  anachronism 
which  results  in  misleading  associations  and  conclusions,  since  it  demands  that  we 
appreciate  and  interpret  Homeric  thought  on  the  criteria  of  an  entirely  different  system 
of  thought. 
The  intentions  or  the  motivation  behind  an  act  are  indeed  very  important,  although 
it  is  worth  considering  whether  this  is  not  so  much  the  case  when  an  act  that  should  be 
regarded  as  immoral  has  been  caused  by  a  moral  motivation,  but  rather  when  a  moral  act 
53 has  been  caused  by  what  is  regarded  as  an  immoral,  or  occasionally  a  non-moral, 
motivation.  I  would  believe  that  the  idea  of  a  pure  morality  basically  implies,  or  aims  at,  a 
person  who  acts  morally  because  of  an  inner  disposition  towards  morality,  and  this  is 
perhaps  the  legitimate  ideal  of  any  man  who  has  ever  thought  on  good  and  evil.  But  as  I 
said,  this  is  an  ideal  which  aims  at  `creating'  agents  of  moral  acts,  and  not  at  justifying 
immoral  acts.  3  It  would  appear,  then,  that  in  the  field  of  morality,  as  in  all  fields  of  human 
action,  results  are  always  more  important;  in  actual  life  good  intentions  can  never,  and 
should  never  function  as  a  justification  of  an  act  that  implies  failure,  moral  or  not. 
Morality  is  basically  a  social  matter,  even  if  it  finally  receives  a  metaphysical  or  theological 
dimension. 
The  idea  that  Homeric  society  is  preoccupied  with  results  rather  than  intentions  is 
closely  related  to  the  interpretation  of  TIplj  and  ai5aic;  if  the  terms  should  be  seen  as 
indicative  of  one's  obsessive  pursuit  of  status,  it  is  inevitable  that  one's  actions  should  be 
interpreted  accordingly  as  being  appreciated  on  the  basis  of  results.  I  hope  that  it  has 
become  rather  clear  by  now  that  neither  term  should  be  seen  only  in  the  light  of 
competitiveness.  If  internally  motivated  behaviour  is  possible,  one's  intentions  are  indeed 
of  interest,  since  it  is  the  intentions  that  define  this  behaviour.  When  Achilles  accuses 
Agamemnon  of  dvai5ski  (A  149,158),  he  talks  of  his  excessively  self-interested 
63I  have  to  confess  that  my  knowledge  of  Kant's  philosophy  is  indirect,  and  therefore  my  interpretation  of 
its  principles  may  actually  be  mistaken;  however,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  the  point  of  stressing  the  intentions  of 
an  act  is  to  ensure  that  a  moral  act  is  not  caused  by  immoral  or  non-moral  motivation,  and  consequently 
that  moral  behaviour  is  not  a  chance  event;  as  Williams  says  (1993:  68),  theories  such  as  that  of  Kant  or 
even  that  of  Hume,  emphasise  the  importance  of  motivation  because  `the  man  who  has  a  moral  motivation 
for  doing  things  of  the  non-self-regarding  sort,  has  a  disposition  or  general  motive  for  doing  things  of  that 
sort;  whereas  the  self-interested  man  has  no  such  steady  motive,  for  it  will  always  be  only  luck  if  what 
benefits  others  happens  to  coincide  with  what,  by  the  limited  criteria  of  self-interest,  happens  to  benefit 
him'.  Obviously,  what  we  have  here  is  a  desirable  result  and  a  way  to  accomplish  it;  a  moral  act  is  better 
ensured  to  happen  when  the  agent  is  inclined  to  act  morally.  But  does  this  principle  also  imply  that  an 
immoral  act  which  is  the  result  of  moral  intentions  should  be  regarded  moral  on  the  grounds  of  these 
intentions?  Or  should  we  believe  that  moral  intentions  inevitably  lead  to  moral  results?  For  it  seems  that 
the  theory  should,  at  least,  aim  at  providing  the  principles  of  constructing  the  best  possible  society  in 
terms  of  morality,  and  not  the  justification,  as  I  said,  for  acts  that  fail  to  meet  the  desired  end. 
54 motivation  which  prevents  him  from  acknowledging  the  T1pj  of  another;  and  when  the 
Greek  embassy  comes  to  Achilles  to  announce  Agamemnon's  regret,  the  hero  replies  in  the 
most  remarkable  way:  EXOpöc  ydp  not  K.  IvoC  6ic3c  'At&«o  m.  Xiiaiv  I  öc  x'  '  pov  pev 
Kn  Ofl  vi  #eoiv,  äAAo  Sä  si  TM  (I  312-13). 
The  fact  that  results  are  indeed  of  great  importance  does  not  necessarily  entail  the 
unimportance  of  intentions.  The  very  plot  of  the  poems  seem  to  prove  exactly  the  opposite. 
In  both  poems  we  have  the  violation  of  a  so-called  co-operative  principle:  in  both 
poems  the  breach  of  established  limits  for  the  sake  of  one's  own  success  may  certainly  not 
affect  one's  status  in  society,  yet  it  proves  disastrous  for  society  itself  and  is  therefore  not 
approved  of.  If  we  should  insist  on  the  distinction  between  competitive  and  co-operative 
values,  we  could  say  that  EEvia  is  an  essentially  co-operative  principle,  which  has, 
however,  consequences  on  the  competitive  level.  It  is  a  social  mechanism  that  prevents 
the  violation  of  the  limits  that  exist  in  a  society:  both  guest  and  host  are  obliged  to 
observe  these  limits  on  which  their  relation  actually  relies.  The  result  is  both  social 
stability,  as  aimed  at  by  morality,  and  social  status  for  the  individual  -  both  the  guest 
and  the  host. 
The  poet,  innocent  of  the  distinction  between  values,  is  certainly  not  concerned 
to  put  the  emphasis  on  one  or  the  other  aspect  of  the  violation.  The  two  co-exist,  being 
of  equal  importance.  If  we  should  forget  for  a  moment  the  discussions  on  competition 
and  co-operation,  we  would  see  perhaps  the  poet's  own  view  more  clearly,  and  we 
would  perceive  the  poems  for  what  they  really  are:  the  narration  of  a  sequence  of 
events  which  seem  to  underline  man's  helplessness  before  life  and  before  the 
consequences  of  his  own  actions  and  decisions  in  which  he  becomes  entangled,  his 
inability  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  that  slight  single  moment  when  right  and  wrong 
55 become  fused.  M  Each  poem  presents  us  with  a  conflict  between  right  and  wrong,  the 
difference  being  that,  while  in  the  Odyssey  this  is  the  typical  conflict  between  the  good 
and  the  bad  characters,  in  the  Iliad  the  situation  is  more  complex  than  that:  on  the  one 
hand,  the  typical  conflict  exists  here  as  well,  but  is  reflected  in  a  less  sharp  distinction 
between  heroes  who  are  portrayed  positively  and  heroes  who  are  portrayed  rather 
negatively,  without,  however,  necessarily  creating  a  tension  between  good  and  bad 
characters:  Agamemnon  and  Paris  do  indeed  retain  their  claim  to  äpE  nj,  but  it  cannot 
be  doubted  at  the  same  time that  the  whole  plot  is  thus  constructed  as  to  highlight  the 
negative  elements  of  their  character  that  lead  to  the  conflict  in  the  first  place;  65  the  poet 
is  not  interested  to  prove  that  their  apcTrj  remains  intact,  but  rather  to  give  a  stimulus 
and  create  the  necessary  tension  for  the  plot.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  in  the  poem  an 
internal  conflict,  which  is  much  more  powerful  and  compelling,  representing  the 
ambivalent  wishes  of  one  single  hero;  this  being  the  case  especially  with  regard  to 
Achilles,  it  enhances  the  tragic  atmosphere  of  the  poem. 
If  we  wish  to  perceive  the  poems  in  this  light,  we  have  to  accept  the  way  in 
which  right  and  wrong  are  perceived  by  the  poet,  his  heroes  and  his  audience,  and  not 
to  seek  our  idea  of  right  and  wrong  instead.  Even  if  it  is  true  that  competitive  failure  is 
an  important  slight  on  one's  ttpij  and  äpr  rij,  we  have  to  remember  that  the  negative 
connotations  that  such  an  idea  bears  for  us  simply  did  not  exist  at  the  time:  criticism  of 
such  a  failure  could  imply  more  than  a  plain  diminution  of  one's  status.  More 
important,  we  have  to  consider  that,  even  in  this  highly  competitive  society,  there  is  a 
64  The  possibility  of  a  conflict  between  such  demands  is  obvious  especially  in  the  Iliad,  for  in  the  Odyssey 
right  and  wrong  are  very  clearly  defined  and  opposed  to  each  other.  This  is  one  of  the  crucial  differences 
between  the  two  poems,  and  the  basis  of  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  development  as  regards  morality 
from  the  older  to  the  more  recent  poem. 
65  See  Dover  (1983)  39;  Garvie  (1994)  on  f,  187-90. 
56 limit  to  one's  pursuit  of  one's  own  personal  interest,  and  the  limit  is  defined  by  the  very 
idea  of  Tiurj. 
Doubtless,  the  Homeric  world  is  innocent  of  a  sophisticated  philosophical 
system  and  language,  but  this  is  after  all  a  matter  related  to  the  history  of  philosophy 
and  not  to  human  behaviour  as  such.  If  morality  corresponds  to  an  essential  function  of 
human  consciousness,  it  would  be  absurd  to  insist  that  Homeric  man  is  ignorant  of  such 
a  function.  The  Homeric  world  is  a  real  world  despite  its  tendency  to  exaggeration,  and 
its  characters  are  real  characters  living,  fighting,  coming  into  conflict  with  one  another, 
but  also  respecting  one  another,  and  thus  proving  themselves  capable  of  making 
choices.  The  absence  of  an  elaborate  philosophical  system  that  would  explore  the 
possibilities  and  the  potential  of  human  morality  does  not  entail  that  morality  in  its 
essentials  is  impossible.  And  the  issue  is  whether  human  behaviour  as  described  in  the 
poems  can  be  seen  as  conditioned  by  a  distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  which  is 
an  essentially  moral  distinction. 
57 2 
'A  Peculiar  Concept  of  Justice' 
In  1912,  in  his  book  From  Religion  to  Philosophy,  F.  M.  Cornford  talked  of  the 
important  relationship  between  the  ideas  of  Destiny  and  Law.  Cornford  begins  by 
setting  the  question  of  the  origins  of  Milesian  philosophy:  the  principles  of  the  pre- 
Socratics,  such  as  Thales'  water  or  Anaximander's  indefinite,  are  certainly  not  ideas 
based  on  or  deduced  from  plain  everyday  experience;  therefore,  Cornford  believes, 
there  must  be  an  ideological  background  on  which  the  philosophers  draw,  and  this 
background  is  that  of  early  religion.  Philosophy  is  then  interpreted  as  the  rationalisation 
of  the  already  existing  ideas  on  life  and  nature  which  were  part  of  religious  thought, 
and  were  expressed  up  to  that  point  in  the  less  abstract  or  theoretic  form  of  mythology.  ' 
Looking  for  the  relation  between  early  Greek  religion  and  early  Greek 
philosophy,  Cornford  notices  that  the  vocabulary  and  imagery  that  philosophy  uses  are 
basically  those  of  religion,  which  are  now  adapted  to  a  different  purpose.  Ideas  such  as 
SiKfl,  TO'  Xpecäv,  uoipa,  are  all  used  by  the  Milesians  in  descriptions  of  nature's 
workings,  providing  what  seems  to  be  a  totally  different  approach  to  life.  But,  Cornford 
insists,  the  difference  is  only  superficial:  if  poipa  and  61KTI  feature  in  philosophy  as 
1  The  pre-Socratics  owe  much  of  their  ideas  to  Near  Eastern  thought,  but  this  does  not  actually  affect  the 
argument  about  the  relation  between  religion  and  philosophy,  even  though  it  obviously  transposes  it  to  a 
different  level. 
58 indicative  of  a  natural  order,  this  is  not  a  new  idea  born  out  of  the  philosophers' 
enlightened  thought,  but  in  fact  it  is  the  basis  on  which  religion  itself  was  formed. 
Comford  seems  today  to  have  gone  too  far.  According  to  him,  uoipa  has 
originally  a  spatial  meaning;  it  denotes  the  division  or  departmentalisation  of  a  tribe,  an 
idea  which  once  related  to  that  of  taboo  assumes  a  definite  moral  nuance:  there  are 
limits  which  should  not  be  transgressed.  This  idea  is  then  believed  to  have  been 
projected  onto  nature  as  a  whole,  whereby  each  element  is  seen  as  having  its  own 
proper  limits;  order  is  maintained  when  limits  are  observed,  when  taboo  is  not  violated. 
In  this  scheme,  the  notions  of  SM  I,  vöµoc  and  veiEo  c,  or  öpxoc,  are  along  with  that  of 
potpa  evocative  of  this  basic  idea  of  departmentalisation  in  nature  and  society.  Moipa 
is  what  ought  to  be  if  order  should  be  observed.  When  the  word  comes  to  denote  fate,  it 
does  not  imply  a  blind  and  inescapable  necessity,  but  instead  a  moral  order  which  can, 
but  should  not,  be  violated.  Relying  on  comparative  anthropological  data,  Cornford 
often  reaches  conclusions  that  might  seem  arbitrary  or  at  least  dangerous,  provoking 
scepticism  and  reservation.  I  will  not  deal  here  with  the  details  of  his  argumentation, 
avoiding  thus  a  field  that  is  beyond  both  my  discipline  and  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
Nonetheless,  his  conclusions  on  the  moral  quality  of  uoipa  and  the  relation  between 
Destiny  and  Law  are  worth  considering. 
Some  forty  years  later,  L.  R.  Palmer  (1950)  examined  the  semantic  relationship 
between  the  above  mentioned  terms,  taking  the  discussion  even  further  by  setting  the 
question  of  a  possible  Indo-European  origin  of  this  idea  of  departmentalisation.  Setting 
out  from  Katpöc,  which  means  `measure,  opportune  moment',  Palmer  noticed  that  the 
word  often  appears  to  have  a  moral  sense;  meaning  also  the  `mark',  it  can  be  used  to 
denote  that  one  has  gone  beyond  a  certain  `mark'  or  `boundary',  that  is  beyond  a 
59 certain  `limit'.  Observing  that  the  word  is  often  combined  with  6IKIi,  he  goes  on  to 
examine  the  possible  semantic  affinity  between  words  that  constitute  the  basic  moral 
vocabulary  of  Greek,  thus  reflecting  the  Greek  Weltanschauung.  L  fx 
,  poipa  and  abca, 
f,  f  opoc,  v6poc,  Saiuwv  are  all  related  to  each  other:  they  are  `boundary  words',  which 
follow  the  same  more  or  less  semantic  development  from  the  meaning  `mark, 
indication'  towards  that  of  `boundary,  limit'  and  finally  that  of  `lot,  fate'.  For  these 
`boundary  words',  he  offers  the  following  scheme  of  semantic  ramifications:  2 
Mark 
indication;  point  out,  say 
characteristic 
aim,  goal,  winning  post;  throw 
Boundary  mark 
(of  space)  limit;  measure;  territory 
(of  time)  opportune  moment,  appointed  time,  season,  year 
(metaphorical)  dividing  line,  decision,  judgement 
Outline 
shape,  form,  mode,  manner 
The  idea  to  be  detected,  then,  in  words  such  as  poipa,  aica,  Sü  r  and  Katpöc  is 
that  of  limitation,  as  experienced  originally  in  nature  itself:  all  forms  of  life  obey  this 
principle  according  to  which  they  are  confined  each  within  the  boundaries  of  its  own 
nature,  and  this  subsequent  order  is  seen  not  only  as  natural  and  inescapable,  but  also 
as  moral,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  consistent  with  itself.  Thus,  setting  off  as  terms  that 
2  Palmer  (1950)  153. 
60 denote  natural  limits,  uoipa,  aTaa  and  SiKII  soon  attain  a  moral  significance  and  expand 
their  application  from  the  outer  to  the  inner  experience  of  man.  Similarly,  ünEppaaia,  a 
word  used  to  denote  impropriety,  is  simply  the  transgression  of  the  established  limits. 
What  Connford  had  observed  when  examining  the  relationship  of  early  Greek  religion 
and  philosophy,  Palmer  now  attempts  to  prove  on  the  grounds  of  etymology. 
What  is  of  interest  for  the  present  thesis  is,  first,  the  fact  that  there  exists  some 
relationship  between  uoipa  and  SiKfl,  and  second  that  this  relationship  stems  from  their 
moral  connotations  and  their  reference  to  this  `peculiar  concept  of  justice'.  3  The  fact 
that  the  idea  of  measure  was  an  essential  part  of  Greek  thought  is  certainly  beyond 
doubt;  one  can  remember  sayings  such  as  p  6sv  ayav  or  rräv  usTpov  äpLQTOV.  4  What 
will  be  examined  here  is  how  this  idea  is  related  to  the  concept  of  fate,  and  how  it  is 
further  evoked  by  SiKn.  In  what  follows  I  will  discuss  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
ideas  of  fate  and  justice  in  an  attempt  to  explore  the  relation  to  the  semantic  field  of 
poipa  and  SiKrr  in  the  Homeric  poems,  focusing  on  the  elements  that  are  present  in  both 
poems,  the  differences  being  left  for  when  the  poems  themselves  will  be  examined. 
Hopefully,  it  will  become  clear  that  the  words  form  indeed  an  important  part  of 
Homeric  thought,  not  simply  with  regard  to  fate  and  justice,  but  also  with  regard  to 
morality  and  to  the  Homeric  concept  of  the  divine  and  its  relation  to  man. 
3  Seep.  10,  n.  5. 
Greene  (1944)  20  sees  this  idea  as  resulting  from  the  'instinctive  feeling  of  a  barrier'  between  man  and 
god,  which  should  also  be  related  to  the  idea  of  divine  4Oovoc;  this  is  the  `reply  of  Themis  to  Moira,  of 
Nomos  to  Physis,  it  is  the  attempt,  by  shrewdness  and  self-discipline,  to  circumvent  the  innate  dangers  of 
life'. 
61 2.1  Fate  and  Moira 
A  belief  in  fate  seems  to  imply  that  there  are  certain  events  in  life  which  have 
been  already  determined  and  defined  by  an  agent  or  power  that  is  external  to  and 
independent  of  man,  which  events  are  inevitable  in  their  accomplishment.  What  this 
non-human,  and  hence  most  probably  divine,  power  has  determined  is  therefore  seen  as 
what  must  be,  and  what  must  be,  as  a  consequence,  is  seen  as  what  will  be  -  although, 
in  reality  the  process  is  quite  the  reverse,  that  is,  one  is  inclined  to  see  what  is  or  has 
been  as  part  of  a  `what  must  have  been'  that  lies  actually  in  the  past.  Such  a  concept 
can  easily  lapse  into  a  fatalistic  approach  to  life,  but  it  can  also  be  no  more  than  an 
occasional  resort  when  no  other  explanation  can  be  provided  for  unwelcome  and 
unpredictable  changes  in  life  -  what  under  different  circumstances  would  be  interpreted 
as  chance. 
Fate  and  chance  seem  actually  to  be  indicative  of  two  fundamentally  distinct 
outlooks  on  life,  yet  they  are  also  remarkably  close  as  regards  their  essential  origin: 
they  both  seem  to  stem  from  the  realisation  of  life's  ultimate  and  utter  unpredictability 
or  irrationality;  but  whereas  a  belief  in  fate  accepts  that  behind  this  unpredictable 
quality  there  must  be  a  reasoning,  albeit  incomprehensible  by  the  human  capacities  of 
intelligence  and  perception,  the  belief  in  chance  apparently  accepts  no  reasoning  as 
such.  Although  chance  does  not  necessarily  come  in  conflict  with  a  belief  in  the  divine, 
nor  does  it  entail  its  absence,  still  fate  fits  more  easily  in  a  system  which  provides  an 
explanation  for  everything  in  life  in  terms  of  divine  causation.  As  Burkert  notes, 
3  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  `fate'  is  used  to  denote  the  concept  in  general,  with  no 
necessary  relation  being  implied  to  the  Homeric  approach,  for  which  'moira'  is  used;  `moira',  at  the  same 
time  is  used  for  all  the  terms  which  denote  the  Homeric  idea  of  predetermination,  while  when  a  reference 
to  particular  terms  is  necessary,  the  Greek  will  be  used. 
62. religion  attempts  to  `make  sense'  out  of  chaos  and  thus  reduce  the  complexity  and 
anxiety  that  surround  man,  6  and  chance  does  not  seem  capable  of  providing  the  solace 
necessary  for  this.  7 
One  could  actually  say  that  moira  is  nothing  but  chance  itself,  though  invested 
with  a  moral  and  religious  meaning.  Moira  may  provide  man  with  a  reasoning  behind 
life,  yet  it  is  not  itself  based  on  some  reasoning.  Rather,  it  represents  the  haphazard  and 
irrational  distribution  of  portions  among  men,  which,  however,  is  sufficiently  effective 
as  an  explanation  of  man's  inevitable  confrontation  with  a  `world  full  of  disconcerting 
events,  scandal  and  trickery'.  8  Moreover,  the  belief  that  the  future  has  been  already 
predetermined,  an  established  course  that  lies  ahead  of  man  waiting  for  its 
accomplishment,  could  be  seen  as  a  latent  human  wish  for  control  over  life:  admitting 
the  existence  of  a  reasoning  in  life,  man  seems  to  obtain  strength  from  the  illusion  that 
if  he  knows  of  the  future,  he  will  be  able  to  manipulate  it  according  to  his  own  personal 
wishes  and  plans.  9  Life  and  moira  prove,  however,  more  powerful  than  man  in  most 
cases,  and  certainly  capricious  and  irrational. 
6  Burkert  (1996)  26.  The  idea  that  religion  creates  sense  by  `reduction  of  complexity'  was  formulated  by 
Niklas  Luhmann  in  his  Funktion  der  Religion  (Frankfurt,  1977),  for  which  see  Burkert  (ibid.  ). 
TvXn  becomes  itself  a  goddess  later  on  in  Greek  religion,  a  fact  that  Burkert  (1985:  185f.  )  attributes  to 
the  decline  of  the  belief  in  the  personal  gods  because  of  the  way  they  were  presented  in  poetry.  `Of  the 
existence  and  actuality  of  the  Homeric  gods  there  can  be  no  proof,  but  no  man  of  intelligence  can  dispute 
the  importance  of  phenomena  and  situations  designated  by  abstract  terms.  Tyche,  the  lucky  hit,  enjoyed 
the  swiftest  rise  to  fame'(186). 
8  Burkert  (1996)  178.  Most  interesting  is  the  appearance  of  -rtixrl  side  by  side  with  µoipa  in  Archilochus 
(16  West):  rrdvTa  TiXn  Kai  uo'  pa,  TTEpIKXEEC,  äv6pt  Uwat;  along  with  the  references  to  ävayxaia 
-rnXrl  (e.  g.  Soph.  EI.  48,  Ajax  485),  the  line  seems  to  underline  the  fact  that  fate  is  basically  a  chance 
event,  since  it  is  not  distributed  on  the  basis  of  some  reasoning  nor  certainly  on  the  basis  of  merit,  but 
rather  haphazardly  instead.  See  also  IF  78-79,  where  Patroclus'  death  is  presented  by  the  hero  himself 
almost  as  a  chance  event:  dXA'  Eµe  µev  Kip  ati  EgavE  oTuyEprl,  t1  TrEp  AaXe  ytyvolimov  rrEp. 
9  One  can  think  of  the  importance  that  divination,  oracles  and  prophecies  have  in  religious  systems;  the 
future  lies  ahead  waiting  to  be  decoded.  For  a  discussion  on  mediators,  signs  and  divination  as  a  means  of 
turning  chance  events  into  a  coherent  system,  see  Burkert  (1996)  chapter  7. 
63 In  the  Homeric  poems  chance  never  actually  appears,  the  word  -r$XTI  is  never 
employed  as  an  explanation,  and  even  events  that  would  normally  be  seen  as  chance 
events,  such  as  the  breaking  of  a  bow,  missing  one's  target,  or  even  one's  death,  are  all 
interpreted  either  as  the  result  of  divine  intervention  or  as  moira.  10  Moira,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  an  all  compelling  status  in  the  poems;  along  with  the  incessant  divine  action 
it  is  responsible  for  the  impression  of  determination  that  is  evoked.  However,  as  will 
hopefully  become  clear  in  due  course,  the  Homeric  concept  of  fate  as  expressed  by 
moira  is  far  from  implying  an  idea  of  determinism  or  fatalism;  most  frequently  it  is 
simply  the  explanation  or  the  interpretation  given  to  life  post  eventum.  As  Comford 
remarks,  "the  ordinance  of  Fate  is  not  a  mere  blind  and  senseless  barrier  of 
impossibility'.  "  Nevertheless,  even  if  Homeric  fate  should  not  after  all  be  regarded  as  a 
blind  and  cruel  power  irrevocably  determining  human  life  in  all  of  its  aspects,  its 
importance  for  Homeric  thought,  and  along  with  that  for  the  unfolding  of  the  Homeric 
plots,  remains  an  undoubted  truth. 
The  terms  which  we  have  to  examine  are  poipa  and  d  oa,  along  with  their 
derivatives  or  cognates,  such  as  p6poc  and  sipapTO,  p6p(o)tpoc  (-ov),  and  äioiuoc  (-ov), 
äiaioc,  Evaiatpoc,  appopoc,  &  opopoc,  while  there  are  also  words  which  are  not  linked 
to  them  at  all  etymologically,  such  as  iErrpwpivoc,  nö-rµoc,  oiToc  and  Krjp;  the  word 
O  #arov,  also  evoking  predetermination,  is  obviously  related  to  the  gods,  and  I  would 
therefore  prefer  to  distinguish  it  from  the  aforementioned  terms.  Neither  poipa  and 
a3Qa  nor  their  derivatives  are  limited  to  the  sense  of  fate;  there  is  instead  a  field  of 
meaning  which  we  will  have  to  define  in  order  that  the  implications  of  moira  as  fate  be 
made  clear. 
10  For  such  instances  of  divine  intervention  see,  for  example,  E  290-96,0  461-70,  Y  382-87,  x  272-76. 
11  Cornford  (1912)  13. 
64 Even  a  most  superficial  reading  of  the  poems  shows  that,  of  the  above 
mentioned  terms,  uoipa  has  the  most  extensive  application  and  the  widest  semantic 
field.  This  may  indeed  be  the  result  of  metrical  necessity,  for  obviously  the  terms 
present  a  variety  of  metrical  qualities.  12  It  seems,  though,  equally  possible  that,  by  the 
time  at  least  of  our  poems,  the  word  was  well-established  in  its  use,  being  more 
powerful  in  its  connotations  than  any  other  term;  or  it  could  simply  be  that  aloa,  the 
second  most  important  term,  being  less  transparent  in  its  etymology,  was  not  as 
effective  as  poipa.  For  it  often  appears  that  despite  their  frequency  the  other  terms  are 
not  always  or  totally  interchangeable  with  poipa:  rro-rpoc  and  olTOc,  for  example,  are 
definitely  limited  in  their  application  and  implications.  13 
TTöTpoc  is  etymologically  related  to  the  verb  Trimca,  and  it  is  therefore 
interpreted  as  `that  which  befalls  one',  and  consequently  one's  destiny;  the  reference  is 
obviously  made  to  an  event  that  is  imposed  on  man  from  without,  and  which  appears  to 
be  no  more  than  a  chance  event;  the  word  comes  finally  to  denote  especially  the 
unpleasant  destiny  of  death.  14  Out  of  its  thirteen  occurrences  in  the  Iliad,  eleven  are 
associated  with  death,  most  frequently  in  combination  with  the  verb  4srrsiv,  15  and  only 
12  If  we  should  confine  ourselves  to  the  nouns  uoipa,  alca  and  popoc,  the  dii%rent  metrical  potential  of 
each  word  is  evident:  p6poc  consists  of  two  short  syllables  and  may  thus  occupy  a  biceps  position;  Uoipa 
and  aTaa,  on  the  other  hand,  correspond  with  one  long  and  one  short  syllable,  thus  falling  into  the 
princeps  position;  however,  the  fact  that  µoipa  begins  with  a  consonant  and  aiaa  with  a  vowel  entails 
further  differentiations  between  the  two  words.  Thus,  vtrEp  ataav  and  ürreppopov  are  more  frequent  than 
ütrep  uoipav  which  is  obviously  more  difficult  to  accommodate.  For  a  similar  metrical  explanation  of  the 
distinction  p6ptpoc  and  pöpoiuoc,  see  Chantraine  (1968)  s.  v.  psipopat,  678.  However,  µoipa  and 
Knpa,  although  belonging  to  different  cases,  do  have  the  same  metrical  qualities,  which  explains  why  they 
both  occupy  the  fifth  foot  fairly  often;  see  Lee  (1961)196.  For  the  terms  `princeps'  and  `biceps'  positions, 
see  Ni  L.  West,  Greek  Metre,  Oxford  1982,19. 
13  Dietrich  (1965),  noting  the  difference  in  the  application  of  the  words,  both  in  quantitative  and 
qualitative  terns,  and,  more  important,  being  supported  by  the  evidence  of  popular  cult  practices  and 
inscriptions,  distinguishes  poipa  as  the  only  word  related  to  actual  popular  belief,  and  infers  that  uoipa 
corresponded  to  an  actual  goddess.  Dietrich's  position  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  due  course. 
"Chantraine  (1968),  s.  v.  it  hrTw. 
15  B  359,  Z  412,  H  52,  O  495,  Y  337,  m  588,  X  39,  all  with  some  form  of  *trEIv;  0  396,  TT  857=  X  363, 
196. 
65 twice,  at  0  170  and  A  263,  do  we  find  the  word  with  the  verb  ävarrIpTA  dpi  denoting 
instead  one's  life,  the  fulfilment  of  which  entails  once  again  death.  In  the  Odyssey  the 
word  is  used  exclusively  with  the  meaning  of  death,  in  more  or  less  standard  formulaic 
lines  such  as  6avsety  Kai  Tr6rpov  EtriaTrsiv  (6  562,  E  308,  p  342,  g  274,  cf.  H  52).  16 
Of  a  similarly  restricted  application  is  ohToc.  Its  etymology  is  controversial: 
according  to  Chantraine,  '7  two  different  solutions  have  been  proposed,  the  first  relating 
the  word  to  the  verb  EI  1,  in  which  case  OTTO;  could  be  seen  as  `la  marche  de  I'  homme 
vers  le  terme  de  son  destin',  the  second,  and  the  less  plausible  as  Chantraine  believes, 
relating  the  word  to  the  Avestan  aeta-  which  has  an  original  sense  of  `part'  and  is 
related  to  alca.  18  The  word  is  used  in  expressions  that  recall  the  use  of  Tr6111oc  (O  34, 
cf.  A  263;  y  134,  cf.  A  372)  or  p6poc  (r  417,  v  384,  cf.  m  133),  and  can  refer  to  death  (f 
417,  fl  388,  y  134,  v  384),  one's  life  (O  34=  354=  465),  or  one's  lot  or  fate  (I  563,  a 
350,0  459,578).  Both  rroT11oc  and  ohToc  are  of  a  fairly  limited  application  in  the 
poems,  hardly  being  able  to  illuminate  the  Homeric  concept  of  fate;  therefore,  I  would 
not  regard  them  as  essential  to  the  following  examination  and  they  will  be  referred  to 
hereafter  only  if  necessary.  What  is  worth  bearing  in  mind,  perhaps,  is  that  both  words 
have  negative  connotations  in  both  poems,  rr6woc  in  particular  being  almost 
equivalent,  as  I  said,  to  death.  As  we  will  presently  see,  both  the  reference  to  an 
unwelcome  event  and  the  relation  to  death  are  important  characteristics  of  the  concept 
as  expressed  by  the  more  important  terms  poipa  and  abaa  too. 
16  Cf.  also  6dvaTOV  xai  nöTuov  ErriarrEiv  (w  31,  also  found  in  the  Iliad,  B  359,0  495,  Y  337)  and 
Odvov  xai  nöTpOV  ärrEOtrov  (A 389=  w  22).  The  word  is  combined  in  a  formulaic  manner  with  different 
forms  of  the  verb  e4  T  Env,  occupying  the  two  last  feet  of  the  line  (the  afore  mentioned  cases  aside,  see  ß 
250,  y  16,8  196,5  714,,  N  197,  A  372,  X  317=  416;  at  8  339-40=  p  130-31  e4  i1rEiv  has  been  replaced  with 
E4iEval;  of  all  the  occurrences  of  the  word  in  the  Odyssey,  only  x  245  has  it  rpov  in  a  different  position. 
17  Chantraine  (1968)  s.  v. 
18  Lee  (1961:  195)  also  relates  oITOC  and  abaa.  A  third  view  relates  oITOC  to  oiow;  see  Dietrich  (1965) 
338. 
66 More  interesting,  perhaps,  is  the  use  of  Krjp.  Unlike  rrörpoc  and  oTTOc,  Krjp  has  a 
significant  place  in  Greek  literature,  appearing  even  to  have  a  divine  status,  either  as 
Krjp  in  the  singular  or  in  the  plural  as  Kijpec,  19  and  representing  the  spirits  `that  cut 
short  the  thread  of  man's  life'.  20  The  etymology  is  once  again  obscure  and 
controversial.  Dietrich  relates  the  verb  to  the  verb  Kfjpaivca,  a  verb  of  similar  meaning 
to  ý9eipw,  PXdnTw,  seeing  in  Krjp  a  power  of  destruction  and  death;  21  since,  however, 
Kripaivca  would  seem  to  derive  from  rather  than  precede  Kfp,  22  Lee's  suggestion  which 
relates  the  word  to  the  verb  Ksipw,  `cut,  shear',  seems  indeed  much  more  plausible.  23 
Such  an  etymological  explanation  would  lead  to  the  interpretation  of  Krjp  originally  as 
the  portion  cut  for  a  person,  that  is  his  lot  or  fate.  This  is  indeed  the  argument  made  by 
Lee,  who  further  relates  iajp  with  poipa  and  aiaa:  the  three  words  are  seen  as  `identical 
in  meaning'  and  `interchangeable  in  usage';  24  nonetheless,  Kjp  is  basically  related  only 
to  death,  any  idea  of  predetermination  concerning  life  in  general  being  entirely  absent 
from  its  semantic  field.  It  can  denote  the  very  event  of  death,  in  which  case  it  is 
paratactically  combined  with  OdvaTcc  or  46voc  (e.  g.  0  66,  n  169,  B  352),  25  or  it  can 
denote  the  fate  or  portion  of  death  which  is  common  to  all  men,  and  in  this  case 
19  Hes.  Theog.,  211  and  217,  where,  along  with  Moipa  t,  they  are  the  daughters  of  Night.  In  Homer  K  4p 
appears  as  a  personification  only  once,  at  1  535,  along  with  'Epic,  Strife 
,  and  Kuboiuöc,  Uproar,  in  a 
rather  metaphorical  sense,  one  could  say,  in  one  of  the  scenes  that  Hephaistus  forges  on  Achilles'  shield. 
20  Greene  (1944)  16;  cf.  Burkert  (1985)  180. 
21  Dietrich  (1965)  242. 
22  The  verb  appears  actually  for  the  first  time  in  Aesch.  Suppl.  999.  H.  Friis  Johansen  and  E.  W.  Whittle 
(Aeschylus:  The  Suppliants,  vol.  3,1980,  ad  loc.  )  relate  to  urip  both  the  transitive  ('bring  death  to')  and 
the  intransitive  ('be  harassed  in  mind')  form  of  the  verb. 
23  Lee  (1961)195;  Lee  refers  the  word  to  the  root  *(s)qer,  from  which  Ksipw  derives.  The  same 
etymology  is  accepted  by  Greene  (1944)17,  n.  40;  Chantraine  (1968:  s.  v.  )  avoids  taking  a  position, 
accepting  instead  that  the  word  remains  obscure. 
24  Lee  (1961)196;  see,  however,  Chantraine  (1968:  S.  V.  Krjp),  who  talks  of  Lee's  '  combinaisons 
etymologiques  deraisonables'. 
25  One  can  see  here  an  original  hendiadys,  to  be  explained  on  the  grounds  of  Krjp's  primary  meaning  of 
fate.  For  a  similar  relation  of  uoipa  with  regard  to  death  see  p.  82. 
67 OdvaT  is  used  in  the  genitive  as  an  attributive  to  Krjp  (e.  g.  B  834=  A  332,  O  70=  X 
210,  A  171=  X  398). 
This  slight  differentiation  of  meaning  between  the  event  and  the  fate  of  death 
will  be  presently  noticed  in  the  application  of  uoipa  and  alga,  and  will  be  discussed 
there  in  more  detail.  The  reason  why  Krjp  is  distinguished  from  the  other  two  terms  is  its 
very  limited  semantic  field,  but,  more  important,  its  inability  to  evoke  the  idea  of 
predetermination  or  fate  with  equal  cogency.  This  is  probably  the  explanation  of  the 
later  development  of  each  word:  while  poipa  and  nErrpwTO  retain  their  meaning  of  fate 
even  down  to  modem  Greek,  icjp  soon  became  a  spirit  that  brings  destruction,  not 
necessarily  connected  with  fate.  26 
When  it  comes  to  the  examination  of  poipa,  axaa,  and  Tropsiv,  it  is  worth  noting 
a  significant  etymological  and  semantic  link  between  them:  they  all  belong  to  Palmer's 
group  of  `mark'  or  `boundary  words'.  The  importance  of  this  observation,  with  regard 
to  the  examination  of  fate,  lies  basically  in  two  points:  first,  it  emphasises  the 
importance  of  the  idea  of  limitation  for  the  concept  denoted  by  moira;  and  second,  it 
relates  this  concept  with  a  notion  of  morality. 
Roughly  speaking,  moira  can  be  said  to  have  three  basic  meanings:  first  of  all  it 
denotes  a  share;  it  then  relates  to  fate,  the  idea  that  one's  life  and  death  have  already 
been  defined;  and  finally,  it  implies  social  propriety  and  moral  behaviour,  Palmer's 
26  Aloa  is  associated  with  fate  in  Pindar,  while  it  is  also  used  in  the  lyric  passages  of  tragedy  down  to 
Euripides;  it  seems  though  that  it  gradually  lost  this  function,  being  limited  thereafter  to  the  use  of  aiaioc, 
surviving  in  modern  Greek  in  the  sense  of  a  happy  end  or  a  favourable  omen. 
68 `peculiar  concept  of  justice'  27  In  what  follows  I  will  aim  at  establishing  a  common  link 
between  these  apparently  diverse  meanings  before  explaining  the  use  of  the  same 
terminology  for  all  three.  It  would  be  very  useful  to  this  end  to  look  for  a  possible 
original  meaning  and  a  plausible  semantic  development,  that  would  hopefully  explicate 
the  peculiarities  of  the  Homeric  concept  of  fate  and  account  for  the  diverse  semantic 
applications  of  the  relevant  terminology.  The  lack  of  sufficient  and  substantial 
evidence  is  an  obstacle,  and  therefore  any  argument  will  be  put  forth  with  the  greatest 
reserve,  being  an  assumption  more  than  a  final  solution.  The  focus  will  be  inevitably  on 
uoipa,  for  this  is  the  most  powerful  term  and  the  one  with  the  widest  semantic  field; 
the  other  terms  will  also  be  considered,  but  to  a  lesser  degree  and  only  when  necessary. 
Both  uoipa  and  aTQa  are  used  to  denote  a  share  in  a  material  sense.  This  well 
accords  with  the  etymology  of  the  words,  and  I  would  therefore  believe  this  to  be  their 
original  meaning.  28  Alm,  being  the  oldest  of  the  relevant  words,  29  is  of  an  obscure 
derivation.  Both  Chantraine  and  Frisk  relate  the  word  to  the  Oscan  aeteis  -'partis', 
30 
27  Dietrich  (1965:  194ff,  212)  draws  a  much  more  detailed  distinction  between  the  meanings  and 
applications  of  lioipa,  according  to  which,  for  example,  loipa  as  death  is  divided  in  two  sub-categories, 
poipa  as  the  agent  of  death,  and  µoipa  as  the  event  of  death;  these  distinctions,  however,  pertain  to  his 
basic  thesis  that  poipa's  original  function  was  that  of  a  goddess  of  death,  who  underwent  a  gradual 
development  towards  a  less  personified  power  until  the  word  came  to  denote  simply  fate,  both  as  death 
and  as  life.  This  thesis  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  pp.  88-91. 
28  Such  an  original  meaning  seems  indeed  self-evident,  although  Dietrich  (1965:  207-9,223-24)  insists  that 
uoipa=share  is  a  much  later  development  of  the  word,  especially  as  found  in  the  Homeric  poems  (share  of 
booty,  share  of  meat  etc);  in  this  application  he  sees  a  rather  technical  use  of  the  term,  whose  late 
character  is  obvious  from  its  more  frequent  occurrence  in  the  Odyssey.  Even  if  one  should  accept  that 
µoipa=share  is  indeed  rather  technically  used  in  the  poems,  it  cannot  be  disproved  that  this  is  the  original 
meaning  of  the  word,  from  which  the  meanings  death,  fate  and  propriety  have  finally  evolved.  Dietrich 
(1965:  208,228)  also  accepts  that  this  meaning  has  a  moral  sense,  yet,  he  fails  to  see  its  relation  to  fate 
because  of  his  argument  that  Moipa=  a  goddess  of  death. 
29  Along  with'Epivüc,  a1aa  is  found  in  inscriptions  in  the  Arcado-Cypriot  dialect,  which  is  believed  to 
represent  the  oldest  form  of  Greek  language.  See  Dietrich  (1965)  11  and  12,  n.  1,  Dodds  (1951)  21,  n.  44. 
Dietrich  seems  to  be  inconsistent  when  he  accepts  that  atoa  `was  originally  used  to  denote  a  share  of 
sacrificial  meat  and  retained  this  meaning  for  some  time',  a  statement  that  apparently  contradicts  his 
conviction  that  the  meaning  `share'  is  a  later  development  (see  previous  note);  still,  he  is  talking  at  this 
point  of  azaa,  which  he  differentiates  from  Näpa;  it  is  poipa  for  which  he  cannot  see  a  relation  to  the 
meaning  `share'.  Unfortunately,  however  interesting  the  distinction  he  draws  between  the  terms,  it  results 
in  an  argumentation  which  is  unnecessarily  complicated  and  not  always  illuminating  as  regards  uoipa  and 
fate. 
30  Chantraine  (1968)  and  Frisk  (1960).  s.  v. 
69 while  there  is  also  believed  to  exist  a  relation  to  the  Lesbian  iooaoOai,  iooric,  according 
to  Hesychius,  who  translates  the  word  as  meaning  KA1  poüa6aI.  31  Whatever  the  case,  it 
is  obvious  that  the  word  implies  a  portion  or  a  share.  Moipa,  on  the  other  hand,  stems 
from  usipopai,  `receive  a  portion',  and  is,  therefore,  quite  transparent  as  regards  its 
original  meaning  of  `share,  portion'.  32  This  primary  sense  of  `share'  is  attested  in  both 
poems  (e.  g.  µoipa  at  0  195,  y  40,  p  258,  and  aToa  at,  1378,1327,  s  40,  r  84).  The 
words  can  refer  to  a  portion  of  meat  (u  260)  or  land  (TT  68),  booty  (A  534)  or  night  (K 
252-53),  or  even  to  a  portion  of  shame  (u  171)  or  hope  (T  84).  We  also  find  the  perfect 
Euuops  of  the  deponent  verb  usipopai  meaning  that  `one  has  got  a  share  in  a  thing'  (A 
278,0  189,  s  335,  A  338),  and  the  adjective  a*  ppopoc  which  can  be  used  for  `one  who 
has  no  share  in  a  thing'  (1489,  E  275);  33  we  also  have  the  adjective  ENUopoc,  used  only 
once,  at  0  480,  for  the  singers  who  enjoy  a  share  of  tgnj  and  ai&k,  while  the  verb 
&apoipdouai  also  appears  only  once,  again  in  the  Odyssey  (g  434),  obviously  meaning 
`divide,  distribute'. 
Most  interesting  is  the  use  of  moira  to  denote  the  apportionment  and 
departmentalisation  of  power  between  the  gods:  according  to  Poseidon,  all  power  is 
divided  by  three  and  distributed  thereupon  to  the  three  sons  of  Kronos  and  Rhea, 
Poseidon  himself,  Hades  and  Zeus:  Poseidon's  province  is  the  sea,  Hades'  the 
underworld,  and  Zeus's  the  sky,  while  all  three  of  them  have  power  on  earth  and 
Olympus  (0  187-193).  The  three  gods  are  therefore  considered  iaöuopot  and  öpj 
rrsrrpcopivot  aigu  (209),  each  having  an  equal  share  of  power,  and  this  is  why,  when 
31  This  is  the  etymology  preferred  by  Greene  (1944)  402,  and  Dietrich  (1965)  11.  For  a  combination  of 
the  two  solutions  by  Bianchi  (d/OI  A/FA,  Destino,  tiomini  e  divinitä  hell'  epos  helle  teogonie  e  nel  culto 
dei  Greci,  Roma  1963),  see  Dietrich  (1965)  339-40. 
32  The  meaning  of  lot,  which  is  frequently  used  for  moira,  further  underlines  the  relation  between  moira 
and  chance.  Cf.  the  way  that  lots  are  drawn  at  H  175-189. 
"  The  adjective  is  also  used  for  someone  who  is  miserable,  for  he  has  no  part  in  fate,  i.  e.  he  has  a  bad  fate, 
as  happens  at  fl  774. 
70 Zeus  demands  Poseidon's  obedience  to  his  will,  Poseidon  revolts  and  states  with 
obvious  determination  that  Zeus  should  keep  to  his  apportioned  province,  Kai  Kparepoc 
trap  Fcav  pcvsTC3  TpIrdTp  Evi  poipll  (195).  This  is  the  only  case  in  which  Trerrpcap  voc, 
the  perfect  passive  participle  of  the  aorist  rroptiv,  `furnish,  offer',  is  used  to  imply  an 
act  of  distribution  rather  than  an  idea  of  predetermination.  The  verb  is  further  related, 
according  to  Palmer,  to  the  root  *per  that  we  find  in  the  word  nipac,  `limit,  boundary', 
thus  denoting  an  idea  of  limitation  not  different  from  the  one  that  uoipa  and  aToa  seem 
to  imply  when  referring  to  shares  or  portions.  34 
It  is  worth  lingering  for  a  moment  on  this  scene.  Burkert  informs  us  that  the 
casting  of  lots  among  three  deities,  and  the  distribution  of  cosmos  among  them,  is  a 
motif  taken  from  the  Akkadian  epic  of  Atrahasis;  33  not  being  rooted  in  actual  Greek 
cult,  it  is  one  of  the  few  references  to  the  gods'  relation  to  cosmogony  in  Homer,  which 
are  the  result  of  the  `neo-oriental'  influence  on  Greece  during  the  eighth  century.  36  At 
the  same  time,  however,  the  departmentalisation  of  power  among  the  Olympians  seems 
to  be  a  consequence  of  the  peculiar  Greek  polytheistic  system:  each  god  representing  an 
entirely  different  power  with  a  distinct  field  of  action,  the  result  is  a  sense  of  disorder, 
since  `there  is  obviously  a  no  to  every  yes,  an  antithesis  to  every  thesis';  37 
departmentalisation  of  power  entails  that  each  god  protects  the  limits  of  his  or  her  own 
province,  this  being  the  only  way  of  mitigating  or  camouflaging  the  multifarious 
quality  of  life  itself.  38 
"Palmer  (1950)165;  cf.  Chantraine  (1968)  and  Frisk  (1970)  s.  v.  rropeiv. 
35  Burkert  (1992)  88-95. 
36  The  other  instances  are  Hera's  reference  to  Oceanus  and  Tethys  at  =  201-302  and  =  246,  and  the  scene 
of  Zeus's  seduction  by  Hera  in  _,  especially  their  making  love  at  346-51.  See  also  Burkert  (1985)  132. 
37  Burkert  (1985)  248. 
39  Burkert  (1985)  218,248;  cf.  Chantraine  (1952)  66ff. 
71 The  idea  that  the  gods  have  their  own  poipai,  to  which  apparently  their 
individual  -riurj  corresponds,  seems  to  evoke  a  sense  of  morality,  with  morality 
implying  the  existence  of  limits  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  (24-26).  Moreover, 
the  existence  of  well  defined  limits  which,  as  Poseidon  says,  should  not  be  violated, 
implies  in  its  turn  a  sense  of  order.  I  will  return  to  the  gods  when  examining  their 
relationship  to  morality  and  justice;  here,  it  suffices  to  note  the  link  between  moira  and 
order  as  an  element  that  relates  even  to  nature  and  cosmos  and  the  gods  who  are  their 
embodiment. 
It  does  not  come  as  a  surprise,  then,  that  moira  is  used  to  denote  a  sense  of 
social  propriety  in  the  poems.  This  meaning  is  found  basically  in  the  expressions  Kara 
poipav  and  KaT'  c?  'iaav,  which  are  often  employed  by  the  poet  and  his  heroes,  both 
mortal  and  immortal,  in  a  formulaic  manner  to  denote  that  someone  has  acted  or  has 
spoken  appropriately.  39  Once  only  in  each  poem  do  we  find  Fv  uoipp,  at  T  186  and  at  X 
54,  while  we  also  have  the  adverbial  use  of  dioipa  at  Z  62,  and  iva(atpov  at  Z  519.40 
The  opposite  of  KaTd  poipav  and  KaT'  diaav  is  oüSä  KaTä  uoipav  at  TT  368,  ß  251=  0  97 
and  1352,  and  unip  diaav  at  f  59=  Z  333;  in  the  Odyssey  rrapä  uoipav  also  occurs,  but 
only  once,  at  g  509.  However,  vrrsp  diaav  is  not  always  used  as  the  exact  opposite  of 
KaT'  dºoav;  along  with  ünep  poipav  and  üncppopov  (-a),  it  is  used  to  imply  a  violation 
of  fate  -  mainly  a  hypothetical  or  potential  violation  that  is  nevertheless  avoided.  The 
39  KaTä  uoipav  appears  at  A  286=  f1373_  K  169=  Y  626,159,0  206,  n  227=  0  141=  v  48=  v  385=  4) 
278=  X  486,  y  331,  y457=6783=6  54=1245=  i  342=1309,5266=o  170=u37,  e496,  K  16=p  35,  o 
170=  o  203,  rr  385,  p  580.  Kar'  dicav  appears  only  in  the  Iliad,  at  r  59=  Z  333,  K  445,  P  716. 
40  Cf.  0  207.  Of  great  interest  are  lines  B  212-14,  where  we  have  a  series  of  three  different  ways  of 
expressing  this  very  idea  of  inappropriateness,  which,  although  not  belonging  with  the  moira  group,  refer 
to  Palmer's  `boundary  words':  the  poet  describes  Thersites,  the  stereotype  of  the  anti-hero  in  this  great 
era,  as  äperpoetrrK,  a  soldier  who  knew  many  a  oapa  errea  and  who  vied  with  the  kings  ov  uarci 
Kdapov.  These  comments,  along  with  the  following  description  of  Thersites'  rather  unpleasant  external 
appearance,  serve  as  an  explanation  for  his  improper,  as  regards  his  social  position,  negative  criticism  of 
Agamemnon. 
72 question  of  moira's  transgression  is  a  rather  complicated  one,  and  will  be  discussed  in 
due  course;  at  this  point,  it  is  worth  noting  the  slight  differentiation  of  the  above 
expressions  which  seems  to  imply  once  more  a  diversity  of  meanings  for  moira. 
The  social  nuance  conveyed  by  the  above  expressions  is  beyond  doubt.  There  is 
obviously  no  relation  to  any  idea  of  fate  or  predetermination;  as  to  the  original  meaning 
of  share,  one  can  certainly  say  that  moira  in  these  cases  denotes  the  social  share  of  Tºurj 
that  each  hero  possesses  and  that  consequently  the  reference  is  made  to  the  hero's 
behaving  according  to  the  demands  of  his  social  status.  The  departmentalisation  takes 
place  this  time  on  a  social  level,  and  we  may  talk  of  an  apportionment  of  TºNrj  among 
men:  each  person  lives  within  the  limits  of  his  social  share,  and  a  proper  behaviour 
entails  observance  of  these  limits.  41  This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  use  of  the 
adjectives  Evaiaºuoc  and  igaioioc;  along  with  aioºuoc,  they  are  also  employed  to 
denote  propriety,  and  the  prepositions  iv  and  EK  fairly  clearly  denote  someone  who  is 
within  or  beyond  one's  own  alca  or  share,  that  is,  within  or  beyond  one's  own  limits.  42 
41  So  Adkins  (1960)  21;  Yamagata  (1994)  107.  Adkins  (1972:  1)  actually  claims  that  the  idea  of  fate 
derives  from  such  an  original  application  to  social  shares  of  status,  he  fails,  however,  to  see  that  this  idea 
of  departmentalisation  is  essentially  moral  in  its  connotations.  Similarly,  Burkert  (1996:  150)  believes  that 
'the  concepts  of  moira  and  aisa,  constitutive  of  the  Greek  world  picture'  have  to  do  with  the  sharing  of 
food  after  hunting,  'one  of  the  universalia  of  human  civilizations...  Recognition  of  equality  and  rank 
comes  in  from  the  start,  as  "parts"  are  distributed  in  due  order'.  The  relation  of  recognition  of  social  status 
to  morality  as  a  recognition  of  proper  limits  is  worthy  of  note. 
42  Similarly,  ürrep  aloav  and  the  word  ütrsp(3aoia  refer  to  the  transgression  of  Emits.  "  Y(3pic  could  also 
be  related  to  the  same  idea,  if  seen  as  cognate  to  üTrEp.  For  the  etymology  of  üßpic  Chantraine  (1968: 
s.  v.  )  presents  three  different  solutions  as  proposed  by  scholars:  the  first  relates  the  word  to  nr  p,  a 
solution  `qui  serait  satisfaisant  pour  le  lens,  mais  reste  inadmissible'  (this  is  the  etymology  that  Greene 
(1944:  18,  n.  45)  suggests);  the  second  solution  traces  the  word  to  6-U=  Uri  and  the  root  of  ßpi-apöc,  but 
is  morphologically  not  plausible,  according  to  Chantraine;  finally,  Chantraine  presents  the  solution 
provided  by  Szemerdnyi  (JHS  94  (1974)  154),  according  to  whom  the  word  is  related  to  the  Hittito- 
louvite  *hu(wa)ppar,  `outrage',  and  which  is  supposed  to  have  been  a  loan  word  in  Greek.  See  also 
Palmer  (1950)  162-63  for  the  similar  implications  of  the  antithetical  couples  ev8IKOc-EKSIKOc,  evvouoc- 
EKVO'Oc. 
73 Both  the  prepositional  phrases  and  the  adjectives,  then,  are  evocative  of  an 
order  which  results  from  the  observance  of  the  set  limits.  Thus,  it  would  appear  that 
besides  referring  to  a  hero's  individual  social  share  or  status,  moira  denotes  social  order 
itself.  When  Nestor,  for  example,  speaks  KaTa  poipav  at  A  286,  he  speaks  in  a  manner 
that  is  appropriate  to  the  situation  as  a  whole  if  order  is  to  be  maintained,  and  not 
simply  appropriate  to  his  own  social  status  or  riurj;  the  issue  at  stake  is  one  of  order 
and  propriety  on  the  side  of  Achilles  and  Agamemnon,  not  of  Nestor.  The 
unquestionable  formulaic  character  of  the  prepositional  phrases  seems  to  account  for 
the  application  of  the  idea  even  to  cases  in  which  no  apparent  link  to  social  propriety  or 
order  can  be  traced.  Thus,  we  hear  at  6  782f  that  the  suitors  tie  the  oars  ITaVTa  Kara 
potpav  (=  6  53f.  ),  and  at  i  308f.  that  Polyphemus  milks  the  sheep  TrdvTa  xacrä  uoipav 
(_  244f.  =  134  If  ).  43 
The  two  meanings,  that  of  `share'  and  that  of  `order'  or  `propriety',  seem 
indeed  combined  in  the  idea  of  fate  as  expressed  by  moira.  The  concept  does  not  refer 
simply  to  an  established  future  or  to  a  destiny;  life's  predetermined  course  is  now 
interpreted  as  the  result  of  an  apportionment,  thus  further  stressing  the  existence  of 
individual  portions  and  shares,  and  consequently  of  limits.  One's  share  in  life  is 
individual  and  unique,  defined  by  the  particular  conditions  of  one's  own  life  and  death. 
As  Clay  says,  44  moira  is  what  differentiates  one  hero  from  another,  and  this 
differentiation  may  be  said  to  span  one's  life  from  birth  to  death.  The  fact  that  fate  is 
perceived  as  a  share  is  perhaps  the  most  important  characteristic  of  the  Homeric 
concept;  life  itself  is  departmentalised  on  the  human  level,  and  this  seems  to  entail  that 
43  Note  also  that  evaicipoc  is  also  used  for  favourable  omens  at  B  53,13159,13182;  similar  is  the  use  of 
trapaioioc  at  A  381.  Rather  peculiar  is  the  use  of  6poiuoc  at  it  392;  the  word  is  usually  associated  with 
death,  but  here  it  refers  to  a  suitable  suitor. 
44  Clay  (1983)  157. 
74 behind  moira  there  is  an  order  which  is  preserved  whenever  moira  is  fulfilled.  45  The 
idea  of  fate  in  general  implies  that  life  is  not  something  one  chooses  and  decides  upon; 
rather,  it  is  something  which  is  defined  by  some  external  source.  When  this  idea  is 
further  seen  as  a  share  or  an  allotted  portion,  a  shift  of  emphasis  is  detected  towards  the 
fact  that  this  share  appears  both  to  define  and  to  be  defined  by  one's  own  limits,  in 
nature,  in  life,  in  society. 
The  idea  that  life  can  be  departmentalised  into  shares  could  easily  be  seen  as 
the  result  of  plain  experience.  Each  person  is  a  separate  unit,  and  as  such  each  person 
has  his  own  share  in  life  and  his  own  share  in  death.  In  a  society,  each  person  is  again  a 
separate  social  unit,  with  a  separate  share  of  ti  nj,  of  the  privileges  of  social  life,  of 
rights  and  obligations.  Most  important,  when  seen  as  part  of  nature  and  against  divinity, 
mankind  has  its  special  share  in  natural  order,  culminating  in  the  share  of  death.  It  is 
indeed  extremely  difficult  to  confirm  that  any  one  of  the  above  meanings  has  a  claim  to 
priority,  or  to  say  with  certainty  whether  man's  perception  of  life  evolves  from  the 
general  towards  the  individual,  from  the  macrocosmos  of  nature  towards  the 
microcosmos  of  human  society,  or  vice  versa;  46  our  evidence  is  scant,  and  not  at  all 
substantial  for  such  a  task.  47 
as  By  talking  of  order,  I  do  not  imply  a  plan;  as  will  be  mentioned  presently,  moira  does  not  evoke  any 
idea  of  destiny  in  the  sense  of  a  metaphysical  plan  or  purpose  to  be  fulfilled. 
4'  Cornford  (1912:  15)  believes  that  `it  is  inconceivable  that  an  abstraction  generalised  from  the  fates  of 
individual  men,  and  inapplicable  to  the  Gods,  should  ever  have  been  erected  into  a  power  superior  to  the 
Gods  themselves.  The  notion  of  the  individual  lot  or  fate,  [...  ]  comes  last,  not  first,  in  the  order  of 
development'.  Contra  Wiezsäcker,  RoscherM.  L.,  s.  v.  `Moira',  3084,  as  quoted  by  Cornford,  ibid. 
47Attempts  like  Cornford's  or  Dietrich's  to  provide  more  tangible  evidence  in  the  support  of  their 
interpretation  have  proven  vain.  Cornford,  based  on  comparative  anthropological  data,  saw  moira  as  the 
projection  of  the  microcosmos  of  human  society  to  the  macrocosmos  of  nature:  the  social  group  is  first 
divided  into  sub-groups  among  which  relations  suggested  by  the  principle  of  taboo  preserve  order,  and 
this  idea  is  then  transferred  to  nature  and  life;  Adkins  (1972)  offers  a  variation  of  this  view,  but  still  sees 
the  original  use  of  moira  in  social  terms;  Dietrich  (1965),  as  already  noted,  accepts  the  priority  of  death, 
but  goes  too  far  in  believing  that  moira  was  actually  a  goddess. 
75 If  we  return  for  a  moment  to  Palmer  and  his  group  of  `boundary  words',  moira 
is  seen  to  imply  the  existence  of  limits  which  prescribe  and  thereupon  circumscribe 
one's  actions;  and  this  is  basically  an  idea  affiliated  to  that  of  morality:  when  limits 
cease  to  exist,  there  comes  chaos  -  exactly  as  happens  with  morality.  That  this  idea 
should  be  interpreted  as  moral  can  have  a  twofold  explanation:  first  of  all,  the  principle 
of  limitation,  as  suggested  by  the  belief  in  well-defined  shares,  is  moral  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  consistent  with  itself;  it  imposes  a  law  almost,  and  it  does  so  indiscriminately 
and  invariably,  perpetuating  and  thus  confirming  itself;  second,  being  thus  consistent 
with  itself,  this  principle  suggests  an  order  according  to  which  the  established  limits 
cannot  and  therefore  will  not  be  violated. 
Moira,  then,  implies  an  idea  of  morality  and  a  sense  of  order.  As  Cornford 
rightly  observes,  48  it  is  not  simply  what  must  be,  but  also  what  ought  to  be.  We  have 
already  seen  how  divine  power  was  apportioned  between  Zeus,  Poseidon  and  Hades: 
the  field  of  power  and  activity  of  each  god  is  well  defined  and  established,  and  any 
transgression  of  the  set  limits  is  a  transgression  of  an  order  and  the  cause  of 
indignation.  It  is  the  same  idea  of  departmentalisation  and  the  same  implication  of  a 
moral  order  that  moira  as  fate  seems  to  evoke. 
Still,  this  is  merely  the  explanation  given  post  eventum.  When  life  proves  too 
fast  and  difficult  for  man  to  comprehend,  he  ascribes  it  to  moira,  that  is  to  an  order  of 
an  inscrutable  reasoning,  which  should  not  be  violated,  and  which,  as  far  as  he  knows, 
is  not  violated.  This  is  the  way  in  which  moira  is  perceived  when  it  refers  to  an  already 
accomplished  event  of  the  past;  it  entails  both  inevitability  and  irreversibility,  and  it 
48  Cornford  (1912)  11. 
76 denotes  the  final  and  ultimate  point  whence  no  return  can  ever  exist.  When  seen, 
however,  as  the  future,  moira  seems  to  be  inviting  and  challenging  man.  It  may  be  still 
looming  as  an  inescapable  order,  yet  it  allows  at  the  same  time  the  possibility  of 
violation.  This  is  certainly  a  paradox  of  the  very  concept  of  fate:  as  a  past,  it  appears  to 
have  been  inevitable,  but  as  a  future,  it  is  ambiguous,  permitting  a  considerable  amount 
of  hope.  To  this  ambivalence  I  will  return  when  examining  the  use  of  the  concept  in  the 
poems.  At  this  point,  I  would  like  to  discuss  the  implications  that  moira  has  when  seen 
as  a  past,  when  used  post  eventum  as  an  explanation  for  life,  because  it  is  basically  in 
this  aspect  that  the  idea  of  order  can  be  detected. 
When  seen  from  a  distance,  as  I  said,  moira  relates  to  an  event  that  has  been 
accomplished,  and  whose  ultimate  character  entails  that  its  consequences  are  inevitable 
for  man.  49  Obviously,  not  all  events  of  life  are  attributed  to  moira  -  not  in  the  Homeric 
world.  In  neither  of  the  poems  do  we  find  the  belief  that  moira  defines  life,  and 
consequently  the  plot,  from  beginning  to  end  in  every  detail;  rather,  there  are  particular 
isolated  events  which  are  said  to  be  fated.  Nor  is  there  any  relationship  whatever 
between  these  events;  no  plan  of  a  metaphysical  dimension  seems  to  be  fulfilled 
through  moira.  Despite  its  importance,  moira  has  not  yet  become  a  cruel  force  that 
binds  man  to  well-defined  movements;  most  often,  it  is  used  in  the  capacity  of  an 
explanation.  The  heroes  -  for  it  is  the  heroes  whom  we  need  to  listen  in  this  case  -  are 
hardly  ever  concerned  with  moira  as  a  predetermined  future;  they  acknowledge  its 
existence  only  in  the  end,  once  there  is  no  other  explanation  to  be  given. 
49  It  is  indeed  possible  that  man  could  or  should  be  regarded  as  responsible  for  this  event,  although  the 
fact  that  for  Homeric  thought  an  event  is  determined  both  on  the  human  and  the  divine  level  seems  to 
entail  that  moira  can  be  the  result  of  human  action,  yet  it  is  also  imposed  on  man  by  external  forces.  The 
issue  will  be  more  relevant  once  we  have  seen  how  moira  is  interwoven  in  the  plot  of  the  poems,  and  a 
hint  only  at  this  point  is,  I  believe,  sufficient. 
77 It  is  in  this  way  that  moira  is  related  to  a  sense  of  order:  it  is  the  reasoning,  the 
explanation  as  to  why  things  happened  as  they  have.  This  explanation  does  not 
correspond  to  an  illustration  of  a  rational  sequence  of  causes  and  effects,  whereby  man 
is  allowed  to  see  the  way  in  which  external  forces  are  supposed  to  affect  the  course  of 
life.  Moira  simply  removes  from  man  the  anxiety  he  feels  against  the  chaos  that 
surrounds  him,  against  the  vertiginous  speed  of  life  itself,  by  confirming  that  what 
happened  was  part  of  an  order  against  which  he  could  not  have  acted. 
It  is  difficult  to  define  with  certainty  or  accuracy  the  characteristics  that  qualify 
an  event  so  that  it  can  be  ascribed  to  fate.  For  the  most  part,  we  have  to  do  with 
unwelcome  events:  an  insurmountable  and  lamentable  misfortune  (Z  356-58,  e  206-7), 
or  the  destruction  of  a  whole  city  (0  511-13,  cf.  TT  707-9,0  517);  50  thus,  poipa  is  öAorj 
(TT  849,  y  238),  6ucc3vupoc  (M  116),  KaKrj  (N  602,  i  52),  XaXErrrj  (X  292);  axoa  is  also 
KaKtj  (A  61)  and  äpyaXEn  (X  61);  and  uöpoc  is  KaKÖC  (Z  357,  A  618)  and  aiv&  (1464, 
cf.  i  53).  5'  It  also  seems  that  the  reference  is  made  to  an  unpredictable  event,  or at  any 
rate  an  event  whose  consequences  cannot  be  easily  foreseen,  and  which  lies,  therefore, 
beyond  human  reasoning  and  control.  Thus  Agamemnon  ascribes  his  ä  rq  to  uoipa  (T 
87-89),  and  Elpenor's  soul  similarly  refers  to  ä-M  and  aTaa  as  the  reasons  behind  the 
hero's  death  (A  60-61).  No  other  explanation  can  account  for  the  apparent  irrationality 
of  these  events;  since  they  have  happened,  it  must  have  been  moira  or  fate  that  they 
should  happen,  and  in  this  way  life  assumes  the  quality  of  a  predetermined  and 
therefore  inevitable  course. 
50  Moira  is  of  a  positive  quality  in  the  case  of  Aeneas,  who  is  fated  to  survive  the  war  (Y  302-8),  and  in 
the  case  of  Odysseus  who  is  fated  to  return  to  Ithaca,  although  at  the  same  time  moira  also  demands  that 
he  should  be  wandering  at  sea  for  ten  years. 
51  OiTO(  is  also  called  uaK6(;  (0  34=  354=  465,  r  417,  a  350,  y  134,  v  384),  while  Krjp  is  KaKrj  (M  113, 
1T  687,  ß  316),  öAorj  (N  665,1535),  ßapeia  ((D  548),  atuyeprj  (4178-79). 
78 Besides  referring  to  isolated  events  of  life,  moira  is  also  used  as  a  synonym 
almost  of  life  itself.  Thus  we  hear  of  Achilles'  life  which  is  brief  and  unpleasant  (A 
416-18);  or  we  hear  that  Hector  and  Andromache  were  born  to  a  common  fate,  in  atafl 
(X  477f.  ).  The  idea  of  predetermination  is  still  present,  yet  in  these  cases  moira  seems 
to  be  equivalent  almost,  at  least  notionally,  to  a  chance  event:  it  refers  to  the  lot  of  an 
individual,  the  fate  that  was  distributed  to  him  haphazardly  and  on  no  rational  basis. 
Life  seen  in  its  entirety  and  from  a  distance  is  explained  retrospectively  as  one's 
individual  share  of  life.  52  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  adjectives  appopoc  (fl  774), 
Käuuopoc  (ß  351),  büopopoc  (X  60,  Tr  139),  Suadppopoc  (X  485)  and  aivopopoc  (X 
481,  w  169)  seem  to  be  used;  the  reference  is  made  to  life  as  a  whole,  to  one's 
unfavourable  lot.  53  Rather  peculiar  is  the  use  of  moira  at  u  75-76,  where  the  reference  is 
made  to  Zeus:  6  yap  T'  Ev  ol6EV  älravTa,  I  uoipdv  T'  appophiv  TE  KaTaevrlTWv 
dvOpc3ncov;  appopul,  an  hapax  legomenon,  obviously  refers  to  one's  miserable  lot,  for 
the  lines  relate  the  sad  story  of  Pandareus'  daughters,  with  poipa,  which  is  used  as  an 
antonym,  having  in  this  case  the  unique  meaning  of  a  fortunate  lot.  54 
The  event  which  seems  to  capture  the  idea  of  moira  most  successfully  is  death. 
This  is  a  use  that  is  mostly  prominent  in  the  Iliad,  the  Odyssey  obviously  providing 
32  Aloa  comes  close  to  meaning  chance  or  luck  also  at  E  209-11:  Pandarus  uses  the  same  expression  that 
Thetis  uses  for  Achilles  at  A  418,  xaKf  don;  were  it  not  the  case  that  Achilles'  death  is  frequently 
mentioned  as  pre-determined,  the  expression  could  well  seem  to  imply  bad  luck.  Cf.  i  259-60. 
53  Cf  also  the  use  of  ätroTuoc  (fl  388,  a  219,  u  140),  and  travdirorpoc  (f1493).  MoipryevEc  at  f  182 
is  an  hapax  legomenon.  It  is  used  for  Agamemnon,  who  is  also  called  6'Xpio6aiuwv,  and  the  reference  is 
obviously  made  to  his  good  luck,  his  good  fate.  The  compound  refers  to  Agamemnon's  social  status  as  a 
king  (Dietrich  (1965)  211),  or,  in  other  words,  to  his  noble  birth  (Chantraine  (1965)  s.  v.  uaipoua1,679)  ; 
Dietrich  (ibid.  ),  in  the  light  of  his  basic  thesis  on  Moira's  original  divine  quality,  sees  the  relation  between 
poipa  and  social  status  as  a  later  development,  not  yet  fully  established  in  the  poems.  As  will  become 
clear  later  on,  moira  comprises  of  all  the  elements  of  one's  life,  social  status  being  one  of  them,  and  I 
would  avoid,  therefore,  both  its  identification  with  and  its  total  distinction  from  Tiurj. 
54  See  Dietrich  (1965)  230. 
79 limited  opportunities  for  such  an  application.  55  The  reference  can  be  made  to  one's 
individual  death,  which  is  fated  to  happen  at  a  particular  moment  and  under  particular 
circumstances,  as  happens  with  Hector  (TT  852-54)  and  Achilles  (`Y  80-8  1);  or  it  can  be 
made  to  the  general  and  common  human  fate  of  mortality,  the  end  that  awaits  all  men 
indiscriminately,  as  is  the  case  of  E3  100,  referring  to  Laertes  by  means  of  the  formula 
poip'  6'Xoý  KaOsAnai  TavflAeysoc  BavdToio.  There  are  indeed  a  considerable  number  of 
cases  in  which  the  relevant  terminology  refers  to  death  as  a  simple  event,  seemingly 
without  the  implications  and  complications  of  the  concept  of  fate.  The  word  popoc 
appears  to  bear  simply  the  meaning  of  death  in  three  out  of  its  five  occurrences  in  the 
Iliad  (1465,0133,  X  280),  and  in  five  out  of  the  eight  occurrences  in  the  Odyssey  (a 
166,  i  61,  A  409,  rr  421,  u  241).  56  The  meaning  is  especially  clear  in  the  compound 
c  popoc,  used  of  one's  premature  or  imminent  death  (A  417,  A  505f.,  195,  a  266).  57 
More  interesting  and  illuminating  are  the  cases  of  formulae  which  seem  to  bear 
only  a  faint  reminiscence  of  an  original  idea  of  predetermination.  Thus,  no06pcoc 
edvaTOc  Kai  uoipa  KpaTauj  seems  to  be  simply  one  of  the  many  alternatives  used  by 
the  poet  for  the  sake  of  variety.  58  A  random,  but  quite  indicative  example  is  TT  333-34: 
ss  True,  this  can  be  no  more  than  the  result  of  the  poem's  particular  subject:  death  being  a  frequent, 
almost  regular  event  of  war,  it  is  expected  that  the  theme  will  recur;  moreover,  the  fact  that  according  to 
tradition,  or  history,  Achilles  and  Hector  died  in  this  war,  requires  that  their  fate  should  entail  death.  Still, 
there  seems  to  be  a  special  link  between  uoipa  and  death,  which  will  prove  of  particular  help  in  our 
understanding  of  the  word's  peculiarities  and  function. 
56  The  remaining  cases  are  Z  356-58,  when,  as  already  noted,  Helen  attributes  Paris'  and  her  own  bad  fate 
to  Zeus,  T  421f.,  Achilles'  reference  to  his  own  fated  death,  and  A  618-19,  when  Heracles  parallels 
Odysseus'  descent  to  Hades  to  his  own.  In  the  Odyssey  we  also  have  the  expression  ürrep  p0pov  three 
times  (a  34,  a  35,  s  436).  At  fl  84-86  the  word  is  ambiguous:  Thetis,  surrounded  by  the  Nereids,  is 
crying  for  her  son,  n  S'  iv  uEaotlc  l  KAaie  uöpov  ov  Trat&k  d'uüuovoc,  cc  of  ePEAAe  I  $OiosaO'  iv 
Tpoip  Fpt(3o  XaKt,  TnX6At  rraTpTlc,  and  now  death  is  set  in  the  context  of  Achilles'  particular  conditions 
of  life,  evoking  in  this  manner  the  idea  of  a  fated  and  well  defined  event. 
s'  Cf  also  A  416,  and  the  use  of  uiwv6a6toc  at  A  352,  used  of  Hector  at  0  612. 
S8  E  82-83=1T  333-34=  Y  476-77;  cf.  also  A  517,  M  116-17,  and  the  rather  peculiar  use  of  p6poipoc  by 
Apollo  at  X  13:  oü  LEv  µe  KTevsetc,  Enrst  oü  Tot  p6pagµöc  eint;  there  are  also  lines  which  seem 
ambivalent,  implying  both  the  event  of  death  and  the  presence  of  fate,  such  as  N  610-3,  P  478=  672= 
X436.  It  would  appear  that  the  more  details  are  given  on  one's  death,  the  closer  the  word  comes  to  the 
meaning  of  fate. 
80 we  are  in  the  middle  of  the  battle  that  takes  place  after  Patroclus  has  entered  the  war; 
he  has  brought  great  havoc  among  the  Trojans,  while  the  Greeks,  with  their  confidence 
being  suddenly  recovered,  rush  against  their  opponents  and  a  series  of  encounters  and 
deaths  is  narrated;  at  TT  330ff  a  brief  scene  begins:  the  lesser  Aias  kills  Kleoboulos,  and 
the  poet  describes  the  latter's  death:  TOV  Ss  KaT'  öOOE  I  'Maps  Trop4Speoc  OdVaToc  Kai 
poipa  KpaTaul;  the  formula  seems  to  be  used  quite  habitually  or  conventionally,  with 
no  apparent  implication  of  fate  or  destiny;  Kleoboulos'  death  is  one  of  the  many  similar 
incidents  that  the  poet  has  to  relate  one  after  the  other,  always  careful  to  avoid 
monotony. 
However,  the  lines  seem  to  evoke  a  notion  of  fate  very  subtly,  and  this  is  made 
evident  once  we  juxtapose  them  with  a  case  where  the  idea  of  predetermination  is 
powerfully  employed  by  the  poet,  forming  an  essential  part  of  the  plot  itself.  At  TT  852- 
54  the  dying  Patroclus  foresees  Hector's  death:  oü  6r1v  oü5'  aüTÖC  Snpöv  pill,  aXXd  Tot 
inSTl  a'xl  TrapkQTTIKEV  BdVaTOc  Kai  o  pa  KpaTauTj,  I  xEPQI  SapEVT"AXIAAijoc  dp  iovoc 
AiaKiSao;  the  whole  construction  of  the  lines,  with  their  reference  to  a  prospective 
event,  and  with  the  narration  being  enriched  with  particulars  as  to  the  time  and 
conditions  of  the  hero's  death,  confers  a  certain  dynamism  to  the  formula,  which  now 
becomes  definitely  more  evocative  of  the  inevitable  necessity  of  an  event  that  seems  to 
59  have  been  predetermined  in  all  its  detail. 
59  Cf  also  0  110-12,  as  opposed  to  TT  333-34.  Another  example  indicative  of  this  flexibility  is  that  of  the 
formula  poipa  treSrpev:  at  X  5-6  the  poet  explains  that"  Europa  S'  aüTOÜ  privat  öAotrl  µoipa  Tre'Srpev 
I'IAiou  rrpotrdpotOe  m,  Xäwv  Ts  LKatacov;  but  when  the  same  formula  is  used  at  A  517  of  Dioreus,  no 
further  comment  is  made  on  µoipa  this  time,  for  the  reference  is  obviously  made  to  the  fate  of  death  and 
not  to  Dioreus'  particular  or  individual  fate.  The  details  that  the  poet  adds  at  X  5-6,  along  with  the  fact 
that  Hector's  death  has  been  foreshadowed  on  different  occasions  by  the  poet  and  the  gods,  create  a  more 
intense  sense  of  predetermination.  Similarly  ambivalent  seems  to  be  the  formula  86vaTOc  Kai  potpa 
KtXdvEt,  used  of  Patroclus  at  P  478  and  672  in  an  almost  habitual  way  that  seems  to  denote  the  plain  fact 
of  the  hero's  death;  the  same  could  be  said  of  X  436  as  well,  where  Hecabe  talks  of  her  son's  death;  when, 
though,  Hector  himself  is  faced  with  the  event  of  his death  and  realises  that  vGv  aüTe  ue  uoipa  KIXdvet  at 
X  303,  the  connotations  of  fate  seem  to  be  more  powerful,  exactly  because  of  what  has  already  preceded 
the  scene. 
81 The  decisive  part  that  the  poet's  own  construction  of  the  narration  plays  in  our 
perception  of  moira  is  evident,  especially  since  we  witness  the  application  of  the  same 
formula  in  different  contexts.  The  poet  appears  to  be  manipulating  both  the  formula 
itself  and  the  idea  of  moira  according  to  the  idea  he  wishes  to  express,  and  his 
technique  of  anticipation  is  masterfully  employed  in  order  to  prepare  us  gradually  for  a 
climax  which,  once  reached,  appears  to  have  been  inevitable.  It  is  the  whole  of  the 
plot,  it  would  seem,  that  sharpens  our  perception  and  reception  of  the  narrated  events, 
the  heroes'  premonitions,  the  gods'  predictions  and  the  poet's  own  ability  to  construct  a 
compelling  story.  When  moira  is  finally  used,  it  seems  to  assume  its  explicit  reference 
to  fate  from  the  very  narration,  thus  putting  even  further  emphasis  on  its  inevitable  and 
final  essence. 
The  difference  between  the  two  applications  is,  in  my  opinion,  obvious.  The 
formulaic  character  of  TT  333-34  seems  to  explain  why  the  idea  of  inevitability  or 
predetermination  is  hardly  sensed  at  all.  60  Still,  it  would  be  misleading  to  interpret 
moira  in  such  cases  merely  as  an  equivalent  of  death,  void  of  any  further  implications 
or  connotations.  If  this  seemingly  static  formula  should  be  seen  as  an  hendiadys,  it 
would  become  clear  that  the  reference  is  made  to  death  as  the  fate  of  mankind  itself. 
More  than  an  event  of  life,  death  is  the  very  poipa  xpaTau  that  comes  over  Kleoboulos 
and  Hector,  the  predetermined,  well-established,  and  therefore  inevitable  end  of  man. 
Whether  this  fate  of  death  is  defined  in  more  detail  as  well  or  not  is  of  minor 
significance,  for  in  either  case  it  is  equally  powerful  and  compelling  in  its 
accomplishment. 
60  Note  also  the  use  of  aioiuov  tjev  for  animals  at  0  273-74  and  for  the  gods  at  0  495. 
82 The  idea  that  death  is  man's  fate  is  even  more  evident  in  the  use  of  cfiaa  at  TT 
441  =X  179.  Zeus  has  been  pondering  whether  he  should  save  Sarpedon  and  Hector 
respectively;  the  reply  comes  in  the  first  case  from  Hera,  in  the  second  from  Athena: 
Zeus  cannot  set  free  from  death  ävSpa  OvrIröv  EövTa,  rrdAai  rrerrpwusvov  thou.  The 
line  sounds  like  a  definition  almost  of  human  essence,  and  it  is  obvious  that  in  this  case 
dica  is  not  merely  death  as  an  event  that  takes  place  during  life,  nor  does  it  refer  to 
Sarpedon's  or  Hector's  individual  moirai;  rather,  it  is  the  common  fate  of  death  that  is 
certainly  not  defined  as  far  as  the  details  of  its  accomplishment  are  concerned,  yet  it  is 
inevitable  as  well  as  predetermined,  an  event  that  man  can  neither  control  nor  avert. 
The  idea  that  is  obviously  projected  is  that  of  human  mortality,  a  predictable,  and 
therefore  pre-ordained  event,  yet  inescapable  and  beyond  control;  what  is  fated  is  that 
man  should  die;  when  and  how  is  not  mentioned,  nor  is  it  of  any  importance.  61 
Of  interest  is  also  the  use  of  uoipa  at  Z  488-89.  This  time  it  is  Hector  who  is 
talking,  trying  to  soothe  Andromache:  no  one  is  going  to  kill  him,  if  this  is  not  fated  to 
happen;  poipav  6'  o"u  Tºvd  ýrýµº  rre4uyp'vov  E{ip  vaº  äv6pcäv,  I  ou'  KaKov,  ov6  pv 
EaeA6v,  £TT1  V  Tc  lTPWTa  y  vrrraL.  Doubtless,  the  lines  imply  one's  individual  share  or 
fate,  rather  than  simply  death;  what  Hector  means  is  that  if  moira  demands  his  death 
after  all,  there  is  nothing  he  can  do  to  avert  it;  no  one  ever  can.  However,  one  can 
detect  some  ambiguity,  created  especially  by  line  489,  stressing  as  it  does  the 
universality  of  moira  and  creating  a  circular  movement  with  its  reference  to  man's 
birth.  This  ambiguity  certainly  derives  from  the  ambivalence  of  the  term  uoipa  itself. 
61  The  lines  are  certainly  more  complicated  than  it  is  suggested  at  this  point,  especially  since  the  question 
of  the  gods'  relation  to  moira  is  raised.  The  issue  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  pp.  138-40. 
83 man  cannot  escape  death,  once  he  is  born,  and  he  cannot  escape  fate,  for  they  are  the 
same  thing;  death  is  man's  fate.  62 
Death  is  certainly  more  than  a  plain  and  ordinary  event  of  life  which  appears 
occasionally  to  be  lacking  an  explanation.  Death  is  the  only  reality  that  man  can  never 
doubt  or  ignore,  the  only  eventuality  with  the  compelling  force  of  a  natural  moral  law 
that  is imposed  on  man  against  his  will,  the  predictable  but  nonetheless  inevitable  end 
that  awaits  all  men,  indiscriminate  in  its  application,  an  inextricable  quality  of  the  very 
essence  of  human  life.  It  is  the  persistent  Leitmotif  of  life,  the  one  necessity  that  man 
experiences  repeatedly  throughout  his  life,  dying  as  he  does  more  than  one  death,  up 
until  the  moment  he  has  to  die  himself,  the  grasp  of  time  that  creates  Glaucus'  beautiful 
simile:  din  trey  4üXAc  v  YEVErj,  Toin  SE  Kai  avSpcäv.  I  4AXa  Ta  µäV  T'  awpoc;  Xapä51c 
41  xesi,  äXXa  Ss  0'  ü7ýtj  Trýs6öwoa  ýüei,  Eapoc  S'  enIyiyvSTai  wprl"  I  we  dV  pCSV  yeveTI  ýj 
piv  düst  ij  6'  a  roXTjyci  (Z  146-49). 
In  human  mortality  some  of  the  basic  characteristics  of  an  idea  of  fate  seem  to 
be  concentrated:  inevitability,  inaccessibility  and  independence  of  human  will  and 
action.  More  important,  though,  is  the  fact  that  human  mortality  seems  to  confirm  the 
association  of  moira  with  an  idea  of  order.  63  Death  evokes  the  order  of  nature  itself; 
natural  order  implies  balance  and  stability  which  are  guaranteed  by  regularity  and  by 
the  eternal  law  of  action  and  reaction,  seen  in  antithetical  couples  such  as  day  and 
62  That  ambiguity  is  one  of  the  very  means  of  poetry  need  not  be  discussed.  Another  example  that  seems 
to  involve  more  than  one  meaning  is  that  of  1318-20:  i°rl  uoipa  NEVOVTi,  Kai  ei  i  dXa  TIC  TroXEl  of 
1\1n1\\t\\1//f  f1  t\t\N7/ 
EV  SE  In  TI  i  nPEV  KaKOC  r1SE  Kai  Eo8X6c'  I  KdTOav'  6pCÖc  O  T'  aEpyk  avTlp  O  TE  TroXXa  Eopyok,;. 
The  fact  that  here,  as  in  Z  489,  KaKÖc  and  EoBX6c  are  ranked  together,  subordinate  as  they  are  to  an  irrt 
po'  pa,  should  perhaps  be  considered  as  further  suggesting  an  interpretation  of  uoipa  as  death. 
63  True,  references  to  an  idea  of  order  seem  to  suggest  a  philosophical  thought  that  is  alien  to  the  poet; 
obviously,  the  idea  conveyed  by  moira,  and  words  such  as  nemesis  or  erinys,  is  an  acknowledgement  of 
what  is  basically  sensed  through  the  very  experience  of  life  and  nature,  and  not  the  result  of  philosophical 
analysis. 
84 night,  spring/fecundity  and  winter/aridity  -a  succession  whose  regularity  appears  to 
have  a  reassuring  effect  upon  us.  This  is  an  order  in  the  sense  that  it  is  invariably 
perpetuated,  obedient  to  its  own  laws  of  equilibrium,  and  hence  rational,  but  more 
important,  a  moral  order,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  consistent  with  itself.  But  it  is  an  order 
that  exists  independently  of  man's  will  or action;  in  fact,  man  is  part  of  this  order,  and 
his  very  existence  is  subject  to  the  same  laws  of  regularity  and  perpetual  balance. 
The  relation  of  death  to  such  an  idea  seems  clear:  man's  fated  share  is  death; 
once  born,  man  has  to  die;  life  and  death  are  another  expression  of  that  very  antithesis 
that  creates  a  sense  of  balance  in  nature.  It  is  obvious,  I  believe,  how  inevitability  also 
becomes  relevant:  death  implies  regularity,  and  inevitability  is  part  of  this  regularity. 
Death  may  be  seen  not  simply  as  one  of  the  many  events  in  one's  life,  but  rather  as  an 
indication  and  confirmation  at  the  same  time  of  a  moral  natural  order.  Being  the  most 
important  restrain  or  lot  that  man  experiences,  and  at  the  same  time  the  only  limit  that 
cannot  be  exceeded  or  violated,  it  appears  as  part  of  a  greater  order  that  permeates 
nature  and  ensures  its  balance,  thus  elucidating  the  moral  quality  of  this  Greek  concept. 
Death  is  universal,  and  as  such  it  enables  moira  or  fate  to  be  applicable  to  all 
men  invariably  and  to  emerge  thereupon  as  an  essential  principle  of  life  itself. 
Moreover,  death  is  a  final  and  irrevocable  event  that  cannot  be  changed  once  it  has 
happened.  If  fate  defines  the  end  of  a  progressive  movement  of  life,  whence  no  return 
can  ever  exist,  it  has  to  be  admitted  that  no  other  event  in  life  apart  from  death  has  the 
power  to  evoke  this  idea  of  an  irreversible  course.  More  important,  death  is  the  only 
eventuality  that  falls  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  gods;  human  mortality  implies  an 
order  that  exists  independently  of  the  gods'  will  and  activity,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
it  is  older  than  the  gods  who,  despite  their  immortality,  are  themselves  not  without 
85 beginning.  The  Homeric  gods  are  neither  responsible  for  nor  particularly  concerned 
with  the  fact  that  man  has  to  die;  Zeus  may  be  wishing  at  some  point  to  save  Sarpedon 
and  Hector,  but  these  are  isolated  cases  of  heroes  who  are  especially  favoured  and 
loved  by  the  god.  Hera's  and  Athena's  words  remind  Zeus  and  the  audience  of  the 
norm:  man  was  doomed  to  death  long  ago  -  TräXai. 
It  is  very  tempting  indeed  to  see  that  the  idea  of  an  inevitable  course  as 
suggested  by  the  belief  in  fate  is  actually  prompted  by  the  inevitable  quality  of  human 
mortality,  and  that  the  limits  of  which  man  first  becomes  aware  in  his  life  are  those  of 
his  mortal  nature.  Human  mortality  seems  to  provide  man  with  the  proof  for  the  reality 
of  an  order,  and  to  function  as  a  reminder  of  the  existing  limits.  However,  the  issue  is 
much  more  complicated  than  it  seems,  and  it  relates  not  simply  to  the  Homeric  concept 
of  moira,  but  to  the  concept  of  fate  in  general,  which  is  extremely  elusive  and  whose 
origin  and  course  of  development  are  therefore  difficult  to  trace.  Believing  that  it 
would  prove  unwise  as  well  as  fruitless  to  insist  here  on  the  matter,  I  would  find  it 
more  appropriate  to  simply  underline  that  the  association  of  moira  with  death  is  indeed 
very  powerful  in  the  poems.  64  Whether  this  is due  to  an  original  relation  or  not,  death 
remains  the  most  important  expression  of  the  idea  of  an  order  that  is  inevitable  as  well 
as  moral,  indicative  both  of  fate's  power  and  of  man's  limitation. 
To  recapitulate:  moira  entails  more  than  mere  predetermination.  The  basic 
terms  used  for  the  concept,  µoipa,  aioa  and  nenpwro,  belong  to  a  group  of  `boundary' 
words,  which  suggest  the  existence  of  limits  that  should  not  be  transgressed  if  order 
64  It  will  become  clear  in  the  fourth  chapter  that  moira  as  death  is  of  a  limited  application  in  the  Odyssey; 
this  has  to  do  with  the  particular  subject  of  the  poem;  the  idea  retains  its  close  relation  to  death,  as  is 
evident  from  the  use  of  standard  formulae,  whenever  this  is  necessary. 
86 should  be  maintained.  Referring  originally  to  a  share  in  a  material  sense,  the  words 
come  to  mean  a  distribution  which  both  defines  and  preserves  the  order  of  well- 
established  limits.  When  this  idea  of  distributed  portions  is  applied  to  human  life,  and 
moira  becomes  one's  share  in  life  and  death,  it  seems  to  retain  its  basic  reference  to 
this  same  order,  which  demands  the  distinct  differentiation  between  the  human  and  the 
divine,  and  which  provides  the  explanation  to  why  things  happen  as  they  do,  why  man 
has  to  die,  or  why  he  has  to  die  at  a  particular  moment  and  under  particular 
circumstances,  why  a  disaster  must  fall  on  a  people,  or  why  a  hero  must  be  denied  his 
return  home  for  an  entire  ten  years.  Doubtless,  the  concept  of  fate  suggests  more  than 
the  existence  of  limits;  and  the  terms  are  often  used  prospectively  and  in  anticipation  of 
an  event  to  come,  the  emphasis  appearing  this  time  to  be  on  the  idea  of 
predetermination.  However,  and  as  will  hopefully  become  clear  once  the  poems  have 
been  looked  at  in  detail,  moira  is  used  most  often  as  a  post  eventum  explanation  that 
`makes  sense'  out  of  life's  almost  non-sensical  flow,  while  it  always  remains  of  interest 
that  the  particular  terminology  should  be  used  to  designate  this  flow  and  to  suggest  that 
life  is  predefined,  a  series  of  events  that  have  to  happen. 
One  point  should  be  made  clear,  before  I  conclude.  It  is  obvious,  I  believe,  that 
such  an  interpretation  of  the  Homeric  concept  of  moira  or  fate  would  appear  to  allow 
little,  if  any,  space  for  the  belief  in  a  personal  power  of  fate.  Moira  has  been  seen  up  to 
now  as  an  event,  or  a  series  of  events,  which  is  perceived  in  its  entirety  only  after  it  has 
been  fulfilled,  and  not  as  a  force,  whose  jurisdiction  it  is  to  define  life  in  advance.  It 
has  to  be  admitted,  however,  that  such  an  idea  does  exist  in  the  poems;  twice  do  we 
hear  in  the  Iliad  of  the  spinning  woman,  who  is  called  Abaa  at  Y  127  and  Moipa  at  fl 
87 209,  while  in  the  Odyssey  we  find  aboa  along  with  the  so-called  KXcäesc  at  rj  197;  65 
more  interesting  still,  we  hear  of  Moipai  who  are  responsible  for  man's  enduring  heart 
at  fl  49,  the  only  occurrence  of  the  noun  in  the  plural,  which  evokes  groups  of  female 
deities  such  as  the  Charites,  or  the  Muses.  66  Nonetheless,  these  are  only  isolated  cases 
that  cannot  provide  us  with  convincing  evidence  of  moira's  personal  character.  In  both 
poems  moira  is  mainly  an  event,  and  not  an  agent  or  a  power  imposing  her  will  on 
man;  the  only  agents  that  both  the  poet  and  his  heroes  seem  to  acknowledge  are  the 
gods.  To  quote  Cornford,  `[Moira]  was  not  credited  with  foresight,  purpose, 
design;...  though  we  speak  of  her  as  a  "personification",  [she]  has  not  the  most 
important  element  of  personality  -  individual  purpose....  she  is  not  a  deity  who  by  an  act 
of  will  designed  and  created  that  order  [of  the  world].  She  is  a  representation  which 
states  a  truth  about  this  disposition  of  Nature,  and  to  the  statement  of  that  truth  adds 
nothing  except  that  the  disposition  is  both  necessary  and  just'.  67 
This  is  certainly  not  the  view  that  Dietrich  expounds  in  his  book  Death,  Fate 
and  the  Gods.  Instead,  having  observed  the  important  link  between  uoipa  and  death, 
and  being  supported  mainly  by  the  evidence  of  post-Homeric  popular  cult  practices  and 
inscriptions,  not  only  does  he  argue  against  a  late  personification  and  deification  of 
µoipa,  but  he  even  claims  that  Moipa  was  originally  and  primarily  a  goddess,  another 
vegetation  and  fertility  chthonic  deity;  this  deity  was  quite  early  associated  with  death 
65  Dodds  (1951:  20,  n.  29)  prefers  to  see  the  plural  as  referring  to  the  "`portions"  of  different  individuals'. 
Macleod  (1983:  on  1l  49)  sees  Moirai  as  a  `source  of  right  order  in  the  world;  of  interest  is  his  remark  that 
Apollo  consciously  uses  Moirai  here,  for  if  he  had  used  the  gods  instead,  he  could  not  arouse  the  gods' 
p6ity  for  Hector'. 
There  are  two  further  instances  in  which  we  have  Moipa,  supposedly  as  a  goddess,  at  T  87,  where  she 
appears  along  with  Zeus  and  Erinys  in  Agamemnon's  famous  apology  to  Achilles,  and  at  T  410,  where 
Achilles'  horses  foresee  the  hero's  death,  for  which  they  are  not  responsible  themselves,  dAAä  OE6c  Ts 
pEyac  Kai  Moipa  KparaLrj.  In  neither  case,  however,  does  there  exist  any  obvious  reason  for  such  a 
writing.  See  Dodds  (1951)  7. 
67  Cornford  (1912)  20-21.  Cf.  Burkett  (1985:  129)  who  sees  moira  not  as  a  person,  a  god  or  a  power,  but 
as  a  fact:  `the  word  means  portion,  and  proclaims  that  the  world  is  apportioned,  that  boundaries  are  drawn 
in  space  and  time.  For  man,  the  most  important  and  most  painful  boundary  is death'. 
88 because  of  her  chthonic  nature,  and  was  gradually  related  to  other  important  aspects  of 
life,  such  as  birth  and  marriage.  Still,  always  according  to  Dietrich,  this  goddess  seems 
to  have  lost  her  personality  in  poetry,  because  of  the  advance  of  the  more  recent,  and 
definitely  literary,  Olympian  family;  the  gods  were  obviously  more  useful  for  the 
construction  of  a  plot,  thus  taking  over  the  functions  for  which  Moipa  was  responsible; 
even  so,  however,  Moipa  retained  her  divine  status  in  popular  cult. 
As  already  noted,  a  pre-Homeric  personification  or  deification  of  Noipa  does 
not  seem  implausible  at  all;  the  poems'  tendency  to  use  poipa  mainly  in  an  impersonal 
fashion  is  certainly  not  sufficient  proof  for  the  contrary.  Yet,  such  a  conclusion  could 
or  should  be  accepted  only  on  the  condition  of  incontrovertible  evidence  that  would  be 
provided  in  its  support  -  which  is  certainly  not  the  case  with  Dietrich,  who  goes  even 
further,  as  we  saw,  in  arguing  for  an  original  divine  status.  However  important  the 
evidence  he  provides  for  the  post-Homeric  popular  religion,  the  absence  of  any 
evidence  for  the  pre-Homeric  era  makes  his  reasoning  unintelligible  and  his 
conclusions  controversial.  One  cannot  help  wondering,  for  example,  why  such  an 
important  deity  should  be  entirely  absent  from  the  Mycenean  evidence  of  the  Linear  B 
tablets,  especially  since  Dietrich  acknowledges  the  connection  of  Moipa  with  a  number 
of  deities  that  do  indeed  feature  in  the  tablets,  such  as  Artemis,  Demeter,  or  more 
important  Zeus.  As  Davison  well  observed,  Dietrich's  `argument  is...  apt  to  give  the 
impression  of  having  been  constructed  "widdershins"  or  anti-clockwise',  and  `his 
interpretation  of  his  Greek  texts  seems  derivative  rather  than  original'.  68 
68  Davison  (1967)  89. 
89 Leaving  aside  Dietrich's  discussion  of  popular  cult  and  religion,  I  would  like  to 
focus  on  his  interpretation  of  uoipa  in  the  Homeric  texts  themselves.  Dietrich  finds  the 
evidence  for  the  personal  nature  of  µoipa  in  the  numerous  expressions  in  which  the 
word  is  used  as  the  subject  of  an  active  structure,  such  as  poipa  Trsbrlacv  or  KaOsA  lCI. 
Besides,  the  difference  in  application  between  the  various  terms  employed  for  the  idea 
of  predetermination  further  underlines  the  unique  importance  of  uoipa:  aioa  refers  to  a 
fate  which  is  related  simply  to  the  particular  plot  of  each  poem,  siµapTo  and  rrenpc  ro 
to  a  fate  that  comes  as  the  expected  consequence  of  causes  that  are  presented  in  the 
poems,  KnpEC,  n6-rpoc  and  o1-roc  refer  simply  to  death.  Moipa  among  them  has  a 
special  status,  exactly  because  of  its  being  actually  a  goddess  69 
It  is  indeed  remarkable  that  Dietrich  imposes  on  the  text  an  idea  that  evidently 
does  not  exist  on  the  grounds  of  external  evidence  which,  as  already  noted,  is  not  itself 
substantial  enough.  Nowhere  in  the  poem  does  Noipa  appear  as  a  deity,  nowhere  is 
there  an  allusion  made  to  the  possibility  of  such  a  function,  with  the  only  exceptions 
noted  above,  which,  however,  are  rather  inconclusive  and  not  of  a  powerful  presence  in 
the  poems;  the  poet  clearly  disregards  this  function  -  whether  consciously  or  not,  is 
difficult  to  define.  As  for  the  argument  that  the  activity  of  uoipa  is  given  in  graphic 
terms,  her  status  as  a  divine  agent  being  thus  underlined,  it  often  leads  Dietrich  to  an 
impasse,  for  he  has  to  concede  that  there  are  indeed  cases  in  which  his  argument  cannot 
actually  apply:  µoipa  TsTUKTai  and  poipa  KLXavsi  are  interpreted  as  instances  where 
`the  concept  of  an  active  figure  of  Moira  has  been  weakened',  while  for  the  formulaic 
line  rrapEOTflKEV  edvaTOC  Kai  uoipa  KpaTairj  we  read  that  `the  concept  of  Moira,  the 
69  Certainly,  Dietrich's  observations  with  regard  to  moira  and  its  relation  to  the  gods  or  to  its  function  in 
the  plot  are  both  interesting  and  penetrating;  it  is  the  basis  of  his  argument  and  the  conclusions  he  reaches 
as  a  consequence  that  appear  to  go  too  far. 
90 deity,  has  been  all  but  lost.  All  that  is  conveyed  by  this  phrase  is  that  a  hero's  death  is 
close  at  hand';  70  and  when  it  comes  to  the  explanation  of  the  same  active  structure  for 
Krjp,  as  found,  for  example  at  X  171=  398,  Kdlp  i5dpaooc  TavfXEyeoc  Oavdroto,  he 
explains  that  Krjp  has  been  modelled  on  poipa,  since  `how  little  the  personal  colour 
conveyed  by  this  type  of  expression  need  be,  can  easily  be  seen  from  instances  when 
weapons  -  spears,  swords  -  are  combined  with  this  verb.  E.  g.  Il.,  xi.  478:  TOV  YE 
8aµäaoeTat  uitcüc  ötoTÖC'.  7l  At  the  same  time,  it  is  of  wonder  actually  that  poipa 
should  be  ascribed  an  original  active  meaning,  since  the  passive  sense  is  so  evident  in 
the  word:  µoipa  is  obviously  the  result  of  division  and  distribution,  what  one  receives 
as  a  share  or  lot,  and  not  the  agent  who  divides  and  distributes.  72 
Dietrich  is  forcing  his  thesis  into  the  poems,  certain  essential  aspects  of  moira 
being  thus  left  with  no  sufficient  explanation.  He  is  frequently  at  a  loss  at  finding  the 
link  between  the  obvious  original  meaning  of  `share'  and  the  idea  of  a  goddess  who 
distributes  death,  saying  simply  that  `the  etymology  of  "lot",  "share",  which  is  perhaps 
correct,  still  it  does  not  grant  us  a  clear  enough  image  of  them  [i.  e.  the  Moirai],  but  it 
certainly  explains  the  path  of  their  further  development'.  73  More  important,  he  creates  a 
polarity  between  Moira  and  the  Olympians  that  is  neither  necessary  nor  accurate.  For, 
as  will  be  discussed  later  on,  the  truth  is  that  moira  and  the  gods  are  not  actually  in 
conflict  with  each  other,  and  any  tension  that  seems  to  exist  is  perceived  by  us  more 
than  by  the  poet  or  his  audience.  By  thus  disregarding  the  gods'  importance  for  the 
70  Dietrich  (1965)  197. 
71  Dietrich  (1965)  247,  n.  2. 
72  Dietrich  himself  (1965:  340)  refers  to  a  distinction  between  µoipa  and  pipoc,  through  which  the  passive 
sense  of  µoipa  seems  evident;  he  quotes  Belardi  (Boll.  Sem.  Ist.  Glott.  Univ.  Di  Roma  1,1,107,  n.  2), 
according  to  whom  `ally  vocale  -e-  era  connessa  la  nozione  di  dinamicitä,  ad  -o-  del  staticitä  o  dell'  azione 
obiettivata'. 
73  Dietrich  (1965)  90. 
91 poems,  he  fails  to  see  the  fine  balance  between  divine  powers  as  against  human 
weakness  and  frailty  -  an  idea  that  is  essential  to  Homeric  thought. 
2.2  Justice  and  dr  Kri 
Justice  is  related  first  of  all  to  some  sense  of  morality;  in  order  to  be  just,  I  have  to 
respect  your  vital  sphere  of  action,  to  respect  the  limits  of  both  my  and  your  province; 
keeping  myself  within  my  limits  prevents  me  from  violating  you,  or  intruding  your  limits; 
this  is  probably  the  meaning  given  to  justice  by  Plato,  when  he  defined  the  virtue  of  justice 
as  `doing  one's  own  things',  Tö  ýrä  auToü  npdrrEiv;  's  also,  if  morality  be  seen  as  a  code 
of  behaviour  suggested  by  a  particular  group,  as  ethics,  justice  is  associated  with  propriety 
or  righteousness  and  adherence  to  this  code.  But  being  just  entails  more  than  being  moral, 
even  if  morality  is  often  a  necessary  component  of  a  just  behaviour.  Justice  is  further 
related  to  retribution,  the  ancient  law  of  balance  and  equilibrium,  in  a  sense,  according  to 
which  an  offended  person  has  to  react  to  the  act  of  offence  by  demanding  some  form  of 
retribution  from  the  offender-,  75  with  a  system,  gradually  developed  and  established,  and 
finally  being  written  down  in  the  form  of  laws,  which  defines  what  is  right  and  wrong,  that 
is,  what  is  permitted  and  what  is  forbidden  in  a  particular  society,  and  what  should  happen 
in  the  case  of  an  offence,  that  is  whether  there  should  be  a  punishment,  and  if  so,  what  this 
punishment  should  be;  and  finally,  justice  is  connected  with  impartiality  and  fairness, 
especially  in  its  connection  to  law,  in  which  case  it  implies  distribution  of  merit  and 
74  Rep.  433  a.  This  is  also  evident  from  a  linguistic  aspect  in  the  history  of  the  word  in  Greek.  As  will  be 
discussed  in  due  course,  the  original  word  SiKrl  has  the  primary  meaning  of  `mark,  indication'  and  then 
`way,  manner';  SiKrl  6ecSv,  for  example,  means  the  manner  of  the  gods;  Skatoc,  subsequently,  is  the 
person  who  behaves  according  to  the  manner  that  is  most  appropriate  to  his  position  in  life  or  in  society, 
the  person,  that  is,  who  keeps  within  the  limits  set  by  life  or  society. 
75  In  a  way,  retribution  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  towards  a  re-definition  of  violated  limits. 
92 punishment  on  the  basis  of  fixed  principles  and  irrespective  of  personal  preconceptions, 
aims,  or  passions  -  an  idea  also  related  to  that  of  equality. 
Righteousness  and  morality,  retribution,  legality,  fairness,  equality:  these  seem 
to  be  the  ideas  essentially  related  to  that  of  justice;  ideas  actually  which  are  subject  to 
philosophical  enquiry  themselves.  Still,  one  thing  should  be  made  clear:  justice  is  not 
morality  or  righteousness,  but  is  simply  associated  with  it;  an  act  can  be  just,  yet 
immoral,  and  vice  versa.  76  Similarly,  justice  is  not  simply  legality,  retribution,  or 
fairness.  According  to  the  social  or  legal  norms  that  form  the  basis  of  a  particular 
society,  different  values  emerge,  indicative  of  the  individual  as  well  as  the  social  end, 
and  the  quality  of  the  highest  value  is  what  finally  and  essentially  determines  the 
meaning  of  both  justice  and  morality.  " 
Roughly  speaking,  then,  we  could  distinguish  two  basic  aspects  of  justice:  an 
internal  aspect,  which  could  be  also  seen  as  a  disposition,  and  an  external  aspect,  the 
law;  that  is,  a  moral  and  a  legal  aspect.  Law  seems  to  be  the  result  of  a  conscious 
attempt  to  put  into  a  concrete  shape  the  principles  that  define  the  behaviour  of  a  social 
group,  what  we  call  habits  or  customs,  or  at  times  oral  or  customary  law,  and  which  is 
actually  a  reflection  of  the  internal  aspect  of  justice,  of  a  collective  disposition.  Still, 
even  oral  law,  for  all  its  flexibility,  corresponds  to  a  conditioned  form  of  justice, 
`manipulated'  as  it  is  by  already  existing  social  forces.  The  internal  urge  for  justice 
seems  to  precede  and  indeed  cause  the  social  principle. 
76  For  example,  in  Greek  tragedy  Antigone's  refusal  to  obey  Creon  is  a  form  of  injustice,  since  it  implies 
disobedience  to  law  or  authority,  yet  it  is  deeply  rooted  in  a  sense  of  morality;  while,  Orestes'  vengeance 
may  be  just,  as  well  as  in  accord  with  law  or  custom,  yet  it  leads  to  a  basically  immoral  action,  matricide. 
For  the  immorality  of  matricide,  or  murder  within  one's  family,  testifies  the  important  role  of  the  Erinyes. 
77  See  Kelsen  in  Westphal  (1996)183-206. 
93 Both  aspects  exist  in  both  poems;  yet  one  should  have  in  mind  that  the  legal  aspect 
does  not  correspond  to  our  sense  of  legal  justice,  simply  because  the  Homeric  age  is  still  an 
age  of  oral  and  customary  law,  laws  are  no  more  than  principles  of  proper  behaviour, 
transmitted  from  one  generation  to  the  next  orally,  and  therefore  quite  probably  adapted 
each  time  to  the  demands  of  society.  This  observation  has  implications  for  the  relation 
between  the  legal  and  moral  aspects  of  justice:  legality  would  appear  to  be  more  moral 
when  formed  by  vague  principles  of  morality  than  by  fixed  laws;  for  legality  corresponds  to 
the  moral  concern  for  the  observance  of  proper  limits  and  not  to  the  adherence  to  some 
fixed  law,  which  can  doubtless  often  prove  to  be  immoral. 
The  word  used  in  classical  Greek  to  denote  justice  is  61Kaioc1  vn.  It  first  appears 
in  a  doubted  couplet  of  the  Theognidean  corpus,  79  to  be  found  again  first  in  Herodotus, 
and  then  in  Antiphon,  Thrasymachus,  Damon  and  Thucydides,  79  before  finally  attaining 
its  full  importance  as  an  abstract  moral  term  in  Plato.  Evidently,  the  word  is  much  later 
than  the  Homeric  poems;  consequently,  the  conclusion  has  been  reached  that,  since  the 
term  denoting  justice  is  absent  from  the  poems,  the  idea  of  justice  must  accordingly  be 
absent.  True,  S&xaioavvri  belongs  to  abstract  Greek  terminology,  and  the  actual  idea  of 
justice  was  not  conceptualised  or  internalised  before  the  fifth  century.  Even  Hesiod, 
who  first  composes  a  poem  concerning  justice  itself,  does  not  refer  to  any  abstract 
78  147-48:  Ev  5  6IKatooVvyII  ouX%rjß6Tiv  Tiao'  apETl)  'QTIV,  I  il&C  6E  T'  dvijp  dyaOöc  Kvpve  SiKaloc  fcýv. 
Line  147  is  also  attributed  to  Phocylides  (fr.  10).  The  couplet's  position  in  the  corpus  is  doubted  on  the 
grounds  that  it  employs  a  term,  and  thus  expresses  an  idea,  that  is  essentially  alien  to  the  age  of  Theognis. 
According  to  Havelock  (1969:  69),  `the  age  of  Theognis  himself  was  innocent  of  any  such  conception.  But 
the  corpus  patently  came  to  serve  as  a  school  textbook  and  as  such  was  receptive  to  editorial 
interpolations,  especially  of  a  moralizing  character.  The  language  of  the  crucial  line 
.... 
is  in  fact 
philosopher's  language,  as  the  adverb  [ouArjßbnv]  may  indicate'.  Similar  doubts  have  been  expressed  by 
P.  Friedlander,  Hermes  48  (1913)  587,  n.;  Dodds,  (1951)  35.  For  the  use  of  ouAXij  6qv  in  philosophical 
contexts,  Havelock  provides  the  following  examples:  Aesch.  P.  Y.  505;  Eur.  Frag.  362;  Plato  Protag. 
324A,  325C;  Resp.  344B,  etc;  Lysias,  13.47  and  62;  and  ouXXa  i  dvw  in  this  sense,  Hdt.  3.82.5,7.16. 
79  Hdt.  1.96.2,2.151.1,6.86.2,  etc.;  Antiphon,  87  B  44  DK;  2.346  DK;  Thrasymachus,  85  B8  DK; 
Damon,  37  B4  DK;  Thuc.  3.63.4.  For  a  discussion  on  the  Herodotean  use  of  the  term  see  Havelock 
(1969)  52-64,  and  (1978)  297ff. 
94 concept;  his  justice,  despite  its  relation  to  Zeus,  corresponds  mostly  to  a  legal  process, 
and  even  when  referring  to  propriety  or  morality,  it  does  so  without  the  philosophical 
background  or  dimension  of  later  ages.  Still,  acknowledging  that  the  idea  is  not 
conceptualised  is  one  thing,  and  proclaiming  its  total  absence  is  another.  The  issue  is 
more  complicated  than  it  might  appear  at  first  sight,  and  a  mere  examination  of  the 
relevant  terminology  would  prove  to  be  insufficient;  still,  such  an  examination  is 
necessary  before  any  discussion  on  Homeric  justice  can  be  held. 
The  word  that  Hesiod  uses,  and  accordingly,  the  word  that  Homer  uses,  in  the 
absence  of  SLKaioc  vn,  is  81'K  TI.  According  to  Palmer,  51KII  stems  from  the  Indo- 
European  root  *deik-,  and  there  is  `little  doubt  about  the  basic  meaning  of  this  root 
[*deik],  which  is  exemplified  in  the  verb  SsiKVU  JI  "I  show,  point  out"'.  80  It  has  been 
mentioned  already  that  SiKT1  belongs  to  the  same  group  of  `boundary  words'  to  which 
uoipa,  aToa  and  nsnpcwTO  belong,  implying  the  demarcation  of  certain  limits;  in  other 
words,  it  is  another  term  suggesting  an  idea  of  morality.  It  remains  to  be  seen  how  SiKfl 
is  actually  associated  with  morality  and  what  the  connotations  are  in  Homeric  thought. 
As  regards  the  semantic  field  of  the  term,  Palmer  remarks  that,  by  contrast  to 
the  development  of  similar  terms  in  other  languages,  `Greek  is  faithful  to  the  primary 
significance  of  the  root  "mark,  indicate",  and  so  we  must  postulate  for  dike  the  primary 
significance  "mark"  or  "indication".......  Greek  shows  no  trace  of  the  development  "to 
say",  and  so  dike  cannot  mean  "pronouncement"  of  the  judge'.  8'  From  this  primary 
8°  Palmer  (1950)  157,  quoting  Schwyzer,  Griech.  Gram.,  1459  for  the  term's  etymology. 
81  Palmer  (1950)157f.  This  observation  is  made  basically  in  order  that  the  Greek  term  be  distinguished 
from  the  Latin  dico,  for  example,  which,  although  stemming  from  the  same  root  *deik-,  and  indeed 
retaining  the  original  meaning  in  derivatives  such  as  index  and  indicare,  evolves,  however,  towards  the 
sense  `say'.  See  Palmer  (1950)  158,  n.  1,  for  examples  of  a  similar  development  in  other  languages.  The 
view  that  6  KTI  denotes  the  verbal  aspect  of  a  decision  or  a  settlement  has  also  been  expressed,  with 
particular  insistence  by  Gagarin  (1973),  (1992). 
95 meaning  we  have  two  different  applications  of  the  word:  a  quasi-legal  application,  with 
61MI  denoting  a  settlement,  or  a  procedure  which  aims  at  a  settlement,  or  even  a 
decision,  and  a  rather  distinct  meaning  of  `characteristic,  manner',  which  seems  to 
attain  a  moral  sense,  with  5  KaIoC,  for  example,  being  the  one  who  behaves  in  the 
manner  characteristic  of  his  position  in  life  or  society,  the  one,  that  is,  who  keeps 
within  his  proper  limits.  82  It  will  be  useful  to  examine  the  two  meanings  separately  on 
the  basis  of  the  evidence  we  acquire  from  the  Homeric  poems  before  inquiring  how 
they  might  be  related  to  each  other.  One  thing  should  be  borne  in  mind,  though:  the 
affinity  between  legality  and  morality  entails  that  quite  often  the  term  seems  to  be 
ambiguous,  susceptible  to  both  interpretations,  and  therefore  a  degree  of  reservation  or 
even  indecisiveness  seems  inevitable. 
2.2.1  1('Kq  as  a  legal  term 
A  common  way  of  describing  bixrl  is  by  means  of  the  adjectives  Ma  /straight 
and  axoXid  /crooked  This  seems  to  provide  further  support  to  the  argument  that  the  word 
was  used  originally  in  the  sense  of  `mark'  or  `indication':  6  Kf  was  the  `direction'  or 
perhaps  the  `ligne  marquee',  83  the  result  of  the  act  denoted  by  SeiKVU  i,  which,  if  seen  in 
the  context  of  a  quasi-legal  procedure,  might  have  designated  `the  dividing  boundary 
line  between  two  pieces  of  land  or  two  property  claims,  the  line  being  either  "straight" 
or  "crooked"'.  84  From  such  an  original  meaning  the  word  came  to  denote  a  judgement, 
which  could  accordingly  be  either  straight  or  crooked,  but  which  would  not  necessarily 
82  Palmer  (1950)  158-59,  Chantraine  (1968),  s.  v.,  283. 
83  Chantraine  (1968)  s.  v.,  284. 
84  Gagarin  (1973)  83. 
96 have  to  do  with  property  claims.  85  When,  for  example,  Hera  accuses  Zeus  at  A  540-43 
on  the  grounds  that  he  always  decides,  5tKaýEiEV,  in  secret  from  her,  the  word  has 
obviously  a  less  limited  sense  than  the  above  described  legal  context  would  demand. 
The  word,  then,  starts  out  with  the  meaning  of  a  dividing  line,  which  is defined  during 
a  settlement,  and  develops  towards  the  meaning  of  a  decision,  usually  a  part  of  a  process 
that  aimed  at  appreciating  data  and  deciding  thereupon  on  how  best  to  have  a  dispute 
settled,  until  it  was  gradually  identified  with  the  process  itself.  A  look  at  the  texts  for 
support  is  necessary  at  this  point. 
A  Homeric  dispute  can  be  settled  by  means  either  of  violence  (M  421-424,  p 
470-73),  or  of  an  informal  reconciliation  between  the  disputants  (I  632-36),  or  of  a 
more  formal  legal  process,  which  is  associated  with  61KT)  (1497-508,  u  439-41).  In  the 
case  of  the  more  formal  legal  procedure,  the  judgement  can  be  delivered  either  by  a 
king  (B  205-6,198-99,  TT  541-42),  or  by  a  body  of  authority  (A  234-39,  TT  386-88,1 
497-508),  and  this  probably  reflects  different  practices  of  the  same  basic  principle.  This 
variety  in  the  settlement  of  disputes  does  not  necessarily  entail  processes  of  different 
periods  of  history,  nor  should  it  necessarily  be  taken  to  imply  different  strata  of 
composition.  As  MacDowell  remarks,  `the  various  kinds  of  dispute-procedure 
mentioned  in  the  Homeric  and  Hesiodic  poems  all  existed  in  early  Greece,  even  if  not 
all  in  the  same  place  at  the  same  time'.  86  Besides,  this  very  variety  appears  to  be  a 
natural  corollary  of  the  oral  quality  of  the  archaic  age:  the  absence  of  writing,  and 
consequently  the  absence  of  formally  written  laws,  entails  that  no  external  power  exists 
85  See  Palmer  (1950)  159,  who  quotes  the  powerful  lines  of  Theognis  (453f.  ):  Xprj  NE  Trapä  oT68unv 
Kai  yvc  pOVa  TTjVSE  &xdoQau,  I  KVpvE,  StKrIV. 
86  MacDowell  (1978)  11.  See  also  Gagarin  (1973)  83. 
97 which  would  demand  the  settlement  of  a  dispute  by  means  of  standard  and  fixed 
principles  or  procedures. 
Interestingly,  6kTI  is  used  when  a  dispute  is  settled  through  a  procedure,  that  is, 
there  must  be  a  kind  of  a  more  or  less  formal  process  taking  place.  This  apparently 
trivial  observation  entails  that  when  referring  to  a  settlement,  6  xrI  is  used  so  that  the 
legal  aspect  of  the  word  be  stressed  more  than  the  moral  -  if  we  can  indeed  separate  the 
two;  in  other  words,  behind  the  legal  use  of  6  xii  there  is  often  no  concept  of  general 
justice  as  an  internal  principle,  but  simply  of  justice  settled  through  a  procedure. 
Justice  in  general,  as  the  moral,  but  not  necessarily  legal  re-establishment  of  order,  is 
rather  expressed  by  the  word  Tioic,  which  certainly  underlines  the  retributive  quality  of 
the  concept.  87  At  the  same  time,  SiicrI  is  often  used  in  distinction  from  (3irl,  violence,  88 
and  this  seems  to  underline  the  relation  between  morality  and  justice:  legality  appears 
to  originate  in  morality,  the  two  being  actually  very  close  as  regards  their  sense  and 
their  connotations,  while  the  distinction  between  8MI  and  Pill  further  underlines  the 
social  dimension  of  bit  n,  reflecting  as  it  does,  an  organisation  of  the  social  group, 
however  premature  or  non-elaborate  this  may  be. 
Thus,  Menelaus  talks  of  Tia«  in  the  Iliad  (e.  g.  f  35If.  ),  just  as  Odysseus  does 
in  the  Odyssey  (e.  g.  co  325-26),  while  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  between 
Agamemnon  and  Achilles  by  contrast  is  described  in  terms  of  6iKr1,  because  it  is  indeed 
87  By  no  means  does  this  entail  that  the  legal  usage  is  devoid  of  any  moral  connotation;  procedural  justice 
is,  or  at  least  should  be,  a  process  whose  ultimate  aim  is  to  establish  an  order  of  a  moral  quality.  Still,  as 
regards  the  usage  of  the  particular  word  in  this  particular  context,  we  have  to  admit  that  the  legal 
implications  are  more  powerful.  This  is  perhaps  also  evident  in  the  use  of  the  adjectives  iOeia  and  oKoaid 
as  necessary  attributives  of  6(Krl  that  define  whether  justice  has  been  established  properly  or  improperly  (TT 
387,1508,41580). 
88  See  1T  387-88,  !;  90-92;  the  same  distinction  is  apparently  implied  at  i  214-15,  C  120-21=  t  175-76=  v 
200-1=  6  575-76. 
98 reached  through  a  procedure.  89  At  T  179-83  we  have  the  reconciliation  of  the  two 
heroes:  Odysseus  tells  Achilles  to  accept  a  meal  with  king  Agamemnon,  so  that  he  lack 
nothing  of  his  SiKTI,  while  Agamemnon  is  advised  to  be  StKaIöTEpoc  in  the  future,  when 
entering  a  dispute  with  another  noble.  The  particular  passage  certainly  exhibits  an 
ambivalent  usage  of  both  SiKTI  and  5IKaI6TEpoc,  yet  it  is  worth  noting  the  context  of  a 
quasi-legal  procedure:  the  term  is  used  not  merely  because  justice  is  settled,  but 
because  a  settlement  is  reached  through  a  procedure. 
When  used  in  a  legal  context,  51KTJ  is  associated  with  a  number  of  words  that 
seem  to  form  an  almost  standard  legal  terminology;  thus,  there  is  an  dyopä,  where 
disputants  and  people  assemble  when  a  settlement  is  to  be  reached  (TT  187,1497,  E3 
26,  p  432);  there  are  the  O  pIQTEC,  most  probably  the  oral  principles  or  perhaps  the 
precedents  on  the  basis  of  which  decisions  are  made  (A  238,  TT  387,  A  569);  the 
cKrp  pov,  the  staff  held  by  a  speaker,  and  believed  to  be  a  symbol  of  sanctity  (A  234- 
39,1  505,  ß  37,  A  569);  and  finally,  we  have  the  standard  way  of  describing  a 
judgement  either  as  iOuia/straight,  or  as  oxoAtd/crooked  (TT  387,1  508,  IF  580;  cf, 
pp.  96,  and  98  n.  87).  Relevant  are  also  the  references  to  the  iaTwp,  who  could  be  either 
the  king  or  an  elder  of  great  experience  and  integrity  so  as  to  be  regarded  capable  of 
reaching  a  straight  judgement  (1501);  the  yspOVTEc  or  elders  who  sit  in  a  sacred  circle 
give  their  judgement  in  turn  and  finally  announce  their  decision  (1  503);  the 
SixaarrdAot  who  are  responsible  for  the  protection  of  8spIOTEC,  the  oral  customary  law, 
their  position  believed  to  be  sanctified  by  Zeus  himself  and  their  authority  being 
emphasised  by  means  of  the  staff  they  hold  (A  237-39,  A  185-86). 
89  In  the  Odyssey,  we  hear  also  of  Orestes'  revenge  on  Aegisthus  (a  40),  which  is  not  related  in  terms  of 
51K4  even  if  it  should  be  seen  as  a  rightful  reaction  that  aims  at  establishing  justice. 
99 The  most  detailed  reference  to  this  proto-legal  procedure  is  found  at  1497-508. 
This  is  a  part  of  the  leisurely  ekphrasis  of  the  book,  known  also  as  the  `Orrioiro,  cr 
following  Thetis'  request,  Hephaistus  is  preparing  Achilles'  new  armour;  the  uniquely 
magnificent  shield  is  embellished  with  scenes  from  various  aspects  of  life:  there  is  the 
sky  and  the  earth  and  the  ocean,  and  then  there  are  two  cities,  one  at  peace,  another  at 
war;  the  scene  from  the  äyopd  belongs  to  the  description  of  the  city  at  peace,  and  is 
itself  characteristically  peaceful  in  its  atmosphere:  everything  seems  to  be  happening  in 
perfect  order:  90 
Aaoi  S'  stv  äyopf  Eoav  ä6pöot*  Evea  aE  VFIKOc 
wpcSpEt,  Svo  S'  dVSpEC  EVEIKEOV  EIVEKa  JToIvi  c 
dV5p6C  61T04e1i1£VOU'  O  {1£V  £ÜXETO  TraVT'  aTTOSOUVat 
SilUW  mýavllKU)V,  6  S'  avaIVETO  pTlSEV  EAEaOal" 
ap#o  S'  ieoOrIv  im  TOTOpt  TrEtpap  E'XEO6al. 
Xaot  S'  dU4OTEpOIQIV  EJrTI  TUOV,  äp4tc  apwyoi" 
KT1pUKEC  S'  dpa  Xaöv  Fpf  TUOV"  of  Se  yspOVTEC 
TjaT'  £TTI  ýEOTOIQI  ÄIeotc  1£PC  EVI  KUKXQ, 
QKTI  TTpa  S£  K1rpUKc  v  EV  XEpo' 
ExOV 
i  pO4WVWV' 
TOIQIV  ETT£IT  TlIQQOV,  apOIßnSIC  S£  511Mcov. 
KEITO  S'  lip' 
EV  pfiooOic1  SUW  XpUQOIO  TÖ(AaVTa, 
TCc  SÖpEV  ÖC 
IIETa  T6101  61KTlV  IOÜVTaTa 
EITrOi. 
90  See  Taplin  in  MacAuslan-Walcot  (1998)  101.  Taplin  provides  a  very  interesting  interpretation  of  the 
Shield  of  Achilles,  which,  as  he  remarks,  is  widely  spread  among  German  scholars;  according  to  it  we 
have  on  the  shield  a  `microcosmos,  not  a  utopia,  and  death  and  destruction  are  also  there,  though  in 
inverse  proportion  to  the  rest  of  the  Iliad 
... 
It  is  as  though  Homer  has  allowed  us  temporarily  to  stand 
back  from  the  poem  and  see  it  in  its  place  ...  within  a  larger  landscape,  a  landscape  which  is  usually 
blotted  from  sight  by  the  all-consuming  narrative  in  the  foreground'  (107);  the  aim  of  this  antithesis  is  not 
mere  pacifism,  but  also  an  emphasis  on  the  tragic  aspect  of  man  himself,  for  the  Iliad  `is  a  tragic  poem, 
and  in  it  war  prevails  over  peace  -  but  that  has  been  the  tragic  history  of  so  much  of  mankind'  (112).  Quite 
different  is  the  view  expressed  by  Havelock  (1978:  127,135-37),  who  sees  in  the  shield  another  instance  of 
the  poet's  didactic  purpose:  by  presenting  the  proper  way  of  settling  a  dispute  he  creates  a  sharp  contrast 
to  the  way  litigation  is  conducted  in  the  main  plot  -a  way  which  proves  disastrous. 
100 Two  men  have  entered  a  dispute  about  the  due  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  as  a 
form  of  reconciliation  for  a  murder.  The  one  responsible  for  the  murder  claims  to  have 
paid  the  money,  while  the  other  man,  most  probably  a  relative  of  the  murdered  man, 
denies  having  received  it.  The  two  contending  parties  come  to  the  iaTwp,  who  could  be 
either  a  witness  or  a  judge,  in  order  to  reach  an  end  or  a  solution,  rrsipap  WcOau  (501), 
while  people,  assembled  to  support  the  two  disputants  (502:  Aaoi  S'  d#OTEpoiaiv 
srrrjiruov,  dµýic  dpcayoi"),  are  kept  back  by  KfjpuKEc  (503);  then  we  suddenly  move  to 
the  yEpOVTEC,  who  sit  on  well  polished  stones  iEpcý  Evi  KOKAQ,?  and,  holding  oKflrrpa 
KfIpüKGWv  (504-5),  `judge'  in  turn,  duoi(3115ic  SiKaCov  (507);  in  the  middle  of  the  sacred 
circle  two  talents  of  gold  are  laid  to  be  given  to  the  one  who  SiKTIV  ieüvTaTa  ETTrO 
(508).  91 
The  shield  of  Achilles  obviously  presents  us  with  an  early  form  of  a  legal 
procedure,  the  reference  to  the  `sacred  circle'  and  the  sceptres  of  the  KnpUKEc 
underlining  the  solemnity  and  formality  of  the  occasion.  92  The  reference  to  the  äyopä 
appears  to  hint  at  an  age  other  than  that  of  the  Homeric  heroes  and  the  Trojan  War: 
what  we  most  probably  witness  is  an  early  form  of  the  democratic  äyopd  rather  than  a 
procedure  of  the  Mycenean  or  heroic  age.  93  Whether  the  body  of  the  elders  simply 
91  True,  the  passage  presents  obvious  difficulties  in  interpretation,  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  poet  refers 
to  a  procedure  with  which  his  audience  must  have  been  familiar.  Thus,  although  in  line  501  the  two 
disputants  are  said  to  appear  before  the  taTwp  in  order  that  they  may  receive  a  judgement  for  their 
dispute,  lines  503-508  refer  to  the  yepovTES,  the  elders,  who  now  seem  responsible  for  the  final  decision. 
A  further  difficulty  arises  from  the  reference  to  the  two  talents  of  gold:  Kelm  S'  äp'  ev  ufaoolal  Süco 
Xpu0Ölo  Tä%avTa,  I  TW  SÖiEV  O&  IETa  T01a1  61KTIV  IOUVTaTa  EITrOI  (507-8);  does  TC  refer  to  one  of 
the  disputants  or  to  one  of  the  elders?  The  very  issue  of  the  dispute  is  also  obscure:  does  the  second  man 
deny  having  received  the  money,  or  does  he  refuse  to  receive  it,  asking  therefore  for  a  different  way  of 
reconciliation?  Doubtless,  one  hardly  expects  that  the  poet  should  be  concerned  to  draw  his  picture  in  all 
accuracy  and  detail,  as  a  historian  would  probably  do;  what  he  aims  at  is  presenting  "the  stable  justice  of  a 
civilized  city"  (Taplin,  ibid.  ).  Thus,  we  are  inevitably  faced  with  terms  which  are  not  explained,  and  with  a 
procedure  whose  sequence  and  operation  we  can  only  faintly  reconstruct,  fully  aware  of  the  vague  and 
blurred  quality  of  the  meagre  information  provided  by  the  poet. 
92  Cf.  Edwards,  (1991)  on  1504-5. 
93  Cf.  Havelock  (1978)  135-136  for  the  importance  of  Sfjuoc. 
101 oversees  the  procedure  described,  or  if  it  is  also  responsible  for  the  final  judgement  and 
settlement  of  the  dispute  is  not  easy  to  decide  on  the  basis  of  the  meagre  and  rather 
oblique  information  the  poet  provides.  Still,  it  is  evident  that  8IKd  EIv  and  SiKq  are 
strictly  legal  terms,  implying  the  final  judgement  reached,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
speech  act  necessary  for  this  judgement  to  be  reached,  as  emerges  from  the  parallel  use 
of  S&Kaýov  (506)  and  biKfly  E  1TOI  (508)  94  Since  we  are  still  in  an  age  of  oral  law,  I  have 
to  agree  with  Gagarin  that  what  we  see  is  an  ad  hoc  administration  of  justice, 
whereupon  the  aim  is  not  adherence  to  some  fixed  principle,  but  rather  a  solution  that 
will  prove  advantageous  and  satisfying  to  both  opponents;  this  doubtless  entails  a 
certain  degree  of  flexibility  in  regard  to  the  laws  applied  and  the  decision  made.  95 
Of  the  remaining  Iliadic  passages  in  which  6  ai  has  a  legal  sense  `i'  573-85  is  worth 
considering  as  well,  albeit  very  briefly.  The  chariot  race  in  honour  of  the  dead  Patroclus 
has  just  finished;  Antilochus  has  managed  to  defeat  Menelaus  and  come  second,  but  only 
by  means  of  his  cunning,  when  Achilles  is  about  to  give  the  second  prize  to  Nestor's  young 
son,  Menelaus  revolts: 
dXA'  CtyET',  'ApyE'Wv  Tjyi1TOp£C  ii5£  {JESOVTEc, 
£t;  jJEOOV  d.  4oT6pOlol  SIKaaaaTE,  irr'  Eit'  dpwy-U, 
urj  TrOr  TIC  EinnOtv'AXaUCiv  XaXKOXtTCävwv" 
`'AvTiaoXov  %,  EÜSEocL  (3ir)odpEVOc  MEViXaoc 
oiXSTai  inrrov  äyC  V,  OTi  of  noXU'  xEipovEc  i  aav 
liTTrol,  aÜTOc  SE  KpEIQQWV  dpETn  TE  ßin  TE.  ' 
Ei  b'  äy'  Eywv  aU'TÖc  SIKäOw,  Kai  u'  oü  TiV(  caul 
94  See  Gagarin  (1992)  61. 
93  Gagarin  (1992)  61,68.  C.  also  Havelock  (1978)  135-136:  sIKrl  does  not  refer  to  a  set  of  principles  or 
rulings  imposed  by  the  judges,  but  is  a  symbol  or  process  achieved  through  oral  persuasion  and  oral 
conviction;  certainly,  this  process  is  based  on  principles,  yet  these  principles  are  quite  flexible,  rather 
precedents  upon  which  the  decision  is  based. 
102 dAAWV  EmlTÄfigEty  &avawv"  tOEia  ydp  EQTat. 
'AVTIAOX'  EI  b'  äyE  SEÜpO,  SIOTpE4Ek,  Tl  GENIC  EQTI, 
aTäc  innWV  nporräpot6E  Kai  äpuaToc,  aGTap  ipaa6Xriv 
XEpOiv  EXE  paaivrjv,  ý  Trep  TO  iTp6QBEV  E"XavvEc, 
irrirwv  c  )dpEVOc  yatrjoXov  Evvoatyaiov 
opvv8l  ''  ýlTý  µEV  EKWV  TO  ENOV  SOJýGJ  appa  TTESý1jQa1. 
The  procedure  is  not  very  different  from  the  one  appearing  on  Achilles'  shield: 
in  both  cases  we  have  two  parties  in  dispute,  and  at  the  same  time  a  third  party 
apparently  functioning  as  a  neutral  power  of  balance.  This  third  party  is  not  a  single 
person  of  authority,  but  rather  a  group  of  people,  at  1503  represented  by  yEpomc  and 
at  W  573  by  jyjTopcc  ý  5s'  ue6ovTec  -  soon,  though,  to  be  replaced  by  Menelaus  himself. 
The  latter  have  obviously  replaced  the  elders  at  this  point  because  the  settlement  takes 
place  during  a  war,  and  the  conditions  are  certainly  different  from  those  described  in 
1.96  The  nobles  are  to  offer  their  judgement  k(;  PEOaov  d  i4orepoiot  (574),  while  the 
final,  aimed  at  decision  has  to  be  straight,  teJa  (580). 
Here  again  there  seem  to  exist  no  fixed  laws  upon  which  the  judgement  is 
formed.  Most  interesting,  however,  is  that  Menelaus  does  not  appear  to  assume  the  role 
of  the  judge  because  of  his  status  as  a  king,  but  rather  because  he  is  the  affected  party 
in  the  particular  situation.  The  procedure  seems  therefore  even  less  formal,  as  the  shift 
of  power  from  the  nobles  to  Menelaus  proves  the  flexibility  of  the  procedural 
principles  themselves.  The  only  detail  that  could  be  seen  as  implicit  of  an  order  that  has 
96  We  can  see  this  reference  to  the  nobles  as  a  hint  of  their  judicial  power  in  earlier  times  of  history,  yet 
the  question  would  then  arise  why  Agamemnon,  the  chief-commander  of  the  expedition  and  the  most 
powerful  Achaean  in  Troy,  who  has  received  Zeus'  6euioTEc  and  a4r  pov  is  not  called  to  settle  the 
dispute.  I  prefer  to  see  this  detail  as  an  anachronism,  the  presentation  of  a  procedure  that  would  be 
immediately  recognised  by  the  poet's  audience;  besides,  as  Havelock  (1978:  92)  observes,  the  poems 
commingle  'romanticism  and  realism',  for  it  is  hard  to  imagine  that  the  poet  had  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
the  actual  practices  of  such  a  distant  age  as  that  of  his  heroes.  See  also  Havelock  (1978)  69ff. 
103 to  be  followed  is  Menelaus'  requirement  that  Antilochus  should  swear  on  Poseidon  in  a 
quite  ritual  fashion,  and  tell  the  truth.  No  other  principles  are  invoked,  no  fixed  laws  or 
rulings.  97 
At  4'542  we  have  the  dative  81'K1  whose  application  seems  rather  obscure.  During 
the  chariot  race,  Eumelus  has  an  accident,  which  is  caused  by  Athena  in  order  that 
Diomedes  may  win  (388-400),  and  as  a  result  the  hero  does  not  manage  to  finish  the  race; 
however,  Achilles  deems  it  proper  to  give  him  the  second  prize  on  the  grounds  of  his  well- 
known  excellence  (536-38);  this  causes  the  reaction  of  Antilochus,  who  was  the  second  to 
finish:  'AVTIAOXCC  pcya6upou  Nearopoc  uiöc  I  MIXE&riv'AXIXna  61(f  i 
. is  ar'  ävaaTäc. 
Richardson's  interpretation  of  the  word  `with  a  formal  appeal'  seems  to  be  in  accordance 
with  the  view  that  Sim  means  a  settlement,  mostly  a  verbal  one,  98  although  the  situation 
does  not  seem  to  evoke  any  formality  whatever;  besides,  a  meaning  that  would  be  closer  to 
`justly'  or  even  `properly'  does  not  seem  particular  relevant,  since  Antilochus'  means  were 
not  fair,  and  his  behaviour  is  later  checked  by  Menelaus  (570-72)  and  condemned  even  by 
himself  (587-95).  The  only  way  in  which  the  dative  could  be  seen  as  equivalent  almost  to 
the  adverb  SIKaicx,  is  if  we  ascribe  to  it  the  meaning  of  an  expected,  and  therefore  proper 
reaction.  Antilochus  reacted  as  was  proper  for  someone  who  felt  offended  by  the  decision 
made;  the  fact  that  he  has  acted  himself  improperly  is  irrelevant  until  the  moment  when  the 
offended  Menelaus  intervenes  and  demands  an  acknowledgement  of  the  violation  and  a 
restitution  of  order.  99 
97  Similarly  informal  seems  to  be  the  instance  described  at  JA  543-47,  which,  however,  assumes  a  degree  of 
gravity  because  of  the  reference  to  Thetis'  and  Athena's  presence. 
98  Richardson  (1993)  228. 
"  This  certainly  does  not  mean  that  Antilochus'  `act  of  individuation',  is  not  of  importance,  for  Menelaus' 
reaction  obviously  proves  the  contrary.  What  is  not  important  is  that  this  act  is  not  an  act  that  would  be 
against  SiKrL  if  SiKrl  should  be  seen  as  the  manner  characteristic  of  Antilochus  both  because  of  his  youth 
and  because  of  his  conviction  that  he  deserves  the  second  prize. 
104 The  most  important  occurrences  of  51K11  in  a  legal  context  having  been  looked  at,  I 
can  now  proceed  with  the  examination  of  the  term's  application  to  a  more  moral  meaning. 
But  first,  it  has  to  be  repeated  that  the  distinction  between  a  legal  and  a  moral  sense  of  the. 
term  is  not  as  sharp  as  it  would  appear  at  first  sight;  if  legality  does  indeed  reflect  morality, 
the  relation  is  not  difficult  to  grasp:  even  in  the  cases  in  which  Siq  has  a  legal  sense, 
signifying  simply  a  procedure,  and  thus  assuming  after  all  different  connotations,  since  it 
refers  to  social  rather  than  personal  morality,  the  two  meanings  may  be  almost  fused,  the 
word  thus  bearing  the  connotations  of  both.  100  Abiding  by  a/the  law  is  a  conscious  decision 
of  an  agent,  indicative  of  his  moral  qualities.  In  an  age  of  oral  law  the  moral  nuance  of 
legality  is  perhaps  even  more  prominent,  for  there  are  no  fixed  principles,  the  violation 
of  which  is immediately  recognised  as  a  kind  of  formal  injustice,  but  rather  vague  and 
flexible  norms  of  behaviour,  which  can  or  cannot  be  violated  at  the  discretion  of  the 
agent.  Even  if  we  see  61Kfl  merely  as  a  legal  process,  its  proper  administration  entails, 
or  even  demands,  a  moral  sense. 
2.2.2  d  l'Ki7  as  a  moral  term 
The  moral  nuance  of  6  ii  is  particularly  evident  in  the  use  of  the  adjective  ÖIKaIoc 
and  the  adverb  &Katcx.  The  latter  is  totally  absent  from  the  Iliad,  while  the  former  has 
only  a  limited  appearance  there;  both  occur  in  the  Odyssey,  evoking  the  sense  of  morality 
that  is  believed  to  characterise  the  poem.  The  use  of  SlKaiö  poc  for  Agamemnon  at  T  181, 
which  was  mentioned  along  with  the  use  of  SiKfl  at  T  180,  is  rather  complicated,  pertaining 
100  It  is  in  this  way  that  1  214-15  and  C  120-21(=  i  175-76=  v  200-1=  0  575-76)  should  perhaps  be 
interpreted,  while  the  ambivalence  of  the  term  can  also  be  noted  in  relation  to  TT  542  and  y  244;  see  p. 
108. 
105 to  the  content  and  the  perspective  of  the  Iliad  as  a  whole,  and  therefore  I  would  sooner 
postpone  its  discussion  for  the  next  chapter.  The  two  other  occurrences  of  the  adjective  in 
the  Iliad  are  at  A  831  for  Cheiron,  and  at  N6  for  the  people  of  the  Abioi;  the  adjective 
being  used  as  a  plain  attributive,  and  no  explanation  being  given  as  to  what  constitutes  the 
`justice'  of  Cheiron  or  the  Abioi,  the  references  are  vague  and  not  particularly  helpful.  it 
seems  inevitable,  therefore,  that  I  should  focus  at  this  point  on  the  examples  provided  by 
the  Odyssey.  The  examination  will  certainly  not  be  limited  to  the  adjective  and  the  adverb; 
for  the  noun  Siian  will  prove  to  have  moral  connotations,  thus  being  worthy  of  notice. 
To  begin  with,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  original  form  in  which  we  sense  a  moral 
nuance  is  öuzii  when  denoting  the  `characteristic'  or  `mark':  we  have  already  seen  that  Sixty 
at  IF  542  could  be  taken  to  imply  that  Antilochus  reacted  in  a  way  that  suited  his  character, 
and  one  could  even  say  his  social  position;  the  reference  is  obviously  not  made  to  some 
abstract  idea  of  justice,  but  instead  to  an  idea  of  propriety  as  this  is  defined  by  the  code  of 
behaviour  of  the  particular  society.  This  would  then  have  to  be  an  application  similar  to 
that  of  the  expression  51KI1(EoTi)  +  genitive,  in  which  case  SiKn  means  `manner,  way' 
and  refers  to  a  characteristic  of  the  noun  in  the  genitive,  e.  g.  dAX'  au'TTI  81KTI  EaTi 
(3pOTCÖV,  OTC  TiC  KE  OdvDaly  (A  218).  But  it  seems  that  the  expression  does  not  simply 
imply  a  characteristic  behaviour,  but  also  the  behaviour  that  is  most  appropriate  for  the 
person  concerned;  thus,  at  a  278-79  we  hear  of  the  way  in  which  the  suitors  were 
expected  to  behave:  instead  of  consuming  Odysseus'  property,  since  pvrio-n  pwv  oüx 
SE  ri  bIKn  TO  TTdpO18E  TTKTO,  01  T'  aYaOn  IV  TE  '  Yvvaixa  Kai  avEloio  66YaTpa 
uVTlCTEÜEIV  EOEÄWaI  Kai  dXX4XOuc  Epiawaly  (a  275-77),  they  should  have  brought 
presents  to  the  bride  and  her  relations. 
106 This  last  example  should  be  associated  with  g  90-92,  where  Eumaus  talks  of 
the  suitors'  behaviour  to  his  guest,  the  disguised  Odysseus:  ö  T'  OK  iOEXouat  SLKaiwc 
ivaceai  OUS£  VEEOBal  £TTI  O4  TEP',  aXXa  EKTIAOL  I  KTIjIaTa  6ap6dTTTOUOIV  rn  p  tOV,  OU'S' 
errs  The  adverb  &Katc  c  obviously  implies  a  proper  behaviour  that  the  suitors 
disregard:  their  impropriety  lies  in  their  consuming  the  property  of  another;  in  other 
words,  the  suitors  go  beyond  their  own  limits,  and  in  this  way  they  violate  the  limits  of 
Odysseus  and  his  O  KOC.  The  adjective  5  atoc  is  also  used  as  the  antonym  of  üßpta-njc 
in  the  formulaic  line  öi  y'  43ptaTai  is  Kai  dyptoi  oü68  5  Kaioff  (ý  120=  i  175=  v 
200).  The  etymology  and  actual  meaning  of  üßpic  remain  uncertain,  101  yet  it  is 
generally  accepted  that  it  refers  to  an  excessive  behaviour  which  proves  dishonouring 
and  offensive  for  the  injured  party.  102  If  ü(3ptcrijc  is,  then,  one  who  exceeds  the  limits 
of  propriety,  Sixaioc  must  be  the  one  who  keeps  within  these  limits.  '03 
The  words  certainly  imply  adherence  to  the  particular  code  of  conduct  that 
exists  in  Homeric  society,  as  is  obvious  from  the  reference  to  the  proper  way  of  wooing 
a  lady  at  g  90-92  and  a  275-77,  or  the  reference  to  the  principle  of  Esvia  at  ý  121(=  0 
576=  t176=  v  201,  cf  u  294f.  =  4  312f.  ).  L  Katoc  is,  then,  the  person  who  conforms 
with  the  principles  of  society,  thus  keeping  within  the  limits  that  these  principles  have 
established.  The  word  can  be  used  for  a  proper  way  of  speaking  (a  414-15=  u  322-23) 
or  for  someone  with  proper  table  manners  (y  52),  and  it  is  therefore  very  close  to  the 
101  See  p.  73,  n.  42. 
102  Cf.  the  use  of  ürrspßiov  and  #t&'  at  >;  92.  For  i  3pic  as  excessive  behaviour  see  p.  44. 
103  Rodgers  (1971)  also  relates  &l'rl  and  being  6  Kaioc  with  the  idea  of  keeping  within  one's  proper 
limits,  and  rightly  relates  the  terms  with  ai&äc;  thus  `being  6IKaioc  depends  on  knowing  where  one 
stands  in  society'  (299),  a  quality  that  leads  to  properly  respecting  another;  however,  I  would  not  totally 
agree  with  her  that  `observing  81Krl  is  not  getting  into  trouble'  (ibid.  );  it  is indeed  true  that  `whether  one  is 
bixaioc  or  ccb&KOC 
... 
depends  on  the  consequences  of  one's  actions'  (292),  but  this  common  sense 
statement  does  not  justify,  I  believe,  the  prudential  meaning  she  ascribes  to  the  terms;  justice  can  be  both  a 
conscious  choice  on  prudential  grounds,  but  it  can  also  be  a  dispositional  attitude,  conditioned  rather 
subconsciously.  Dickie  (1978:  99)  also  sees  SiKrl  as  opposed  to  ü(3ptc,  which  denotes  'a  transgression  or 
overstepping  of  the  due  order  of  things',  normally  consisting  in  `one  person's  invading  the  rights  of 
another';  see  also  his  criticism  of  Rodgers'  arguments  (100-1) 
. 
107 use  of  the  expressions  KaTa  uoipav,  scar'  aToav.  It  does  not  come  as  a  surprise,  then, 
that  we  find  Siicrr  alongside  aioipa  cpya  at  g  84:  the  line  belongs  to  Eumaeus,  part  of 
the  same  utterance  as  f;  90-92,  the  context  being  again  the  suitors'  insolent  conduct; 
their  impropriety  disregards  the  norms  of  Homeric  society.  Although  both  the  noun  and 
the  adjective  may  be  said  to  refer  to  a  disposition  of  the  agent,  it  is  obvious  that  they 
should  not  be  seen  as  indicative  of  an  abstract  and  conceptualised  notion  of  justice. 
Worth  noticing  is  also  the  association  of  6(Kfl  with  e  pLcTec  at  i  214-15; 
Odysseus  gives  his  impression  of  the  Cyclops:  äv6p'  £TTEA£ÜQEQeai  sydXfv  imciIEVOV 
dAKnv  I  äypiov,  GÜTE  6Ixac  EZ  Ei5OTa  OÜTE  e£utaTac.  This  is  the  second  occurrence  of 
the  noun  in  a  largely  moral  context,  the  first  being  the  above  mentioned  case  of  g  84. 
As  happens  in  the  formula  of  c  120-21  bii  is  again  paired  with  äypiov,  and  the  lines 
are  generally  thought  to  reflect  the  opposition  between  a  civilised  and  a  primitive 
world.  AlKac,  therefore,  could  be  taken  to  denote  the  legal  procedures  by  means  of 
which  disputes  are  settled  in  an  organised  society,  and  the  lack  of  which  entails 
violence.  The  application  in  this  case  would  not  be  different  from  TT  542,  where 
Sarpedon's  kingly  qualities  are  described,  '04  or  from  y  244,  where  we  hear  of  Nestor 
who  Trspi  o15E  8IKac  1ý6  4p6viv  dMcav.  OENiorec  refers  to  principles  of  behaviour, 
which  can  be  seen  to  have  either  a  moral  or  a  legal  content.  This  is  exactly  the  point  at 
which  the  two  applications  of  81KTI  seem  to  converge,  morality  and  legality  appearing  as 
the  two  aspects  of  the  same  essential  quality. 
It  is  indeed  very  difficult  to  prove  or  assert  that  the  two  applications  of  the  word 
have  a  common  origin;  Gagarin  is  against  such  an  interpretation,  insisting  that  we  have 
104  As  Janko  notes  (1992:  on  1T  541-7),  we  have  here  `the  two  desiderata  for  a  king',  that  is  `to  avert  civil 
strife  and  prevent  foreign  attack'.  Cf.  also  T  108-114,  where  we  find  the  hapax  legomenon  65IKia. 
108 actually  two  distinct  semantic  developments  of  the  term,  the  one  leading  to  SiKf  as  a 
process,  the  other  to  SiKatoc  as  an  attribute  of  the  person  who  behaves  properly.  One 
could  see  the  former  as  the  basis  of  the  judicial  terminology  of  later  times,  and  the 
latter  as  the  basis  of  the  respective  moral  terminology,  with  SIKaioaüvrI  being  the  term 
that  denotes  justice  in  an  abstract  sense.  105  Such  a  solution  seems  indeed  plausible,  for 
the  relation  between  SiKTI  as  the  line  between  land  properties,  or  as  a  judgement,  and 
51KTI  as  one's  characteristic  behaviour  is  not  easy  to  trace. 
I  would  not  be  so  categorical  myself.  One  should  consider  that  the  economy  of 
language  that  so  intensely  characterises  epic  poetry  should  perhaps  raise  the  question 
whether  it  was  possible,  or  rather  desirable,  to  use  the  same  term  in  two  sharply  distinct 
ways;  the  fact  that  the  noun  is  mainly  limited  to  a  legal  context  certainly  allows  a 
differentiation,  but  there  seems  to  exist  a  latent  reference  to  morality  even  in  these 
cases  which  permits  the  term  to  be  used  in  other  contexts  with  equal  readiness.  The 
key,  I  think,  is  the  relation  that  exists  between  morality  and  legality,  which  demands 
that  even  a  legal  act  is  based  on  and  should  be  conducted  according  to  essential 
principles  of  morality.  A  society  which  enjoys  the  privilege  of  having  laws  on  the  basis 
of  which  it  can  pursue  social  harmony  is  a  society  which  has  acknowledged  the 
importance  of  morality  for  its  survival  and  has  therefore  formed  a  code  of  some  kind  in 
order  to  ensure  that  certain  essential  principles  are  not  violated.  Behind  the  non- 
elaborate  Homeric  concept  of  justice,  either  as  a  procedure  or  as  a  disposition,  one  can 
detect  the  basic  principle  of  morality  as  defined  in  the  previous  chapter:  a  condicio  sine 
qua  non  for  all  societies,  which  acknowledges  the  crucial  role  that  the  existence  of 
limits  may  have  for  survival. 
105  Gagarin  (1973)  82,87. 
109 At  the  same  time,  it  has  to  be  admitted  that  the  Homeric  concept  of  justice  is 
non-elaborate.  Whether  implying  a  legal  process,  or  a  moral  behaviour,  6krI  and  its 
derivatives  appear  quite  inarticulate  or  even  premature.  For  the  reference  is  obviously 
made  to  the  particular  principles  of  the  Homeric  code  of  behaviour,  and  therefore  we 
can  hardly  say,  for  example,  that  SiKaioc  denotes  a  `just  man'  in  a  conceptualised 
sense.  It  is  propriety  and  adherence  to  the  code  that  is  commended  or  criticised,  and  not 
a  disposition  of  some  abstract  quality  that  could  potentially  entail  a  conflict  at  times 
with  the  code  itself.  The  quality  suggested  by  the  adjective  is  defined  by  the  particular 
demands  of  the  particular  society,  and  this  certainly  means  that  it  is  not  of  a  universal 
value  that  supersedes  time  and  space.  As  Havelock  rightly  observes,  '  both  epics...  are 
very  far  from  identifying  "justice"  as  a  principle  with  a  priori  foundations,  whether 
conceived  as  the  necessary  "rule  of  law"  or  as  a  moral  sense  in  man'.  106 
Still,  for  all  that  it  would  be  absurd,  in  my  opinion,  to  insist  on  this 
characteristic  of  Homeric  thought  or  society;  if  this  society  is  ignorant  of  other 
possibilities  as  regards  morality  and  justice,  and  is,  therefore,  content  with  the 
existence  of  a  code  that  ensures,  at  times  successfully,  at  times  not  so  much  so,  social 
stability  and  even  prosperity,  it  is  obvious  that  what  is  lacking  is  simply  the  awareness 
of  the  ephemeral  quality  of  this  code  or  of  an  elaborate  philosophical  system  that  would 
transcend  the  necessities  of  the  particular  time  and  place;  107  by  no  means  should  this  be 
106  Havelock  (1978)  180-8  1. 
107  The  absence  of  writing  is  perhaps  a  significant  factor  for  the  non-elaborateness  of  thought,  although 
not  the  only  factor.  Havelock  (1978:  221ff)  stresses  the  importance  that  writing  had  for  the 
conceptualisation  of  ideas;  `Language,  as  it  presented  itself  to  be  read,  became  a  physical  material 
amenable  to  an  arrangement  which  was  structural  -  or  "geometric"...  This  meant  rearrangement,  for 
whereas  the  previous  need  for  oral  memorization  had  favored  sequences  governed  by  the  laws  of  sound,  it 
was  now  possible  to  supplement  these  by  dispositions  suggested  by  the  laws  of  shape'  (225).  In  any  case, 
the  absence  of  an  elaborate  legal  system  should  be  seen  as  closely  affected  by  the  oral  character  of  the 
period.  But  the  question  remains  whether  a  more  elaborate  legal  awareness  entails  an  equally  elaborate 
moral  awareness;  as  I  said,  in  a  society  of  written  laws,  the  line  between  legality  and  morality  seems 
sharper.  See  p.  44,  n.  43  and  the  reference  to  Williams  (1993)  63ff. 
110 taken  to  imply  that  Homeric  man  is  incapable  of  moral  behaviour.  We  have  already 
seen  in  the  first  chapter  that  moral  behaviour  can  exist  irrespectively  of  the  presence  or 
acknowledgement  of  internal  or  conceptualised  principles;  the  fact  that  Homeric  man 
acts  out  of  a  concern  for  his  name  is  not  incompatible  with  his  ability  to  distinguish 
right  from  wrong,  or  proper  from  improper  behaviour,  and  act  accordingly. 
What  I  hope  to  have  made  clear  in  this  chapter  is  that  both  moira  and  SiKTI  can 
be  seen  as  essentially  moral  terms.  The  former  denotes  an  order  which  results  from  an 
act  of  departmentalisation,  and  although  this  order  is  usually  seen  in  the  dimension  of 
nature  or  life,  the  relevant  terms  can  also  be  used  to  designate  a  moral  order  that  is 
socially  defined.  A  Kf  also  refers  to  such  a  social  order,  and  although  no  idea  of 
departmentalisation  is  implied,  still,  there  is  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  certain  limits 
that  a  SiKaioc  man  does  not  transgress.  These  are  the  limits  set  by  the  Homeric  code  of 
ethics,  and  although  they  may  appear  to  be  of  a  rather  ephemeral  quality,  they  still  have 
the  power  to  create  a  nexus  of  principles  against  which  right  and  wrong  are  defined. 
Moral  behaviour  is  not  only  possible,  but  necessary,  and,  more  important, 
acknowledged  as  such. 
One  final  remark  in  anticipation  of  what  is  to  follow.  moira  is  obviously  related 
to  the  gods.  Whether  or  not  it  should  be  seen  as  identical  to  them  will  be  examined  in 
the  remaining  two  chapters;  but  whatever  the  case,  the  gods  represent  in  some  way  the 
order  implied  by  moira.  This  is  certainly  not  necessarily  a  just  order;  neither  nature  nor 
life  is  always  and  consistently  just,  in  the  sense  in  which  man  perceives  justice. 
Accordingly,  the  gods  are  not  always  and  consistently  just:  even  if  they  behave 
occasionally  in  a  manner  that  would  justify  the  use  of  the  term,  this  is  not  the 
characteristic  for  which  they  are  renowned  and  acknowledged  in  the  Homeric  world. 
Iii Diizn,  with  its  limited  application  and  meaning,  is  far  from  denoting  such  an  idea  of 
divine  justice.  Its  moral  nuance  is  beyond  doubt,  but  it  is  confined  to  human  behaviour, 
and  the  closest  that  the  gods  can  come  to  it  is  by  observing  social  order  in  human 
society;  this  function,  when  applicable,  should  be  distinguished  from  the  idea  of  a  just 
god  who  dispenses  happiness  and  misery  according  to  merit,  or  who  is  invariably 
concerned  with  human  happiness.  The  gods  with  their  concern  for  order,  rather  than 
justice,  are  a  successful  explanation  for  both  good  and  evil. 
112 3 
The  Iliad 
The  Iliad,  whose  title  is  certainly  not  the  poet's  own,  is  the  poem  about  Achilles' 
terrible  pfiv«.  A  wrath  so  obdurate  and  powerful  that  it  caused  the  death  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  heroes,  comparable  only  to  the  wrath  of  a  god.  '  This  is  the  point  of  reference 
for  the  poet,  who  finds,  nonetheless,  quite  often  the  opportunity  to  divert  from  this  main 
subject  and  narrate  events  that  belong  to  the  background,  whether  of  the  past,  the  present 
or  the  future:  we  hear  of  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  Trojan  war, we  see  the  great 
heroes  of  this  glorious  era  fighting,  discussing,  crying  and  loving,  and  we  witness  the 
destruction  of  Troy,  the  story  of  a  family  and  a  people  slowly  disintegrating  before  our 
eyes.  The  gods,  at  times  simply  observing,  but  most  often  participating  in  the  war,  are 
constantly  present,  advancing  life  to  its  end  in  one  way  or  another.  Being  frequently  in  the 
poet's  focus,  they  form  another  excuse  for  digression,  this  time  on  a  different  plane,  which, 
however,  retains  a  relation  to  the  basic  plot.  These  episodes  that  surround  the  main  theme 
are  manipulated  with  extreme  mastery  so  as  to  be  both  related  to  and  independent  from  it. 
Thus,  the  poet  manages  to  return  to  his  central  hero  at  regular  intervals  without  however 
disturbing  the  flow  of  his  narration,  until  he  finally  becomes  entirely  absorbed  with  the 
hero's  own  action. 
1  For  1nvnc  as  the  word  used  only  for  the  gods'  wrath  see  Clay  (1983)  65ff.;  according  to  Clay  µnvºs  is 
caused  when  an  attempt  is  made  `to  blur  or  overstep  the  lines  of  demarcation  separating  gods  from  men'  (66); 
for  her  application  of  this  argument  to  the  plot  of  the  Odyssey,  see  p.  243,  it  27. 
113 The  nucleus  and  essence  of  the  poem  is  Achilles'  wrath.  The  theme  of  the  angry 
hero  who  withdraws  from  battle  must  have  been  traditional,  as  the  exemplum  of 
Meleager's  story  seems  to  imply  (1524-605),  2  although  this  story  is finally  accommodated 
to  the  needs  of  the  narrative.  3  However,  as  Griffin  has  rightly  observed,  this  is  exactly  the 
point  at  which  the  Iliad  diverges  from  tradition:  besides  the  exemplum  which  is  used  in 
order  to  prescribe  how  Achilles  should  behave,  and  consequently  how  the  plot  should 
evolve,  there  are  indications  in  the  preceding  books  that  Achilles  will  return  to  the 
battlefield  as  soon  as  he  receives  proper  gifts  of  reconciliation  from  Agamemnon.  4  This  is 
not  what  happens  after  all,  however.  Achilles  refuses  the  gifts,  and  the  poet,  almost  defying 
tradition,  sets  off  for  the  construction  of  a  totally  different  plot:  from  this  point  onwards 
the  essence  of  Achilles'  tragedy  takes  a  definite  shape,  as  he  becomes  entangled  in  the 
unpleasant  consequences  of  his  own  decisions  and  passions. 
As  already  noted,  a  great  part  of  the  plot  belongs  to  the  gods.  Either  in  relation  to 
Achilles'  wrath  or  not,  their  intervention  remains  undoubtedly  imposing.  At  the  same  time, 
moira  has  an  all-compelling  presence;  if  nothing  else,  it  appears  to  define  Achilles'  life  in 
a  way  that  raises  the  question  of  human  freedom  of  will  and  action:  the  hero  is  said  to  have 
a  choice  between  two  fates:  he  can  either  stay  and  fight  and  win  a  glorious  death,  or return 
2  The  presence  of  Phoenix  in  I  has  been  suspected  of  interpolation.  For  relevant  bibliography  see  Willcock 
(1964)  146,  n.  4;  see  also  Griffin  (1995)  23-25. 
3  Willcock  (1964)  152f.  In  his  discussion  on  the  poet's  way  of  manipulating  mythological  paradeigmata 
according  to  the  development  of  his  own  plot,  Wilcock  argues  in  a  quite  persuasive  manner  that  the  story  of 
Meleager  as  found  in  the  poem  is  not  entirely  traditional;  the  detail  about  the  hero's  wrath  and  subsequent 
withdrawal  from  battle  is  an  invention  of  the  poet  of  the  Iliad,  aiming  at  creating  the  necessary  parallel  that 
would  make  Phoenix'  speech  of  exhortation  effective.  Still,  the  theme,  as  Willcoclc  observes  (152,  n.  6),  may 
be  said  to  be  latent  in  the  withdrawal  of  Paris  (Z  326)  and  Aeneas  (N  460),  while  the  Odyssey  provides 
examples  of  quarrels  between  heroes  at  y  136,9  75  and  h  544. 
4  Griffin  (1995)  19-21. 
114 to  Phthia,  and  live  a  long  but  quiet  life  (1410-16);  still,  and  despite  the  fact  that  he  seems 
at  some  point  to  be  opting  for  the  latter  (I  427-29),  his  life  seems  to  be  inextricably  bound 
to  the  fate  of  death.  Is  this  not  a  cruel  power,  refuting  all  that  has  been  said  about  moira  in 
the  previous  chapter?  Is  the  hero  not  confined  to  well-established  movements,  that  defy  his 
wishes  and  his  plans?  And  if  moira  is  of  such  a  power  in  the  poem,  how  could  it  be 
reconciled  with  the  belief  in  divine  justice?  The  latter  seems  to  demand  that  the  gods  act 
on  the  basis  of  principles  that  support  morality  and  propriety,  yet  no  such  basis  can  exist  if 
the  gods  have  ultimately  to  obey  the  irrational  force  of  moira.  Should  we,  then,  exclude  the 
possibility  of  divine  justice  in  the  poem?  Or,  should  we,  instead,  see  moira  as  part  of 
divine  justice  itself?  The  issue  is  complex,  and  moira's  coercive  power  may  be  seen  in 
relation  to  the  limited  importance  that  the  idea  of  divine  justice  has  in  the  poem.  5 
3.1  Moira 
In  the  previous  chapter  t  examined  the  concept  of  moira  mainly  as  this  is  perceived 
by  the  heroes,  believing  that  in  this  way  we  might  have  a  better  glimpse  of  the  actual 
Homeric  belief.  It  was  noted  at  this  point  (87)  that  moira  is  used  as  a  post  eventurn 
explanation  of  life:  being  employed  once  an  event  has  been  accomplished,  and  implying 
the  order  of  life's  departmentalisation  and  distribution  in  shares,  it  provides  the  reason  as 
3  Chantraine  (1952:  92)  describes  the  difference  between  the  two  Homeric  poems  as  follows:  `L'  Ilia*  est  une 
tragedie  du  destin,  sans  justice.  L'  Odyssee  est  un  roman  optimiste  qui  fait  triompher  la  justice'.  Moira  and 
divine  justice  do  seem  to  be  incompatible  to  a  certain  degree:  if  fate  defines  the  course  of  life,  the  gods  are 
obliged  to  obedience,  whether  or  not  fate  is  their  own  decision,  disregarding,  it  would  seem,  the  consideration 
of  justice;  however,  if  moira  should  be  seen  as  implicit  of  an  order,  divine  justice  is  certainly  not  incompatible 
with  it,  granted  that  divine  justice  does  not  refer  to  a  universal  and  unconditional  idea  of  morality,  but  simply 
to  a  reciprocal  punitive  justice. 
115 to  why  things  ought  to  be  as  they  are.  The  truth  is  that  moira  is  actually  employed  in 
exactly  the  same  way  by  the  poet  himself;  the  events  which  he  narrates  are  events  that 
belong  to  his  past,  that  have  been  accomplished  and  defy  any  other  rational  explanation, 
and  which  he  cannot  by  any  means  disregard  or  modify:  Achilles  and  Hector  have  indeed 
died,  and  Troy  has  been  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  reason  behind  these  events  can  be  no 
other  than  fate. 
In  a  way,  then,  the  poet's  perspective  of  life  is  not  different  from  that  of  Hector 
standing  outside  the  Scaean  gates  and  realizing  that  life  is  subject  to  fate's  decree  after  all 
(X  297-306).  The  difference  is  that  the  poet  has  an  entirely  different  purpose  when 
employing  moira:  while  the  hero  seeks  an  explanation,  the  poet  seeks  the  material  upon 
which  he  will  construct  his  plot.  Detached  emotionally  from  the  events  he  narrates,  he  can 
use  moira  almost  at  will,  according  to  the  emphasis  he  wishes  to  put  on  life  and  the 
perspective  he  wishes  to  endorse  himself.  I  will  try  to  examine  here  the  way  in  which  the 
poet  appropriates  this  knowledge  to  his  narrative  purpose,  how  moira  is  intertwined  with 
the  plot  and  bow  the  subsequent  outcome  defines  our  perception  of  the  Iliadic  man;  to  this 
end  I  will  focus  particularly  on  the  cases  in  which  moira  refers  to  events  that  the  poet 
himself  perceives  as  fated  or  predetermined. 
The  events  that  the  poet  ascribes  to  moira,  either  directly  through  his  own  narration 
or  indirectly  through  the  gods,  are  the  death  of  Sarpedon  (TT  433-34),  Patroclus  (IT  47,687) 
and  Hector  (0  612-14),  and  although  Achilles'  actual  death  is  not  narrated  by  the  poet,  its 
connection  to  moira  is  drawn  explicitly  and  with  increasing  emphasis  in  the  poem.  The  fall 
of  Troy  seems  also  to  be  related  to  moira,  an  event  foretold  on  numerous  occasions  both  by 
116 the  poet  and  by  the  gods  -  interestingly  enough,  though,  foretold  mainly  by  means  of  a 
negative  application  of  moira:  thus,  we  hear  that  it  was  not  fated  that  Troy  should  fall  to 
Patroclus  or  to  Achilles  (TT  707-9),  or  that  a  possible  capture  of  Troy  during  the  battle 
narrated  in  0  would  be  against  fate  (ivnsppopov,  517)  -  two  instances  from  which  we  can 
conclude  that  the  fall  of  Troy  was  indeed  fated.  6  Although  it  is  not  made  clear,  therefore, 
whether  it  is  the  actual  destruction  or  the  circumstances  of  the  destruction  that  are 
predetermined,  the  event  still  looms  over  the  plot,  and  its  inevitability  is  admitted  by  the 
poet  and  his  gods,  and  anticipated  by  the  heroes.  7  At  the  same  time,  there  are  events  of 
less,  and  less  direct,  significance  to  the  actual  plot,  such  as  Aeneas'  survival  of  the  war  (Y 
302-8),  or  the  death  of  minor  figures,  such  as  Asius  (M  116-17)  or  Dioreus  (A  517). 
In  order  that  the  implications  of  moira  be  illuminated,  it  is  necessary  that  we 
examine  its  relation  to  the  gods.  The  relation  between  moira  and  the  gods  is  certainly  not 
unexpected.  On  the  one  hand,  moira  implies  a  cause  which  is  external  to  and  independent 
of  human  will;  since  non-human,  it  must  be  related  to  the  divine  in  some  way.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  gods  are  presented  as  being  responsible  for  everything  in  life,  small  or  great, 
exercising  their  power  of  control  over  human  lives  with  unquestionable  ease.  The  gods' 
decisions,  then,  inevitable  as  they  are  in  their  accomplishment,  seem  to  entail  a  degree  of 
predetermination  for  life:  Hera's  insatiable  hatred  for  Troy  and  her  fervent  wish  for  its 
destruction,  Aphrodite's  power  over  the  notorious  couple,  and  most  of  all  Zeus's  plans, 
6  Cff,  also  B  155.  For  Achilles'  fate  not  to  capture  Troy,  see  also  Y  29-30.  The  event  is  explicitly  attributed  to 
aiaa  in  the  Odyssey,  at  6  509-13,  although  the  reference  there  is  supposed  to  be  part  of  Demodocus'  song; 
see  Garvie  (1994)  on  6  506-12. 
7  See,  for  example,  H  30-32,17  707-9  and  Z  447-49.  Troy's  fall  is  actually  rather  complicated;  in  the 
background  there  seems  to  be  the  idea  that  Troy  is  destroyed  because  of  Paris'  violation  of  the  principle  of 
hospitality,  which  is  believed  to  be  protected  by  Zeus  himself;  however,  and  as  will  be  made  clear  in  the 
following  chapter,  this  explanation  is  rather  suppressed  by  the  poet.  We  do  hear  that  Zeus  promised  a  victory 
to  the  Greeks,  but  no  reason  is  given  for  that  promise. 
117 obviously  define  life,  forcing  man  into  an  established  course  from  which  he  cannot  escape. 
Thus,  it  happens  that  the  impression  of  predetermination  that  so  powerfully  dominates  the 
poem  is  not  only  the  result  of  moira's  application  to  the  text;  most  often  it  is  the  gods' 
planning  and  plotting  on  human  lives  that  creates  the  suffocating  impression  that  man  is 
actually  deceived  and  entrapped  within  imperceptible  yet  all  too  oppressing  confines. 
So,  what  is  the  difference  from  moira?  Could  the  gods'  activity  be  interpreted  as 
moira?  Is  moira  the  very  action  of  the  gods,  their  decisions  which  are  imposed  on  the 
heroes  irrespective  of  their  will?  Zeus  in  particular  is  the  supreme  power,  the  ävc  that 
reigns  over  gods  and  men  alike  by  the  right  of  his  might  and  imposes  his  will  against  all 
odds.  8  It  would  seem  only  natural,  then,  that  he  should  be  responsible  for  moira  as  well. 
Given  the  fact  that  man  is  inclined  to  attribute  to  moira  those  events  that  have  been 
accomplished  irrespectively  of  or  against  his  own  will,  and  that  moira  is  simply  the  name 
given  to  life  post  eventum,  there  seems  to  be  no  obvious  reason  why  moira  should  be 
distinguished  from  divine  action:  life  is  indeed  defined  by  the  gods  in  its  smallest  detail. 
What  would  prevent  one  from  drawing  the  connection,  or  from  suggesting  the 
identification  of  the  two? 
In  fact,  nothing.  As  will  become  clear  fairly  soon,  the  relation  does  indeed  exist  in 
the  poem.  This  is  not  surprising,  granted  the  power  that  Zeus's  regime  enjoys.  What  is 
surprising  is  that  this  idea  co-exists  with  that  of  moira's  actual  differentiation  from  the 
a  Zeus  is  an  ccvaf,  like  Agamemnon  (A  186;  A  280-81;  Q  211;  0  107-8),  a  characteristic  instance  of 
interpreting  the  divine  in  terms  of  human  behaviour  and  social  principles.  However,  the  two  worlds  exist  in 
sharp  contrast  to  each  other,  as  the  gods  enjoy  an  eternal  and  ageless  life  of  ever-lasting  happiness,  while  men 
are  doomed  to  misery.  This  antithesis  is  essential  to  the  poem's  ideology  and  perspective,  for  in  this  way 
human  tragedy,  and  therefore,  human  grandeur,  are  illuminated  even  more  distinctly.  See  Griffin  (1980) 
118 gods.  It  is  moira's  ambivalent  status  against  the  gods  that  is  rather  disquieting  and 
confusing.  The  relation,  as  presented  by  the  text  itself,  is  problematic  and  inconsistent.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  appears  that  moira  and  the  gods  do  not  coincide,  either  in  their  action  or  in 
their  intention,  but,  with  the  boundaries  between  them  not  being  clearly  cut,  it  frequently 
happens  that  the  gods'  interference  bears  the  same  significance  for  the  heroes,  and  the 
same  unbearable  truth  of  man's  fragility,  as  fate  or  moira,  the  relation  between  the  two 
being  therefore  only  the  result  of  confusion.  9  At  the  same  time,  the  gods  are  indeed  related 
to  moira:  they  know  of  its  decrees  and  seem  to  act  towards  their  fulfilment;  moreover, 
quite  frequently  they  seem  to  be  even  responsible  for  the  decision  that  elsewhere  belongs 
to  moira,  thus  disallowing  the  conclusion  of  their  subordination  to  it;  Zeus  in  particular 
enjoys  a  much  closer  relation,  manifest  also  on  a  verbal  level,  which  may  often  create  the 
impression  of  his  identification  even  with  moira. 
Obviously,  albeit  sadly,  the  question  of  moira's  relation  to  the  gods  can  receive  no 
answer  that  would  establish  a  solution  of  absolute  consistency,  for  the  mere  reason  that  no 
such  answer  is  ever  given  in  the  poem  itself-  Moira  is  both  independent  of  and  related  to 
the  gods,  at  times  even  seeming  to  be  identified  with  them.  This  lack  of  determination,  so 
to  speak,  on  the  part  of  the  poet,  and  the  subsequent  self-contradicting  and  certainly 
flexible  presentation  of  moira  are  easily  justified  once  we  consider  the  nature  of  the 
9  See  for  example  the  explanation  Agame=on  gives  for  his  delusion  which  made  him  take  Briseis  from 
Achilles.  aXAaZrk  Kai  VIdipor  Kai  4EpoWrneEpivdc,  I  dt  Ti  got  Eiv  ayopq-  #ecýv  WaXovjypiov  v(T86- 
87).  The  passage  may  be  interpreted  in  more  than  one  way,  Dietrich  (1965:  202ff.  ),  for  example,  sees  here  an 
instance  of  Moires  tendency  to  become  all  the  more  related  to  some  notion  of  justice  and  morality,  and 
although  'Moira  and  Erinys  are  not  yet  -  as  in  later  literature  -  clearly  defined  moral  agents  that  are  imagined 
to  inflict  retribution  for  guilt',  still  the  'connection 
...  of  the  personal  Moira  with  Erinys.  is  conceived  on  a 
higberlevel  than  that  of  death-dealing  deities'  (203),  Dodds  (1951.6),  rightly  as  I  believe,  suggests  that  moira 
is  here  simply  'brought  in  because  people  spoke  of  any  unaccountable  personal  disaster  as  part  of  their 
portioW'  or  "lot".  meaning  simply  that  they  cannot  understand  why  it  happened,  but  since  it  has  happened, 
evidently  "it  had  to  be";  see  p.  89,  n.  66. 
119 concept  of  fate  itself  and  the  nature  and  function  of  the  poem.  If  the  concept  represents  a 
human  `invention'  or  illusion,  it  is  only  natural  that  it  should  be  inconsistent  or  deficient;  if 
it  really corresponds  to  an  external  force  which  can  indeed  control  life,  it  is  only  natural 
that  it  should  be  beyond  human  perception  and  therefore  the  cause  of  eternal  human 
puzzlement.  Moira  or  fate  proves,  therefore,  far  too  complex  an  idea  for  the  poet  to  be 
concerned  with  the  definition  either  of  its  essence  and  function  or  of  its  relation  to  the 
gods;  with  his  primary  interest  lying  with  the  narration  of  a  story  and  the  construction  of  a 
plot,  inconsistencies  and  vagueness  are  expected,  when  it  comes  to  the  application  of 
philosophical  or  theological  ideas. 
Moira  and  the  gods  exist  in  a  relation  of  a  very  fine  balance  indeed,  which  can  by 
no  means  correspond  to  a  system  which  is  fully  developed  and  totally  consistent  with 
itself.  Behind  the  plot  there  is  no  theological  system  which  can  be  detected,  and  therefore, 
the  best  one  can  hope  for,  when  examining  Homeric  theology,  is  to  describe  different  ideas 
and  tendencies,  not  rarely  in  conflict  with  one  another,  in  the  most  accurate  way.  If  we  are 
frustrated  by  the  flexibility  both  of  moira's  nature  and  of  its  relation  to  the  gods,  we  have 
to  bear  in  mind  that  the  poet  is  equally  frustrated  and  confused,  the  only  difference  being 
that  he  does  not  seem  to  be  concerned  either  with  the  cause  of  his  confusion  or  with  the 
solution  to  it;  to  him  moira  seems  to  be  both  an  event  and  a  power,  both  independent  from 
and  related  to  the  gods,  and  he  appears  to  be  employing  the  idea  most  suitable  to  the 
context  of  his  narration.  But  these  are  after  all  expected  inconsistencies  when  it  comes  to 
such  a  concept  as  that  of  fate,  and  certainly  not  peculiar  to  Homeric  thought. 
120 The  ambivalence  of  the  relation  may  be  said  to  result  from  moira's  basically 
distinct  province  and  field  of  activity.  It  would  appear  that  the  occasional  preference  of 
moira  to  the  gods  and  vice  versa  is  often  a  matter  of  different  perspectives  and  emphases. 
The  difference  is  to  be  detected  mainly  in  the  poet's  own  manipulation  of  both  moira  and 
the  gods,  but  it  would  seem  that  even  the  heroes'  more  vague  utterances  do  imply  such  a 
distinction,  if  only  occasionally.  Although  this  difference  may  be  said  to  be  only  slight, 
still  it  disallows  the  complete  and  unconditional  identification  of  the  two.  The  literary 
quality  of  our  poem,  and  its  indifference  to  the  problem,  simply  results  in  their  being 
brought  into  sharp  relief.  In  what  follows,  I  will  attempt  to  explore  the  way  in  which  the 
poet  employs  and  manipulates  the  gods  and  moira,  and  to  interpret  the  poem  accordingly. 
There  is  certainly  little  doubt  about  the  importance  of  the  gods'  role  in  the  poem; 
whether  seen  as  individual  deities,  each  pursuing  a  different  plan  and  exercising  a  different 
power,  or  as  the  collective  idea  of  divinity  that  permeates  nature  and  life,  their  incessant 
participation  in  the  plot  underlines  their  power  over  human  affairs.  Every  single  situation 
in  He  seems  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  divine  participation  or  intervention  throughout  the 
poem:  from  Apollo's  plague  up  until  Zeus's  command  for  the  burial  of  Hector,  the  plot  is 
unfolded  with  the  gods  interfering  with  human  affairs,  deciding  the  course  of  life,  and 
causing  thereupon  the  events  narrated.  Their  intervention  being  at  times  discreet  and 
imperceptible,  as  when  they  bring  courage  to  a  warrior  or manipulate  a  hero's  mood,  and 
at  times  patent  and  incontrovertible,  as  when  they  participate  in  the  battle  themselves,  or 
even  discuss  with  the  heroes,  they  seem  to  be  omnipresent  and  ubiquitous. 
121 The  importance  of  divine  interference  and  the  conviction  of  its  effectiveness  is 
more  than  frequently  asserted  by  the  heroes  themselves.  Although  unable,  as  mortals,  to 
know  the  exact  workings  of  the  gods,  and  therefore  unable  to  identify  them  with  certainty, 
they  still  draw  the  link  between  life  and  the  gods,  all  too  often  unmistakably.  Achilles 
rightly  suspects  a  divine  presence  in  the  plague  (A  62-67),  for  example,  just  as  Priam  does 
when  coming  to  Achilles  guided  by  the  disguised  Hermes  (fl  374-77).  The  gods  are 
deemed  responsible  for  a  turning  in  the  course  of  battle,  for  success  or  failure,  for  looks 
and  courage,  for  life  and  death.  And  when  Achilles  reflects  on  human  misfortune,  trying  to 
soothe  both  Priam's  and  his  own  pain,  he  talks  of  the  famous  jars  of  Zeus  (fl  527-33): 
there  are  two  jars  at  the  threshold  of  the  god's  palace,  the  one  containing  misery,  the  other 
happiness;  and  out  of  those  the  god  distributes  life  to  the  mortals:  either  a  combination  of 
the  two,  or  plain  misery.  True,  the  heroes'  utterances  are  vague,  referring  to  an  indefinite, 
collective  power  of  the  divine  rather  than  to  the  individual,  personal  gods  that  we  see 
moving  about  in  the  poem.  But,  although  this  may  result  in  some  confusion,  as  regards 
divine  responsibility,  as  well  as  the  relation  of  the  gods  to  moira,  the  importance  of  divine 
action,  confirmed  as  it  is  by  the  plot  itself,  remains  beyond  doubt. 
Not  at  all  surprisingly,  the  supreme  power  belongs  to  Zeus.  He  is  the  father  of 
mortals  and  immortals  alike,  whose  power  is  acknowledged  both  by  the  other  gods  and  by 
the  heroes,  but  more  important,  by  the  poet  himself,  who  uses  this  power  as  the  motive 
force  of  the  plot.  It  is  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  poem  that  we  hear  of  Zeus's  will:  the 
poet  will  sing  of  Achilles'  wrath  towards  Agamemnon,  a  wrath  with  terrible  consequences 
for  Greeks  and  Trojans  alike:  tens  of  thousands  of  heroes  were  to  become  the  prey  of  dogs 
and  birds,  and  it  was  in  this  way  that  Zeus's  will  was  fulfilled  -  eiöý  6' 
ETEÄEIETO  PouA  1  (A 
122 5).  It  is  not  easy  to  define  what  exactly  Zeus's  will  or  plan  involves,  yet  it  seems  to  refer  to 
Zeus's  promise  to  Thetis  to  honour  her  son  (A  523-27),  rather  than  to  a  more  general  plan 
concerning  the  Trojan  War  and  its  outcome.  1°  Hearing  of  this  plan  so  early  in  the  poem 
certainly  underlines  the  significance  that  this  concept  has  both  for  Homeric  thought  and  for 
the  Iliadic  plot;  for  it  is  true  that,  besides  reflecting  an  essential  belief  of  Homeric  religion, 
the  idea  of  an  all  powerful  Zeus  is  particularly  helpful  for  the  construction  and  unfolding 
of  the  narrative. 
The  god  first  appears  at  A  494f.:  the  gods  have  just  arrived  on  Olympus  from  the 
land  of  the  ACtllOpeS;  KC(1  TÖTE  &T}  Trp&&~OXUPTrov  IQav  OE01  a'tEv  EOVT£c,  I  TTdVTEc  &pa, 
Zaüc  S'  fipxs.  After  this  ceremonial,  almost  theatrical  procession,  the  meeting  with  Thetis 
follows.  The  goddess  ascends  Olympus;  Zeus  is  sitting  apart  from  all  the  gods  on  the 
highest  peak  of  Mount  Olympus;  there,  in  isolation,  Thetis  will  come  as  a  suppliant  and 
ask  for  a  favour:  `Honour  my  son,  for  he  is  much  dishonoured  by  king  Agamemnon:  grant 
power  to  the  Trojans,  until  the  Achaeans  will  honour  him  back  again';  Zeus,  silent  at  first, 
finally  assents  to  her  request;  afraid  of  Hera's  complaints  though  he  is,  he  nods  to  Thetis, 
and  his  immortal  locks  shake,  and  along  with  them  the  whole  of  Olympus.  When  Zeus 
appears  before  the  gods  again,  all  of  them  stand  up  at  his  entrance  -  ov6e  TIC  ETXr)  )i  ivau 
EtrepXopwoV,  äA1'  dVTiot  ECTav  aTravTEc  (A  534-35).  And  when  Hera  finally  confronts 
"  Such  a  plan  is  mentioned  in  the  Cypria  (11-7,  Allen);  according  to  the  poem,  the  Trojan  War  was  caused  by 
Zeus  out  of  pity  for  earth,  which  was  carrying  too  heavy  a  load  of  people  at  the  time.  The  fact  that  the  poet  of 
the  Mad  does  not  mention  such  a  plan  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  his  knowing  about  it;  even  if  the 
Cypria  should  be  regarded  as  later  than  our  Iftadý  the  tradition  could  well  have  existed  before  the  composition 
of  the  latter,  for  the  idea  of  a  destruction  of  mankind  is  certainly  one  of  the  subjects  of  Near  Eastern  literature, 
cf-  Burkert  (1992-.  101-106).  That  Zeus's  -will  here  is  to  be  restricted  within-the  confmes  of  our  poem  is  evident 
from  the  structure  of  the  sentence:  A5  comes  as  a  complement  to  the  preceding  lines,  besides,  as  will  become 
clear  later  on,  it  is  necessary  that  Zeus's  will  should  be  the  promise  to  Thetis,  for  in  this  manner  Achilles' 
responsibility  and  subsequent  tragedy  are  emphasised. 
123 him  and  whines  at  him,  as  any  woman  would,  when  feeling  that  her  husband's  decisions 
do  not  particularly  suit  her  own  plans,  Zeus  responds  first  rather  mildly,  and  then  less  so, 
threatening  her  with  his  power  and  evading  her  question  by  establishing  the  ultimate  nature 
of  his  plan  -  as  any  husband  would,  when  getting  tired  of  his  wife's  endless  whimpering.  Ei 
S'  oürw  TOGT'  EOTiv,  Eioff  I1  XXEI  4Aov  Avat  (564)  is  the  verse  containing  the  essence  of  his 
words,  and  at  the  same  time  of  his  power.  "  Hera  retreats;  she  feels  fear  and  pain  (568-69); 
Hephaistos  tries  to  reconcile  the  two  gods,  by  pointing  out  to  Hera  that  Zeus's  power  is  not 
to  be  disregarded  -  dpyaAroc  ydp'OA  iirtoc  dVTI4  pEa6aL  (589).  And  with  Hephaistos 
narrating  how  he  was  once  hurled  down  from  Olympus,  and  thus  bringing  merriment  again 
to  this  divine  gathering,  the  scene  comes  to  its  close.  12 
Reminders  of  Zeus's  unique  power  are  dispersed  throughout  the  poem,  establishing 
both  his  superiority  and  the  inevitability  of  his  plan.  Among  the  plethora  of  references, 
there  are  two  scenes,  which,  placed  at  rather  regular  intervals,  seem  to  function  as  stepping 
stones  to  the  plot:  they  are  the  two  instances  in  which  Zeus  discloses  the  future  to  the  gods, 
the  first  in  e,  the  second  in  0.  Both  instances  are  the  point  of  culmination  of  divine 
discord  and  disorder,  with  Zeus  establishing  his  power  thereafter  even  more  firmly  and 
11  Cf,  the  phrase  66-rco  Trou  Atli  pLUEt  6TrEppEvfl  ý[Xov  Eli=  (B  116,123,  E  69),  a  typical  explanation  of 
events  offered  by  the  heroes. 
12  This  scene  of  marital  discord  has  often  been  seen  as  improper  and  all  too  human  for  the  father  of  gods  and 
men,  especially  after  the  grand  presentation  that  precedes  it.  Along  with  episodes  such  as  the  Theomachy  in  Y, 
Zeus's  seduction  by  Hera  (---  159-353)  or  the  lay  of  Aphrodite  and  Ares  in  the  Odyssey  (8  266-366),  it  is 
believed  to  account  for  the  accusation  of  the  gode  fiivolous  and  therefore  irreligious  character.  However, 
'their  carefree  existence  is  necessary,  to  throw  into  relief  and  make  us  see  human  life  as  it  is'  (Griffin  (1980) 
170);  see  also  Macleod  (1982)  3-4.  Of  interest  is  also  Burkert's  account  of  Hera's  characteristic  divine 
qualities  (1985:  132ff),  according  to  which  the  goddess's  almost  comic  status  in  Homer  should  be  related  to 
her  representing  both  the  before  and  the  after  of  marriage,  that  is  both  virginity  and  dissension,  a  trait  which  is 
also  evident  in  her  cult.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Xenophanes,  actually  criticises  this  side  of  the  gods  as  improper 
to  divinity,  and  not  their  attitude  towards  man,  whichwe  find  most  disturbing;  see  Babut  (t974)-  This  is  also  a 
point  in  which  the  Iliad  is  different  from  the  Odyssey.  with  the  exception  of  the  scene  between  Aphrodite  and 
Ares,  the  gods  of  the  more  recent  poems  seem  more  dignified,  this  could  be  seen  as  further  supporting  the  idea 
that  there  is  a  moral  development  in  the  Odyssey,  to  which,  however,  I  would  not  subscribe. 
124 forcefully.  Pointing  both  backwards  and  forwards,  recapitulating  and  at  the  same  time 
foreshadowing  the  plot,  they  emphasise  Zeus's  role  both  in  life  and  in  the  poem. 
The  whole  of  9  has  been  interpreted  by  Kirk  as  evolving  round  the  central  theme 
of  Zeus's  superiority:  in  its  `spasmodic  structure'  and  `inconclusive  episodes'  it  is 
confirmed  that  `Zeus's  will  is  paramount,  that  the  other  gods  cannot  frustrate  it,  and  that  it 
points  towards  Trojan  dominance  and  Achaean  crisis  until  Akhilleus'  wrath  is  assuaged'.  13 
The  book  opens  with  a  `manifesto'  of  the  god's  power:  the  gods  are  assembled  on 
Olympus,  and  Zeus  states  his  demand  of  absolute  obedience  to  his  will:  whoever  fails  to 
conform  with  his  plan  will  be  severely  punished;  for  he  is  OecSv  KpdTiarroc  c  TrduTwv  (17); 
and  even  if  all  the  gods  together  tried  to  pull  him  down  from  Olympus  with  a  golden  chain, 
him,  who  could  move  the  earth  and  the  sea  and  suspend  them  from  Olympus,  well,  even 
so,  they  would  not  be  able  to  move  him  from  the  sky;  T6000v  Eyc  TrEpl  T'  Eiei  6ECäv  nEpi  T' 
vp'  äv8pränwv  (27).  Zeus's  law  is  the  law  of  physical  strength,  and  it  is  the  threat  of 
imposing  this  law  that  prevents  the  other  gods  from  objecting  to  him.  Zeus  is  determined 
to  fulfil  his  plan,  and  he  will  do  so,  whether  or  not  the  other  gods  agree  with  him. 
Later  on  in  the  same  book  the  threat  is  almost  materialised  and  the  god's  power  is 
confirmed:  Hera  and  Athena  decide  to  ignore  Zeus's  command;  feeling  pity  for  the  Greeks, 
they  enter  the  war  (350ff.  );  besides,  as  Athena  complains,  it  is  not  fair  for  Zeus  to  help  the 
Trojans:  how  can  he  forget  that  she  was  the  one  who  helped  his  son  Heracles  through  the 
labours  imposed  by  Eurystheus;  an  instant  flashback  towards  A  and  we  are  reminded  how 
everything  began:  behind  the  Trojan  victory  there  is  the  god's  promise  to  Thetis  (370-72); 
13  Kirk  (1990)  on  0  350-484. 
125 everything  has  been  advancing  towards  the  accomplishment  of  this  promise  and,  therefore, 
it  is  in  accordance  with  it  that  the  plot  is  built  up.  Religious  belief  and  narrative  necessity 
impose  and  fulfil  their  parallel  aims,  without,  however,  proving  themselves  incompatible. 
But  now  it  is  time  that  Zeus  intervened:  his  messenger  fris  warns  the  two  goddesses  of  the 
terrible  punishment  they  are  to  have  inflicted  upon  them,  if  they  do  not  withdraw-,  they 
have  to  know  that  far  too  many  Greeks  will  still  have  to  be  killed  by  Hector,  before 
Achilles  joins  the  war  again;  and  that  will  not  happen  until  after  Patroclus'  death,  ox  ya,  p 
U#aT6V  S'OTI  (477).  By  thus  revealing  the  future,  Zeus  reaff-irms  and  re-establishes  his 
power. 
In  0  the  plan  is  given  in  even  more  detail:  Apollo  will  help  Hector  against  the 
Achaeans,  who,  in  their  flight  will  reach  Achilles'  tent;  Achilles  will  then  send  Patroclus 
to  help,  but  for  all  the  help  he  will  offer,  and  for  all  the  enemies  he  will  kill  -  among  them 
Zeus's  son  Sarpedon  -  he  will  be  killed  by  Hector;  and  Achilles,  mad  at  Hector,  will  kill 
him  in  turn;  what  remains  is  the  final  and  total  destruction  of  Troy  (59-71).  Here  again  a 
reference  in  made  to  the  promise  to  Thetis  (74-77),  and  here  again  the  plan  follows  after  a 
god's  attempt  to  disobey  and  disregard  Zeus's  previous  threats  and  commands:  this  time  it 
is  Poseidon  who  helps  the  Greeks  stealthily  and  unbeknown  to  Zeus;  for  the  supreme  god 
has  been  seduced  by  Hera  and  is  now  asleep;  but  as  soon  as  he  wakes  up,  his  will  is  once 
again  imposed  in  a  fashion  similar  to  that  of  E). 
The  detail  in  which  the  god's  plan  is  presented  inevitably  emphasizes  the 
inevitability  of  his  words;  not  for  a  single  moment  do  we  question  their  truth,  and  even  if  it 
is  the  poet  who  is  ultimately  responsible  for  them,  still,  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that  the 
126 image  he  presents  us  with  is  that  of  an  all  powerful  god,  whose  will  is  a  command  and  a 
law,  inescapable  and  indisputable.  Everything  that  Zeus  wills  becomes  an  unavoidable 
necessity  imposed  on  mortals  and  immortals  alike;  and  it  often  appears  that  everything 
happens  simply  because  Zeus  wants  it  to  happen.  As  Hera  says  to  Athena  at  E)  43  0-3  1,  it  is 
only  natural  and  proper,  iTTICIKEC,  that  he  should  be  the  one  who  makes  the  decisions;  and 
it  is beyond  doubt  that  his  decisions  shape  a  substantial  part  of  the  plot.  The  plan  which  he 
conceives  in  A  and  then  discloses  in  O  and  0  is  indeed  fulfilled  in  the  poem  in  all  its 
detail:  the  god  comes  into  action  by  first  deceiving  Agamemnon  with  a  dream  into 
believing  that  the  god  is  on  the  Greeks'  side  (B  3-6,35-40);  the  Greeks  are  defeated,  the 
Trojans  are  glorious  in  their  victory,  with  Hector  leading  them  closer  and  closer  to  the 
Greek  ships,  to  which  he  finally  sets  fire  -  and  then  everything  comes  out  as  foreseen  or 
planned  by  Zeus.  '4 
Zeus  has  the  unquestionable  privilege  to  transform  his  will  into  a  certain  future 
under  the  threat  of  an  exercise  of  physical  strength,  or  rather  violence.  Nothing  and  no  one 
can  ever  hinder  the  accomplishment  of  the  events  he  has  determined.  The  other  gods  do 
not  necessarily  always  agree  with  him,  yet,  whatever  they  will,  or  whatever  means  they 
employ  to  achieve  their  own  aim,  in  the  end  they  always  have  to  yield  to  his  power  and 
acknowledge  his  unique  claim  to  the  final  decision;  even  if  they  gain  a  momentary  control 
over  events,  as  happens  with  Hera  and  Poseidon  in  =,  causing  thus  a  significant  turn  in  life, 
"  The  question  is  whether  this  is  a  plan  formed  by  Zeus  or  a  decree  of  moira.  But  if  we  accept  that  the  two 
are  essentially  one  and  the  same  thing  in  the  sense  that  they  are  viewed  from  a  different  perspective,  not  that 
they  are  identified,  there  is  no  reason  to  insist  on  the  differentiation.  It  is  worth  noting  at  this  point  that  Zeus's 
plan  is  not  placed  randon-dy  by  the  poet  in  e  and  0;  immediately  after  the  plan  is  disclosed,  we  are  transferred 
to  the  human  plane  of  action,  and  the  heroes'  limited  knowledge,  which  is  the  basis  o-C  their  decisions  and 
actions,  comes  into  sharp  contrast  with  the  knowledge  of  the  audience;  such  rapid  shifts  between  the  two 
worlds  further  enhance  the  tragic  sense  of  the  poem;  see,  for  example,  the  scene  of  the  divine  assembly  at,  &  I- 
72. 
127 still,  the  final  outcome  can  only  be  the  one  decided  by  Zeus;  and  when  again  it  appears  that 
life  is  brought  forward  through  the  agency  of  one  of  the  lesser  gods,  as  happens  with 
Apollo  in  TT  or  Athena  in  X,  it  is  once  more  Zeus  who  allows,  or  even  requires  their  action. 
Even  the  god  himself  seems  to  be  bound  by  his  own  will:  feelings  of  pity  towards  the 
Greeks  or  the  Trojans  are  not  sufficient  an  excuse  for  him  to  violate  his  previously  made 
promises;  15  his  will  and  his  plan  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  thus  becoming  the  motive 
power  operating  directly  or  indirectly  behind  every  final  event. 
This  idea  of  Zeus,  as  expressed  by  the  poet  himself,  is  reflected  in  the  heroes' 
perception  of  the  god  as  well,  with  Achillee  description  of  the  god's  jars  at  fl  527-33 
being  its  most  powerful  manifestation.  The  difference  obviously  is  that,  while  the  poet's 
references  to  Zeus  are  supposedly  accurate  accounts  of  the  god's  intentions  and  actions, 
the  heroes  simply  express  an  assumption  about  divine  intervention;  exactly  because  of  his 
superiority,  Zeus  frequently  features  in  their  words  as  the  natural  cause  of  everything,  even 
when  we  know  that  this  is  not  really  the  case.  Every  single  thing,  every  situation  may  be 
directly  or  indirectly  linked  to  Zeus,  and  his  name  is  invoked  almost  in  afagon  de  parler, 
or  as  a  synecdoche  for  the  divine,  each  time  that  a  hero  recognizes  the  presence  of  divine 
agency,  but  is  still  uncertain  as  to  which  god  is  actually  to  be  praised  or  blamed.  16  Still, 
there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  differentiate  the  poet's  view  of  the  god  from  that  of  the 
heroes,  since  in  either  case  Zeus  features  as  the  supreme  power  which  is  responsible  for  a 
15  Cf  A  4449.  E)  24546,  X  169-176. 
16  For  direct  link  see  A  63,  B  134,669-70,  E  91,224,  Z  159,  T  298-99,306f.;  for  indirect  link  through 
reference  to  gods  in  general,  see  A  178,290,  A  320,  H  288,  N  727.  That  Zeus  features  in  such  cases  as  the 
supreme  power,  representative  of  the  divine  in  general,  rather  than  as  an  absolutely  personal  god  is  further 
supported  by  the  fact  that  quite  frequently  his  name  is  used  alongside  the  general  ee6c,  hol,  or  5a  1  pCov, 
almost  as  their  alternative,  see,  for  example,  Z  349  and  rl  534. 
128 plan  that  has  been  defined  and  detennined  some  time  in  the  past  and  is  now  fulfilled.  Zeus 
himself  proves  this  unique  privilege  of  his  when  he  proclaims  that  his  nod  entails 
inevitability,  as  already  noted,  for  as  the  god  himself  explains,  -ro5-ro  yap  Eg  ipgftv  yE  psT, 
a'Oav,  ýTotai  PE'YICFTOV  I  TiKtICA)P'  06  YCIP  hi6v  TraMvdYpETcv  c,  65'  ahTa-njXO'V  I  c,  651 
aTEXEU7TOV,  *0  TI  KEV  KtýaXfi  KaTavEUCco  (A  525-27);  or  when  he  tells  Apollo  that  it  will.  be 
he  alone  who  will  decide  the  course  of  the  war:  KCIBEV  S'  aýTck  siy6  #acopat  EwPYOV  TE 
CITOC  TE,  I  C'Lk  KE  Kai  abTII;  'AXatoi  avanvsuoczat  Tr6voto  (0  234-35).  The  heroes'  tendency 
to  relate  their  life  and  death  to  the  supreme  god  is  justified  and  validated  by  the  poet's  own 
narration  and  presentation  of  the  god.  The  two  jars  of  which  Achilles  talks  may  be  the 
assumption  that  a  mortal  makes  on  the  data  of  his  limited  knowledge,  yet  the  very  plot  that 
our  poet  constructs  confirms  this  assumption  and  justifies  the  position  of  Achilles'  words 
at  the  end  of  the  poem. 
The  connection  vAth  moira  is  obviously  not  surprising.  It  appears  first  of  all  to  be 
supported  by  the  mere  fact  that  the  whole  development  of  the  plot  seems  to  depend  on  the 
god's  will.  Everything  in  the  poem  seems  to  be  controlled  by  Zeus,  as  his  promise  to 
Thetis  triggers  the  plot  and  causes  an  all  important  change  in  the  course  of  the  war,  while 
it  is  also  his  will  that  demands  the  destruction  of  Troy.  One  could  easily  draw  a  conclusion 
for  the  identification  of  the  two:  moira  is  nothing  but  Zeus"s  will,  which  is inevitable  and 
irreversible,  and  whose  power  we  witness  in  the  poem  all  too  intenselY;  there  is  no  other 
power  greater  than  Zeus  in  the  poem,  and  nothing  ever  seems  to  be  fulfilled  unless  it  is 
decided  by  the  supreme  god.  '7 
17  So  Lloyd-Jones  (1993:  5):  'Moira,  one's  "portioe,  is  in  the  last  resort  identical  with  the  Aill  of  Zeus'. 
129 The  connection  is  evident  on  the  verbal  level  as  well.  Aca  is  directly  related  to  the 
god  at  1609  and  P  321.18  At  P  321  ff.  the  reference  is  obviously  made  to  Zeus's  plan  for  a 
temporary  Greek  defeat,  a  plan  that  the  Achaeans  would  have  violated,  had  it  not  been  for 
Apollo:  "Apyi-tot  8i  KE  K660C  'EXOV  Kai  6mp  &6c  cFtaav  I  KdPTd  Kai  (36bd  C#TEPC,?  -  dxx' 
"TOkWT6XXcav  I  MvE[av  STPUVE.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  this  is  the  only  case  in  which 
Zeus's  plan  is  mentioned  in  terms  of  moira;  otherwise,  moira  and  the  plan  may  be 
interwoven,  but  are  never  explicitly  identified.  1  608-10  are  different:  Phoenix  has  just 
advised  Achilles  to  give  up  his  wrath  and  accept  Agamemnon's  presents,  the  hero  refuses 
the  advice  and  scoms  the  reconciliation  offered;  OU"  TI  JIS  TaUTrIC  I  XPE6  TIPfiq*  ýPOVSCa  8S 
%v 
TETipfic0ai  Atoc  atoD,  I  i'l  p'  'EgEt  irapa  viluall  KOPGOVIGIV,  EIC  0'  KI  dOTW)  I  iV  (IT40EIGGI  11EVID 
PFr,  Ir  Kai  poi  ýiXa  youvaT  opcapTý  Moira  appears  to  have  been  defined  by  Zeus  himself,  it  is 
part  of  his  decisions  for  the  course  of  Achilles'  life,  it  is  the  reason  behind  Achilles' 
prowess  and  status. 
We  also  hear  Helen  ascribing  Paris'  and  her  own  bad  fate  or  fortune  to  Zeus  at  Z 
357:  61mv  Em  Zr;  U'C  OfiKE  KaK6  V  116pov,  and  Priam  drawing  a  similar  conclusion  at  X  60-61: 
41  4%I%  ov  pa  7Ta-mp  Kpovt&ry;  Ern  y4paoc  o6&ý  I  ato-g  Ev  CipyaXs'D  ýOfaci.  There  are  also  instances 
which,  although  less  direct,  and  perhaps  of  a  slightly  ambiguous  status,  seem  to  point 
towards  the  same  direction.  At  . 
1328-30  Achilles  reflects  on  how  his  hopes  and  wishes  for 
the  Trojan  War  were  all  frustrated  since  Patroclus  died.  dXX'  OU  k  =5PEGM  VOT'PaTa 
I  ZEU 
TraVTa  TE;  kEUTq*  I  ap#O  y6p  7Ti7TPtOTat  6potTIv  ycitav  ips6oat  I  au'Tou-  bt  TpoiD.  A  similar 
ambiguity  is  sensed  at  0  289-91,  where  Athena  and  Poseidon  come  to  the  rescue  of 
Achilles  from  the  river-god  Xanthus;  Poseidon  reassures  the  hero  of  their  help:  ToIca  ydp 
13  One  could  also  add  T  87,  for  which  see  p.  119,  n.  9. 
130 TOI  VC&  OECSV  E'TTITaPP66CA)  ZIPCV,  I  ZT]Wk  &iTaivq'caVT09;,  EYCO  Kai  rTaXXa,;  'Ae4vTj-  I  cS,;  & 
TOI  ITOTapcý  ye  6ap4pwat  CAMP&  iOTIV.  19  The  ambiguity  obviously  lies  in  the  fact  that 
Zeus  is  presented  as  knowing  and  advancing  the  ordinance  of  fate,  but  not  necessarily  as 
being  responsible  for  it  as  well. 
Some  could  certainly  distinguish  between  the  heroes'  utterances  and  those  made  by 
a  god  or  the  poet's  own  narration.  In  the  former  the  tendency  for  an  identification  almost 
of  moira  with  the  god  could  be  seen  as  the  result  of  the  heroes'  limited  knowledge:  not 
knowing  the  exact  relation  between  the  two,  they  easily  attribute  moim  to  the  god  who  is 
commonly  accepted  tabe  the  cause  behind  life.  Tbus,  Achilles'  reference  to  At(k  alca  at  I 
609  could  be  taken  as  the  inference  that  a  mortal  would  draw,  without  necessarily  proving 
the  truth  of  the  statement.  Similarly,  Helen's  and  Priam's  words  are  only  an  assumption. 
Poseidon's  words,  on  the  other  hand,  are  obviously  more  vague  in  their  implications  of  a 
relationship:  Zeus  approves  of  the  god's  intervention  for  the  sake  of  Achilles,  but  this 
proves  ultimately  nothing  for  his  relation  to  moira. 
Unfortunately,  the  situation  is  not  as  simple  as  to  be  explained  by  the  means  of 
such  a  distinction.  At  T  410  moira  appears  alongside  the  great  god,  who  can  be  no  other 
than  Zeus:  this  is  the  moment  when  Achilles  re-enters  the  war;  a  terrible  battle  is 
imminent,  for  we  already  know  that  Hector  will  soon  be  killed  by  the  ferocious  son  of 
Peleus;  the  climax  is  built  up  and  Achilles'  tragedy  is  further  underscored  by  the  prediction 
of  his  own  death:  this  is  not  simply  the  moment  of  triumph  of  an  illustrious  and  all 
majestic  hero,  but,  more  important,  the  irrevocable  moment  that  will  lead  to  his  death;  his 
19  Cf.  also  1115-21,0  82-84 
131 horses,  Xanthus  and  Balius,  Podarge's  famous  offspring,  pronounce  his  fate:  dAd  Toi 
riyyýeEv  ýpap  oXiOptov-  ou5E  Tot  fpdr.  I  a`iTlOt,  dXX&  OE6(;  TE  liEyac  ra't  Wipa  tcpaTatil 
(409-10).  20  The  immortal  status  of  the  horses  provide  the  utterance  Nvith  a  degree  of 
momentous  significance.  Should  one  see  this  powerful  collocation  as  an  hendiadys  and 
associate  it  uritli  Zeus'  predictions  at  0  470-77  and  0  57-71,  or  more  important,  with 
Zeus's  actual  action  in  the  poem;  or  rather  see  two  distinct  powers  aiming  at  the  same  end 
but  moving  actually  in  parallel?  The  question  xvill  be  discussed  later  on;  here  it  suffices  to 
note  that,  whatever  the  case,  the  connection  between  the  great  god  and  moira  remains 
beyond  doubt. 
Moreover,  Zeus  may  occasionally  appear  to  be  responsible  for  the  events  that  are 
elsewhere  attributed  to  moira.  The  plan  he  announces  at  e  is  called  a 
Og#aTov,  21 
although 
the  main  events  affected  have  a  relation  to  moira  as  well.  The  god  may also  appear  as 
being  responsible  for  one's  death  or  survival  (A  52-55,  M  402-3,  N  222-27),  for  Patroclus' 
20  As  already  noted  (88,  n.  66)  I  see  no  obvious  reason  why  pcIpa  should  be  written  at  this  point  with  a  capital 
'M',  implying  a  personal  goddess,  unless  we  wish  to  see  some  sense  of  grandeur  in  the  horses'  words,  and 
consequently  inthewhole  episGdethe  personaL  or  quasi-personal  appearance  of'Epiv6m.  a  few  lines  later  on 
J  418)  could  be  said  to  further  incite  such  an  interpretation,  yet  the  formulaic  character  of  pcýtpa's 
occurrence  seems  to  me  to  be  against  it,  I  would  deem  it  more  probable  that  what  the  poet  and  his  audience 
perceived  was  an  impersonal  fate,  rather  than  a  powerfal  goddess.  The  only  cases  in  which  pcýipa  appears 
personally,  as  we  have  seen,  is  in  the  capacity  of  the  spinning  woman  at  fl  209  (cf  Y  127,  where  we  find 
Alca),  and  in  the  unique  occurrence  of  the  plural  Mdtipcii  at  fl  49;  certainly  T  410  is  not  a  reference  to  such  a 
neral  function. 
k  The  word  appears  once  again  in  the  poem,  at  E  64,  this  time  in  the  plural:  Meriones  kills  Phereclus,  the  son 
of  Harmonides  the  joiner,  6C  Kali  'AXEgdV5PCt)  TEKTývaTG  VfiaC  ciiaac  I  C(PXEK&OUqt  a"I  IT601  xaKO'V 
T'  001  'VOVTO  101  T'  C(U'TCý,  E91TEI  Oý  TI  OECSV  EKeg#aTa  ?  ý71.  Oi#=(  is  taken  by  Kirk  (1990:  ad  PWE  YE 
loc.  )  to  mean  Parie  neglect  of  ;  Evici,  a  supposition  that  refers  us  to  the  idea  of  Zeus'sjustice  in  his  capacity  as 
'Ectivioc.  However,  the  scholia  refer  to  'two  different  prophecies  of  doom  (if  Paris  went  overseas,  or  if  the 
Trojans  pursued  seafaring)'  (Kirk,  ibid.  )  an  explanation  which  accords  better  with  the  application  of 
N#C(Tov  at  0  477.  Unfortunately,  the  passage  is  quite  vague.  But  I  would  tend  to  prefer  the  scholiasts' 
explanation  to  a  moral  remark  on  Paris'  behaviour,  for  the  simple  reason  that,  as  will  become  clear  in  due 
course.  Zeus!  s  protection  of  the  principle  of  gevia  is  indeed  alluded  to,  yet  it  is  never  witnessed  in  the  plot. 
The  reference  to  such  a  prophecy  could  also  be  seen  in  the  light  of  a  previous  tradition,  similar  to  that  found  in 
the  Cypria,  according  to  which  the  war  was  part  of  a  greater  plan  by  Zeus.  See  Clark  (1986:  381)  where 
Kullmann's  argument  that  B  340,  A  52-55,  M  13-23,  N  222-27.  T  86-90  and  270-74  can  be  seen  as 
reminiscences  of  this  tradition  is  mentioned. 
132 death  in  particular  (n  694-93;  cf  TI  232-52,18-11),  and  Achilles'  fate  (I  11  5-16=  X  365- 
66,142941;  cf.  TT  37=51);  and  certainly  for  the  outcome  of  the  Trojan  War.  We  are 
informed  by  the  Greek  heroes  that.  Zeus  nodded  to  their  cause  (B  300-30,350-53)  -a  sign 
whose  importance  is  made  clear  at  A  525-27,  as  we  have  seen  (129).  Troy's  destruction, 
therefore,  is  not  only  something  that  the  heroes  expect  or  fear,  but  more  important, 
something  that  all  the  gods  are  certain  of  (H  30-32,  TT  707-9).  22  Even  when  the  Greeks 
suffer  heavy  casualties  and  all  the  leaders  are  wounded,  yet  they  are  all  still  alive,  and  thus 
Zeus's  plan  for  the  end  of  the  war  is  never  reversed.  Doubtless,  we  have  here  simply  an 
historical  necessity  which  the  poet  cannot  help  obeying:  but  the  intensity  of  Zeus's 
connection  to  the  facts,  conscious  of  it  as  the  poet  is,  evidently  proves  the  god's  unique 
ability  to  define  and  control  human  affairs. 
Hector's  case  is  actually  indicative  of  this  shift  of  emphasis  from  moira  to  the  god. 
It  is  in  E)  that  we  first  hear  of  his  imminent  death  in  a  rather  oblique  statement  by  Zeus:  oU' 
Y6P  TTPIV  ITOXE'POU  dIT07TaUOETat 
oppilio;  "EKTcap,  I  TTpiv  opOat  Trapa  va6ýi  7TC&ýKEa 
TTr)XE*Icova  (  473-74)  and  the  whole  plan  is  named  a  Oc'4aTOV  (477);  in  0  Zeus  lays  out 
before  the  gods  the  futureý  but  this  time  more  explicitly:  Hector  will  kill  Patroclus  and  will 
then  be  killed  by  Achilles  (68);  at  0  612-14  the  poet  foreshadows  Athena's  role  in  the 
hero's  death,  his  p6paipov  ýpap;  at  TT  851-53  the  dying  Patroclus  foresees  Hector's  death, 
ayXi  TrapEcTrIKEY  OavaTOC  Kai  jicýtpa  KpaTaiTI;  at  P  201-8  it  is  Zeus  himself  who  talks:  let 
me  honour  you  now,  miserable  you,  for  death  is  near,  edvawc  [ 
... 
I  cxg56v  clai,  and 
Andromache  will  not  receive  you  back  again.  And  thus  we  come  to  X,  "EKropoc-  dvatp'raic- 
as  early  as  line  5  the  subject  becomes  clean" 
EKTOPC(  S'  aU'TOý  116vat  6kih  pcýtpa  TT6'8Tpsv; 
22  Zeus  has  already  decided  on  the  Trojan  destruction,  0  69-7  1;  cf  0  213-17,559-602. 
133 at  209  Zeus  takes  his  scales  and  weighs  the  deaths  of  Achilles  and  Hector:  ýurs  8' 
"  EKTOpoi;  dicipov  ýpap  (212);  when  Hector  himself  realises  the  inevitability  of  his  death,  he 
cries:  c'Aa  Troirot,  h  paa  64  lie  Ocol  6dvaT6V5Z  KdACaaaV  (297).  23  while  a  few  lines  on  he 
says  Ov  a5TE'  PE  P6pa  KtXdVEI  (303)  -  the  same  formula,  slightly  varied,  that  Ffecabe  uses 
at  436:  vGv  a5 
OdvaT()C 
Kall  pcýipa  KlXdVS1.24 
The  confusion  is  clear,  and  any  attempt  to  define  the  relation  between  the  two 
powers  in  a  totally  rational  and  consistent  fashion  proves  vain.  Both  moira  and  Zeus  take 
part  in  Hector's  death,  according  to  the  narration  of  the  poet  himself,  and  whether  the  god 
succumbs  to  moira's  ordinance  or  he  forms  himself  what  is  later  to  be  termed  fate  by  the 
poet,  remains  moot  What  is  clear  is  that  the  poet  carefully  builds  up  his  narration  so  that 
Hector's  death  will  finally  seem  inevitable,  demanded  by  forces  that  are  external  to  him, 
and  independent  of  his  will.  At  the  same  time,  he  uses  the  god  whenever  this  is  necessary 
for  a  motive  force  to  be  given  to  the  plot,  and  moira  when  a  plain  explanation  must  be 
given  to  the  events. 
True,  one  could  object  by  saying  that  the  fact  that  Zeus  controls  the  future  does  not 
necessarily  entail  that  he  has  also  defined  it;  his  demand  of  the  lesser  gods  that  they  should 
abide  by  moira's  ordinance,  as  well  as  his  disclosure  of  the  future  in  E)  and  0  could  be 
seen  not  as  a  confirmation  of  his  identification  with  moira,  but  as  an  indication  of  his  very 
23  This  explanation  is  not  very  different  from  that  given  later  by  Achilles:  sirrEll  8ri  T&S'  av5pa  OEOI 
&xpdcyaa6at  i&,.  -,  Kav  (X  379),  although  it  could  be  said  that  Achilles,  seeing  Hector's  death  from  a  different 
ferspective,  talks  rather  of  the  gods'  support  to  him  than  of  their  enmity  to  his  opponent. 
4  True,  one  could  take  moira  at  303  as  meaning  simply  death,  as  Dietrich  does,  thus  avoiding  any 
inconsistency  in.  Hector's  words-,  however,  Hecabe's  words  prove  that  the  meaning  of  the  word  is flexible  and 
almost  ambiguous:  moira  can  be  both  death  and  fate  at  the  same  time. 
134 subordination  to  it:  being  the  supreme  god,  he  uses  his  power  and  strength  in  order  to 
ensure  that  moira  will  not  be  violated.  Besides,  Atok  PouXý  is  never  explicitly  identified  TI 
with  moira;  25  being  of  a  Tather  haphazard  origin,  Zeus's  will  is  only  a  momentary  plan  that 
is  conceived  and  accomplished  within  the  limits  of  the  narration,  and  with  no  further 
implications  of  destiny  or  fate;  more  important,  this  plan  can  well  be  seen  as  being 
fulfilled  in  1,  when  the  Greek  embassy  comes  to  Achilles  with  the  news  that  king 
Agamemnon  is  willing  to  offer  due  honour  to  him,  were  he  willing  to  help  them  in  their 
struggle  against  the  Tro,  ans,  for  they  seem  doomed  to  destruction,  ever  since  he 
abandoned  them.  Strictly  speaking,  this  is  the  point  at  which  Achilles'  wish  that  his  TIPTI 
be  properly  recognized  comes  to  its  fulfilment,  and  at  which  tradition  itself  would  demand 
that  the  hero's  wrath  be  appeased.  26  If  thus  seen,  the  poem  appears  to  advance  further  than 
pToclaimed  in  the  pToemium;  27  the  At6  PcuXý,  of  which  we  hear  at  A  5,  dominates  then  I  OC  rL 
only  part  of  the  poem,  the  rest  of  which  moves  forward  independently  of  the  god's  initial 
promise. 
The  truth  is,  however,  that  even  after  1,  the  plot  flows  in  the  same  rhythm  it  has 
acquired  in  B  and  which  has  by  now  become  regular.  The  fact  that  Achilles  does  not  yield 
to  the  Greeks'  appeal  may  indeed  trigger  an  unexpected  turn  of  the  plot,  but  this  passes 
unnoticed,  for  what  was  initiated  by  Zeus  in  B  with  Agamemnon's  dream  will  for  a  long 
time  still  constitute  the  main  theme  of  the  poem.  In  fact  the  poet  succeeds  in  intertwining 
different  strands  of  traditional  and  non-traditional  material  into  a  smooth  and  consonant 
25  The  only  exception,  as  we  saw,  is  P  321,  where  Zeues  plan  is  mentioned  as  At(k  alacc;  the  fact  that  this 
(Aacc  has  to  be  attributed  to  Zeus  in.  order  that  the  reference  be  made  clear  seems  to  function  as  a  restriction; 
Zeus's  plan  of  honouring  Achilles  is  nowhere  presented  as  something  fated  to  happen. 
26  Griffin  (1995)  19-2  1. 
27  This  is  a  technique  which,  according  tG  Rutherford  (1991-1993:  43),  is  common  to  both  Homeric  poems. 
135 flow  of  events:  for  if  the  temporary  Greek  defeat  is  explained  by  the  promise  given  in  A, 
and  is  therefore  an  event  confined  within  the  limits  of  the  poem,  and  most  probably 
suggested  by  the  poet's  own  poetic  creativity,  the  final  Greek  victory  is  demanded  by  a 
similar  promise  that  Zeus  made  to  the  Greeks  nine  years  ago  (B  300-30,350-53),  but  more 
important  it  is  demanded  by  a  tradition  that  has  most  probably  developed  around  an 
allegedly  historical  nucleus.  The  two  themes,  the  promise  to  Achilles  and  the  destruction 
of  Troy,  that  up  to  a  point  move  in  parallel  lines,  are,  then,  intermingled  in  Zeus's 
statements  so  as  to  form  a  coherent  whole,  namely  Zeus's  will,  which  is  inevitable  in  its 
fulfilment. 
At  the  same  time,  moira  is  indirectly,  as  it  appears,  related  to  the  god's  promise  to 
Thetis  through  its  relation  to  the  outcome  of  the  Trojan  War:  moira  is  mentioned  as  the 
determining  force  behind  the  death  of  the  heroes,  but  more  important  behind  the 
destruction  of  Troy.  It  is  moira  that  demands  Sarpedon's  death,  thus  causing  Zeus's  own 
exclamation  of  pity  for  the  hero  at  TT  431-38,  as  is  also  the  case  for  Hector  and  Achilles; 
and  it  is  against  the  violation  of  Troy"s  moira  that  the  gods  often  act,  intervening  at  crucial 
moments  and  thus  securing  not  only  that  Troy  should  be  destroyed,  but  that  it  should  not 
be  destroyed  in  a  different  fashion  or  at  a  different  time  from  that  ordained  by  moira. 
Moira  is  combined  with  Zeus's  promised  plan  for  the  destruction  of  Troy,  which  in  its  turn 
is  combined  with  the  promise  to  Thetis,  the  result  being  an  inextricable  continuum  of 
events  the  causation  of  which  is  extremely  hard  to  define. 
It  becomes  obvious,  then,  that  the  poet  not  only  avoids  any  unidimensional 
solution,  but,  more  important  he  is  actually  responsible  for  our  frustration  to  a  great 
136 degree:  closely  interweaving  Zeus's  will  and  moira,  he  forms  after  all  one  single  motive 
power  of  the  poem.  What  we  ultimately  have  before  us  is  an  ambivalent  relationship:  Zeus 
can  indeed  be  seen  as  identical  with  fate,  since  he  is  responsible  for  almost  everything  that 
happens  in  the  poem,  and  more  important  for  events  that  are  elsewhere  attributed  to  fate; 
but  he  can  also  be  seen  as  distinct  from  it  with  equal  readiness,  if  we  accept  that  his 
relation  to  moira  is  limited  to  the  fulfilment  of  its  decrees.  Neither  aspect  seems  more 
valid  than  the  other,  and  both  seem  plausible,  since  both  can  be  confirmed  by  the  text  For 
the  truth  is  that,  apart  from  the  ambiguity  of  all  the  afore  mentioned  references  to  Zeus  and 
moira.  or  fate,  which  does  not  allow  us  to  talk  of  a  clearly  defined  identification  in  the 
poem,  further  doubt  is  cast  upon  such  a  conclusion  by  the  occasional  appearances  of  moira 
as  an  independent  factor  of  life,  functioning  in  parallel  rather  than  in  a  relation  of  some 
kind  to  Zeus  or  the  gods. 
These  are  the  cases  in  which  moira  refers  to  death,  or  rather  to  human  mortality. 
True,  Ze-us  can  be  responsible  for  a  hero's  death,  as  already  mentioned,  and  the  possibility 
that  this  responsibility  entails  more  than  the  fulfilment  of  moira's  decree  bas  already  been 
discussed.  When  it  comes,  though,  to  man"s  very  mortal  nature,  the  impression  is  that 
moira  functions  on  a  different  level  from  Zeus,  and  that  subsequently  the  two  should  better 
be  distinguished.  Twice  do  we  hear  of  Zeus  pondering  over  the  violation  of  mortality's 
restraint  on  man,  once  in  the  case  of  his  son  Sarpedon,  and  once  in  the  case  of  his  beloved 
hero  Hector  (TT  433-38,  X  168-176).  Both  instances  could  actually  be  taken  to  refer  to  the 
heroes'  particular  share  in  death,  in  which  case  Zeus  would  imply  that  he  wishes  to  save 
then  from  death  at  the  particular  moment  and  under  the  particular  circumstances.  With  the 
reply  that  Hera  and  Athena  offer  respectively  we  have  a  shift  of  emphasis  from  the 
137 individual  to  the  general  fate  of  death:  Sarpedon  and  Hector  have  to  die  for  they  are 
human.  The  two  aspects  are  almost  identified:  since  they  have  to  die,  they  have  to  die  now, 
Zeus  should  not  attempt  to  change  this  fate,  for  it  would  entail  a  violation  of  the  very  order 
of  nature. 
As  already  noted  (83),  at  TT  44142=  X179-180  alca  denotes  the  only  share  of 
which  man  is  certain,  his  inextricable  link  to  death,  and  it  is  fairly  obvious  why  such  a 
meaning  differentiates  moira  from  the  gods,  either  Zeus  in  particular  or  the  gods  in 
general:  human  mortality  is  part  of  an  order  that  precedes  the  birth  of  the  Olympian  family 
of  gods,  it  is  one  of  the  human  characteristics  for  which  the  Olympians  bear  no 
responsibility.  Even  if  the  gods  are  occasionally  responsible  for  the  particular  conditions  of 
death  of  a  particular  hero,  and  even  if  Zeus  may  be  seen  as  defining  these  conditions,  the 
fact  that  the  heroes  have  to  die  is  far  beyond  their  jurisdiction  and  their  power. 
Common  sense,  then,  and  plain  eKperiencc  require  the  differentiation  of  the  gods 
from  moira  at  this  point;  as  %%ill  be  discussed  later,  the  gods  are  rational  powers,  their 
behaviour  and  their  response  to  human  conduct  being  based  on  principles  that  both 
underline  and  secure  their  superiority.  But  their  being  rational  entails  that  they  are  also 
placable;  the  gods  can  be  infuriated  by  human  behaviour  as  easily  as  they  can  be  appeased 
in  their  wrath  when  man  finally  acknowledges  their  power  and  status.  Obviously,  human 
mortality  cannot  be  controlled  by  their  power;  death  is  inevitable  and  implacable,  it  is  an 
almost  irrational  demand  which  has  to  be  admitted  as  a  part  of  natural  order.  This  order  the 
gods  should  not  violate,  and  as  experience  proves,  they  do  not  violate. 
138 The  question,  then,  in  these  cases  is  not  whether  Zeus  can  overturn  a  decree  that 
belongs  to  fate,  or  change  a  predetermined  course  of  life,  but  rather  whether  he  can  violate 
what  seems  to  be  part  of  a  natural  order:  man  is  mortal,  and  any  wish  of  Zeus  to  go  against 
this  order  will  meet  the  disagreement  of  the  gods  -  the  only  case  where  the  gods  prove  able 
to  check  Zeus's  authority.  However,  it  is  not  without  significance  that  Zeus  is  presented  as 
being  able  to  choose,  if  he  so  wishes,  to  save  the  heroes,  that  is  as  being  able  to  control 
death  and  human  mortality,  the  answer  is  never  given,  and  the  possibility  'remains 
significantly  Mootq.  28  Such  an  idea  is  in  obvious  harmony  with  the  god's  presentation  in 
the  poem  as  the  supreme  power,  but  there  is  more  in  it  than  the  plain  reaffirmation  of 
Zeus's  superiority.  These  instances  certainly  draw  our  attention  to  Zeus's  actual 
differentiation  from  fate,  29  but  they  also  seem  to  imply  that  Zeus  is  not  after  all 
subordinate  to  moira;  even  when  he  is  not  responsible  for  its  decrees  and  demands  on 
mankind,  even  when  he  is  a  distinct  power  with  a  different  field  of  activity,  he  can  still 
operate  in  parallel  to  and  independently  of  moira.  The  relation  is  not  necessarily  one  of 
29  Clay  (1983)  157;  Clay  also  sees  the  lines  as  referring  to  the  violation  of  natural  order,  but  she  talks  of  the 
hierarchy  in  the  relationship  between  mortals  and  immortals,  with  moira  being  'a  critical  element  in  this 
dichotomy'  (156);  her  reference  to  Zeus's  position  being  in  jeopardy  presupposes  the  belief  in  divine  envy  or 
resentment,  which,  however,  is  not  relevant  in  the  poem.  Chantraine  (1952:  72)  rightly  draws  our  attention  to 
the  lines'  possible  implication  merely  of  a  retardation  of  events,  which  one  can  compare  with  1  239  and  y 
241-46.  Adkins's  (1972:  15ff.  )  explanation  is  also  worth  noting:  it  is  the  gode  limited  and  conditional  ýAO`Try; 
towards  man  that  prevents  them  from  inconveniencing  themselves  for  the  sake  of  the  mortals;  this  view  well 
explains  the  gods'  occasional  indifference  towards  mankind  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  context  of  divine 
justice;  it  further  seems  to  accord  with  Glaucus'  exclamation  on  Sarpedon's  death  c'(vr'IP6'  CA3)PICITOC  &COXE,  I 
I:  apTrrNv,  &6c  uit&-  6  6'  ou'6'  ou  TraiSk  alAvet  (IT  520-21);  the  hero  is  not  concerned  with  the  fact 
that  Sarpedon  was  mortal  or  that  he  had  to  die  at  this  moment;  at  this  moment  of  sorrow  the  emphasis  is  on 
Zeus's  unwillingness  to  intervene  and  save  his  son. 
29  Different  is  the  view  of  Lloyd-Jones  (1983:  5),  who,  in  keeping  with  his  interpretation  of  moira  as  the  will  of 
Zeusý  sees  Here  s  -words  as  a  warning  to  Zeus  that  'he  cannot  sacrifice  to  a  sudden  whirn-  his  own  settled 
policy',  but  obviously  such  an  interpretation  overlooks  the  powerful  implications  of  human  mortality  that  line 
TT441=X  179  bears. 
139 subordination  or  of  hierarchy:  moira  and  Zeus  seem  after  all  to  operate  on  two  different 
levels,  which  often  intersect. 
Soon  after  Athenas  reply  at  X  179-180,  the  scene  of  the  K1QPOOTaCt  a  follows:  Zeus 
takes  his  scales  and  weighs  the  KfiPEC  of  Achilles  and  Hector;  as  expected,  it  is  Hector's 
Kýp  that  sinks.  A  similar  scene  exists  at  E)  69-77  where  Zeus  weighs  the  KfipEC  Of 
Achaeans  and  Trojans,  and  this  time  it  is  the  Achaeans'  YTIP  that  sinks.  The  association  of 
Zeus  with  the  idea  of  balancing  the  scales  is  also  found  at  TT  658  and  T  223-24,  where, 
however,  no  reference  is  made  to  fate,  but  Zeus  appears  simply  to  be  deciding  on  the 
course  of  the  war.  Regarding  TT  658,  Janko  notes  that  'the  rapid  allusion  proves  the  idea 
traditional',  providing  at  the  same  time  two  further  reasons  that  would  support  the  thesis 
that  the  idea  should  be  attributed  to  the  Dark  Age  at  least:  first,  the  archaeological  find  of 
an  LH  IIIA  crater  from  Enkomi  on  which  there  is  a  depiction  of  a  god  holding  scales,  and 
second  the  Aeolic  type  ipoc  in  the  expression  bok  [Pa  TaXaVTa  which  suggests  that  we 
have  an  old  formula  which  is  simply'under-represented'.  30 
Whether  or  not  this  traditional  idea  of  a  god  deciding  by  holding  the  scales  was 
also  related  to  the  fate  of  death  from  the  very  beginning  is  difficult  to  say,  although 
Dietrich  mentions  a  pair  of  golden  scales  of  Mycenean  origin,  with  a  butterfly,  supposedly 
representing  the  dead  soul,  being  engraved  on  each  scale.  31  Whatever  the  origin  of  the 
3'0  Janka  ('  1992)  ad  loc.  An  interesting  approach  is  that  of  Morrison  (1997)  who  sees  the  instances  of 
KrPOOTacta  as  a  conscious  device  of  the  poet  which  creates  a  swinging  movement  from  a  sense  of  'openness 
and  flexibility'  to  that  of  'fixity'  and  predetermination,  while  it  conceals  at  the  same  time  the  poet's  own  quest 
for  possible  alternatives  in  terms  of  the  narrative  and  against  tradition.  Such  an  interpretation  highlights  the 
poet's  freedom  in  manipulating  fate  and  the  gods  according  to  the  demands  of  the  narrative. 
"  Dietrich  (1965)  295. 
140 connection,  the  idea  is  used  in  the  poem  in  a  rather  figurative  fashion:  it  is  'a  visual  or 
symbolic  representation  of  the  crucial  moment  at  which  the  decision  becomes 
iffevocable".  32  The  question  whether  Zeus  should  be  seen  as  subordinate  to  fate  or  at  any 
rate  to  a  law  of  natural  order,  or  rather  as  responsible  for  the  decision  made,  seems  to  be 
irrelevant  and  non-existent  for  the  poet,  who  uses  this  old  image  for  its  own  sake  only.  As 
in  most  of  the  cases  already  discussed,  the  reference,  to  Zeus  is  the  consequence  of  his 
superiority,  and  not  necessarily  a  proof  either  of  his  Msponsibility  for  fate  or  of  his 
subordination  to  it. 
More  powerful  than  the  image  of  Zeus  weighing  the  fates  of  death  is  certainly  the 
already  mentioned  image  of  his  distributing  happiness  and  misery  out  of  his  two  jars  (n 
527-33).  It  is  the  very  act  of  distribution  that  recalls  the  function  of  moira  and  the 
correlative  idea  of  apportionment,  while  it  is  also  worth  noticing  that  the  distribution  is  not 
conducted  according  to  some  principle,  but  is  instead  the  result  of  pure  chance  -  exactly  as 
happens  with  fate.  Achilles'  words  obviously  reflect  man's  own  perspective;  the  very  fact 
that  in  the  example  of  Peleus  that  he  provides  in  the  following  tines  he  talks  of  the  gods  - 
I.  I'  MIXýi  OE  I  86cav  dyXa6  Wpa  I  EK  YEVSTýC  (534f  )-  is  an  indication  of  the  COC  PEV  Kai  01 
generalising  character  of  the  statement.  It  remains  beyond  doubt,  however,  that  the  passage 
seems  to  find  considerable  support  in  the  very  development  of  the  plot,  with  Zeus  being 
truly  the  power  that  bestows  happiness  and  misery;  in  view  of  Achilles'  own  sorrowful 
experience  in  the  poem,  the  association  seems  justified  and  appropriate. 
32  Richardson  (1993)  on  X  208-13.  See  also  Greene  (1944)  16,  En-dyn-Jones  (1992)  102.  Different  is  the  view 
of  Chantraine  (1952)  73:  '  Le  roi  des  dieux  mesure  et  ditem-dne  ainsi  le  destin  de  chacun'.  For  other  views 
expressed  on  the  scene  OfKrIPOCITacit'a  see  Dietrich  (1965)  294. 
141 When  compared  to  Zeus,  the  lesser  gods  are  obviously  of  limited  power.  Doubtless, 
it  cannot  but  be  admitted  that  they  participate  in  life  all  too  effectively,  thus  influencing 
the  development  of  events  to  a  considerable  degree;  more  important  they  do  so  as 
individual  forces,  each  having  a  different  field  of  activity  and  power  and  representing  a 
different  reasoning,  their  aims  not  necessarily  deriving  from  or  being  suggested  by  some 
other  personal  or  impersonal  force.  Thus,  Aphrodite  intervenes  on  her  own  initiative  and 
saves  her  favourite  Paris  from  Menelaus"  vengeful  attack,  brings  him  to  Helen,  and  sees  to 
the  re-establishment  of  their  relationship  (r  373420);  Hera,  helped  by  Athena,  prevents 
the  Greeks  from  leaving  Troy  at  a  most  crucial moment  of  the  war  (B  155-18  1),  while  later 
on  she  seduces  Zeus  in  order  that  Poseidon  may  help  the  Greeks  (---  153-165);  Apollo, 
fighting  against  the  Greeks,  checks  Diomedes'  forceful  assault  and  saves  Aeneas  (E  43  1- 
53)  and  stands  as  an  obstacle  against  Achilles'  ferocious  spirit  (0  595-  X  20). 
However,  in  this  patriarchal  system  of  hierarchy,  where  might  is  right  and  violence 
is  always  imminent,  it  is  obvious  that  the  lesser  gods,  when  not  willingly  obeying  Zeus,  arc 
often  forced  to  obedience,  having  to  postpone,  modify,  or  even  cancel  their  plans  in  the 
face  of  Zeus's  requirements  or  demands.  33  They  consistently  and  constantly  pursue  their 
own  aims,  even  when  this  entails  a  confrontation  with  ZCUS,  34  thus  often  changing  the 
33  The  idea  of  a  divine  farnily  is  of  Near  Eastern  origin,  as  Burkert  explains  (1985:  182),  and  exists  already  in 
Mycenean  religion,  albeit  not  so  elaborate  and  complex;  Hesiod's  7heogony  seems  to  be  a  further  evidence  for 
the  perception  of  the  gods  in  terms  of  familial  relations.  Along  with  the  idea  of  departmentalisation,  then,  we 
find  an  idea  of  hierarchy,  and  the  question  is  whether  this  idea  reflects  an  actual  belief  which  would  place  Zeus 
above  all  other  divine  powers,  or  whether  this  is  only  a  literary  device  or  convention.  One  can  admit  a  degree 
of  exaggeration  in  literature,  and  the  fact  that  every  region  bad  its  own  special  deity  who  was  worshipped 
more  than  all  others  creates  some  suspicion  towards  Zeus's  superiority  as  expressed  in  the  poems.  However, 
regional  cult  of  gods  other  than  Zeus  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  possibility  that  Zeus  was  acknowledged 
at  some  point  as  the  supreme  god,  and  it  seems  plausible  to  suppose  that  the  idea  was  already  established  by 
the  time  of  our  poems-,  both.  the  heroes'  irrvocation  of  the  god  and  the  poems  of  Hesiod,  which  profess  to  be 
revealing  a  truth  of  some  kind,  point  in  this  direction. 
34  it  is  especially  the  gods  who  favour  the  Greeks  who  come  in  conflict  with  Zeus  -  naturally,  for  in  the  poem 
Zeues  will  develops  so  as  to  favour  the  Trojans;  see  G  350-80,1-  159ff,  0  153-65,352-62. 
142 course  of  life,  for,  as  I  saidý  each  one  corresponds  to  a  distinct  power  of  life  as  well  as  of 
the  plot;  but  these  aims  can  be  fulfilled  only  as  long  as  they  do  not  threaten  Zeus's  own 
plarL  Thus,  if  Zeus's  plan  is  not  affected  by  the  gods'  action,  he  seems  rather  indifferent  to 
their  participation,  occasionally  giving  them  even  the  permission  to  act  as  they  wish  (A  37, 
68-72);  but  if  it  is,  he  soon  brings  the  gods'  attempts  to  a  fruitless  end,  re-establishing  his 
order  (E)  397-408,447-56;  0  13-33,158-167).  35 
Being  thus  subordinate  to  Zeus  and  his  will,  the  lesser  gods  obviously  lack  the 
power  of  an  irrevocable  decision  that  is  imposed  on  mortals  and  immortals  alike;  and  this 
is  why  they  are  to  be  distinguished  from  fate;  the  privilege  of  an  irreversible  will,  which 
can  be  seen  as  an  inevitable  certainty,  is  one  that  only  Zeus  enjoys  -  thus  providing  the 
reason  for  his  occasional  identification  with  fate.  It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  no  one 
of  the  lesser  gods  is  ever  personally  related  to  moira  directly,  by  means  of  a  collocation 
similar  to  AiM  alca,  and  that  their  relation  to  it  on  a  personal,  individual  level  is  only 
limited  to  the  fulfilment  of  its  ordinances.  Athena,  for  example,  is  responsible  for  Hector's 
fated  death  (0  612-14),  just  as  Apollo  will  be  for  Achilles'  (T  417).  In  such  cases  the  gods' 
action  is  in  manifest  agreement  %kith  the  requirements  of  moira,  but  their  position  towards 
moira  remains  ultimately  unclear:  are  they  consciously  fulfilling  what  is  already  defined 
for  the  future,  or  does  their  intervention  agree  with  moira  only  coincidentally?  Do  they 
35  Indicative  of  this  shifting  relation  between  the  gods'  and  Zeus's  own  plan  is  the  divine  action  in  E  ande: 
Athena's  essential  support  for  Diomedes  could  be  taken  as  a  threat  to  Zeus's  plan  fbr  the  Trojan  advance  and 
victory,  yet  not  only  is  it  effective,  but  it  is  also  in  agreement  with  Zeus's  concession  to  Hera's  wish  for  Troy's 
final  destruction  (A  34-38);  one  could  suggest  that  Athenes  intervention  at  this  point  well  accords  with  the 
god's  desire  to  first  deceive  the  Greeks  into  believing  in  his  favour  and  then  bring  upon  them  the  decided 
disaster,  thus  posing  no  threat  to  the  god's  plan;  it  seems,  though,  most  probable  that  we  have  here  a 
conscious  delay  on  the  part  of  the  poet  in  order  that  Diomedes'  c'xp  ici-rva  be  accommodated  in  the  narration; 
thus,  he  skilfully  postpones  the  declaration  of  Zeus's  plan  until  0:  any  divine  intervention  in  favour  of  the 
Greeks  after  that  point  is  forbidden  and  doomed  to  failure. 
143 succumb  to  moira,  do  they  know  of  the  future  and  act  in  accordance  with  it,  because  they 
are  subordinate  to  some  external  power  which  is  superior  to  them,  or  do  we  simply  have  a 
reference  to  a  hero'  s  death  and  a  god's  action,  with  the  implications  of  fate  being  more  or 
less  irrelevant? 
The  truth  is  that  in  most  cases  the  gods  appear  actually  to  be  consciously  following 
the  directions  given  by  Zeus  himself  or  to  fulfil  some  plan  related  to  the  god  in  some  way, 
as  happens  in  the  examples  quoted  above,  or  "rith  Poseidon  at  Y  293-307,  who  helps 
Aeneas,  for  he  is  to  survive  the  war.  36  There  are  other  cases,  though,  in  which  the  gods 
seem  to  be  acting  in  accordance  with  moira  without  actually  being  conscious  of  or 
concerned  with  the  fact.  Thus,  at  B  155-156  we  see  Hcm  intervening  just  at  the  right 
moment  to  prevent  the  Greeks  from  leaving  Troy  -  an  event  that  would  be  against  fate 
(LiTippopa);  and  at  E  671-76  we  hear  how  Athena  intervenes  unbeknown  to  Odysseus  and 
directs  him  away  from  Sarpedon,  because  it  was  not  fated  that  he  should  kill  Zeus's  son. 
Are  we  to  see  these  actions  as  conscious  attempts  against  a  possible  violation  of  moira,  or 
as  plain  coincidence?  The  poet  is  not  interested  in  providing  a  definite  answer,  but  what 
seems  to  be  beyond  doubt  is  that  the  gods  are  certainly  not  presented  as  being  responsible 
for  the  definition  of  moira's  actual  content 
There  is,  however,  a  possibility  that  the  lesser  gods  could  be  seen  as  related  to  or 
even  identified  with  fate,  and  this  is  when  they  feature  as  the  collective  idea  of  the  divine, 
a  body  of  diverse  forces  which,  however,  converge  at  some  point  under  the  power  of  Zeus 
36  This  instance  is  of  particular  interest,  since  Poseidon  fights  against  the  Trojans;  here,  he  appears  to  be 
concerned  both  for  the  hero  and  for  the  fWfilment  of  Zeus's  plan,  which  he  also  relates  to  fate. 
144 and  act  in  unison  towards  the  fulfilment  of  a  common  end;  in  other  words,  when  acting  as 
individual  powers  with  distinct  plans  and  aims,  the  lesser  gods  are  not  seen  as  capable  of 
defining  fate;  it  takes  Zeus's  prior  decision  for  them  to  be  ascribed  such  a  function.  The 
references  made  to  such  a  collective  capacity  of  the  gods  are  issued  mainly,  but  not  only, 
by  the  heroes,  and  they  seem  to  underline  both  the  belief  in  the  divine  origin  or  quality  of 
moira  and  that  in  the  gods'  own  power  over  human  life.  When,  for  example,  Priam  says  at 
r  308-9,  Auk  pEv  Trou  'ro  yE  615a  Kal  d6civaT01  &01  aXXOI  I  OITITO'rS`PG?  eavd-roto  dXot; 
19f  TrETrpealiEvov  EaTtv,  one  could  see  here  simply  an  implicit  acknowledgement  of  moira's 
non-human  and  therefore  divine  nature,  of  the  control,  that  is,  that  non-human  powers 
exercise  over  human  lives,  the  actual  identity  of  which,  though,  remains  of  no  concern;  or 
suppose  that  these  vague  gods  are  the  personal  gods  of  the  poem,  who,  when  it  comes  to 
the  final  decision,  converge  under  the  power  of  Zeus  and  affect  life  as  a  unified  and 
harmonious  body.  37 
The  confusion  is  again  evident:  are  we  to  assume  that  the  gods'  knowledge  of 
moira  -  615E  -  entails  their  responsibility  for  it  as  well?  If  the  reference  is  not  made  to  the 
personal  gods  of  the  poem,  what  are  the  implications  of  the  relation  that  the  heroes  draw 
between  moira  and  the  godS?  38  One  could  go  on  raising  similar  questions  indefinitely,  but 
the  labour  would  prove  futile  and  fruitless.  However  perplexing  these  references,  we  have 
to  admit  that  no  rational  or  systematic  explanation  can  be  given,  for  there  is  no  intention 
37  The  idea  that  the  gods  might  act  as  a  body  and  actually  in  order  to  ensure  the  fulfilment  of  moira  is  evident 
from  the  very  plot:  despite  their  occasional  disagreements  and  conflicts  of  interest,  the  gods  finally  act 
together  and  under  the  power  of  Zeus.  Despite  Zeus's  authoritative  power,  we  often  see  the  gods  deciding  as 
a  body,  cf  A  1-77  and  X  174-76 
38  Cf  -50,  where  Helen  explains  her  life  as  a  result  almost  of  a  divine  plan,  au'T  P  rrEt  T66E  Y'  also  Z  345  E 
C05E  eEet  KaK6  TEKPTIPaVrO,  later  on  substituting  Zeus  for  the  gods,  whom  she  relates  to  116po.!;,  elciv  iTrI 
ZEVýI;  6ýKE  KC(KO'V  p6pov  (357). 
145 for  such  an  explanation  on  the  part  of  the  poet.  The  poet  uses  the  gods  and  moira 
according  to  his  narrative  aims  each  time. 
It  is  worth  lingering  for  a  moment  on  this  differentiation  between  the  heroes' 
perception  of  divine  action  and  the  poet's  supposedly  accurate  account.  It  was  at  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  that  Jorgensen  (1904)  first  observed  a  distinct 
difference  between  the  two.  Focusing  on  t-11  of  the  Odyssey  and  being  concerned  with  the 
inconsistencies  detected  there  in  terms  of  divine  responsibility,  Jorgensen  noted  that  the 
poet  consciously  and  consistently  follows  a  technique  according  to  which  his  mortal 
characters  are  not  allowed  to  talk  of  the  divine  in  more  detail  than  is  expected  of  them: 
being  of  limited  knowledge  and  perception,  they  cannot  possibly  be  aware  of  the  exact 
nature  of  the  gods,  their  motivation  and  their  behaviour;  they  can  only  sense  their  presence 
in  life,  and  assume,  on  the  data  of  experience,  their  intervention,  without  being  able, 
however,  to  accurately  define  which  deity  is  involved  each  time;  by  contrast  to  the  poet 
himself,  who  can  give  an  accurate  account  of  divine  action,  the  heroes  can  only  talk  in 
obscure  and  indefinite  terms,  such  as  &ck,  &cc  TIC,  OEOI  or  8atpczv,  simply  acknowledging 
in  this  fashion  the  indubitable  presence  of  the  divine  in  their  lives;  the  only  god  who  is 
ever  personally  credited  with  responsibility  is  Zeus,  who  appears  in  such  cases  in  a 
synecdoche  almost  for  the  gods  rather  than  as  the  personal,  individual  god  participating  in 
the  plot  Some  forty  years  later,  Else  (1949)  further  examined  this  differentiation, 
concluding  that  the  pnnci  e  aims  basically  at  realism:  the  heroes  talk  as  Homer's 
contemporaries  talked,  and  this  is  the  language  of  later  philosophy  as  well;  man  can  talk  of 
the  divine  only  in  abstract  and  vague  tenns. 
146 When  seen  in  this  light,  a  considerable  number  of  inconsistencies  can  be  dealt  with, 
without  our  having  to  resort  to  the  solution  of  multiple  strata  of  composition.  As  regards 
moira,  in  particular,  we  are  famished  with  a  further  explanation  as  to  why  an  event  can  be 
ascribed  both  to  fate  and  the  gods  at  different  times  and  contexts,  without  necessarily 
implying  that  the  two  are  identical:  the  gods  who  appear  as  responsible  for  fate  are  the 
unified  gods  of  the  heroes'  utterances,  the  divine  in  general,  and  not  the  personal, 
individualised  gods  whom  we  see  moving  about  in  the  poem  and  who  are  subordinate  to 
moira.  When,  for  example,  Hector  senses  the  inevitability  of  his  death,  as  he  stands  alone 
against  Achilles,  he  talks  first  of  the  gods, 
63  Tr&roi,  ý  pdXa,  54  peeco, 
eavaTOV8E  KdXcacav 
(X  297),  he  follows  with  a  reference  to  Athena's  deceit,  EpE  6  iýaTraTrIm  'Ae4vTl  (299), 
and  concludes  with  moira,  vGv  aks  ps  jjcýipa  KlXdVEI  (303),  if  the  presence  of  Athena  and 
moira  at  this  point  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  preceding  narration,  the  reference  to  the 
gods  is  no  more  than  the  hero's  acknowledgement  of  the  divine  presence  and  responsibility 
for  so  important  an  event,  and  should  by  no  means  be  seen  as  a  reference  to  the  personal 
gods,  who  are  certainly  not  involved  in  Hector's  death- 
Obviously,  for  the  heroes  who  lack  the  poet's,  and  consequently  our  own, 
knowledge  of  the  gods'  exact  behaviour  and  action,  the  boundaries  between  fate  and  the 
gods  seem  rather  fluid  and  flexible;  fate  and  the  gods  appear  to  be  of  equal  preponderance, 
for  both  entail  unpredictability  and  inevitability;  they  both  define  the  limits  within  which 
man  is  allowed  to  move,  since  both  are  capable  of  determining  the  course  of  human  life; 
and  it  is,  therefore,  ultimately  of  little,  if  any,  importance  for  the  heroes  what  the  exact 
nature  of  fate  is  and  what  its  relation  to  the  gods.  Out  of  this  fusion  or  confusion  of 
147 powers,  the  gods  often  emerge  as  responsible  even  for  events  that  elsewhere  seem  to  fall 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  fate. 
However,  extreme  caution  is  demanded  when  applying  Jorgensen's  observation  to 
moira,  for  it  can  lead  to  a  polarity  which  corresponds  to  a  rather  simplistic and  not  at  all 
accurate  interpretation  of  the  poem.  On  the  one  hand,  we  have  the  poet's  narration,  part  of 
which  consists  of  the  gods'  uttcrances;  on  the  other,  the  heroes'  perception  of  divine 
action,  which  is  not  accurate  and  certainly  not  always  correct.  Are  we  supposed  to  see  here 
a  distinction  between  truth  and  non-truth,  reality  and  non-reality?  And  if  so,  with  whom 
does  the  truth  lie? 
A  similar  confusion  had  been  previously  observed  in  the  case  of  Zeus's  relation  to 
moira  (131ff.  ),  and  it  was  noted  at  that  point  that  however  useful  the  distinction,  it  does 
not  always  account  for  the  inconsistent  presentation  of  this  relation,  for  it  often  seems  that 
even  the  poet  is  as  confused  as  his  heroes.  The  same  is  true  of  the  gods:  it  is  not  simply  the 
heroes  who,  assume  a  relation  to  moira,  but  the  poet  also  lapses  occasionally  into  the  same 
vague  and  uncertain  references.  Thus,  at  TT  692-93  he  talks  of  Patroclus'  death:  'Evea  Tiva 
TrPCSTOV,  Tiva  8"ucyraTOV  Eigwaptgao;,  I  TTaTP&XEIC,  'OTC  cF4ce8eoiOdta7-,  ýt,,  6.  -KdAcccav;  he 
asks,  using  the  same  formula  that  Hector  uses  at  X  297.  Despite  his  privileged  position 
when  compared  to  his  heroes,  the  poet  is  still  another  mortal  who  can  indeed  talk  of  the 
gods  as  his  heroes  do,  not  being  always  able  to  systematically  present  his  beliefs,  often 
being  inconsistent  with  himself  when  it  comes  to  the  exposition  of  religious  ideas,  and  thus 
avoiding  any  clear  definition  either  of  fate  or  of  its  relation  to  the  gods. 
148 It  would  be  rather  misleading,  then,  to  see  the  differentiation  as  indicative  of  a 
polarity  between  the  poet's  supposedly  true  conception  and  the  heroes'  misconception  of 
the  divine,  between  truth  and  non-truth.  It  is  indeed  true  that  a  polarity  exists,  through 
which  we  seem  to  gain  a  bifocal  view  on  life:  reality  becomes  of  an  ambiguous  quality,  at 
times  being  identified  with  the  heroes'  own  perception,  at  times  with  the  narration  of  the 
poet  himself,  the  latter  often  belying  the  former,  the  heroes'  limited  knowledge  is  thus 
further  emphasised,  especially  since  it  often  proves  disastrous  for  the  heroes  themselves, 
yet  at  the  same  time  this  mortal  view  on  life  is  shown  to  be  true  in  its  own  way,  since  life 
is  to  be  lived  after  all  on  the  data  of  this  very  limited  knowledge.  But  this  has  ultimately 
little  to  do  with  the  way  that  moira  is  perceived.  39 
The  assumption  that  the  poet  possesses  a  truth  that  is  denied  to  his  heroes  rather 
blurs  our  view  of  moira"  s  meaning  and  function;  for  the  truth  is  that  both  the  poet  and  his 
heroes  share  the  same  basic  idea  of  moira,  both  being  equally  puzzled  at  its  workings  and 
its  nature.  If  the  poet  appears  to  be  reveating  a  trutk  this  is  only  a  coincidentat 
consequence  of  his  inevitably  detailed  account  of  divine  action:  by  profession  he  is  entitled 
to  more  knowledge  than  his  heroes  or  even  his  audience,  but  his  aim  is  not  to  enlighten  us 
in  regard  to  some  theological  or  philosophical  truth  of  which  only  he  knows,  nor  to  inform 
us  of  the  essence  of  the  divine,  but  rather  to  use  his  privilege  and  create  a  narration  that 
will  be  both  coherent  and  interesting.  The  privileged  knowledge  that  our  poet  enjoys  as  a 
39As  will  be  discussed  in  due  course,  this  differentiation  is  detected  in  the  case  of  divine  justice  as  well,  but 
there  it  is  even  sharper  the  poet  is  consistently  silent  on  the  issue  of  the  gods'  exercising  any  fann  ofjustice  as 
regards  the  events  narrated,  while  the  heroes  not  only  express  a  vague  belief  in  it,  but  more  than  that  they 
constantly  seek  for  its  manifestation. 
149 present  from  the  Muses  is  a  knowledge  of  facts,  both  divine  and  human,  and  not  of 
theology  or  philosophy.  And  his  difference  from  his  mortal  heroes  is  one  of  perspective 
and  aim:  the  poet  constructs  a  plot;  his  heroes  express  their  frustration  at  the  life  they  have 
to  live,  and  the  death  they  have  to  die. 
Nor  is  it  of  any  help  to  diminish  the  importance  of  the  Olympians,  as  Dietrich  does; 
according  to  his  view  the  differentiation  between  the  poet  and  his  heroes  should  be  seen  as 
indicative  of  the  poet's  distorted  view  of  the  divine  which  results  from  the  fact  that  the 
Olympian  family  of  gods  is  no  more  than  a  poetic  creation,  a  literary  convention  that  has 
no  existence  outside  the  confines  of  the  poem;  the  actual  religious  belief  of  the  poems'  age 
is  expressed  by  the  heroes 
. 
40  The  problem  with  Dietrich's  argument  lies,  I  believe,  in  his 
drawing  too  sharp  a  distinction  between  the  literary  'god-machinery'  and  the  actual  objects 
of  religious  belief,  this  he  does  in  an  attempt  to  support  his  main  thesis  that  Moira  was 
originally  a  goddess,  whose  divine  status  Nvas  diminished  in  literature  because  of  the  more 
useful  and  certainly  more  recent  Olympians;  she  survived  nonetheless  in  popular  belief,  as 
the  evidence  of  cult  practices  and  inscriptions  seem  to  prove.  The  vague  references  to  the 
gods  are  taken,  then,  to  correspond  to  such  popular  beliefs:  Moira  is  one  of  the  many 
divine  powers  acknowledged  and  worshipped. 
40  Dietrich  (1965)  chapter  13;  as  Ernlyn4ones  informs  us  (1992:  93),  the  idea  of  the  'Machines  of  the  Go& 
was  suggested  in  1715  by  Pope,  while  the  term  Gotterapparat  was  coined  in  the  nineteenth  century,  but  as  is 
suggested  by  En-dyn-Jones!  s  discussion  (ibid.  )  the  idea  was  not  as  inflexible  as  Dietrich  implies.  For  similar 
views  expressed  on  the  gods  by  G.  Finsler,  U.  von  Witamowitz-Moellendorff  and  M.  P.  Nilsson  see  (1960)  2; 
Nilsson  in  particular  (7he  M>renean  Origin  of  Greek  Mytholqy,  Berkeley  1932,244)  sees  that  the  Olympian 
scenes  are  'sometimes  tainted  with  burlesque,  a  tone  due  to  Ionian  minstrels,  who  were  fundamentally 
irreligious'.  Calhoun  himself  (1960)  rejects  this  interpretation,  arguing  instead  that  the  Olympian  scenes 
originate  in  well-known  motifs  and  themes,  and  that  the  gods  are  not  the  poet's  own  invention,  but  rather 
'traditional  figures,  gods  of  ancient  myth  and  folk  tale'.  I  would  obviously  agree  with  Griffin  (I  980:  144f)  that 
'if  the  poems  are  to  be  taken  seriously  at  all,  then  it  would  seem  that  the  gods  who  preside  over  them  must  be 
taken  seriously,  tocý. 
150 Dietrich's  main  argument  for  an  original  divine  status  of  moira  has  been  discussed 
already  (88ff.  ).  Here  I  would  like  to  focus  on  his  perception  of  the  Olympians  as  a  literary 
device,  for  it  creates  a  new  polarity,  not  innocent  or  insignificant  in  itself  ft  is  indeed  true 
that  the  readiness  with  which  the  poet  manipulates  his  gods  raises  suspicions  as  to  their 
status  in  actual  Greek  religion;  it  is  not  simply  their  occasionally  frivolous  character, 
apparently  in  conflict  with  their  more  severe  and  majestic  aspect,  that  is  in  disagreement 
vAth  our  perception  of  divine  essence,  but  also  the  rather  obvious  fact  that  they  are  often 
employed  for  their  mere  usefulness  to  the  plot:  their  action  advances  the  plot,  and  their 
intervention  often  helps  the  poet  out  from  an  impasse.  41 
However,  such  an  interpretation  seems  to  do  a  grave  injustice  to  the  Homeric  gods. 
Flexibility  is  actually  an  essential  characteristic  of  Greek  religion;  not  simply  because  the 
literary  texts  prove  it  to  be  so,  but  because  this  is  a  natural  concomitant  of  a  culture  that  is 
basically  oral  in  its  operation.  With  no  written  religious  texts,  that  could  profess  an 
unalterable  truth  about  the  divine,  Greek  Teligion  enjoyed  a  unique  freedom  of 
42 
development,  unhindered  by  dogmatic  fears  and  limitations.  True,  a  poet  may  well  use 
the  gods  to  advance  his  plot,  to  construct  a  multicoloured  narrative,  or  to  escape  from  a 
narrative  impasse;  yet  by  no  means  should  this  be  taken  to  prove  that  these  gods  are  void 
of  a  religious  status.  Besides,  one  has  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  gods  may  have  been 
41  The  problem  is  actually  more  complicated  than  it  appears  at  first  sight,  for  it  raises  the  issue  of  the  nature  of 
myth  and  its  relation  to  cult  and  ritual,  an  issue  that  has  been  much  discussed  by  scholars.  The  question  is 
whether  the  gods  of  a  literary  text  correspond  to  actual  powers  of  cult,  or  they  belong  only  in  the  literary  time 
and  space.  The  research  on  ritual  does  throw  light  on  aspects  of  religion  that  are  not  included  in  our  texts  of 
myft  yet  one  should  consider  whether  the  two  can  not  after  all  co-exist  as  complementary  to  each  other.  See 
Gould  (1985). 
42  See  Gould  (1985)  24. 
151 introduced  into  Greek  religion  through  the  medium  of  literature,  but  literature  was  at  that 
point  one  of  the  essential  ways  in  which  ideas  were  exchanged  between  cultures  and 
crystallised  in  memory.  43  The  attacks  that  Homer  was  to  receive  in  later  centuries  from 
Xenophanes  and  Plato,  or even  the  very  development  of  Ionian  philosophy,  could  be  seen 
as  a  testimony  to  that;  reaction  always  follows  action. 
The  essence  of  the  Homeric  gods  seems  to  lie  neither  in  their  morality  nor  in  their 
claim  to  a  mystical  awesomeness;  their  essence  is  their  unquestionable  power,  not  only  in 
terms  of  their  physical  strength,  but  also  in  terms  of  their  immortal,  eternal  existence. 
Every  other  characteristic  of  theirs  is  accommodated  to  this  basic  quality,  and  everything 
seems  to  stem  from  it  Their  very  function  in  the  poem  certainly  proves  this  element,  more 
important,  this  very  power  operates  as  the  negative  of  human  essence,  god  and  man  being 
thus  defined  against  each  other.  As  regards  moira,  the  gods'  relation  to  it  is  such  as  to 
further  underline  this  interrelation  and  interdependency  between  the  human  and  the  divine 
-a  relation,  no  doubt,  that  demands  that  the  Olympians  be  viewed  as  actual  objects  of 
betiet  and  not  merely  as  a  poetic  device. 
Up  to  now  I  have  examined  the  possibility  that  moira,  embodying  the  idea  of 
predetermination  in  life,  could  be  seen  as  related  to  or  even  identified  with  the  gods:  moira 
is  actually  defined  by  divine  action.  But  it  has  been  noted  that  moira  entails  more  than 
plain  predetermination;  the  idea  of  an  apportionment  of  shares,  I  argued,  implies  a  sense  of 
moral  order.  Is  there  any  way  in  which  order  could  be  related  to  the  gods? 
43  See  Burkert  (1992:  95),  where  he  refers  to  the  ritual,  iconographic  and  literary  channels  of  transmission  of 
ideas  from  one  culture  to  another,  observing  that  they  were  not  mutually  exclusive,  but  'may  have  overlapped 
and  reinforced  one  another  in  many  different  ways'. 
152 I  The  two  instances  Of  KTIPOOTacia,  as  well  as  the  cases  of  Zeus's  wish  to  save 
Sarpedon  and  Hector  from  death,  could  seem  to  imply  that  Zeus,  and  consequently  the 
gods,  are  after  all  obliged  to  follow  an  order  that  is  external  to  their  own  plans  or  wishes. 
The  same  could  be  said  of  the  cases  in  which  the  expressions  ýTrEp  p6pav,  ýnip  aloav  and 
6ngpliopov  occur,  which  imply  the  possibility  of  moira's  violation:  the  gods  intervene  just 
at  the  right  moment  to  prevent  such  a  violation,  and  in  this  way  the  order  suggested  by 
moira  is  maintained  (see  p.  144).  The  difference  is  that  in  these  cases  the  reference  could 
be  taken  to  imply  that  the  gods  follow  actually  a  plan  of  their  own,  and  do  not  obey  some 
extemally  imposed  decree. 
The  issue  is  obviously  not  different  from  the  one  already  discussed:  there  is  once 
more  a  question  of  priority  and  hierarchy.  Does  this  order  pre-exist,  and  do  the  gods  obey, 
for  it  is  undoubtedly  superior  to  them?  Or  are  the  gods  responsible  in  some  way  for  this 
order,  which  is  after  all  the  consequence  of  their  very  action?  One  should  perhaps  see  the 
issue  in  a  totally  different  light:  the  gods  co-exist  with  the  order,  without  necessarily  being 
subordinate  to  it,  or responsible  for  it.  The  order  exists,  the  gods  act,  and  it  happens  -  we 
are  never  told  why  or  how  -  that  the  gods'  actions  agree  with  that  order.  The  poet  is  never 
concerned  to  prove  that  there  is  some  particular  kind  of  relation  between  the  two.  That 
there  should  be  a  relation  is  only  the  expected  consequence  of  the  gods'  status  in  life  and 
nature,  and  in  Homeric  thought  itself 
The  only  conclusion  to  be  reached  after  this  examination  is  that  the  relation 
between  moira  and  the  gods  is  ambivalent  and  not  at  all  clear.  Zeus,  being  the  supreme 
153 god,  whose  will  is  imposed  in  the  form  almost  of  a  law,  enjoys  a  unique  relation  to  moira 
that  can  at  times  be  said  to  entail  the  identification  of  the  two.  The  lesser  gods,  when  seen 
individually,  lack  the  power  that  could  imply  an  unconditional  or  unquestionable 
identification  with  moira;  they  rather  appear  to  succumb  to  it  as  they  succumb  to  Zeus, 
fulfilling  its  decrees  even  when  these  are  against  their  own  plans  or  wishes.  However,  they 
could  be  seen  as  closely  related  to  or  even  identical  to  moira,  when  they  feature 
collectively;  although  this  is  mostly  the  case  in  the  utterances  of  the  heroes,  the  occasional 
vague  references  made  by  the  poet  himself  prove  that  the  belief  in  this  relation  is  not 
simply  the  result  of  the  heroes'  misapprehension  due  to  their  limited  knowledge,  but  also  a 
reflection  of  the  poet's  own  bewilderment  at  the  proximity  of  the  two  and  his  utter 
frustration  at  providing  a  solution. 
It  was  noted  earlier  (118-2  1),  that  the  inconsistency  in  moira's  relation  to  the  gods 
is  an  intrinsic  characteristic  of  the  very  concept  of  fate,  which,  moreover,  the  poet  is  not  at 
all  concerned  to  explain  away  or  avoid;  no  person  who  believes  in  fate  can  expound  in  a 
totally  rational  fashion  the  workings  of  fate,  or  its  relation  to  the  divine.  More  interesting, 
although  the  gods  can  be  identified  with  moira,  the  poet  seems  to  prefer  to  keep  the 
relation  vague.  His  own  uncertainty  as  regards  the  nature  of  moira,  which  he  shares  with 
his  heroes,  accounts  for  his  occasionally  connecting  moira  with  the  gods  himself,  and 
especially  with  Zeus.  At  the  same  time,  however,  he  seems  to  be  consciously  avoiding  the 
total  identification.  However  close  the  two  may  seem  at  times,  such  a  relation  is  finally 
avoided;  the  poet  needs  an  independent  moira  and  an  independent  Zeus  for  the  effective 
construction  of  his  plot.  What  I  would  wish  to  examine  at  this  point  are  the  reasons,  in 
terms  of  narrative,  for  which  the  poet  avoids  establishing  a  categorical  identification  of 
154 moira  with  the  gods,  and  the  characteristics  of  moira  that  allow  the  possibility  of  such  a 
choice. 
First  of  all,  a  crucial  difference  between  moira  and  the  gods  should  be  noted.  Both 
are  certainly  the  cause  of  good  and  evil  alike.  The  gods  can  destroy  as  easily  as  they  can 
glorify,  and  it  would  appear  that  their  anthropomorphic  qualities,  their  passions  and 
whims,  justify  exactly  this  behaviour.  In  this  way,  their  relation  to  moira,  I  have  argued 
(I  I  If),  is  definitely  stronger  than  their  relation  to  any  forin  of  justice,  whether  this  be 
denoted  by6IKIjor  not.  For  the  gods  are  ultimately  closer  to  the  power  of  life  and  nature 
than  to  that  of  law  or  morality;  they  suggest  the  existence  of  an  unknown  dimension  that 
proves  able  to  control  human  life,  all  too  often  without  a  comprehensible  reasoning  as 
such. 
However,  this  very  anthropomorphic  quality  of  the  gods  that  explains  their 
occasional  injustice  or  immorality  is  the  point  at  which  the  gods  are  to  be  distinguished 
from  moira.  Moira  has  no  passions,  no  wishes  and  no  reason;  it  simply  exists  and  man 
cannot  propitiate  it  or  manipulate  it  according  to  his  wishes  and  by  means  of  his  behaviour. 
Propriety  is  irrelevant,  piety  even  more  so.  The  gods,  on  the  other  hand,  can  change  their 
disposition  towards  man,  or  at  least  this  is  what  man  wishes  to  believe.  Although  they  have 
the  right,  because  of  their  superiority,  to  disregard  man's  wishes  and  prove  cruelly 
indifferent  to  him,  or  even  to  destroy  him  for  reasons  suggested  by  thoughts  of  self- 
interest,  still  they  can  be  placated,  and  their  decisions  can  be  therefore  seen  as  largely 
conditioned  by  human  behaviour. 
155 The  Iliadic  plot  evolves  around  the  promise  that  Zeus  made  to  Thetis  in  order  that 
Achilles'  wrath  towards  Agamemnon  be  appeased.  AtOk  5  MXEIETo  pouXý,  is  the 
programmatic  statement  made  at  A  5,  establishing  the  role  of  the  god  in  the  plot  and 
foreshadowing  the  solution.  But  this  will  is  ultimately  the  result  of  Achilles'  own  will;  a 
constant  interaction  between  divine  and  human  activity  leads  to  the  inevitable  fulfilment  of 
Zeus's  plan.  In  the  background  of  this  combined  action  there  is  always  moira,  confirming 
us  or  informing  us  of  the  solution  to  the  plot;  not  moira  as  an  agent  or a  power,  but  moira 
as  an  order,  as  an  autonomous,  unbiased  and  self-sufficient  reality.  It  is  obvious,  I  think, 
why  the  poet  needs  Zeus  to  be  independent  of  moira:  his  will  should  not  have  the 
impersonal  and  irrevocable  character  of  moira;  irrevocable  though  it  is  indeed,  because  of 
the  god's  power,  it  is,  however,  a  will  that  would  not  have  existed  had  not  Achilles  asked 
for  the  god's  favour. 
But  there  is  more  to  be  said  about  the  hero's  responsibility.  Both  human  and  divine 
action  fulfil  moira,  the  difference  being  that,  although  the  gods  are  aware  of  the  order 
which  permeates  life  beforehand,  man  acquires  this  knowledge  only  afterwards,  and  most 
important,  too  late.  Whereas  the  gods  appear  as  conscious  agents  of  fate,  therefore,  man 
looks  like  a  pitiful  puppet,  obliged  to  blind  obedience;  even  Achilles,  privileged  with  the 
foreknowledge  of  his  fate  does  not  manage  to  escape  after  all  its  demands.  But  is  this  all? 
Is  man  simply  subject  to  this  impersonal  order,  to  its  inevitable  course,  all  his  decisions 
and  actions  being  doomed  in  advance,  existing  in  vain?  Certainly,  this  is  not  the 
impression  we  have  of  the  poem. 
156 Achilles'  will,  as  I  said,  causes  Zeus's  will;  as  Thetis  says  to  her  son,  after 
Patroclus  is  killed,  TiKVOV,  TIP  KXwetc;  Ta  pEv 
6T)  Tot  TETEXEOTai  I  E'K,  &16C,  6c  apa 
Trpiv  y'  Eu"XEo  Xupac  avaaXcav  (173-75).  The  hero  knows  of  his  fate,  he  knows  that  if  he 
re-enters  the  battle  he  will  be  killed  himself  His  reply  is  not  the  helpless  cry  of  a  man  who 
feels  the  restraints  of  some  superior  force;  instead,  he  confronts  his  fate  for  it  is  the 
V  inevitable  consequence  of  his  own  action:  all'TtKa  TE6vairiv,  EMI  OU'K  a"p'  EIIPEXXOV  iTafpo? 
0  -99,  KTEIVOPEVC-,  )  mapOvat  aM'  ýpai  Trapa  vilumv  ino'ciov  jXOoi;  apo6pTt;  (198 
104). 
Not  all  heroes  are  as  determined  and  as  sincere  as  Achilles.  But  then,  no  other  hero 
knows  of  his  own  fate  beforehand.  44  What  remains  true  for  everyone,  however,  is  that  fate 
refers  to  that  single  moment  to  which  one's  own  actions  lead,  and  whence  everything  takes 
what  seems  to  be  an  inescapable  route.  When  Hector  is  found  against  Achilles,  he  grasps 
the  detail  in  his  previous  decisions  that  makes  his  death  an  inevitable  reality:  recalling 
Polydamas'  advice  to  retreat  before  it  is  too  late,  he  assumes  total  responsibility  for  what 
followed  and  feels  shame  before  his  people  (X  99ff). 
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  discussed  the  possibility  that  the  Homeric  concept  of  fate, 
as  expressed  by  words  such  as  pdt'pa,  alca,  nkpca-ro  and  even  KTIP,  should  imply  an  order 
which  can,  but  should  not  be  violated.  This  order  exists  independently  of  man,  and 
according  to  the  preceding  analysis,  in  parallel  with  the  gods.  Each  entity,  divine  or 
44  We  hear,  however,  of  heroes  who  went  to  the  war  despite  a  prophecy  foretelling  their  death  (B  831-34=  A 
329-32,  E  150-51),  and  more  important  we  hear  of  Euchenor,  who,  like  Achilles,  is  presented  as  having  a 
choice  between  two  fates  (N  663-65). 
157 human,  has  its  own  portion  in  this  order,  which  portion  is  defined  by  well  established 
limits.  By  ascribing  certain  events  to  moira,  man  is  reassured  that  good  and  evil  are  part  of 
an  order,  and  therefore  necessary  and  inescapable  elements  of  life  itself.  The  explanation 
may  prove  of  little  practical  help,  yet  it  is  a  powerful  enough  mechanism  of  defence  for 
man  to  confront  life.  Life  is  no  more  incomprehensible  and  irrational,  and  the  fact  that 
man  himself  cannot  totally  perceive  the  reasoning  of  such  an  order  that  demands  his  death 
does  not  disprove  the  existence  of  the  order. 
But  this  irrational  order  entails,  as  it  appears,  a  paradox  that  accepts  both 
predetermination  and  responsibility.  What  is  interesting  in  the  case  of  Achilles  is  that  his 
decision  coincides  with  the  demand  of  moira;  this  is  the  point  at  which  the  concept  seems 
to  be  functioning  as  a  restrictive  power.  However,  the  truth  is  that  this  coincidence  is 
inevitable  in  the  sense  that  as  things  have  turned  out,  and  considering  the  hero's  character, 
the  decision  he  makes  is  the  only  possible  decision.  There  is  a  sense  of  cause  and  effect 
that  determines  life's  course,  the  balance  between  action  and  reaction,  this  being  the  order 
implicit  in  moira.  But,  and  this  is  where  the  iffational  element  is  relevant,  the  very  first 
beginning  that  leads  to  the  cause,  and  subsequently  to  the  inevitable  effect,  remains 
inexplicable  and  beyond  control  . 
45  A  different  approach  would  talk  of  chance,  as  I  said; 
but  in  the  Homeric  world  chance  simply  does  not  exist,  and  behind  every  single  moment 
there  is  a  power  acting  in  parallel  to  man. 
"  In  other  words,  we  have  a  form  offalum  con&cionale  as  opposed  to  fatum  denunlialimm,  according  to 
Servius'  distinction;  see  Pack  (1939)  352. 
158 It  is  in  this  way  that  the  expressions  6TrEp  dicav,  unip  pcýtpav,  and  6nippopov  (-a) 
should  be  understood.  The  possibility  of  moira's  violation  seems  at  first  sight  to  contradict 
the  impression  that  moira,  is  irrevocable  and  ineluctable.  The  imagery  used  for  moira  in  the 
text  is  indeed  evocative  of  its  coercive  power:  we  hear  that  moira  ng5qow  (A  517,  X  5), 
KaTsMapc  (E  82-83=  TT  333-34=  Y  476-77),  6pacv  (E  629),  aP#KdXL'qIsv  (M  116),  "aye  (M 
613-14,  N  602),  8apaaas  (7-  119);  equally  compelling  is  the  image  of  Kica  or  Mcýtpa 
spinning  events  apparently  with  the  thread  of  one's  life  -  thus  creating  an  inextricable  and 
therefore  well  established  course  for  life  (Kica  at  Y  127-28,  M&tpa  at  fl  209-10).  The 
element  of  inevitability  seems  to  be  a  link  between  moira's  diverse  applications;  whether  it 
is  death  in  general,  or  one's  particular  death,  or  the  destruction  of  Troy,  the  impression 
created  is  that  this  is  an  event  that  can  by  no  means  be  avoided.  46 
The  text,  however,  does  suggest  at  the  same  time the  possibility  of  a  transgression 
and  a  subsequent  alternative  course  by  means  of  the  expressions  ýnip  ctioav,  ýTrip  pcýipav, 
and  uTrEppopov  (-(x).  Out  of  the  seven  occurrences  of  the  expressions,  Z  487  belongs  to  a 
hero's  utterance:  Hector  attempts  to  dismiss  Andromache's  fears  and  gloomy  premonitions 
by  confirming  that,  as  long  as  fate  allows  it,  he  will  not  be  killed,  oý  yap  TIC  If  ýnip  alcav 
91  avTlp  "Mi  rrpdidqjsi.  The  human  perspective  is  obvious:  for  the  hero  nothing  can  ever 
happen  against  fate;  although  the  words  could  be  seen  as  prompted  simply  by  his  concern 
for  his  dismayed  wife,  still,  we  discern  the  determination  of  the  warrior  that  Hector  often 
proves  to  be  in  the  poem:  only  fate  can  stop  him.  The  poet,  on  the  other  hand,  either 
through  the  narrative  or  through  the  gods'  words,  presents  us  with  a  more  flexible  view. 
Here  again  moira  is  not  violated  in  the  end,  yet  now  the  poet  can  tell  us  why  this  is  so  -a 
"  CE  the  powerful  image  of  TT  442=  X  180:  OaVdTOIO  6UCrjXgC)C  ifallaAl7aal. 
159 knowledge  that  Hector  certainly  lacks:  a  situation  against  moira  is  always  avoided  by 
means  of  divine  intervention.  47  Only  once  does  something  happen  against  moira:  at  TT  780 
we  hear  that  the  Achaeans  were  for  a  moment  victorious  ýTrip  dicav. 
For  a  moment,  then,  it  appears  that  the  fated  event  is  suspended  and  everything 
seems  to  move  against  it.  Yet,  at  the  crucial  moment,  divine  intervention  seems  to  confirm 
the  inevitability  of  fate.  It  is  perhaps  in  the  same  light  that  Zeus's  momentary  hesitation 
over  Sarpedon's  and  Hector's  death  should  be  seen:  fate's  course  is  almost  in  danger,  only 
to  be  re-established  by  Hera's  and  Athena's  intervention.  Everything  happens  in  the  end  as 
it  is  fated  to  happen,  and  inevitability  becomes  one  of  the  essential  qualities  of  the 
concept.  48 
The  solution  seems  to  be  in  total  harmony  with  the  plot's  development.  Fate  is 
fulfilled,  and  whether  this  is  a  poetic  device  of  anticipation  or  a  necessity  suggested  by 
tradition,  or  perhaps  a  combination  of  the  two,  nothing  and  no  one  seems  to  be  able  to 
change  this  course.  Not  surprisingly,  since  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  of  which  I 
talked  cannot  be  overlooked.  For  what  ultimately  prevents  the  violation  of  moira  is  the 
47  These  are  the  cases  of  B  155-56  (the  Greeks  should  not  leave  Troy),  P  321-23  (the  Greeks  almost  victorious 
9 unip  At&;  aloav),  Y  29-30  (Achilles  should  not  capture  Troy),  Y  335-36  (Aeneas  should  not  be  killed),  0 
516-17  (the  Greeks  should  not  capture  Troy  yet).  The  expressions  could  indeed  be  taken  as  a  means  of 
emphasis,  as  Edwards  (1994:  on  P  321)  remarks,  or  they  can  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  poem's  purpose;  so 
Dietrich  (1965:  284ff.  ).  For  the  relation  of  divine  intervention  and  moira's  fulfilment,  see  p.  155 
48  Morrison  (1997:  285)  sees  the  examples  as  cases  of  openness  (see  p.  140,  n.  30),  which  fall  actually  into 
two  categories:  events  determined  by  tradition,  and  events  determined  by  the  plot  of  the  particular  poem;  such 
passages  'show  that,  just  as  Achilles  contemplates  alternatives  to  his  fate  of  dying  young,  Homer  is  determined 
to  challenge  the  tradition  by  showing  how  easily  events  -  and  his  song  -  might  have  followed  a  different 
course';  among  the  cases  mentioned,  besides  the  ones  relating  to  moira's  violation,  are  Menelaus'  and 
Nestor's  premature  death  (H  104-8,  E)  90-91)  which  stand  against  tradition,  and  G  130-32,0  458-65,  cases 
which  are  against  Zeus's  plans. 
160 very  fact  that  it  would  take  an  almost  supernatural  effort  on  man's  side  to  exceed  the  limits 
of  his  own  nature. 
It  is  very  tempting  indeed  to  see  in  this  religious  belief,  which  is  innocent  of 
philosophical  and  psychological  analysis,  the  quintessence  of  human  behaviour:  moira 
denotes  the  limits  of  our  existence,  which  we  can  never  escape,  for  they  actually  define  our 
'selr;  what  we  do  and  what  we  live  is  indeed  pre-cletermined  by  our  own  self,  by  the  limits 
that  constitute  our  being,  the  limits  that  have  been  imposed  on  us  from  without  and 
irrespectively  of  our  will;  everything  may  be  predicted  and  foreseen,  as  long  as  we  have 
the  sobriety  to  see  and  the  courage  to  admit  the  truth.  Doubtless,  this  is  not  what  the  poet 
or  his  heroes  see  in  moira,  nor  how  they  would  explain  moira's  power  in  life;  yet,  it  is 
interesting  to  see  how  these  apparently  different  views  seem  to  have  the  same  implications. 
in  place  of  the  self  there  is  moira  and  an  order  of  a  religious  and  moral  quality;  the 
inevitability  is  not  internally  suggested  or  imposed 
'49 
but  it  is  ultimately  the  same  idea  of 
limits  that  is  implied,  even  if  this  time  the  limits  cannot  be  explained  on  the  grounds  of 
genes  or  milieu.  Man  seems  entrapped  and  compelled  to  live  a  life  that  is  already 
established.  Moira  denotes  the  limits  and  the  order  that  describe  and  circumscribe  human 
nature. 
49  For  moira  as  the  externalisation  of  essentially  internal  mechanisms  of  behaviour,  see  Bartosiewiczova  (1977- 
1978)  3.  The  idea  is  certainly  in  keeping  with  the  more  general  tendency  of  Homeric  thought  to  ascribe  the 
causation  of  life  to  an  external  sources;  Dodds  (1951:  7,16)  talks  of  'overdetermination',  thus  giving  a 
somehow  simplified  and  schematic  account  of  the  Homeric  'irrational',  while  Lesky  (1961),  by  emphasising 
the  parallel  and  inextricably  linked  action  of  mortals  and  immortals,  presents  an  interesting  and  highly 
discerning  approach  of  Homeric  religious  experience. 
161 Nevertheless,  by  no  means  should  this  idea  be  taken  to  contradict  the  belief  in 
human  responsibility.  For  it  is  after  all  man  himself  Nvho  constructs  his  own  fate.  50  What 
we  have,  then,  in  the  concept  of  fate  is  a  peculiar  and  complex  system  of  causes  which 
exist  in  parallel  to  one  another,  acting  towards  the  accomplishment  of  an  inscrutable  order. 
Moira  may  be  the  name  given  to  the  haphazard  action  of  the  gods,  or  it  may  be  their 
conscious  attempt  towards  the  preservation  of  this  order;  it  may  be  the  name  given  to 
man's  own  actions,  when  seen  as  fulfilling  this  same  order,  or  it  may  be  a  chance  event, 
which  assumes  in  this  way  a  reasoning.  This  order  exists  in  parallel  both  to  human  and 
divine  action,  the  difference  being  that  the  gods  are  aware  of  this  order,  either  because  of 
their  superiority  or  because  of  the  poet's  puzzlement.  Lesky  (1961)  has  shown  rather 
convincingly  how  human  and  divine  action  evolve  on  two  parallel  levels,  without  the  one 
affecting  the  other's  degree  of  responsibility;  moira  should  perhaps  be  seen  to  represent  a 
third  level,  even  if  occasionally  it  comes  close  to  coinciding  with  divine  determination, 
and  although  this  time  we  cannot  talk  of  proper  causation,  since  moira  refers  not  to  a 
power,  but  to  an  abstract  natural  order. 
At  the  same  time,  predetermination  is  perceived  post  eventun?  as  indicative  of  this 
very  order.  The  poet's  ability  to  manoeuvre  during  the  narration  and  use  at  times  moira 
and  at  times  the  gods,  or even  a  combination  of  the  two,  with  human  action  being  always 
indispensable  for  life's  performance,  proves  that  all  explanations  can  be  plausible  at  the 
same  time.  What  determines  which  idea  is  to  be  used  each  time  is  the  emphasis  that  the 
So  See  Leach  (1915)  3  80:  'Where  would  be  the  great  ethical  teaching  of  the  Greek  Drama  if  it  were  merely  the 
spectacle  of  men  and  women  moving  like  automata  to  a  destined  end?  ';  also  Jones  (1996)  117f:  'Achilles 
must  be  seen  to  be  acting  as  a  free  agent,  otherwise  the  epic  and  Achilles'  story  would  become  mere 
melodrama:  mere  Cyclic  epic.  As  it  is,  it  becomes  tragedy'.  The  same  idea  is  expressed  by  Morrison  (1997), 
this  time  through  the  antithesis  between  'openness'  and  'ftity',  see  p.  140,  n.  30. 
162 poet  wishes  to  put  on  events  and  the  perspective  from  which  life  is  ultimately  viewed.  For 
the  heroes,  moira  and  the  gods  are  easily  interchangeable,  for  they  often  exercise  an 
equally  coercing  power  on  their  life.  For  the  poet  it  seems  that  the  narration  often  drags 
him  towards  one  or  the  other  solution;  when  Zeus  talks  of  the  future,  it  is  inevitable  that 
we  view  a  powerful  god  who  knows  of  the  future  and  is  capable  of  defining  it  as  well; 
when  moira  is  used,  the  emphasis  is  on  the  inevitability  of  natural  order,  since  this  order  is 
now  seen  as  predefined  and  inescapable.  By  the  end  of  the  poem,  the  audience  gains  a 
bifocal  view  on  life,  with  man  being  at  the  same  time  subject  to  and  responsible  for  life: 
Zeus  may  foresee  the  future,  he  may  observe  moira's  decrees,  but  he  never  forces  Achilles 
or  any  other  hero  to  some  particular  action;  his  plan  is  a  human  wish,  anIthe  heroes  act  as 
free  agents  aware  of  their  own  wishes  and  plans,  and  of  their  responsibility. 
3.2  Divine  Justice 
The  question  of  divine  justice,  or  more  generally  of  divine  morality,  in  the  Homeric 
poems  has  apparently  always  concerned  scholars,  as  well  as  readers  of  Homer.  One  can  simply 
remember  Theagenes  of  Rhegium's  attempt  to  defend  and  explain  the  Homeric  poems  as  an 
allegory,  thus  justifying  possible  immoral  deeds  of  the  immortals  -  an  attempt  which  clearly 
proves  that  by  the  end  of  the  sixth  century  Homer  had  already  been  the  object  of  criticism; 
Xenophanes'  polemics  towards  Homer,  as  well  as  Hesiod,  provoked  by  the  poets' 
misrepresentation  of  the  gods  as  agents  of  an  immoral  behaviour  that  even  among  men  was 
163 impermissible,  the  cause  of  disapproval  and  shame,  51  as  well  as  Plato's  decision  to  expel  the 
poet  from  his  ideal  TroXmia  on  the  grounds  that  his  poetry  was  neither  useful  nor  true.  " 
Accordingly,  scholars  have  often  sought  a  solution  in  emendation  or  elimination,  in  cases 
where  the  behaviour  of  the  gods  seems  extraordinarily,  almost  unacceptably  immoral  or 
human.  S3 
True,  after  the  work  of  Milman  Parry  and  Albert  B.  Lord,  and  vvith  the  compositional 
principles  of  oral  poetry  being  known  and  widely  acknowledged  as  the  cause  of  the  Homeric 
multilateral  quality,  many  apparent  discrepancies  in  the  poems  were  at  last  explained  and 
accounted  for.  Still,  Homeric  theology  remains  of  the  most  ambivalent  quality,  susceptible  to 
diverse,  indeed  conflicting,  interpretations.  54  The  problem  seems  to  lie  with  the  gods' 
inconsistent,  rather  than  totally  immoral  character,  further  accentuated  by  a  discrepancy 
often  traced  between  the  actual  behaviour  of  the  gods  and  the  ideas  about  divinity 
expressed  in  the  poem  by  the  mortal  characters.  Once  more  the  differentiation  observed  by 
Jorgensen  proves  to  be  of  relevance  (see  p.  146).  The  acknowledgement  of  the  poet's 
omniscience,  a  result  of  his  special  relation  to  the  Muses,  combined  with  the  observation 
that  the  poet's  own  presentation  of  the  gods  is  differentiated  from  that  of  his  mortal  heroes, 
can  easily,  albeit  simplistically,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  truth  should  be  sought  for  in 
the  poet's  own  words;  the  heroes'  expression  of  a  belief  in  gods'  morality  or  justice  is 
nothing  but  a  mere  'wishful  thinking',  their  naive  conviction,  being  the  result  of  their 
51  See  fr.  I  IB(DK):  TraVTa  Oeck  avg6TjKav"Oijrip&  0' 
'Hal'050C 
TE  I  6'aaa  7Tap' 
&WpcýTroioiv 
o'vEi5ca 
Kai  q/66yoq 
iCTIVi 
cf.  also  fr.  12B,  (DK):  Cak  TrXCIOT'  E;  ýOiygo:  Wo  eEcsv  adeEPICTIa  9PYa,  I  KXEfTrTE1V 
POtXE6EIV  TE  Kalt  aXXtjXOU1;  alTaTEUEIV. 
52  Rep.  398  a-b,  607a. 
53  Thus,  e  33342,  Apollo's  and  Hermes'  expressed  wish  that  they  were  in  bed  with  Aphrodite,  as  Ares  is,  were 
omitted  by  a  number  of  ancient  editions  as  morally  offensive;  see  Van  der  Valk  (1949)  186,  n.  S. 
54  In  fact,  Homeric  theology  seems  to  defy  the  oral  theory,  as  Kullmann  (1985)  has  shown;  see  p.  21,  n.  24. 
164 limited  knowledge  and  power  of  perception;  the  actual  character  of  the  gods  is  the  one 
presented  by  the  poet  himself,  as  seen  in  his  characterisation  of  them. 
True,  if  we  consider  only  the  behaviour  of  the  Homeric  gods,  we  can  hardly  allow 
them  being  called  just  or  moral.  Their  obsession  with  their  personal  TIP4,  which  often 
results  in  man's  destruction,  seems  to  defy  all  principles  of  justice  and  morality.  Thus, 
statements  like  that  of  Dodds,  who  finds  'no  indication  in  the  narrative  of  the  Iliad  that  Zeus 
is  concerned  with  justice  as  such'  or  Chantraine,  who  speaks  of  the  'caractere  anarchique  du 
panthdon  homdrique',  55  seem  justifiable  -  still,  not  satisfying.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
opposite  view  which  advocates  gods'  justice  and  sees  in  it  a  force  that  permeates  the 
poems,  does  not  seem  satisfying  either.  Order  is  indeed  established  in  the  end  of  both 
poems,  the  lesser  gods  always  succumb  in  the  end  to  Zeus"s  will,  and  we  do  hear  of  Zeus's 
concern  for  justice  from  the  poet  himself,  yet,  does  this  entail  that  we  can  apply  to  the 
Homeric  gods  the  principle  of  justice  and  the  quality  of  moral  behaviour?  Such  an 
approach  proves  extremely  dangerous,  for  it  can  lead  to  associations  that  do  not  actually 
exist  in  the  poems  themselves.  Thus,  Lloyd-Jones,  although  stating  that  the  Homeric 
concept  of  divine  justice  does  not  necessarily  have  to  correspond  to  any  abstract  or 
absolute  idea  of  justice,  still  tries  to  accommodate  Zeus'  behaviour  with  a  train  of  thought 
55  Dodds  (1951)  32,  Chantraine  (1952)  64;  Chantraine  (ibU)  Ru-ther  argues  that  the  Homeric  gods  do  not 
correspond  to  no  moral  or  natural  law,  a  view  with  which  I  would  not  agree  totally,  in  the  face  of  what  has  been 
hitherto  discussed  about  the  gods'  relation  to  moira;  moreover,  I  would  think  that  the  very  fact  that  the  gods  are 
related  to  nature  and  its  laws  explains  their  moral  inadequacy,  with  moral  being  defined  in  human  terms.  Of  interest 
is  also  the  view  expressed  by  Adkins,  (I  960a:  62),  that  the  'gods  as  portrayed  generally  in  the  Homeric  poems  are 
far  from  just.  Though  right  triumphs  in  the  main  plots  ... 
it  does  not  do  so  because  it  is  right';  there  is  a  point  in 
Adkins'  s  remark,  yet  one  should  consider  that  although  the  gods  do  not  appear  as  agents  of  justice,  the  audience 
quite  probably  perceived  the  solution  of  the  plots  as  a  proof  of  divine  order,  that  this  is  not  always  relevant  to  the 
Iliadic  plot  will  become  dear  later  on.  For  similar  views  as  expressed  by  G.  Murray  and  C.  M  Bowra,  see  Clay 
(1983)  135,  mg. 
165 that  is  essentially  abstract  and  absolute  in  its  morality,  therefore  conlcuding  that  the 
Homeric  gods  are  agents  of  a  moral  power  that  is  finally  established  in  both  poems.  56 
Such  conflicting  readings  of  the  poems  certainly  correspond  to  the  conflicting  qualities 
of  the  Homeric  gods  themselves.  Although  the  two  opposing  views  presented  tend  to  be  rather 
extreme,  still  they  do  not  emerge  ex  nihilo;  there  is  a  trace  of  truth  in  both  -  however 
implausible  or  disquieting  this  may  appear  at  first  sight.  For  the  Homeric  gods  are  both  just  and 
unjust,  moral  and  immoral.  At  times  they  seem  to  sanction  morality  with  their  own  behaviour 
and  mete  out  justice  among  men,  yet  there  are  also  times  when  they  can  appear  indifferent  to 
both,  concerned  only  with  their  own  prerogative  of  TIPTI,  selfishly  disregarding  all  principles,  if 
this  is  deemed  necessary  for  their  personal  aims  and  plans  to  be  fulfilled.  Interpretations 
which  aim  at,  or  wish  for,  a  single  and  more  consistent  idea  of  the  divine  in  Homer,  inevitably 
depend  on  a  choice,  a  preference  for  the  one  or  the  other  characteristic,  ignoring  or  neglecting 
the  aspect  against  which  they  opted,  and  thus  disregarding  an  essential  quality  of  the  Homeric 
gods,  namely  their  moral  ambivalence.  57 
It  is  perhaps  necessary  that  the  questions  about  the  Homeric  gods  be  redefined.  The 
matter  is  not  whether  they  are  just  or  unjust,  moral  or  immoral;  if,  or  rather  since,  they  can  be 
both  at  the  same  time;  if  the  poet  is  not  interested  in  concealing  this  apparent  contradiction  by 
constructing  a  more  or  less  coherent  image  of  them;  if  he  is  indeed  quite  satisfied,  as  it  seems, 
with  their  presence  in  the  poem,  and  does  not  feel  he  is  being  unjust  towards  their  nature  or 
56  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  ch.  1. 
57  The  reasons  that  permit  this  ambivalence  will  be  discussed  in  due  course;  here,  let  it  suffice  for  me  to  say,  in 
anticipation,  that  however  vast  the  differences  between  the  two  poems,  and  even  if  the  04,  ssey  clearly  puts  more 
emphasis  on  the  gods'  moral  aspect,  this  equivocal  quality  characterises  their  behaviour  and  its  perception  by  the 
heroes  in  both  poems. 
166 disrespectful  to  their  status;  then,  the  question  is  which  is  the  aspect  of  the  gods  that  actually 
constitutes  their  imnost  and  indisputable  essence,  the  aspect  which  it  would  be  disrespectful  on 
the  part  of  both  the  poet  and  his  heroes  to  question  or  even  deny.  For  it  is  obviously  not  their 
justice;  justice  and  morality  can  be  ascribed  to  them,  but  they  are  neither  their  only  nor  their 
primary  function. 
True,  it  is  very  probable  that  the  sanction  of  morality  and  the  distribution  ofiustice 
are  essential  characteristics  of  the  divine  almost  by  definition.  As  Burkert  remarks,  'if  reality 
appears  dangerous  and  downright  hostile  to  life,  religion  calls  for  something  beyond 
experience  to  restore  the  balance'.  58  Cults,  rituals  and  religious  systems  seem  to  be  based  on 
the  assumption  that  the  powers  that  exist  beyond  man's  reach  or  comprehension  are  affected 
by  human  behaviour  in  multiple  ways  and  respond  to  it  accordingly.  Such  beliefs  in  their  turn 
seem  to  condition  human  behaviour  and  ultimately  form  the  basis  of  social  principles  and 
codes,  or  even  superstitions.  And  this  is  basically  the  reason  why  we  cannot  deny  this  function 
to  the  Homeric  gods.  Or  rather,  why  the  poet  cannot  deny  it;  for  this  is  a  conclusion  drawn 
from  the  poems  themselves,  as  "ill  become  obvious  later  on. 
Still,  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that,  however  important  an  element  of  the  divine 
behaviour,  justice  or  morality  are  not,  in  the  case  of  the  Homeric  gods,  the  characteristics  on 
which  their  divine  quality  is  based;  that  is,  the  Homeric  gods  are  not  acknowledged  as  gods 
58  Burkert  (1996)  33.  For  Burkert  this  is  another  characteristic  of  religion  that  proves  its  effectiveness  in 
'making  sense'  of  chaos,  and  therefore  an  explanation  of  its  persistence  through  the  ages;  'by  establishing 
connectioncs  of  fault,  consequence,  and  remedy,  it  creates  a  context  of  sense  and  premises  a  meaningful 
cosmos  in  which  people  can  live  in  health  and  at  ease'  (128);  see  his  discussion  on  pp.  118-126,  and  especially 
p.  125,  where  he  talks  of  guilt  as'  universal  and  aboriginal  and  typical  of  the  human  mind  and  human  behavior 
in  general'. 
167 because  they  sanction  the  behaviour  of  the  Homeric  society,  the  sanction  they  provide  derives 
from  rather  than  supports  their  authority.  The  Homeric  man  seems  to  wish  for,  or  at  times  even 
enjoy  their  justice,  but  what  he  ultimately  respects  and  fears  in  them  is  their  immortality  and 
their  extreme  and  omnidirectional  superiority,  evident  in  their  ability  to  interfere  with  and  thus 
control  human  life.  The  Homeric  gods  offer  an  explanation  of  life  and  nature;  they  represent 
the  other  world  to  which  man  has  no  access,  which  is  beyond  human  control  and  human 
perception;  and  as  such  they  should  be  definitely  respected  or  feared,  but  they  cannot  be  forced 
to  be  consistently  just  or  moral.  59 
Any  discussion  on  justice  has  to  begin  with  the  examination  of  the  relevant 
terminology.  As  noted  in  chapter  two,  in  the  place  of  the  later  more  abstract  and 
conceptualised  term  5IKaiccuvTj  the  Homeric  poems  have  the  rather  less  elaborate  term 
81KTI.  The  word  and  its  cognates  are  rarer  in  the  Iliad  than  in  the  Odyssey,  and  this 
observation  has  given  rise  to  the  conclusion  that  what  we  witness  is  the  process  of  a 
development  of  thought:  the  Odyssey  being  the  more  recent  poem  of  the  two,  we  can  see 
how  archaic  Greek  thought  gradually  matures  towards  a  more  elaborate  phase,  and  while 
51KTI  (or,  assumedly,  justice)  is  almost  absent  from  the  Iliad,  it  becomes  more  important  in 
the  Odyssey,  and  finally  acquires  its  full  importance  in  Hesiod's  Works  and  Days,  even  if  it 
is  still  not  as  elaborate  a  concept  as  in  later  periods.  This  schematic  development  on  a 
verbal  level  is  supposed  to  reflect  a  corresponding  development  of  thought,  as  perceived 
through  the  different  emphasis  that  is  put  on  justice  in  each  of  the  three  poems:  in  the 
Odyssey  justice,  and  in  particular  divine  justice,  is  supposedly  both  more  elaborate  and 
59  1  have  been  talking  about  the  Homeric  rather  than  the  Iliadic  gods  at  this  point,  because  I  believe  that  the 
discussion  is  relevant  to  the  gods  of  both  poems.  There  is  certainly  a  difference  between  the  two  poems,  which 
will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapter. 
168 more  frequently  employed  than  it  is  in  the  Iliad,  while  Hesiod  represents  once  again  the 
point  of  culmination  of  archaic  Greek  moral  thought,  as  the  idea  comes  now  into  the  poet's 
focus.  This  scheme  of  a  development  of  thought  well  agrees  with  the  generally  accepted 
outline  of  Ancient  Greek  literary  history,  with  Homer  chronologically  preceding  Hesiod.  60 
My  aim  will  be  to  question  this  idea  of  a  linear  development.  As  far  as  51KII  is 
concerned,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  the  poems  do  present  an  interesting  and  thought- 
provoking  difference  in  the  use,  and  perhaps  also  the  function,  Of  61KTI.  Still,  I  believe  that 
words  and  their  accurate  meaning,  function  or  frequency  are  but  the  starting  point  of  a 
research;  one  should  always  bear  in  mind  that  the  absence  of  a  particular  term  from  a  work 
of  literature,  although  indicative  of  the  poet's  milieu,  may  also  be  determined  by  the  poet's 
literary  or  narrative  intentions  -  even  if  only  partly.  Moreover,  it  has  been  argued  earlier  on 
that  510KTI  is  of  a  rather  restricted  meaning  in  the  poems,  and  hardly  ever  does  it  seem  to 
refer  to  divine  justice;  which  would  entail  that  the  frequency  of  the  word  has  after  all  little, 
if  anything,  to  do  with  the  issue. 
I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  limited  presence  Of  SIKTJ  in  the  Iliad  is  of  no 
significance;  it  is  indeed  significant,  as  far  as  the  particular  term  is  concerned.  However, 
two  things  should  be  considered:  first,  that  its  absence  from  the  particular  poem  in  no  way 
proves  its  absence  ftom  the  eighth-century  vocabulary;  the  poet  does  use  the  word  when 
this  is  necessary  or  helpful,  and  his  avoiding  or  neglecting  it  may  be  simply  because  he 
does  not  essentially  need  it;  second,  even  if  the  particular  term  in  which  we  are 
60  Doubts  about  Homer's  priority  to  Hesiod  have  been  expressed  by  M.  L.  West,  Hesiod.  7heogony,  Oxford 
1966,46f 
169 accustomed  to  trace  justice  in  Greek  literature  is but  rarely  employed,  the  poet  has  other 
ways  available  to  express  both  a  notion  of  justice  and  its  commendation.  If  &Katocývrl  as 
the  term  for  an  abstract  idea  of  justice  is  absent  from  Homeric,  and  even  Greek,  thought 
before  the  fifth  century,  this  only  proves  that  philosophical  inquiry  and  scrutiny  into  the 
details  and  essence  of  fundamental  principles  of  life  is  still  not  elaborate  enough  to  engage 
in  the  nuances  that  an  idea  may  involve.  Words  with  elaborate  meaning,  implicit  of  subtle 
differentiations,  presuppose  an  elaborate  thought  and  investigation;  and  this  is  doubtless 
not  the  world either  of  Homer  or  of  his  heroes. 
Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  use0f 
81KTI  iS 
Stillunsophisticated  and  non-conceptualised 
in  the  Homeric  poems,  and  that  consequently  the  idea  ofjustice  is  not  elaborate  enough  to  be 
regarded  as  a  concept  of  a  coherent  philosophical  system,  is  not  a  sufficient  proof  of  the 
absolute  absence  of  the  concept;  one  should  consider  that  the  Homeric  idea  ofjustice  could  be 
simply  wider  than  the  use  Of  81KT)  seems  to  imply.  The  Homeric  poems,  each  in  its  own 
succinct  manner,  allude  to  the  idea  of  justice,  and  in  fact  of  divine  justice,  on  various 
occasions,  thus  proving  that  any  absolute  identification  Of  81KTJ  with  the  idea  can  only  be 
misleading  and  partial  . 
61  Besides,  as  has  been  already  discussed,  the  idea  of  morality  and 
justice  in  the  Homeric  poems  is  also  closely  related  to  the  word  p6tpa,  and  the  implied  idea  of 
fate. 
61  Dickie  (1978:  950  rightly  observes  that  the  absence  of  an  abstract  and  theoretical  terminology  in  the 
Homeric  poems  should  not  be  taken  to  imply  the  absence  of  the  respective  ideas  as  well;  for,  as  he  further 
notes  (96),  one  has  to  take  under  consideration  the  whole  vocabulary  of  the  poems  and  the  way  in  which 
terms  behave  in  relation  to  each  other. 
170 0  A  distinction  should  be  drawn,  therefore,  between  Si  Kil  and  j  ustice;  if  the  infonnation 
provided  by  5tR  proves  to  be  insufficient  and  slightly  inconclusive  for  our  understanding  of 
the  Homeric  concept  of  divine  justice,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  the  examination  merely 
of  8tq  is  simply  not  enough,  nor  crucial  to  any  conclusion;  other  aspects  of  the  Homeric  gods 
%rill  have  to  be  considered  alongside  the  meaning  and  use  Of  51KY1,  such  as  their  behaviour,  their 
perception  by  the  heroes  and  their  interpretation  by  the  poet  himself,  as  evident  in  indirect  and 
discreet  comments  throughout  the  poem,  or  in  the  very  manipulation  of  the  plot,  and  finally 
their  relation  to  p6ipa  as  a  power  not  of  destiny,  but  of  a  moral  order  that  pervades  life; 
besides  these  aspects,  the  gods'  fimction  as  dramalis  personae  of  the  narrative,  as  well  as  the 
implications  of  their  divine  essence,  should  also  be  considered. 
The  vital  difference  between  the  two  poems  in  their  respective  ways  of  relating 
notions  of  justice  with  the  gods  can  certainly  not  be  overlooked.  The  Odyssey  seems  to 
provide  us  with  a  different  concept  of  the  gods  that  does  not  allow  us  always  to  speak  of 
the  poems  in  common  terms.  Both  the  degree  and  the  fashion  of  divine  participation  is 
different,  and  one  could  say,  as  Kullmann  does,  62  that  there  is  a  difference  in  divine 
motivation,  which  has  consequently  an  effect  on  the  way  the  gods  are  perceived  by 
mortals,  whether  they  be  the  heroes  or  the  poet's  audience,  or even  the  poet  himself  Still, 
the  question  remains:  is  this  sufficient  proof  of  a  development,  or  simply  the  expected 
consequence  of  the  vital  differences  of  narrative  aims  that  each  poem  seems  to  fulfil? 
Before  comparing  the  two  poems,  though,  it  is  only  wise  to  return  to  the  terminology  and 
ideology  of  the  Iliad. 
62  Kullmann  (1985)  3. 
171 In  the  poem,  the  noun  81KTI  itself  appears  four  times  in  the  singular  (11  388j  508,  T 
f  180,  T  542),  and  once  in  the  plural  (TT  542),  while  the  verb  WdýEtv  occurs  five  times  (A 
542,  E)  431,1506,  T  574,579);  of  these  occurrences  only  three  are  related  to  the  gods,  or 
more  precisely,  to  Zeus  himself  (A  542,  ()  431  and  TT  388);  of  the  remaining  cases,  TT  542, 
1506  and  508,  and  IF  574  and  579  have  clear  legal  implications  and  are  therefore  related 
63 
to  morality  only  indirectly,  while  T  180  and  T  542  have  an  ambivalent  meaning.  The 
adjective  &Kaioc,  which  has  been  said  to  be  the  form  most  clearly  related  to  some  notion 
of  morality  (p.  105  above),  is  limited  to  three  occurrences:  we  have  SIMIOTEpoc  at  T  181, 
and  5txa16TaToc  at  A  832  and  N  6;  finally,  the  word  5iKacTr6X0C  appears  only  once  at  A 
64  238.  Of  great  importance  is  the  fact  that  only  T  180  and  181  are  related  to  the  main  plot, 
referring  to  the  dispute  between  Achilles  and  Agamemnon  -  the  lines  will  be  discussed  in 
due  course. 
It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  word  appears  to  be  of  a  quite  restricted  meaning 
in  the  poem,  especially  when  compared  to  the  terminology  and  philosophy  of  later  ages 
p  (I  10f).  In  its  legal  sense  the  noun  51KTJ  may  be  said  to  denote  the  decision  made  during  a 
procedure,  the  settlement  reached  through  the  procedure  or,  finally,  the  procedure  itself, 
while  the  verb  &Kdýcz  denotes  the  act  of  deciding  through  such  a  procedure;  this  non- 
elaborate  character  is  obviously  related  to  the  very  oral  character  of  the  legal  'system'  of 
63  Of  these  cases,  1506,508,  IF  542,574,  and  579  have  been  discussed  in  pp.  1004,  and  TT  542  in  p.  108. 
64  Havelock  (1978:  127-133)  rightly  observes  that  61KII  is  used  in  the  Iliad  mostly  in  the  legal  context  of  a 
procedural  justice,  and  talks  therefore  of  the  legalities  of  the  poem,  while  the  04wey,  where  the  adjective  is 
more  frequently  used,  the  term  is  related  to  the  'moralities'  of  the  poem's  subject;  however,  as  far  as  the  Iliad 
is  concerned,  he  is  led  astray  by  his  thesis  of  the  poem's  didactic  character  and  sees  in  the  plot  a  paradigm  of 
oral  'justice'.  an  item  of  oral  storage  to  be  memorised  through  poetry  (see  p.  18,  n.  22;  p.  100,  n.  90): 
Agamemnon  has  violated  a  legal  procedure,  and  the  references  to  the  proper  administration  of  such 
procedures  which  are  dispersed  especially  in  the  second  half  of  the  poem  aim  exactly  at  creating  a  sharp 
contrast  by  means  of  which  the  didactic  end  of  the  poem  will  be  accomplished. 
172 the  period.  It  is  evident  that  the  term  does  not  imply  a  coherent  and  consistent  system, 
according  to  which  disputes  are  settled;  instead  there  seem  to  exist  precedents  on  the  basis  of 
wWch  a  legal  procedure  can  be  conducted,  aiming  at  a  peaceful  and  satisfactory  solution  that 
would  be  acceptable  by  both  disputants.  In  other  words,  61Kq  can  hardly  be  said  to  denote  any 
abstract  and  elaborate  notion  of  justice,  either  as  a  behavioural  norm  or  as  a  judicial  system. 
But  it  has  to  be  repeated  that  the  absence  of  an  elaborate  system,  legal  or  judicial,  and  the 
rather  restricted  meaning  Of  51KTI  as  a  moral  term  do  not  necessarily  entail  the  absence  of  all 
sense  of  justice  and  morality  from  the  Homeric  world.  Rather,  it  only  proves  what  can  easily 
be  assumed  about  an  oral  culture,  namely  that  its  ways  of  administering  justice  and  ensuring 
morality  are  different  from  those  of  a  culture  that  is  accustomed  to  the  facility  of  %Nriting.  65  As 
noted,  and  as  we  have  seen  in  chapter  two  (109-10),  both  the  notion  and  the  practice  ofjustice 
exist,  yet  not  only  or  not  necessarily  in  relation  to  61KII. 
And  the  question  remains:  how  are  the  Homeric  gods  related  to  51KII?  Up  to  now  I  have 
consciously  avoided  the  occurrences  of  the  word  where  such  a  relation  is  implied,  for  they 
demand  a  more  careful  examination.  I  begin  with  the  famous,  if  not  notorious,  simile  of  TT 
385-93 
6;  5'  U'  iT6  Xa  t'Xa  Tri  iTacaKEXatvT'l  pEppt6E 
)ftAl  v 
91 TIllaT'  o'iTcap  tvcý,  o'-m  Xapp6TaTov  Xist  u'&,  )p 
WC,  O'TE  84  p"  av5pcc3(3i  KOTEccyapEvoc  XaXETr4vll, 
65  Hence,  the  importance  of  the  ayopa  and  the  0'PK0mr;:  they  function  in  the  absence  of  a  written  document 
that  could  be  used  for  future  reference.  Of  importance  is  also  the  connection  of  the  gods  themselves,  and 
especially  Zeus,  both  with  the  BEPICTEC,  which  are  supposedly  given  to  a  king  by  the  god,  and  with  the  oaths, 
in  his  capacity  as  ZEk  "OpKioc;  as  Richardson  (1993:  on  Y  566-85)  remarks  on  the  practice  of  oath-taking, 
'it  effectively  makes  the  gods  the  witnesses,  and  so  could  be  considered  more  secure'. 
173 o 
"pill, 
69V 
1 
Ii 
ayopfi  oxoXtac  Kptvczai 
OiptaTac, 
EK  81  St'KrIV  EXd(JCOCI,  6ECSV  OITIV  OU'K  aXEyovTEi;  - 
TcSv  5E  TE  TTdvTcc  pEv  iToTapet  TrXýOouat  ýgovnc, 
TroXNac  6i  KXITOC  TOT'  a7TO'rpT'IYOUCI  Xapd5pat, 
cc  S'  a'Xa  TTop4upr;  Tiv  peyaXa  anvaXouat  ýgouoai 
Eig  6PECA)V  ilTlKdp,  PIVUOSI  68'  TE  Epy"  a'VOPCa'TrCov* 
coc  i  iTTroi  Tpc.?  a't  peyaXa  aTEvdXovTo  ecoucat. 
The  simile  has  been  suspected  of  interpolation  on  the  grounds  that  the  general  idea 
of  Zeus  as  a  god  of  justice  who  punishes  human  transgressions  is  not  compatible  with  the 
idea  of  the  god  as  expressed  in  the  main  plot,  but  rather  evocative  of  a  later  age;  66  as  will 
become  clear  presently,  Zeus  seems  quite  often  indifferent  to  human  impropriety,  proving 
consistent  only  with  regard  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  plan.  Besides,  the  strong  resemblance  of 
the  lines  to  Hesiod's  Works  and  Days  220-24,  seems  to  cast  further  doubt  on  the 
authenticity  of  the  lines.  In  support  of  the  lines  one  could  use  the  argument  that  similes 
correspond  to  the  poet's  own  age  rather  than  to  that  of  the  heroes,  and  therefore  the  idea 
implicitly  reflects  a  more  recent  belief  which  is  inevitably  in  conflict  with  the  more 
traditional  concept  of  the  divine  as  reflected  in  the  god's  behaviour  in  the  plot,  but  which 
is  not  necessarily  the  product  of  a  later  stage  of  thought.  67  Or  one  could  also  follow  M.  L. 
West  and  argue  for  Hesiod's  priority  to  Homer  (see  p.  169,  n.  60),  thus  avoiding  the 
solution  of  a  late  interpolation. 
"  For  relevant  bibliography,  see  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  187,  n.  26. 
67  This  view  seems  to  be  implied  by  Chantraine  (1952:  76)  who  talks  of  a  progress  in  thought  between  the  time 
of  the  appearance  of  traditional  themes  and  the  time  of  their  composition.  I  would  avoid  regarding  Zeus's 
possible  indifference  to  propriety  as  a  more  traditional,  and  hence  older  perception  of  the  divine,  for,  as 
already  noted,  I  would  believe  that  the  relation  of  divinity  to  some  sort  of  propriety  is  an  essential  element  of 
religion  in  general;  see  p.  167. 
174 More  important,  however,  I  would  regard  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  Zeus  as  implied 
by  the  simile  is  not  alien  to  the  poet  at  all,  nor  certainly  unique  to  this  simile.  The  idea  is 
expressed  on  different  occasions  and  by  different  heroes,  68  and  although  the  poet  himself 
avoids  applying  the  principle  to  his  plot  I  would  regard  the  heroes'  utterances  as  sufficient 
evidence  for  the  existence  of  the  belief  in  the  poet's  background.  Doubtless,  the 
discrepancy  between  this  belief  and  the  god's  actual  behaviour  in  the  poem  would  persist. 
To  this  issue  I  will  return  when  I  examine  the  possibility  or  necessity  of  the  idea  of  divine 
justice  in  the  poem. 
What  is  unique  about  the  simile,  and  perhaps  misleading  as  regards  its  relevance  or 
applicability  to  the  poem,  is  most  probably  the  association  of  Zeus  with  81KII,  the  fact,  that 
is,  that  he  appears  to  be  punishing  a  violation  related  to  some  concept  of  justice.  It  is 
certainly  obscure  whether  StK9  here  implies  the  legal  procedure,  which  is  violated  because  of 
men's  crooked  decisions,  69  or  a  morality  of  a  more  general  quality  which  is  similarly  offended; 
the  conteA  as  well  as  the  contrast  between  61KY1  and  Pirl,  seem  to  imply  the  former,  yet  with 
68  See  p.  180f.  It  could  be  suggested  that  the  differentiation  of  the  simile  from  other  references  to  divine 
justice  results  from  the  fact  that  now  the  god  seems  concerned  with  human  propriety  in  general,  and  not  with  a 
slight  on  his  personal  T111i  which  is  basically  the  case  in  the  other  examples;  this  is  certainly  an  idea  that 
seems  more  fitting  to  the  Odyssey  rather  than  the  Ifiadý  see  p  485-87,  where  the  gods  are  said  to  roam  the 
earth  in  disguise,  dVePCSTrCL)V  V"PPIV  TE  Kai  Ovopirlv  t#pc3v-rE,;.  I  would  regard,  however,  that  Apollo's 
concern  for  Hector's  body  (fl  33-54)  is  also  implicit  of  the  same  idea,  and  the  resort  to  the  explanation  of 
interpolation,  which  has  affected  the  whole  fl  [see  Macleod  (1982:  8)],  seems  to  me  too  easy  a  solution;  I 
would  not  find  it  impossible  that  two  or  even  more  distinct  ideas  about  divinity  should  co-exist  in  the  poems; 
even  the  application  of  moira  could  be  interpreted  in  this  way. 
69  So  Gagarin  (1973)  86.  Cf  Havelock  (1978)  214f 
175 1  70 
=Xiac  Upta-rac  being  substituted  for  the  expected  OKOXia(:  6IKac,  the  word  assumes  almost 
a  more  general  sense:  what  people  send  away  is  propriety  in  the  administration  of  justice.  71 
The  reference  to  eccsv  oTric,  implicit  of  the  idea  of  an  all-seeing  god  who  punishes 
transgressions,  seems  to  fiather  enhance  the  impression  that  the  term  has  moral  rather  than 
legal  connotations.  72  However,  it  would  appear  that  the  distinction  between  the  two 
interpretations  is  not  so  sharp,  once  we  remember  that  a  legal  process  is  after  all  an  expression 
or  version  of  morality  itself,  a  legal  sense  would  not  be  excluded,  then,  granted  that  legality 
functions  as  the  guarantee  of  morality.  For  the  audience  the  simile  unfolds  in  seconds,  and  the 
connection  drawn  between  crooked  decisions,  St'Kfl,  and  Zeus's  wrath  has  most  probably  an 
immediate  effect  of  relating  impropriety  to  the  god's  punishment  Zeus  is  wroth  at  the 
described  situation,  he  emerges  as  Zeus--npaopoc,  the  supreme  god  who  oversees  human 
behaviour  and  punishes  transgressions  of  established  principles  of  propriety.  What  is  worth 
noting,  however,  on  the  basis  of  what  has  been  already  said  about  the  concept  ofjustice,  is  that 
the  word  does  not  apparently  refer  to  an  idealised.  or  conceptualised,  notion,  but  to  propriety, 
which  is  of  a  more  restricted  sense,  and  more  particularly  to  the  procedures  that  the  god 
himself  has  given  to  man.  73  The  image  is  the  reverse  of  that  presented  at  T  108-14,  where 
70  OEll  tc  denotes  the  principles  of  propriety  in  general,  which  constitute  the  oral  or  customary  law  of  Homeric 
society,  or,  in  a  legal  context,  the  precedents  upon  which  a  decision  is  formed,  rather  than  a  decision  which  is 
reached  during  a  settlement  and  can  be  characterised  as  straight  or  crooked;  one  can  see,  therefore,  the  line 
either  as  implying  a  crooked  interpretation  of  such  principles  or  precedents  (see  Janko  (1992)  on  TT  386-88), 
or  as  resulting  from  the  obvious  relation  between  the  two  ideas;  cf.  X  568-71,  where  Minos  is  said  to  be 
OEPIOTE603V  vkucatv  (569),  for  the  dead  apýl  SIM;  ETIPOVTO  jVaKTa  (570). 
71  Dickie  (1978:  98)  examines  the  Homeric  and  Hesiodic  passages  together,  and  concludes  that  in  Hesiod  it  is 
not  the  legal  process  that  is  driven  away;  'A  legal  process  still  exists,  but  it  is  corrupt  and  biased.  Similarly,  in 
the  Homeric  passage,  it  is  not  legal  process  as  such  which  is  driven  forth  by  those  who  pronounce  crooked 
judgments  with  bie.  It  is  rather  the  quality  which  makes  a  judge  pronounce  straight,  i.  e.,  impartial,  judgments, 
and  that  quality  is  justice  or  equity'. 
72  For  the  old  Indo-European  idea  of  the  omniscient  god  who  sees  everything  and  punishes  trespasses,  see 
Griffin  (1980)  179ff,  and  especially  181f  for  the  particular  Iliadic  passage.  Burkert  (1996:  43)  refers  to  the 
very  old  and  biological  reaction  of  anxiety  caused  by  the  fear  of  the  staring  eye,  although  the  reference  is  made 
to  the  evil  eye  in  particular. 
73  See  A  238-39,198-99. 
176 EUAKIa,  along  with  Eu'rryEciq,  are  said  to  bring  prosperity,  the  terms  obviously  referring  to 
proper  administration  ofjustice  and  power. 
Twice  again  is  Zeus  mentioned  in  relation  to  atin  in  the  Iliad,  both  times  we  have  the 
verb  61Kd;  CJ:  at  A  540-543  Hera,  suspicious  of  Thetis"  visit  to  Zeus,  complains  to  him  that  he 
always  likes  5tKa;  gPEV  on  his  own  and  in  secret  from  her,  while  at  E)  42943  1,  Hera  finds  that  it 
is  only  proper,  ETTIEW6C,  that  it  must  be  Zeus  who  decides  on  the  life  and  death  of  Greeks  and 
Trojans.  Line  E)  43  1,  Tpcact  TE  KCýl  Aava6tat  81Ka;  iTCZ,  could  well  seem  to  refer  to  a  just 
settlement  of  the  old  dispute  between  Greeks  and  Trojans,  yet  the  context  suggests  otherwise: 
Zeus  favours  not  the  Greeks  at  the  moment  but  the  Trojans,  realizing  his  plan  to  honour 
Achilles,  and  thus  he  can  hardly  be  said  to  decide  from  the  perspective  of  justice.  It  seems, 
then,  that  in  both  cases  the  verb  5IKa;  ca  has  the  quite  limited  meaning  'adjudicate';  Zeus  is 
here  the  supreme,  the  most  powerful  god,  the  father  of  men  and  gods,  whose  decision  defines 
the  course  of  events;  whetherjustly  or  not  is  simply  not  mentioned. 
One  possibility  exists  that  Zeus  should  be  related  in  these  references  to  some  notion  of 
justice,  and  this  is  if  we  see  the  act  Of  &Kaýgpw  as  indicative  of  a  king's  offices:  Zeus  is 
himself  an  avaý,  often  having  to  make  decisions;  a  belief  that  when  doing  so,  he  administers 
justice  in  a  proper  or  straight  fashion,  would  not  seem  implausible;  the  order  prevailing  on 
Olympus  despite  the  incessant  conflicts  between  the  gods  might  be  taken  as  a  proof  of  this.  11is 
decisions  should,  then,  be  regarded  not  as  arbitrary  and  whimsical,  but  rather  as  the  evidence 
of  the  god's  j  ustice.  Besides,  he  is  responsible  for  giving  the  ee  pi  OTE,;  to  the  mortal  kings,  a 
fact  that  seems  to  entail  the  divine  sanction  of  the  proper  conduct  of  legal  procedures.  This  is 
indeed  the  view  expressed  by  Lloyd-Jones:  the  original  meaning  of  'indication'  for  61KTI  is  a 
177 reference  to  the  divine  law,  74  and  the  universal  order  which  is  supported  and  preserved  by  the 
godS. 
75 
Such  an  interpretation  would  bring  us  to  the  expression  8tKq  OEcSv,  which  we  find  once 
only  in  the  Odyssey  (T  43).  If  the  word  denotes  the  characteristic  manner  of  the  gods,  this 
cannot  be  but  a  reference  to  the  order  of  life  as  established  by  the  gods,  an  order  which  takes 
us  back  to  moira.  Greene  also  seems  to  suggest  a  similar  view,  when  he  sees  Dike  as  'the  Way 
of  Tbings',  the  order  of  'Nature,  the  universal  Mother';  the  idea  is  believed  to  have  been 
eclipsed  when  the  Olympians  invaded  religion  and  Zeus  was  now  married  to  Thernis,  'the  new 
divine  counterpart  of  human  conscience  and  human  ideals  of  conduct'.  76  The  possibility  that 
6i'Kil  did  enjoy  such  a  relationship  vAth  the  gods  cannot  be  disproved;  as  noted,  it  seems  to 
correspond  to  the  idea  of  order  that  moira  implies.  Yet,  what  has  to  be  stressed  is  that  this 
order,  however  moral,  is  far  from  being  just  in  the  way  that  justice  is  usually  perceived  by 
man.  Even  if  we  accept  that  SIKTJ  is  after  all  theway  of  the  gods,  this  does  not  necessarily  entail 
that  the  gods  are  just  in  the  sense  that  they  distribute  happiness  and  misery  on  the  basis  of 
merit  -  for  after  all  this  is  what  the  human  concept  of  divine  justice  essentially  demands.  AIKTJ 
is  the  way  of  nature,  and  nature  can  be  extremely  unjust  -  this  being  probably  the  reason  why 
man  is  constantly  looking  for  justice.  Thus,  the  gods'  relation  to  moira,  as  well  as  moira's  own 
relation  to  some  sense  of  order,  seem  to  make  sense:  life  entails  both  good  and  evil,  and  as  vvill 
become  clear  presently,  the  Homeric  concept  of  the  gods  allows  sufficient  space  for  the 
explanation  of  both,  while  the  belief  in  moira  further  removes  the  complexity  of  evil's 
causatiom 
74  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  6-7. 
75  Lloyd-Jones  (1987)  310. 
76  Greene  (1944)  10.  Cf  also  Comford  (1912)  172-77. 
179 However  we  interpret  51'KTI,  then,  whether  as  a  quasi-legal  term  which  can  refer  to 
propriety,  but  only  in  the  limited  sense  of  abiding  by  the  principles  of  a  particular  society,  or  as 
a  more  'metaphysical'  concept  that  relates  to  the  order  prevailing  in  nature  and  life,  the  term  is 
certainly  not  used  to  designate  an  idea  of  absolute  divine  justice.  In  other  words,  the  idea  that 
the  god  may  respond  to  human  behaviour  and  be  concerned  with  propriety  is  not  expressed  by 
81KrI,  even  if  the  term  implies  an  order  of  things  which  demands  itself  a  proper  administration 
and  conduct.  In  the  simile  of  TT  385-93  61KTI  is  not  an  attribute  of  the  god,  even  if  the  idea 
implied  relates  to  a  god  who  is  concemed  with  justice. 
To  conclude,  5iKq  has  a  fairly  limited  application  in  the  Iliad,  even  less  so  in  relation  to 
p  the  gods.  The  adjective  81MIOC,  which  has  been  said  to  have  moral  connotations  more  than  the 
noun  &Kq  and  the  verb  StKdýca  do,  appears  only  three  times  in  all  in  the  Iliad,  as  opposed  to  the 
ten  occurrences  of  the  noun  and  the  verb  together,  while  the  adverb  SlKatczc  is  totally  absent. 
Even  so,  and  despite  the  scarce  application  of  the  adjective,  the  relation  between  51KY1  and 
some  idea  of  morality  does  exist.  Moreover,  one  should  be  particularly  careful  not  to  infer  that 
the  limited  use  Of  61  K71  in  the  poem  entails  a  limited  importance  of  morality  or  justice  in  the 
Homeric  world.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapter  (72ff.  ),  moira,  apart  from  denoting  an 
idea  of  predetermination,  also  refers  to  a  notion  of  social  order  which  demands  the  respect  of 
limits  -a  notion  which  has  been  regarded  as  essentially  moral. 
As  for  the  relation  Of  BIKTJ  to  the  gods,  it  has  to  be  admitted  that  it  does  indeed  exist,  as 
the  above  examples  clearly  show,  even  if  the  idea  never  seems  to  attain  an  important  place  in 
the  poem.  More  important,  even  if  one  should  see  51KTI  as  a  technical  or  legal  rather  than  a 
179 moral  teM  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  poet  is  aware  of  the  belief  that  the  gods,  vvith  Zeus  as 
their  d"vag,  do  punish  possible  transgressions  of  men,  being  wroth  at  impropriety  -  an  idea  that 
certainly  exists  independently  of  8tR  as  well,  as  will  become  clear  presently.  However,  it  has 
to  be  noted  that  no  relation  is  ever  drawn  between  61KII,  Zeus  and  the  offences  committed  by 
Agamemnon  and  Paris,  and  also  that,  despite  the  belief  in  the  gods'  punishment,  the  gods  are 
never  called  &Katoi  themselves. 
I  have  been  mentioning  quite  often  that  there  exists  in  the  poem  the  belief  in  the 
gods'  concern  for  propriety,  which  may  also  imply  their  punishing  impropriety,  an  instance 
of  this  being  the  very  simile  at  TT  385-93.  What  remains  to  be  seen,  then,  is  how  this  idea  is 
expressed  in  the  poem,  and  whether  it  is  relevant  to  the  plot  in  some  way. 
It  is  a  quite  common  view  that  Zeus  wants  the  Greeks  to  win,  because  Paris' 
improper  behaviour  towards  Menelaus  deserves  punishment;  the  principles  of  ýcvta, 
protected  by  Wc  H-sivioc,  were  neglected  and  violated  by  Paris  and  now  this  impropriety 
of  a  single  person  has  an  impact  on  Troy  in  general.  The  moral  character  of  Troy's 
destruction  is  often  stressed,  as  support  seems  to  be  found  in  the  text  itself-  at  r  351-354 
Menelaus  prays  to  Zeus  for  a  victory  against  Paris  in  a  most  powerful  way:  ZE6  ava,  86c 
TEtaaa6at  6'  11E  TTp6TEPCC  KdK'  iopyE,  I  8-tov  'AXiýav5pov,  Ka'  'pf  U6  at 
jC  '  iT'  XEp  I  8dpaccov, 
6#a 
TIC  EPPIYJPI  KC('I 
41YOVC&3V  dVOPCýTTCAW  I  gEIV050KOV 
KaKC(  p'Egat,  *0  KEV  ýIXOTTJ-ra 
TrapaaX-O,  and  Kirk  sees  in  this  prayer  'a  powerful  reminder  of  his  rectitude,  which  'in 
180 itself  gives  him  the  advantage  over  Paris,  who  can  naturally  attempt  nothing  similar';  77  at 
A  160-162,  after  Pandarus  has  broken  the  oath  given  for  the  agreement  made  at  r  276-91, 
Agamemnon  soothes  his  wounded  brother,  by  reassuring  him  that  ci  ITEP  yap  TE  Kal  aU'TIýK' 
'OX6PITIO(;  OUK  EiTiXECCEV,  I  E'K  TE  Kai  4i  TEM,  Cr5V  TE  pEyaXq,  3  aTTETEicav,  I  cu'v  cýfiatv 
KCýaXfiOl  yuvalgl'  TE  Kal  TEKEEcow;  according  to  Kirk  again,  we  have  here  'the  first  general 
statement  in  Greek  literature  of  the  powerful  dogma  that  Zeus  always  exacts  vengeance  in 
the  end'.  78 
If  such  statements  in  the  poem  are  supposed  to  be  explaining  Troy's  fall  in  moral 
terms,  the  morality  and  justice  of  Zeus  and  the  gods  in  general  is  further  supported  by 
parallels  of  other  examples  in  which  Zeus  appears  to  be  punishing  acts  of  impropriety,  79 
the  most  striking  of  which  is  supposed  to  be  that  of  Achilles:  at  1502-512  Phoenix  talks  of 
aT-q  that  is  sent  upon  men  by  Zeus  for  their  not  listening  to  AIM'  -  an  allegory  aiming  at 
persuading  Achilles  to  accept  Agamemnon's  gifts;  on  these  lines  Hainsworth  comments 
that  'it  is  correct  to  see  a  moral  connexion  between  the  temper  of  Akhilleus  and  his  fate.  In 
that  sense  the  death  of  Patroklos  and  his  own  TmTpoc  eToipog;  are  a  penalty  brought  upon 
him  by  his  own  intransigence,  nqt  a  morally  neutral  chain  of  causes  and  effects';  80  in  a 
similar  way,  Richardson  comments  on  Hector's  reference  to  6EC3v  p4vtpa  at  X  358  that  'it 
looks  as  if  Akhilleus'  death  may  be  seen  as  a  retribution  for  his  behaviour  towards  Hektor's 
77  Kirk  (1985)  ad  loc.  It  is  worth  noting  the  use  of  TrPOTEPOi;  in  Menelaus'  words,  for  it  obviously  relates  to 
the  retributive  character  of  justice,  and  this  is  the  very  trait  of  the  concept  that  makes  Achilles'  reaction  fairly 
legitimate,  see  Cairns  (1993b)  160;  not  surprisingly,  the  wronged  hero  does  not  talk  of  the  offence  in  terms  of 
a  slight  on  the  god's  Ttp4,  but  rather  from  the  perspective  of  a  patient  who  asks  for  divine  support. 
78  Kirk  (1985)  ad  loc. 
79  Lycurgus,  for  example,  is  punished  for  his  attack  on  Dionysus'  nurses  at  Z  130-140,  and  Niobe  for 
regarding  herself  as  equal  to  Leto  at  fl  603-7. 
Hainsworth  (1993)  ad  loc. 
181 corpse',  81  a  view  based,  as  it  seems,  on  the  fact  that  Apollo,  'a  god  concerned  with 
132 
fundamental  Greek  ethical  principles',  is  the  one  who  gets  extremely  angry  at  Achilles' 
behaviour,  and  more  important,  the  one  who  will  later  kill  him. 
Certainly,  there  is  some  kind  of  truth  in  all  these  views.  It  is  beyond  doubt  that 
Zeus  destroys  the  Greeks  because  Agamemnon  dishonoured  Achilles,  or  that  Zeus  destroys 
the  Greek  wall,  because  the  Greeks  did  not  sacrifice  before  building  it.  And  we  often  find 
that  a  hero  is  punished  by  a  god,  as  happens  with  Lycurgus  (Z  130),  Bellerophon  (Z  200- 
202),  Oineus  (1529-549)  or  Niobe  (fl  605-609)  (see  p.  18  1,  n.  79).  Still,  one  should  have  in 
mind  that  justice  and  punishment  are  not  necessarily  connected,  for  if  justice  entails 
punishment,  the  contrary  is  not  always  true.  My  aim  will  be  to  show  that  the  Iliadic  gods 
do  not  after  all  appear  to  be  concerned  about  justice  itself,  yet  this  should  not  be  seen  as 
indicative  of  the  absence  of  the  idea  altogether,  since  the  examples  quoted  above  clearly 
testify  to  the  contrary.  The  question,  then,  is  why  the  poet  actually  suppresses  any  explicit 
reference  on  his  part,  avoiding  the  application  of  the  idea  to  his  plot. 
As  I  have  already  said,  the  difficulty  when  discussing  divine  morality  or  justice  in  the 
Iliad  lies  Nvith  an  essential  inconsistency  in  the  character  of  the  gods:  they  are  said  to  represent 
an  idea  ofjustice,  even  if  vaguely  and  indirectly,  yet  at  the  same  time  they  behave  in  a  manner 
that  actually  defies  all  principles  and  obligations  that  an  idea  ofjustice  seem  to  entail.  In  other 
words,  their  actual  behaviour  and  participation  in  the  plot  does  not  seem  to  conform  with  the 
belief  in  their  supporting  justice,  which  does  exist  in  the  poem,  whether  related  to  StKq  or  not 
81  Richardson  (1993)  ad  loc.  Cf  Clay  (1983)  65T,  who  further  believes  thatwith  Achilles'  ransoming  Hector, 
the  ordered  hierarchy  between  men  and  gods  is  restored. 
82  Richardson  (1993)  on  0  22-76,  cf.  note  on  fl  33-54. 
182 Being  the  witnesses  of  the  gods'  capricious  and  unpredictable  behaviour,  we  are  quite 
astonished  at,  if  not  shocked  by,  their  self-absorption  and  egotism,  and  at  the  same  time 
perplexed  by  the  occasional  references  to  their  justice.  As  noted  earlier  in  the  chapter, 
neither  aspect  should  be  overlooked  if  we  wish  to  comprehend  the  gods'  complex 
character.  The  question  is  whether  this  is  more  our  own  appreciation  of  the  issue,  while  for  the 
poet  and  his  heroes  there  is  no  inconsistency  at  all.  An  examination  of  the  gods'  behaviour  is 
necessary  at  this  point. 
That  Homeric  religion  is  anthropomorphic  need  not  be  discussed  in  extenso.  First 
of  all,  the  very  structure  of  the  divine  society  is  merely  a  reflection  of  that  of  human 
society.  83  Zeus  is  an  avag  (r  351),  just  like  Agamemnon  (A  506),  demanding  obedience 
and  having  the  power  to  impose  his  will  on  the  divine  family;  the  gods  hold  assemblies  of 
their  own,  and  opinions  are  heard  before  Zeus  makes  the  final  decision.  84  Each  god  has  a 
personal  field  of  activity,  or,  as  noted  (70-72),  a  personal  p6ipa,  which  entails  personal 
status  andTlp4,  and  which  is  protected  not  only  against  human  offences,  but  also  against 
offences  from  another  deity.  85  Their  relations  to  each  other  are  reciprocal,  based  on  the 
same  principle  of  do  ut  des  that  defines  human  interrelations:  Thetis  helped  Zeus  once,  and 
Zeus  is  obliged  to  help  her  now,  showing  thus  his  gratitude  and  properly  recognising  her 
TIJITJ  (A  503-510);  if  he  refuses  his  help  to  her,  she  will  think  of  herself  as  PSTa  IT601V 
13  The  assimilation  of  religious  systems  to  social  practices  or  realities  is  often  interpreted  as  a  means  of 
stability  through  a  definition  of  the  identity  of  the  social  group;  see  Havelock  (1978)  25;  Burkert  (1996:  15) 
underlines  the  paradox,  from  a  socio-biological  perspective,  that  although  religion  does  reflect  a  social  reality, 
it  also  proves  unwilling  to  adapt  to  changing  conditions,  focusing  instead  on  'unchanging  "eternar'  truths';  the 
paradox  obviously  lies  with  the  fact  that  despite  its  inflexibility  religion  finally  persists,  the  principles  of 
survival  fitness  thus  proving  non-operative. 
94  For  Zeus's  status  as  evident  from  his  responsibility  for  deciding  the  outcome  of  events,  see  p.  145,  n.  37. 
85  This  is  the  case,  as  we  saw  (70-72)  with  Poseidon  and  Zeus,  while  the  idea  underlies  the  tension  between 
Hera,  Athena  and  Aphrodite,  since  Paris  opted  for  the  goddess  of  love  (fl  29-30). 
183 I  aTIPOT6'nl  MC  (A  5  16)  -  and  thus  Zeus  makes  the  promise  that  is  necessary  for  the  plot  to 
unfold.  136  There  is  even  the  idea  of  gifts  as  a  means  of  sealing  such  a  relationship  and 
recognising  one's  help,  as  happens  with  Hera  who  promises  to  give  Pasithee  to  Hypnos, 
granted  that  he  will  help  the  goddess  seduce  Zeus  (--  263-279). 
Moreover,  the  anthropomorphic  quality  of  the  gods  entails  that  they  share  the  same 
passions  and  weaknesses  as  man.  If  the  violation  of  Menelaus'  TIPTJ  can  cause  such  a 
terrible  war,  the  violation  of  Hera's  or  Athena's  TIP4  can  cause  an  insatiable  hatred  that 
can  be  quenched  only  Nvith  the  total  destruction  of  Troy.  Subject  to  love  and  hate,  affection 
and  jealousy,  the  gods  seem  to  react  in  a  self-centred  and  self-absorbed  fashion.  Earnest 
and  sincere  concern  for  morality  or  human  welfare  is  rare,  unless  suggested  by  some 
familial  or  other  special  relation,  and  then  only  of  a  minor  importance.  Self-interest  is 
more  decisive  a  factor  of  their  behaviour,  often  resulting  in  conflict  among  the  gods 
themselves.  Their  incessant  plots  and  deceits  prove  more  than  anything  else  that  they  are 
not  models  of  propriety.  As  Greene  points  out,  '[the  poet's]  ethics  ... 
is  nobler  than  his 
theolo 
).  87 
When  the  gods  react  to  human  behaviour,  this  reaction  is  not  presented  as  a 
genuine  concern  for  propriety  or  morality  per  se,  but  is  seen  instead  in  the  light  of  the  very 
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principle  of  apM  and  Tipil.  A  prayer  is  listened  to  and  a  favour  is  granted  in  exchange  for 
the  TIp4  received,  and  accordingly,  disaster  is  the  response  for  neglect  and  violation  of  a 
96  Other  references  to  the  gods'  reciprocal  relations:  e  360-73,1394409,  rl  110-11. 
97  Greene  (1944)  11.  CC  Havelock  (1978)  5  1:  'the  gods'  essential  characteristic  is  not  superior  morality,  but 
superior  durability'.  Superior  power  should  also  be  noted,  for,  as  will  become  clear  soon,  this  is  actually  the 
most  important  quality  of  the  gods,  second  only  to  their  immortality, 
184 god's  Tlp4.  Due  respect,  then,  is  demanded  for  the  god  to  intervene  for  the  sake  of  a  hero, 
and  due  respect  is  shown  through  offerings  and  sacrifices,  not  through  the  observance  of 
some  moral  code  of  behaviour.  88  The  principle  of  quidpro  quo  defines  the  relationship 
between  mortals  and  immortals  in  a  manner  that  seems  rather  inappropriate  if  the  gods 
should  be  ascribed  the  more  sober  and  dignified  principle  ofjustice. 
It  does  not  come  as  a  surprise,  then,  that  the  gods  punish  lack  of  piety  not  out  of  a 
concern  for  the  moral  inadequacy  of  an  impious  man,  but  because  their  personal  TIp4  has 
not  been  properly  acknowledged.  Thus,  we  hear  that  Artemis  punished  Oineus  for  not 
sacrificing  to  her  only  of  all  the  gods  (1533-40);  the  issue  seems  to  be  the  offence  towards 
the  goddess  and  her  Tlp4,  and  not  the  moral  aspect  of  Oineus'  act,  since  it  is  clear  from  the 
narration  that  the  latter  acted  out  of  negligence  and  not  on  purpose.  "  Furthermore,  the 
gods  may  punish  impiety,  but  they  do  not  necessarily  reward  piety;  either  because  of 
indifference,  or  because  of  a  conflict  between  their  own  interest  and  the  interest  of  those 
who  seek  for  their  support.  When  the  Trojan  women  pray  to  Athena  and  promise  sacrifices 
in  return  for  her  help  (Z  297-3  10),  Athena  not  only  refuses  to  listen  to  their  prayer  (3  11), 
but  actually  wishes  for  and  aims  at  their  destruction.  The  gods'  tendency  to  be  influenced 
by  human  behaviour  only  when  their  personal  TIPTJ  is  violated  is  also  evident  in  the 
behaviour  of  Athena  and  Hera  in  general.  Both  of  them  wish  Troy's  utter  destruction  and 
do  everything  they  can  to  achieve  it;  behind  their  hate  we  find  no  sense  of  morality 
88  See  A  61-66,  E  177-178,  Z  87-98,111-115,1533-536,  Y  862-881,  rl  66-70. 
89  The  question  of  Oineus'  intentions  proves  of  no  importance  to  the  goddess  who  is  concerned  with  the  result 
of  impiety  and  dishonour,  however,  it  is  worth  considering  whether  results  are  always  more  important  even  in 
religious  systems;  we  are  still  far  from  any  idea  of  divine  forgiveness  and  mercy.  More  important,  one  has  to 
see  in  such  cases  the  belief  that  disaster  follows  a  human  failure,  whether  a  mistake  or  a  moral  error  is  not  of 
any  significance  whatever  for  life;  since  no  belief  in  afterlife  exists  everything  must  be  seen  from  the 
perspective  of  the  present. 
185 regarding  Paris'  behaviour;  their  only  concern  is  that  they  were  personally  dishonoured  by 
Paris  and  his  preference  for  Aphrodite  (fl  22-30).  What  mattes  for  the  gods  is  not  the  act 
itself,  but  the  impact  it  has  on  their  pride  and  TIPT). 
What  we  have,  then,  is  an  image  of  gods  who  punish  every  human  act  that  threatens 
their  T1jj4,  but  do  not  reward  every  human  act  that  exalts  it.  It  is  therefore  doubtful  whether 
divine  justice  can  be  detected  in  the  poem,  since  it  becomes  clear,  first  that  the  only 
principle  that  can  define  divine  behaviour  is  of  an  external  and  quite  superficial  nature, 
and  second  and  more  important,  that  even  this  principle  is  not  steady,  that  is  man  cannot 
form  upon  it  his  behaviour  in  order  to  ensure  his  future  happiness.  As  it  appears  that 
human  behaviour  does  not  always  influence  the  order  on  the  divine  level,  we  cannot  talk  of 
a  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  More  important,  it  Nvould  appear  that  divine  response  to 
human  behaviour  cannot  form  a  sanction  of  propriety.  90 
However,  a  point  should  be  made  clear,  even  if  only  to  refute  the  preceding 
conclusion;  for  we  seem  to  make  the  same  mistake  that  leads  to  the  conviction  that 
morality  is  absent  from  the  poems.  It  would  indeed  be  absurd  to  suggest  that  the  gods  can 
ever  be  seen  as  just  in  the  sense  that  they  are  gods  of  an  absolute  and  unequivocal  justice 
that  prevails  life.  For  it  often  appears  that  merit  and  responsibility  are  not  after  all  decisive 
factors  of  their  response  to  man:  the  good  do  not  always  prosper,  the  bad  are  not  always 
90  As  noted  (50),  this  could  explain  perhaps  the  importance  that  alt&k  has  in  Homeric  society:  the  absence  of 
any  powerful  and  unquestionable  divine  sanction  of  propriety  necessitates  the  function  of  other  mechanisms 
which  can  ensure  adherence  to  the  code  of  behaviour.  With  no  fear  of  an  afterlife  punishment,  and  with  no 
evidence  in  life  for  a  relation  between  behaviour  and  happiness  or  misery,  public  opinion  functions  as  a 
reminder  of  propriety,  a  restraint  of  impropriety.  I  do  not  imply  a  conscious  substitution;  simply  that  public 
opinion  and  shame  or  fear  of  criticism  are  inevitably  more  compelling  when  they  are  the  only  evaluative 
criterium  of  one's  quality. 
186 punished,  and  this  eternal  question  of  life  persists.  But  this  is  a  question  that  cannot  be 
answered  by  Homeric  religion,  since  it  lacks  the  metaphysical  dimension  of  a  belief  in 
afterlife,  and  it  further  accepts  a  polytheism  that  allows  enough  space  for  all  misery  and 
unhappiness  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  an  offended  god.  91 
More  important,  by  insisting  on  the  gods'  inability  to  correspond  to  such  a 
conceptualised  idea  of  divine  justice,  we  end  up  forcing  on  the  poem's  world  a  distinction 
and  a  belief  that  is  utterly  alien  to  it.  As  happens  with  morality,  we  have  to  look  for  the 
element  in  the  gods'  behaviour  that  would  justify  the  expressed  belief  in  their  justice,  and 
try  to  understand  by  the  criteria  that  Homeric  man  uses  how  this  concept  is  reconciled  with 
his  overall  view  on  life.  Only  then  can  we  examine  whether  this  idea  is  applicable  in  the 
text,  and  if  not,  why  it  is  not  so.  To  do  this,  I  have  to  re-examine  some  of  the 
characteristics  attributed  earlier  to  the  gods,  wishing  to  see  them  in  a  slightly  different 
perspective  this  time,  avoiding,  as  much  as  this  can  be  possible,  mingling  our  own 
perceptions  and  prejudices  with  the  actual  beliefs  as  found  in  the  text. 
It  was  noted  above  that  the  gods'  reaction  to  human  behaviour  is  not  sensed  as  a 
genuine  concern  for  morality,  but  rather  as  the  selfish,  impersonal  and  rather  immoral 
concern  for  their  own  prerogatives  of  apETý  and  TIP4.  We  usually  feel  disconcerted  by  the 
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gods'  obsession  with  their  personal  apETTI  and  TIpil,  but  the  truth  is  that  this  obsession  is 
91  For  polytheism  as  an  obstacle  to  the  development  of  more  moral  gods,  see  Burkert  (1985)  248: 
'Polytheism  encounters  fundamental  difficulties  in  giving  legitimation  to  a  moral  world  order.  its  multiplicity 
always  implies  opposition,  the  only  sense  of  order  possible  being  the  one  resulting  from  a  departmentalisation 
of  powers,  of  an  apportionment  of  moirai among  the  gods.  See  also  Chantraine  (1952)  64ff,  the  solution 
provided  by  man  to  these  gods  who  'introduisent  dans  le  monde  plus  de  &sordre  que  d'ordre'  (66)  is, 
according  to  Chantraine,  the  application  of  an  idea  of  hierarchy,  of  an  organisation  'familiale  et  f6odale  i  la 
fois'  (67). 
187 the  very  principle  on  which  they  are  seen  as  just.  Behind  this  rationalisation  of  the  gods 
and  their  assimilation  to  human  standards  and  principles  there  is  the  belief  in  a  reciprocal 
relation,  essential  to  all  religious  systems.  Anthropomorphism  is  simply  the  result  of  man's 
attempt  to  comprehend  the  indefinable  power  that  exists  beyond  his  knowledge,  and  this 
means  basically  that  essential  qualities  of  the  divine  are  simply  translated  into  signs  or 
terms  that  will  be  easily  identifiable  or  recognisable  by  man.  92  Hence  the  attributes  of 
apETTI,  TIp4  and  Pirl,  which  are  no  more  than  the  acknowledgement,  in  human  terms,  of  the 
superiority  of  the  divine;  as  Phoenix  says  of  the  gods,  TcSv  7TEP  Kai  ps[ýC.  OV  C'(PST4  TE  TIP4  TE 
93  Pill  TE  (1  498).  The  gods  represent  the  'unattainable  extreme,  perfection',  and  this 
perfection  can  only  make  sense  if  seen  in  the  light  of  principles  of  which  man  is  aware. 
f.  For  Homeric  man  the  fact  that  the  gods  are  concemed  with  their  TIPIJ  IS  an 
indication  of  the  interaction  that  exists  between  the  human  and  the  divine.  The  gods  are 
believed  to  respond  to  human  behaviour,  which  is  therefore  conditioned  accordingly,  due 
respect  to  the  gods  being  an  essential  principle  of  the  code  of  ethics.  94  When  Chryses  prays 
to  Apollo,  reminding  him  of  all  the  past  offerings,  the  god  responds  (A  35ff.  ),  and  this  may 
be  seen  as  the  result  of  Chryses'  own  piety  as  manifested  in  the  past  and  of  his  special 
relation  to  the  god  through  his  priesthood  -a  response,  that  is,  based  on  reciprocity.  To 
some,  such  a  response  may  appear  too  superficial,  the  result  of  favouritism  rather  than 
92  See  Chantraine  (1952)  57ft  especially  63. 
93  Burkert  (1996)  27.  Chapter  4  is  also  particularly  relevant  to  the  discussion. 
94  For  vows,  prayers  and,  most  important,  sacrifices  and  offerings  being  of  the  universalia  of  religion  see 
Burkert  (1996)  4. 
188 moral  consideration,  95  but  I  would  think  that  for  Homeric  man  this  is  simply  an  instance  of 
a  god's  just  reaction  to  a  pious  man.  Behind  it  we  can  discern  a  most  elementary  concept 
of  divine  justice:  the  good  have  to  prosper,  the  bad  have  to  suffer. 
Particularly  interesting  in  this  light  is  Zeus's  protection  of  oaths  and  of  the 
principles  of  ýEvta  and  'IKEata,  which  protection  is  also  seen  as  a  matter  Of  TIPý:  the 
violation  of  any  of  these  principles  is  a  violation  against  Zeus  himself,  a  sign  of 
indifference  towards  his  TIp4,  and  the  god's  reaction  aims  simply  at  restoring  the  order. 
Some  of  the  most  important  principles  of  conduct,  then,  are  related  directly  to  the  supreme 
god,  thus  being  sanctioned  by  him.  The  necessary  link  between  propriety  and  divine 
response  is  made  comprehensible  through  the  reference  to  the  gods  Tlp4,  and  although  we 
may  find  the  association  too  mundane,  it  seems  to  provide  the  proof  for  the  god's  concern 
for  propriety:  if  Zeus  punishes  possible  transgressions,  this  means  that  he  is  offended  by 
such  transgressions,  which  are  therefore  unwelcome  to  him  and  condemned  in  man.  The 
negative  connotations  Of  T1114  simply  do  not  exist. 
95  So  Gagarin  (1987)  294,  n.  25.  Gagarin  draws  a  distinction  between  moral  and  religious  offences  by  the 
criterion  of  self-interest;  as  religious  offences  he  regards  the  offences  to  the  gods'  TIPý,  which  are  obviously 
motivated  by  self-interest,  thus  proving  that  the  gods  are  not  actually  agents  of  morality  since  it  is  only 
occasionally  that  they  respond  without  being  personally  involved.  Gagarin's  reference  to  morality  as  the 
absence  of  self-interest  (see  p.  35,  n.  26),  and  further  his  argument  that  the  weak  divine  sanction  further 
justifies  our  terming  these  rules  as  moral,  for  in  an  ideal,  Kantian  system  moral  rules  need  no  sanction  (295), 
illuminates,  I  believe,  the  problematic  basis  of  his  interpretation.  I  would  regard  such  a  distinction  as 
inappropriate  to  a  world  which  does  not  evaluate  action  on  such  a  basis.  Nor  would  I  agree  that  a  divine 
sanction  and  the  consequent  fear  of  the  gods  necessarily  diminishes  the  moral  quality  of  an  act:  for  the  initiate, 
fear  is  even  necessary,  and  what  is  important  after  all  is  knowledge  if  what  one  has  to  do.  See  p.  272  and  n.  49 
on  ecou6i;. 
189 It  would  be  misleading,  therefore,  to  state  that,  since  the  gods  are  concerned  with 
their  apET4  and  TIP4,  they  act  out  of  self-interest,  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  just.  96  The 
terms  are  merely  the  Homeric  version  of  the  idea  of  submission  and  reciprocity  that  forms 
an  essential  characteristic  of  all  religions,  stemming  from  a  feeling  of  dependence  on  the 
unknown  'other';  behaving  with  caution,  showing  respect  and  offering  tokens  of 
acknowledgement  aims  exactly  at  what  seems  the  absurd  basis  of  injustice,  namely, 
conditioning  divine  response  and  consequently  life  itself  97 
Such  a  concept  of  divine  justice  seems  indeed  too  inarticulate  and  elementary  in  a 
way,  and  it  definitely  does  not  correspond  to  the  ideas  found  in  more  recent  religious 
systems.  The  punishment  of  Oineus  for  what  is  after  all  a  mistake,  and  not  a  moral  error, 
does  seem  too  selfish  a  response,  and  not  particularly  just.  Similarly,  Athena's  and  Hera's 
hatred  for  Troy,  not  founded  on  the  consideration  of  any  moral  elements,  looks  superficial 
and  even  absurd.  Yet,  one  should  consider  that  for  the  initiate  of  this  religion,  or  of  any 
religion,  these  are  simply  explanations  of  life's  misfortunes  and  misery  in  a  more  or  less 
rational  way  -  with  rational  meaning  the  reference  to  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect  -  which 
further  confirm  the  existence  of  a  reality  beyond  human  perception.  The  aim,  at  this  stage 
96  Adkins  (1972)  makes  many  interesting  points  in  his  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  values  of  Homeric 
society  to  the  perception  of  the  gods,  yet  he  insists  on  seeing  the  ideas  of  clpeTý  and  TIPTI  merely  as  a  negative 
obsession  that  prevents  the  existence  of  morality. 
97  Particularly  interesting  is  Burkert's  (1996:  13)  response  to  the  'opium  thesis'  concerning  religion's  function; 
according  to  this  thesis  religion  simply  fialfils  'human  %ishes  in  a  fantastic,  unrealistic,  and  possibly  detrimental 
way'  providing  'the  illusion  of  happiness':  Burkert  asks  'is  illusion  dysfunctional?  The  discovery  of  endorphins 
E 
... 
]  rather  points  to  the  positive  biological  function  of  illusive  happiness  to  overcome  dramatic  crises  of  stress 
and  pain'. 
190 at  least  of  religion,  is  not  the  verification  of  divine  justice  itself,  but  rather  of  divine 
existence  through  divine  j  ustice.  9' 
The  essence  of  the  Homeric  gods  is  their  power  and  their  immortality.  They  do 
correspond  to  some  order,  but  this  is  the  order  of  nature  and  life,  which  is  inconsistent  and 
incomprehensible  in  its  ways.  It  is  indeed  inevitable  that  some  form  ofjustice  be  attributed 
to  the  gods,  however  elementary;  but  justice  is  not,  after  all,  the  quality  upon  which  the 
gods'  superiority  is  based  -  at  least  the  notion  of  justice  to  which  we  are  accustomed.  The 
order  that  the  gods  impose  and  support  entails  morality,  as  already  noted,  but  part  of  this 
order  is  the  gods'  unquestionable  superiority.  The  justice  of  the  gods,  being  the  result  of 
their  own  superiority,  entails  that  they  have  the  right,  if  so  they  wish,  to  disregard  man's 
need  of  their  support  and  be  indifferent  to  him. 
It  would  appear,  then,  that  the  gods'  supposedly  selfish  concem  for  their  T1114  is 
only  a  reflection  of  the  belief  that  improper  behaviour  is  offensive  to  divinity  and  results  to 
destruction;  or,  reversely,  of  the  belief  that  a  destruction  must  originate  in  some  offence 
towards  divinity  -a  belief  clearly  seen  in  the  case  of  Achilles'  inference  concerning  the 
plague  (A  62-67).  Anything  can  constitute  an  offence  towards  the  gods,  since  disaster  can 
appear  at  any  time  and  with  no  apparent  reason.  More  important  still,  principles  of  conduct 
98  Dodds  (1951:  52,  n.  18)  is  certainly  right  to  stress  that  there  is  a  difference  between  the  offence  of  pedury  or 
hospitality  as  an  offence  against  divine  TIp6  and  'a  concern  for  justice  as  such',  for  the  gods  obviously  do  not 
appear  to  be  interested  in  the  concept  of  justice  itself.  As  happens  with  morality,  or  with  the  word  SIKIJ,  we 
are  not  yet  in  a  period  of  conceptualisation,  and  ideas  are  perceived  in  the  particular  form  they  attain  in  the 
particular  society  rather  than  as  abstract  and  absolute  principles.  But  being  premature  and  non-conceptualised 
does  not  mean  not  existing  at  all.  The  point  here  is  to  see  whether  the  Homeric  world  had  any  notion  whatever 
of  divine  justice,  not  to  prove  what  is  obvious,  namely,  that  it  did  not  have  our  notion  of  divine  justice.  As 
noted  (187),  1  would  regard  the  absence  of  a  belief  in  afterlife  as  decisive;  it  is  worth  noting,  however,  that 
Agamemnon's  statement  at  A  160-62  recalls  the  belief  of  a  later  age,  see,  e.  g.  Solon  13  West  29-32. 
191 among  men  themselves  appear  under  the  protection  of  Zeus's  Own  TIPTI,  an  essentia  i 
between  man  and  god  being  thus  provided.  If  the  individual  lesser  deities  provide  the 
explanation  to  life's  multilateral  quality  by  creating  an  almost  chaotic  nexus  of  causes  and 
effects,  with  their  conflicts  and  quarrels  often  accounting  for  life's  very  self-contradictory 
demands  on  man,  the  superior  power  of  Zeus  and  the  hierarchy  it  entails  seem  to  restore 
order;  99  at  the  same  time,  this  order  of  Zeus  extends  towards  man  in  a  way  that  human 
impropriety  and  impiety  towards  the  god  are  seen  as  one  and  the  same  thing.  100  Our  wish 
to  find  a  more  disinterested  reaction  of  the  gods  results  basically  from  our  own 
preconception  on  how  divinejustice  should  be  understood  or  even  administered. 
Athena  and  Hera,  Poseidon  and  Aphrodite  are  'perfectly  within  their  own  rights"(" 
when  reacting  because  of  their  offended  T1114;  in  fact,  they  are  expected  to  react  in  a  way. 
The  situation  is  definitely  more  complicated  when  it  comes  to  Zeus,  for  now  the  issue  of 
human  interrelations  is  involved  as  well:  by  protecting  his  Own  Tipý,  the  god  protects  those 
who  behave  properly,  and  those  who  behave  properly  both  observe  the  limits  of  society 
and  are  pious  towards  the  god.  But  the  god  does  not  always  respond  as  expected.  More 
than  anyone  else,  he  is  the  god  who  can  disregard  possible  offences  and  therefore  seem 
particularly  unjust.  The  lesser  gods,  even  when  appearing  to  act  in  a  self-centred  or 
"  Chantraine  (1952) 
100  CE  Rutherford  (1986)147:  'Homeric  morality  is  upheld,  however  capriciously,  by  the  gods'. 
101  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  4.  In  this  point  I  agree  with  Lloyd-Jones  that  the  idea  of  divine  justice  exists  in  the 
poem,  and  order  essentially  related  to  the  gods,  even  if  this  is  an  inscrutable  order  which,  further,  is  different 
from  what  we  would  believe;  see  also  Uoyd-Jones  (1987)  310.  However,  elsewhere  Lloyd-Jones  seems  to 
imply  a  more  general  concern  for  justice  on  the  gods'  part,  thus  proving  himself  somehow  inconsistent.  More 
important,  and  this  is  where  I  disagree,  he  interprets  the  whole  Iliadic  plot  in  terms  of  divine  justice;  the  issue 
will  be  discussed  presently.  Gagarin  (1987.293)  opposes  to  Lloyd-Jones's  view  on  the  gods'  rights  to  act  at 
will  by  arguing  that  the  gods'  superiority  may  entitle  them  to  retaliation,  but  that  this  is  after  all  not  an  act  of 
moral  basis,  moral  and  immoral  being  defined,  for  Gagarin,  on  the  basis  of  the  degree  of  self-interest  involved 
in  the  motivation  of  an  act. 
192 capricious  manner,  are  always  after  their  Tlp4,  but  Zeus  may seem  occasionally  rather 
indifferent,  absorbed  as  he  is  with  the  accomplishment  of  his  plan  -  in  fact,  during  the 
poem,  the  god  never  appears  to  be  concerned  with  the  violation  of  any  of  the  principles 
with  which  he  is  connected. 
Leaving  aside  for  the  moment  Zeus's  role  in  the  poem  as  Ecivioc,  it  is  worth 
looking  at  his  function  as  'IKEOloc;  and  "OPKIO(;.  'IKEGia  does  not  actually  become  an  issue 
in  the  poem,  and  consequently  Zeus's  relation  to  it  is  not  particularly  evident.  102  There  are 
only  two  rather  vague  references  at  fl  156-157  and  fl  569-570,  while  perhaps  slightly 
more  direct  is  the  allegory  of  the  AtTat'  at  1502-514,  who  are  presented  by  Phoenix  as  the 
daughters  of  Zeus.  As  Hainsworth  comments,  'the  poem  [ 
... 
]  ignores  the  role  of  Zeus  as 
protector  of  suppliants;  103  even  the  case  of  Chryses,  mith  which  the  poem  opens,  and 
which  proves  of  great  significance  for  the  plot,  avoids  a  reference  to  such  a  capacity  of  the 
god.  Instead,  it  is  Apollo,  as  we  saw,  who  listens  to  the  priest's  prayer. 
As  far  as  oaths  are  concerned  Zeus's  role  is  more  clear,  but  rather  ineffective.  The 
practice  of  taking  an  oath,  and  actually  by  calling  a  superior  power  as  a  witness,  must  have 
been  very  old;  equally  old  must  have  been  the  belief  that,  if  an  oath  is  violated,  the  powers 
that  have  been  invoked  will  bring  punishment.  104  This  seems  to  be  suggested  by  the  rituals 
102  For  IKEGia,  see  pp.  27-28. 
103  Hainsworth  (1993)  on  K  454. 
104  For  oath-taking  as  an  important  principle  of  Homeric  ethics  see  p.  29;  see  also  Burkert  (1996)17  1:  'the  use 
of  witnesses  to  guarantee  a  shared  mental  world,  and  the  use  of  ritual  to  create  realistic  signs,  to  affix  an 
ineradicable  seal  by  the  imprinting  function  of  awe.  At  both  levels  reduction  of  complexity  is  met  by  a 
surplus"  from  the  supernatural  sphere.  Unseen  partners  share  the  knowledge,  and  nonobvious  causality 
wields  coercive  power.  Both  are  accepted  in  an  atmosphere  of  absolute  seriousness'. 
193 that  accompany  an  oath,  105  and  the  deities  that  are  connected  with  it.  106  Naturally  enough, 
since  Zeus  is  the  supreme  power  of  the  known  order,  and  since  a  violation  of  an  oath 
implies  the  violation  of  this  order,  Zeus  is  connected  with  oaths  as  the  power  that  prevents 
or  punishes  their  violation. 
This  is  not  what  happens  in  the  poem,  though.  At  F  268-301  an  oath  is  taken  by 
Trojans  and  Greeks  alike  just  before  the  duel  between  Paris  and  Menelaus;  as  soon  as  the 
oath  is  taken,  the  wish  of  the  soldiers  is  heard  -  both  the  Greek  and  the  Trojan  soldiers,  as 
f  the  poet  says,  implying  the  common  Nvish  and  belief.  ZF.  6  KX;  510TE  JIEYICTE,  Kal  aeavaTOI 
0%q,  f  ecot  a)Aot,  I 
6ITTrOTEPOI  TrPOTCPOI  UITSP  OPKIa  7TI111TIVEtav,  I  C358,  #1  CYKC'ýaXoi;  XapýStc  p'coi 
6;  65s  olvoc,  I  a6T6V  Kai  TEKECA3V,  aXoxot  S'  dMoici  8apCiev  (297-301).  The  lines  seem 
actually  like  a  formula  used  in  similar  cases  in  the  poet's  age,  certifying  thus  the  belief  in 
the  connection  of  Zeus  and  oaths.  Yet,  the  poet  continues  by  immediately  showing  Zeus's 
refusal  to  fulfil  this  prayer  -a  refusal  that  could  be  also  seen  as  indifference:  "fli;  4av, 
v  107 
ou5'  a'pa  TT6  #IV  iTTEKpataivE  Kpovicav  (302).  The  result  of  the  duel  is  ambiguous;  at 
the  most  crucial  moment,  when  Menelaus  is  about  to  attack  Paris,  Aphrodite  intervenes 
and  saves  her  favourite  hero.  The  next  scene  is  on  Olympus,  Zeus  himself  wondering 
whether  he  should  finally  end  this  war,  or  cause  the  violation  of  the  oath  and  have  the 
heroes  fighting  again;  Hera's  reply  proves  decisive:  how  can  he  cancel  all  her  plans  and 
ignore  her  wishes.  As  a  consequence  Zeus  sends  Athena  to  cause  the  violation  of  the  oath, 
of  which  he  is  himself  the  witness  and  the  protector. 
105  See  Kirk  (1985)  on  r  269-70;  Hainsworth  (1993)  on  K  321-23. 
106  See  Kirk  (1985)  on  r  103-4,  and  r  276-78;  Hainsworth  (1993)  on  1454;  Burkert  (1996)  175f. 
107  Doubtless,  one  could  take  TrcS  as  implying  that  Zeus  may  not  be  fulfilling  the  prayer  at  the  moment,  but 
will  fulfil  it  in  the  future,  see  Kirk  (1985)  on  B  419-20;  but  within  the  limits  of  this  particular  poem  Zeus  never 
seems  concerned  with  this  Trojan  impropriety. 
194 It  is  worth  considering  at  this  point  that  the  participation  of  the  gods  in  the  plot  can 
be  interpreted  in  terms  of  their  dramatic  function  even  to  its  smallest  detail.  The  poet 
needs  Zeus  on  the  side  of  the  Greeks  basically,  for  Troy  has  to  be  destroyed;  for  the 
moment,  however,  the  god  has  to  support  the  Trojans,  for  this  is  part  of  his  promise  to 
Thetis.  Now,  the  poet  wished  to  present  a  duel  between  the  two  heroes  who  are  directly 
linked  to  the  cause  of  the  war  -a  duel  which  is  commonly  accepted  as  being  rather 
inappropriate  on  the  tenth  year  of  the  war,  but  which  offers  the  opportunity  for  the  great 
scene  of  the  TvXocKoma  (r  139-244)  as  well  as  for  the  presentation  of  the  duel  itself.  It  is 
not  surprising  that  the  duel  has  no  end  actually,  and  that  Aphrodite  intervenes  to  save 
Paris;  it  is  not  surprising  either  that  the  oath  taken  cannot  be  observed,  since  the  plot  has  to 
continue,  and  Troy  has  to  be  destroyed.  The  poet  simply  has  to  find  a  way  to  come  out  of 
this  narrative  impasse:  Zeus  has  to  decide  and  put  in  motion  the  turn  of  the  plot  to  its 
previous  course. 
Similarly,  the  presence  of  the  lesser  gods  is  essential  to  the  unfolding  of  the  plot: 
one  can  think  of  Athena's  role  in  Diomedes'  dpicrrcfa  (E),  Apollo's  in  Patroclus'  death 
(TT),  or  Athena's  role  again  in  Hector's  death  (X).  The  two  factions  in  which  the  divine 
powers  are  divided  seems  a  necessary  mechanism  for  the  war  to  be  constantly  ambivalent. 
If  we  return  to  Athena's  attitude  towards  the  Trojan  women,  or  Troy  in  general,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  poet  cannot  sacrifice  the  original  characterisation  and  disposition  of  the 
goddess  for  the  sake  of  one  single  episode;  still,  he  cannot  sacrifice  his  wish  to  present 
Troy  and  its  people  either.  The  women  pray  and  make  their  offerings,  they  promise  future 
sacrifices,  but  the  plot  has  to  remain  intact,  and  the  traditional  fall  of  Troy  be 
195 accomplished:  the  goddess  has  to  refuse.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  poet  is  very 
cautious  when  narrating  the  gods'  attitudes  and  reactions.  Both  Zeus  and  Athena  refuse  the 
offerings;  the  poet  is  very  clear  on  this.  The  requirements  of  the  narrative  are  concealed 
behind  this  refusal,  but  this  is  ultimately  more  than  a  device;  for  it  reflects  the  belief  that 
the  gods  can  after  all  be  inconsistent. 
It  is  obvious,  then,  that  the  reason  why  we  cannot  talk  of  the  gods'  justice  as  a 
permanent  and  unquestionable  characteristic  of  theirs  is  that  the  gods  seem  to  retain  the 
right,  if  so  they  wish,  to  disregard  such  considerations.  The  gods  are  not  bound  by  any 
obligation  towards  man,  and  their  occasionally  immoral  or excessive  behaviour  is  only  the 
natural  consequence  of  their  very  immortality;  immune  to  the  fear  of  pain,  age  and  death, 
they  can  do  as  they  please,  certain  that  their  bliss  is  eternal,  not  easily  threatened.  They 
pursue  their  aims  and  interests  with  extreme  passion  for  they  risk  nothing  when  they  do  so; 
and  they  can  certainly  be  immoral  and  unjust  towards  man,  not  particularly  respecting  or 
feeling  concerned  about  him,  for  they  are  indubitably  superior  to  him.  10' 
Such  a  behaviour  on  the  human  level  would  be  regarded  as  essentially  immoral  in 
the  sense  that  all  limits  seem  to  be  violated,  yet  the  question  of  the  gods'  immorality  is 
log  David  Hume  (An  F-jiquiry  Concerning  the  Principles  of  Morals,  in  Westphal  (1996)  138)  notes:  'Were 
there  a  species  of  creatures  intermingled  with  men,  which,  though  rational,  were  possessed  of  such  inferior 
strength,  both  of  body  and  mind,  that  they  were  incapable  of  all  resistance,  and  could  never,  upon  the  highest 
provocation,  make  us  feel  the  effects  of  their  resentment;  the  necessary  consequence,  think,  is  that  we  should 
be  bound  by  the  laws  of  humanity  to  give  gentle  usage  to  these  creatures,  but  should  not,  properly  speaking, 
lie  under  any  restraint  ofjustice  with  regard  to  them  ... 
Our  intercourse  with  them  could  not  be  called  society, 
which  supposes  a  degree  of  equality;  but  absolute  command  on  the  one  side,  and  servile  obedience  on  the 
other.  Whatever  we  covet,  they  must  instantly  resign:  Our  permission  is  the  only  tenure,  by  which  they  hold 
their  possessions:  Our  compassion  and  kindness  the  only  check,  by  which  they  curb  our  lawless  will:  And  as 
no  inconvenience  ever  results  from  the  exercise  of  a  power,  so  firmly  established  in  nature,  the  restraints  of 
justice  and  property,  being  totally  useless,  would  never  have  place  in  so  unequal  a  confederacy'. 
196 simply  non-existent  for  the  heroes.  Morality  is  not  the  quintessence  of  the  Homeric  gods, 
at  least  not  in  their  relation  to  man;  the  relation  between  mortals  and  immortals  is  well 
defined  as  one  of  inferiority-superiority,  and  in  the  gods'  wish  to  act  as  they  like, 
irrespective  of  man's  own  wishes,  man  acknowledges  exactly  this  relation  that  underlines 
his  own  weakness  as  opposed  to  the  eternal  power  of  the  divine.  Moreover,  he  regards  the 
gods'  whimsical  behaviour  towards  him  almost  as  a  right  which  is  based  on  this  superiority 
of  theirs.  The  gods  are  inaccessible,  they  are  nature  and  life  itself,  and  man  cannot  demand 
their  attention,  nor  press  a  rightful  claim  on  them.  The  gods  can  be  just  as  easily  as  they 
can  be  unjust.  This  is  their  way  and  manner,  and  this  is  the  order  of  life  as  perceived  by 
man,  and  such  a  view  obviously  allows  enough  space  for  the  innumerable  injustices  of  life 
itself.  'O' 
'We  think  more  easily  in  positive  than  in  negative  terms.  "  10  Even  if  all  of  man's 
hopes  or  wishes  for  justice  are  after  all  belied  by  life,  man  cannot  but  believe  in  the 
existence  of  some  power  of  good  which  observes  and  guarantees  order.  He  may  not  rely  on 
the  gods'  just  reaction,  but  he  does  his  best  to  ensure  their  possible  favour.  Moreover,  he 
apparently  cannot  avoid  believing  in  a  relation  between  order  and  the  gods.  The  gods  may 
not  appear  to  be  acting  for  the  sake  of  order,  yet  they  are  inevitably  related  to  it,  even  if 
vaguely.  Everything  comes  from  the  gods,  evil  as  well  as  good,  but  it  is  ultimately  the  good 
109  See  Gould  (1985:  32f):  'if  god,  .... 
is  made  in  the  image  of  man  (inevitably,  as  Xenophanes  saw),  equally 
inevitably  divinity  must  surpass  man  in  some  sense  or  another,  and  must  reveal  the  possibility  of 
"otherness".  -A  god  wholly  within  the  compass  of  man's  image  of  himself  explains  nothing,  offers  no 
reassurance  against  the  fear  of  chaos'. 
110  Greene  (1944)  3. 
197 that  we  prefer  to  remember;  'life  is  bound  to  optimism  -  even  this  may  be  called  a 
biological  necessity.  "" 
What  remains  to  be  seen  is  whether  this  idea  is  ever  applied  to  the  text,  whether 
this  justice  is  ever  relevant  to  the  plot.  We  have  already  met  the  views  that  Troy  is 
destroyed  because  of  Paris'  violation  of  the  laws  of  gma;  that  Achilles  is  punished  with 
Patroclus'  death  for  his  disregard  for  the  Greek  embassy,  and  that  his  own  death  is  even  a 
punishment  for  his  maltreatment  of  Hector's  dead  body,  finally,  there  also  exists  the  view 
that  both  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  are  actually  punished  for  their  improper  conduct  to 
each  other. 
Of  these  views  I  would  regard  the  ones  relating  to  Achilles'  suffering  and  death  as 
too  extravagant  to  accept.  Nothing  in  the  poem,  in  my  opinion,  points  in  that  direction. 
Achilles  is  indeed  criticised  both  for  his  obduracy  and  his  unyielding  wrath,  and  for  his 
cruel  attitude  to  Hector;  the  latter  assumes  even  greater  significance  since  it  is  Apollo  who 
expressly  condemns  the  hero's  conduct  (fl  33-54),  thus  confirming  Hector's  own  words  at 
X  358-60:  #aýEo  vuv,  pq  TOI  Tt  6Ec3v  p4vipa  yEvc,  )pat  I  r'lpaTt  TCý  O'TE  KEV  CE  TTdpt,;  Kai 
.  1c;  t  Tr  ,  mv.  Both  Ocýpol;  'AiTAXcav  I  ECOXO'V  EOVT'  O'xS'(3CA3CIV  E'VI  IKair-  UXTJ  Apollo's  and 
Hector's  words  are  very  interesting,  especially  since  they  demonstrate  the  gods'  concern 
for  human  improper  conduct  in  general,  and  not  with  regard  to  a  slight  on  a  god's 
particular  TIJITI.  112  However,  Achilles  finally  gives  up  his  revengeful  and  disrespectful 
111  Burkert  (1996)  154;  also  142. 
112  The  moral  character  of  C1  has  been  the  reason  for  suspicion,  but,  as  Macleod  (1983:  8-35)  has  shown,  the 
book  is indispensable  to  the  plot  and  the  atmosphere  of  the  poem.  For  the  relation  between  Apollo's  words 
and  the  simile  of  TT  384-92,  see  p.  175,  n.  68. 
198 abuse  of  the  body,  obeying  Zeus's  demand  that  he  should  allow  Hector's  proper  burial. 
The  scene  of  Achilles'  meeting  with  Priam  re-establishes  the  violated  order,  and  Achilles 
reappears  as  the  dignified  and  great  hero  he  was  at  the  beginning  of  the  poem. 
As  for  the  view  concerning  Achilles'  violation  Of  IKEGia  in  1,  which  is  supposedly 
the  reason  of  the  subsequent  suffering,  it  appears  that  the  inference  is  drawn  on  the 
grounds  of  Phoenix's  reference  to  the  AIM,  Zeus's  daughters  (1502-14),  which  reference, 
nevertheless,  may  indeed  aim  at  persuading  the  hero,  but  does  not  actually  correspond  to 
the  reality  of  the  narration:  '  13  the  heroes  do  not  come  to  Achilles  as  suppliants,  no  ritual  is 
followed,  and  therefore  no  principle  is  violated  when  Achilles  rejects  their  pleas.  114  The 
rejection  of  the  Greek  embassy  is  an  essential  part  of  the  plot,  the  'vital  hinge',  as  Griffin 
rightly  observes,  '  15  and  the  same  is  true  of  Patroclus'  death:  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect 
between  the  two  incidents  is  obvious,  yet  it  is  not  determined  by  some  form  of  divine 
justice. 
The  story  of  Achilles  is  a  typical  case  of  apapTia,  a  mistake  for  which  the  hero  is 
morally  responsible  in  the  sense  that  he  is  consciously  deciding  to  act  as  he  does,  and 
which  is  the  beginning  of  a  sequence  of  events  inextricably  linked  to  each  other  and 
leading  ultimately  to  suffering;  the  final  confrontation  of  the  hero  with  this  reality  and  the 
subsequent  knowledge  and  the  painful  acknowledgement  of  his  responsibility  challenges 
the  audience  to  a  view  of  man's  tragic  existence  which  demands  that  he  be  entangled  in 
113  For  the  textual  problems  relevant  to  1.  see  Griffin  (1995)  19-26. 
"'  Gould  (1973)  does  not  seem  to  regard  the  scene  as  one  of  supplication  either:  he  gives  all  the  examples  he 
would  classify  as  characteristic  of  the  principle  (80,  n.  39),  and  no  reference  is  made  there  to  the  embassy. 
113  Griffin  (1995)  19. 
199 the  unwelcome  consequences  of  what  appeared  to  be  a  moment  of  powerful  and  proud 
triumph.  116  We  have  seen  how  moira  is involved  in  this  pattern  as  the  inescapable  order  of 
life  which  entails  predetermination  on  the  one  hand,  but  is  largely  accomplished  by  human 
action  on  the  other.  The  gods  participate  and  define  life,  but  at  the  same  time  the  main  plot 
is  the  result  of  man's  own  will.  When  it  comes  to  the  relation  of  the  plot  to  divine  justice, 
it  appears  that  the  principle  is  simply  not  applicable.  A  notion  of  divine  justice  would  not 
be  incompatible,  considering  that  moira  and  the  gods  often  correspond  to  parallel  levels  of 
causation  (see  p.  162),  nor  is  it  impossible  that  tragedy  should  involve  divine  punishment 
after  all:  the  fact  that  the  Iliadic  plot  is  not  a  story  of  right  and  wrong,  with  a  clearly 
defined  polarity  finding  a  solution  at  the  end,  does  not  necessarily  demand  that  no  issue  of 
divine  justice  be  raised.  Still,  the  absence  of  divine  justice  is  a  conscious  choice  of  the 
poet,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  suggests  this  choice  to  the  poet.  But  first,  it  should  be 
made  clear  that  the  poem,  in  its  basic  plot,  cannot,  or  rather  should  not,  be  seen  in  terms  of 
divinejustice. 
Achilles'  gravest  mistake  is  evidently  made  at  the  very  moment  when  he  decides  to 
stubbornly  insist  on  his  wrath.  As  Griffin  observes,  the  rejection  of  the  Greek  Embassy 
creates  a  'new  complexity  of  the  plot'  and  consequently  a  'new  complexity  of  the  moral 
116  Cf  Aristotle's  preference  for  the  aTrXok  pý6oi;,  which  relates  the  change  Eg  Eu'TuXia,;  Ek  5UG-ruxtav, 
pq  6id  poX6TIpiav  aW  V  dpap`ritav  pEydXqv  (Poet  1453a  10).  Even  if  AcUles'  behaviour  should  be 
regarded  as  moray  reprehensible  on  the  grounds  that  he  disregards  the  bonds  of  friendship  and  loyalty  for  the 
sake  of  his  Tipi  I  would  doubt  that  this  behaviour  would  provoke  any  form  of  divine  justice.  More  important, 
even  if  one  should  opt  for  this  moral  interpretation  of  Achilles'  behaviour,  the  issue  is  still  one  of  mistake,  for 
the  hero  does  not  disregard  the  others  with  the  intention  to  cause  the  harm  he  finally  causes,  but  rather  out  of 
excessive  and  blind  self-absorption  and  passionate  egotism;  his  wish  that  the  Greeks  should  acknowledge  his 
TIprI  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  he  wishes  their  total  destruction,  and  the  expressed  wish  that  both  Trojans 
and  Greeks  should  be  killed  so  that  he  and  Patroclus  should  plunder  Troy  for  themselves  (TT  97-100)  is  in 
perfect  harmony  with  the  characterisation  of  the  angry  hero,  and  I  would  not  take  it  too  literally.  See  also 
Pack  (1939)  353,  where,  talking  of  the  Oedipus  myth  as  used  by  Sophocles,  relates  the  6(pap`ria  of  the  hero 
with  the  application  of  thefatum  condidonale,  'the  protasis  admitting  free  will  and  responsibility,  the  apodosis 
fate  and  innocence'. 
200 atmosphere:  no  one  is  simply  right'.  '  17  The  reference  to  the  AlTaf,  as  well  as  Meleager's 
exemplum  may  be  seen  as  hints  underlining  the  significance  of  the  moment,  foreshadowing 
at  the  same  time  an  unpleasant,  but  not  yet  predictable,  solution  for  the  plot.  Yet,  it  is 
already  in  A,  during  the  quarrel  with  Agamemnon,  that  we  come  across  the  hero's 
obstinate  character  which  will  prove  to  have  fatal  consequences  both  for  the  Greek  army 
and  for  the  hero  himself. 
The  interpretation  of  the  dispute  between  Achilles  and  Agamemnon  is  indeed 
crucial  to  the  interpretation  of  the  whole  poem,  and,  although  discussions  on  it  seem  to 
abound,  the  examination  seems  inevitable.  First  of  all,  it  has  to  be  repeated  that  this  is 
basically  a  moral  issue  in  the  sense  that  the  heroes  act  upon  a  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong;  I  would  take  this  to  be  a  clear  indication  of  their  being  morally responsible  for  their 
behaviour.  Besides,  we  have  also  seen  (43ff.  )  that  for  the  dispute  the  poet  does  employ  a 
moral  language:  U'Ppic  and  dvat8clij  are  both  used  for  Agamemnon,  while  we  also  hear  of 
vGpeatc.  Once  it  is  accepted  that  public  opinion  does  not  concern  only  competitive  success 
or  failure,  but  moral  behaviour  also,  and  that  it  can  indeed  condition  one's  behaviour,  in 
the  sense  that  one's  fear  of  criticism,  ai&ok,  may  reflect  one's  own  fear  of  being  morally 
inadequate,  and  accordingly  that  disregard  for  criticism,  dvai&111,  may  imply  insensitivity 
both  to  criticism  itself  and  to  the  code  of  ethics,  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  terms  are 
definitely  not  void  of  moral  significance. 
It  is  high  time  that  the  use  Of  SM1  and  SIM101;  in  their  relation  to  the  plot  were 
examined.  Each  word  appears  only  once  in  this  context,  both  of  them  being  part  of  the 
117  Giiffin  (1995)  7. 
201 same  passage,  T  172-183.  This  is  the  moment  of  reconciliation  between  the  two  heroes. 
Patroclus  is  dead  now,  and  Achilles  decides  to  re-enter  the  war,  without  however  being 
concerned  any  more  for  the  violation  of  his  Tipf'I  and  Agamemnon's  insult;  still, 
Agamemnon  does  offer  him  the  gifts  as  promised  at  1  121-157.  Odysseus  almost  gives 
instructions  to  the  two  heroes  on  how  they  should  conduct  the  act  of  reconciliation: 
Ta  6i  8c3pa  dvag  dv5pcSv'Ayapipvcov 
olciTca  ii;  Ilicary  ayop4v,  'iva  TravTci;  'AXaiot 
6  'ýOaXjjcýtctv  TiScact,  ou'  8s'  #cct  *tv  'tavG&. 
el  6PVUE'TCa  86  TOI  OPKOV  WApydoiciv  dvaCYTdC, 
114  TrOTS  Tfil;  Fu'vfiq  imp6pwat  i1'5E  ptyývav 
11  UPIC  EGTI'V,  6vag,  r"I  T'  av5pcSv 
ý  TE  yuvalKCSV'  T) 
Kai  5s  cot  aU'TCý  OUP(k  EM  #cctv'tXao4;  'EoTcA). 
allT&P  E"TrEtTa  or:  5aret  EVI  KXICiDi;  apecdoeca 
TTISIP10,  ItVa  Pil  TI  8wrfc  Cm8succ  c'xrla0a. 
'ATPE15ii,  6  6'  ETrElTa  5IKat6TEpOC 
Kalt 
F.  Tr'  aMq) 
EacEat.  ou  pEv  yap  Tt  vEpEccTIT6v  pactXfia 
av8p'  6Trapecoadat,  'OTC  T11;  TTp6TCpOf;  XaXETrT]Vfl. 
The  setting  is  similar  to  that  of  a  legal  procedure  or  a  settlement  (see  pp.  WE); 
there  is  an  ayopa  and  the  gifts  are  to  be  put  in  the  middle  for  all  to  see;  and  there  is  an 
oath  to  be  taken.  But  what  exactly  does  81'KTI  mean  here?  How  can  Achilles  be  short  of 
50  IKTI?  And  how  is  it  to  be  understood  in  relation  to  a  supper?  The  meaning  of  the  word 
seems  to  be  further  obscured  by  the  use  Of  81Kat6-rcpo,;  in  line  181,  which  seems  to  bear  a 
moral  rather  than  a  legal  sense.  It  is  the  very  procedural  context,  however,  that  determines 
202 the  meaning  Of  51KTI:  the  reference  is  made  to  the  proper  settlement  between  the  two 
heroes;  the  supper,  an  instance  of  ritual  in  the  Homeric  world,  seems  to  seal  the  act  of 
reconciliation,  and  in  this  manner  Achilles  will  have  been  duly  recompensed  in  a  legal 
sense.  Despite  Achilles'  apparent  indifference  towards  the  material  aspect  of  the 
recompense,  it  has  to  be  ensured  that  the  settlement  has  been  conducted  in  full  accord  with 
the  demands  of  the  code  of  social  and  legal  propriety,  for  it  is  in  this  way  that  balance  can 
finally  be  restored.  '  18 
The  Use  Of  51Kat6TEPOC  for  Agamemnon  is  even  more  difficult  to  explain.  In  fact, 
the  adjective  is  used  only  twice  again  in  the  Iliad,  both  times  in  the  superlative  degree,  and 
in  a  context  that  is  not  at  all  illuminating  as  regards  the  qualities  that  allow  one  to  be  called 
51Kaioc;  (see  p.  106):  at  A  831  we  hear  that  Cheiron  is  5=16'raToc:  of  all  the  Centaurs  and  at 
N6  that  the  peoýle  of  the  Abioi  are  also  51MOTaT01;  now,  we  know  that  Cheiron  was  the  only 
Centaur  not  to  fight  Zeus,  in  the  latter's  conflict  with  the  Titans,  while  the  Abioi,  whether 
corresponding  to  an  historical  people  or  not,  seem  to  imply  with  their  name  the  absence  of 
violence.  '"  This  is  all  we  can  make  of  these  cases. 
The  opposition  between  &KY1  and  Piq  or  uippti;  has  been  noted  already  (107-109,175); 
in  the  Odyssey  it  forms  part  of  the  wider  opposition  between  civilised  and  primitive  societies 
which  is  essential  in  the  plot  of  the  poem.  One  could  hardly  find  such  a  meaning  in  this 
118  This  is  more  than  etiquette;  for  ritual  functions  as  the  manifestation  or  expression  of  one's  regard  for 
another. 
""  The  scholia  give  two  different  etymologies:  a-ptoe;  in  which  case  the  word  refers  to  a  people  who  Eve  the 
blessed  ffe  of  Hesiod's  Golden  Race  (WD  109-26),  since  T(75wc  &  au'Topdnac  Tj  yfi  Ptov  ýipEl  066gV  Tt 
;  cýove'oOiouotv(AbT);  and  a-pia;  a  third  explanation  relates  the  word  to  P&,  and  while  Nicolaus  Damascenus 
(FGrHist  90,104=  lo.  Stob.  Anth.  111  1,200)  and  Eustathius  (916,20)  take  the  word  to  Mean  T6  xpficew 
TOUTOUI;  p6vouc  Tgov;  and  Tc6;  6pa  Picý  respectively,  Et.  Gen.  prefers  the  meaning  Pick  pil  Xpcojiivwv. 
203 passage.  Still,  the  opposition  can  be  operative  on  a  legal  level,  the  implication  being  that  the 
distinctive  characteristic  of  a  civilised  society  is  that  it  enjoys  the  privilege  of  principles  and 
laws  -  even  oral  laws.  Thus,  when  5IKrJ  is  juxtaposed  to  Pal  in  the  simile  of  TT  384-92,  the 
antithesis  refers  to  the  proper  and  the  improper  way  of  conducting  a  legal  procedure.  One 
could  follow  Havelock,  then,  and  interpret  the  lines  in  the  light  of  Agamemnon's  'act  of 
individuation'  in  A,  where  the  hero  violates  with  his  behaviour  the  very  principles  of  the 
procedure  which  he  should  have  protected  in  his  capacity  as  a  king.  120 
That  the  adjective  could  indeed  have  legal  implications  is  not  implausible.  As 
already  noted  (93,109),  in  an  oral  society  such  as  the  Homeric,  legality  is  perhaps  closer  to 
morality  than  is  the  case  in  a  society  in  which  laws  are  written  down  and  abiding  by  these 
laws  may  often  entail  a  conflict  with  morality  itself  AlKal0c;  obviously  does  not  refer  to  a 
general  disposition  towards  justice  that  would  necessarily  entail  a  genuine  concern  for  fairness 
or  for  unbiased  decisions;  nor  does  it  mean  law-abiding,  in  the  rather  impersonal  sense  of 
obeying  a  law  almost  blindly,  for  fear  of  punishment  and  even  against  moral  principles;  it  does 
refer,  however,  to  adherence  to  a  system  that  aims  at  protecting  the  limits  that  define  the 
position  of  the  members  of  a  social  group,  and  it  is  in  this  way  that  the  word,  although 
referring  basically  to  the  existence  of  procedural  norms,  has  moral  implications  as  well. 
F  However,  &Katoc,  by  contrast  to  SIKTI,  has  purely  moral  connotations  in  the 
majority  of  the  cases  in  which  it  appears,  denoting  the  person  who  keeps  within  his  proper 
limits;  if  thus  seen,  the  adjective  should  be  taken  to  refer  to  Agamemnon's  excessive 
120  Havelock  (1978)  133.  Cf  Havelock  (1978)  129-130,  where  81Kat  are  not  seen  as  principles  ofjustice,  but 
as  events  that  involve  justice  and  become  procedures  because  they  are  subject  to  'management'  by  officials 
who  do  not  manage  the  'formularies'  but  protect  them. 
204 behaviour  towards  Achilles,  or,  to  use  Achilles'  and  Athena's  term,  his  U*Pptc.  True, 
nowhere  in  the  poem  is  the  conflict  between  the  two  Greek  heroes  referred  to  as  an  a5lKia, 
while  we  hear  of  anpita  repeatedly  (B  23940,1110-11,1648,  N  113,  TT  59).  But  this  is  after 
all  an  issue  related  to  the  semantic  development  of  the  relevant  terminology.  &['KTI  and 
61Katoc  are  certainly  very  limited  with  regard  to  their  meaning  in  the  Iliad,  referring  to 
propriety  rather  than  to  justice;  d8ffla,  which  does  not  appear  at  all  in  the  Homeric  poems, 
would  denote  the  violation  of  limits  -a  sense  that  aTipta  and  Gpptc  definitely  evoke. 
Whether  the  preference  Of  dTlpia  for  the  definition  of  such  a  violation  should  be  seen  in 
the  light  of  the  legal  connotations  that  61KTI  has  is  difficult  to  confirm;  what  one  can  say 
with  considerable  certainty  is  that  the  terms  are  related  semantically  to  one  another,  and 
that  Agamemnon's  behaviour  is  described  in  this  case  too  in  a  more  or  less  moral 
vocabulary;  more  important,  the  context  and  spirit  of  the  whole  utterance  seems  to  bear 
equally  negative  connotations,  further  underlining  the  hero's  moral  responsibility  for  the 
quarrel  and  its  consequences. 
Besides  the  terminology  which  suggests  that  the  dispute  raises  a  moral  issue,  the 
very  construction  of  the  plot  and  the  perspective  of  life  we  seem  to  gain  through  it  seem  to 
further  demand  this  interpretation.  A  crucial  question  is  whether  we  should  talk  of  a 
mistake,  a  misapprehension,  that  is,  of  the  situation  in  which  they  are  involved,  in  which 
case  they  are  still  morally  responsible,  but  not  morally  reprehensible  also;  or  whether  it  is  a 
moral  error  that  they  commit,  in  which  case  they  do  not  simply  distinguish  right  from 
wrong,  but  they  act  intentionally  against  what  is  perceived  to  be  right  according  always  to 
the  Homeric  code  of  ethics.  A  further,  and  more  important,  question  that  arises  concerns 
the  implications  this  behaviour  has  in  terms  of  divine  justice. 
205 The  truth  is  that  to  a  certain  degree  Agamemnon's  claim  is  rightful;  Adkins  is  right 
in  this.  '  2'  Agamemnon  has  the  right,  as  commander-in-chief,  to  take  Briseis  or  any  other 
prize;  although  he  is  condemned  for  his  greediness  (A  149,166-171,23  1,  B  225-42),  he  is 
not  condemncd  becausc  this  grecdiness  is  not  justificd  by  his  status,  but  bccause  hc  secrns 
to  be  taking  advantage  of  his  status  against  the  rights  of  others;  if  a  quarrel  on  material 
gain  seems  too  superficial  and  amoral,  it  has  to  be  repeated  that  alongside  the  result  that 
such  a  behaviour  has  in  material  terms,  it  also  entails  disrespect,  and  disrespect  entails 
offence  and  insult.  Agamemnon  may  not  have  the  intention  to  dishonour  Achilles  or  any 
other  hero,  yet  dishonour  is  the  consequence  of  his  blind  and  egotistical  indulgence  in  his 
own  superiority.  What  has  to  be  noted  is  that  this  is  a  trait  of  his  very  character:  neither  his 
martial  or  strategic  abilities,  nor  his  wisdom  seem  to  justify  his  claim  to  superiority  in  the 
expedition,  but  this  does  not  prevent  him  from  behaving  almost  like  a  spoilt  child,  who 
cannot  even  conceive  the  existence  of  limits  to  his  own  claims;  for  superior  though  he  is, 
there  is  a  limit  defined  by  the  claims  of  others.  Obviously,  it  is  Agamemnon's  very 
character  that  causes  the  dispute,  and  it  is  also  his  character  that  underlies  his  disregard  for 
the  moral  dimension  of  his  decision  to  take  Briseis:  the  fact  that  he  seems  so  deeply  self- 
absorbed  is  certainly  typical  of  him,  but  not  necessarily  typical  of  the  Homeric  society  in 
genera  . 
122 
121  Adkins  (I  960a)  5  1. 
122  One  can  think  that  Achilles  is  criticised  by  Aias  for  his  indifference  towards  his  ýiXot  (162842),  or  that 
Sarpedon  and  Hector  are  particularly  sensitive  to  their  responsibility  and  sense  of  obligation  for  their  people 
(M  310-21;  Z  441-46).  Agamemnon,  by  contrast,  shows  such  feelings  only  retrospectively,  when  disaster  is 
imminent  -  another  instance  of  his  lack  of  wisdom. 
206 Achilles'  behaviour  is  also  excessive:  proud  and  self-assertive  as  he  is,  he  cannot 
accept  that,  despite  his  actual  superiority,  he  should  be  patronised,  disregarded  and 
insulted  in  such  a  way  by  Agamemnon,  merely  on  the  grounds  of  his  own  lesser  rank  in  the 
expedition.  Self-absorption  prevails  in  Achilles  too  (see  1  98-111),  yet  his  attitude  is 
somehow  more  legitimate  (see  1  523),  for  it  is  the  expected  and  natural  reaction  to 
Agamemnon's  insulting  conduct.  But  Achilles'  excessive  character  is  in  its  turn  the  cause 
for  the  unwelcome  events  that  follow  after  his  rejection  of  the  embassy.  The  reason  that 
the  hero  provides  for  his  insistence  is  simple:  Agamemnon  is  not  sincere  (1  312-13).  A 
noble  demand  indeed,  especially  when  we  consider  that  it  comes  from  the  hero  who 
regards  himself  as  an  ETCýCIOV  6XOCC  dP06PN  (7-  104),  once  his  companion  has  been 
killed,  and  who  is  ready  to  get  killed  himself  because  of  his  pain;  yet,  under  the  particular 
circumstances,  this  demand  cannot  but  prove  fatal.  Once  Achilles  rejects  Agamemnon's 
gifts  and  the  Greeks'  pleas,  the  plot  is  gradually  built  in  such  a  manner  that  his  recently 
justified  withdrawal  becomes  a  cold-hearted  indifference  open  to  disapproval:  the  Greeks 
will  criticise  his  obstinacy  (1628-642,  A  664-667,762-764)  and  so  will  Patroclus  at  TT  30- 
35;  at  -- 
139-142  it  is  Poseidon  who  accuses  Achilles,  but  more  important,  after  Patroclus 
gets  killed,  Achilles  himself  will  criticise  his  own  behaviour,  in  grave  pain  and  with  a  deep 
sense  of  responsibility  (198-111;  T  56-64)  -  carefully  avoiding,  though,  saying  that  he  Nvas 
not  justified  to  get  angry  in  the  first  place.  The  plot  is  evidently  constructed  with  extreme 
care  so  that  right  and  wrong  should  be  fused  and  confused,  creating  an  unquestionable 
tragic  effect. 
Such  a  complex  plot  can  be  comprehended  in  its  entirety  only  if  -,  vc  accept  that  it 
pertains  to  an  essentially  moral  issue.  Both  heroes  act  consciously,  opting  for  what  they 
207 perceive  to  be  right  Nestor's  intervention  is  a  hint  that  this  may  not  be  true  after  all,  yet 
the  quarrel  has  already  entrapped  the  heroes  in  their  own  passions,  and  reasoning  with 
them  is  simply  impossible.  The  conflict  in  the  poem  is  a  moral  conflict,  external  as  well  as 
internal,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  an  equally  compelling  plot  line  could  emerge,  were  the 
issue  one  of  mere  success. 
The  whole  issue  is  presented  in  a  most  realistic  manner  by  the  poet:  the  heroes' 
reaction  to  each  other,  Nestor's  conciliatory  tone,  the  Greeks'  silent  and  distant  attitude. 
More  important,  the  poet  seems  to  be  consistent  in  his  purpose,  which  is  to  ofler  an 
insightful  view  of  human  life  and  nature.  The  Greeks'  silence  seems  indeed  to  be  essential 
to  this  end:  the  two  central  heroes  are  in  this  way  isolated,  and  their  personal  responsibility 
is  brought  into  sharp  relief  With  no  clear  moral  comment  being  expressed  in  the  poem,  the 
perspective  of  the  audience  oscillates  back  and  forth  through  the  narrative  in  an  attempt  to 
grasp  the  moment  which  defines  the  plot  and  the  eventuality  of  fate.  Not  being  a  typical 
story  of  right  and  wrong,  the  poem  seems  to  demand  that  a  moral  commentary  should  be 
avoided,  since  it  would  certainly  obscure  the  complex  questions  that  are  finally  raised.  The 
poet  draws  actually  no  moral;  he  only  presents  the  way  in  which  human  nature  functions, 
and  the  way  man  is  driven  by  his  passions,  those  passions  that  define  after  all  his  fate. 
However,  the  fact  that  we  have  to  do  with  a  moral  issue  does  not  necessarily  entail 
that  the  idea  of  divine  justice  should  be  relevant  as  well.  The  conflict  between 
Agamemnon  and  Achilles  does  not  raise  any  issue  of  divine  justice  at  all.  No  god  is 
personally  slighted  by  the  event,  no  principle  related  to  the  gods  has  been  violated.  This  is 
a  matter  that  refers  purely  to  human  interrelations,  and  no  question  of  propriety  that  would 
208 have  the  gods  involved  is  raisect.  Athenacomes;  to  Achilles"  -side  after  Hera"s  admonition 
and  talks  of  Agamemnon's  U*pptc  (A  213),  yet  the  word  need  mean  no  more  than  the 
evidently  excessive  behaviour  of  the.  Mycenean  king  as.  felt  by.  Achilles,  as  long  as.  such 
behaviour-  is-  not  directed  against  the  gods,  it  is  not  an  issue  asking  for  divine  justice.  The 
supportof  the  two  -goddesses  iý  ifrefevant  to  the  quarrel  itself  and  as  the  poet  informs  us 
Hera  sends  Athena  to  Achilles  because  she  was  actually  concerned  for  both  heroes,  ap#z 
6PCSC  6UPCý  ýIMOUCd  TE  K115OPEVII  TE  (A  196). 
As  for  Zeus,  hecould  certainly  avoid  intervening  -and  he  would  perhaps  do  -so,  were 
it  not  for  Thetis:  she  helped  Zeusonce,  and  he  has  to  honour  and  help  her  now  in  return. 
This,  certainly  proves  two  things:  first,  that  the  interventionof  the  god  is  not  suggested  by 
any  concern  of  his  for  the  propriety  or  the  moral  cause  of  the  heroes,  and  second,  that  the 
heroes  themselves  actually  know  that  they  are  involved  in  -a  conflict  with  no  moral 
implications  that  could  concern  the  gods;  their  conflict  is  based  on  the  external  principle  of 
-r4p4,  and  the  only  moral  sense  that  its  violation  implies  is,  as  I  said,  the  -disregard  of 
clearly  set  limits  -  adisregard  that  both  heroes  prove  capable  of  Achilles  asks  for-  the  help 
-of  Zeus,  knowing  that  he  is  favoured  by  the  gods  because  -of  his  origin,  and  not  because  of 
his  moral  superiority  -  either  of  the  particular  moment,  or  of  his  character  in  general.  123 
173  Uoyd-Jones'  (1983:  11  ff.  )  approach  is  totally  different.  He  rightly  interprets  the  quarrel  as  a  Tnatter  of 
morality,  yet  he  sees  the  solution  to  the  plot  as  related  to  divine  justice:  'both  Agamemnon  and  Achilles 
receive  rough  justice  for  their  injustice  to  each  other  and  the  rest  of  the  Achacans  perpetrated  during  their 
quarrel'  (27).  He  further  relates  Zeus  with  SIKTI  as  the  'established  order'  which  the  god  preserves  'by 
punishing  mortals  whose  injustices  disturb  it'  (27)  and  although  such  a  relation  may  indeed  be  true,  it  remains 
beyond  doubt  that  its  presence  in  the  poem  is  not  as  powerful  as  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  the  solution  of 
the  plot  is  related  to  this  order. 
209 The  Ect  that  behind  Achilles"  favour  with  Zeus  there  is  no  concern  for  justice  is 
further  suggested  by  the  god's  constant  confinnations  that  the  god's  plan  is  to  honour 
Thetis,  and  through  her  Achilles.  too;  nowhere.  in  the  poem  does  the  god  express  any 
condemnation  of  Agamemnon's  behaviour,  nor-  does  he  ever  justify  Achilles'  wrath.  He 
sirapfy  fulfils  the  promise  he  gave  to  Thetis.  Zeus's  participation  in  the  plot  is  necessary; 
not  becausejustice  has  to  be  restored,  but  rather  because  he  has  to  fulfil  Achilles'  will  (see 
pp.  154ff.  );  besides  the  fact  that  divine  participation  is  a  vital  element  in  human  life,  and 
consequently  in  the  plot,  it  is  the  supreme  god's  ability  to  transform  his  will  into  an 
inescapable-  future.  and  his  peculiar  relation  to  m,  6ira  that  demand  Ifis  compelling  presence. 
in  the  plot. 
The  potential  for  divine  justice  -may  indeed  exist  in  -the  poem,  even  in  relation  -to 
the  quarrel  itself;  -since  the  idea  exists  that  gods  may  indeed  punish  human  impropriety,  it 
would  not  be  impossible  for  the  poet  to,  construct  a  plot  which  would  provide  such  a  view 
on  life.  Yet,  the  poet  seems  to,  wish  otherwise.  Just  as  he  isolates  his.  heroes  from  their 
environment,  he  consciously  suppresses  -this  possibility,  for  his  focus  is  on  man  himself,  on 
the  consequences  of  his  actions  not  as  a  result  of  divine  punishment,  but  instead  of  his  own 
weakness.  The  polarity  between  the  human  and  the  divine  that  permeates  the  poem 
demands  that  the  gods  beoften  presented  as  indifferent;  by  minimising  the  roleof  -divine 
justice,  the  poet  emphasises  even  more  the  man's  tragic  struggle  against  himself,  against 
his  own  life  and  his  own  fate.  The  heroes,  -and  more  than  -anyone  Achilles,  undergo  -a 
development  in  their  character  that  cannot  be  disregarded  by  any  means.  Through  suffering 
they  gain  knowledge,  even  if  only  too  late,  and  thus  their  whole  existence  seems  to,  be 
fulfilledand  justified.  The  conflict  between  rightand  wrong  that  develops  within  oneself, 
210 would  not  have  been  perceived  as  sharply,  had  the  poet  employed  the  gods  as  powers  of 
justice  andguarantors  of  propriety.  In  the  matter  of  the  dispute  there  is finally  no.  right  and 
wrong-,  consequently,  there  is  no  place  for  divine  j  ustice. 
The  poet"s  conscious  choice  to  suppress  the  idea  of  divine  justice  becomes  even 
clearer  once  we  consider  the  case  of  the  Trojan  war.  This  is  certainly  a  case  in  which  right 
and  wrong  are  succinctly  defined:  Paris"  impropriety  is  undoubted,  and  besides  seducing 
and  -abducting  Helen,  he  has  also  disregarded  the  prin6ples  of  Wa.  which  aTe.  under  the 
protection  of  Zeus  himself  References  to  Zeus's  just  involvement  in  the  Nvar  dar  exist  in 
the  poem  (see  p.  ISO);  being  part  of  the  heroes'  own  utterances,  they  seem  to  reflect  fairly 
accurately  the  passionate  reaction  that  Paris!  behaviour  caused.  For  the  audience  who 
know  -the,  final  outcome,  -the  Trojan  destmction  may  easily  be.  interpreted  as  the  expected 
consequencer  of  the-  gods'just  punishment;  for  after  all,  the  belief  in  divinejusticc,  like-  the- 
beliefin  moira,  is  often  a  post  eventum  appreciation  of-life  that  aims  at  'making  sense. 
However,  Ihis  idea  exists  only  in  the  background  of  the  poem,  and  divine  justice  is 
never  realised  as  such,  in  the  confines  always  of  tbc  plot.  Paris'  offence,  another  case  of 
90 
aTIpta  ofone  hero  to  another,  is  mainly  presented  as  aconflict  with  terrible  consequences 
for  the  heroes  themselves  and  those  around  them,  a  conflict  which  is  basically  a  matter 
demanding  settlement  between  men  alone.  The  gods  participate  not  as.  forces  who  favour 
thoser  who  are  right,  but  rather  as  individuals  who  get  involved  out  of  some  personal 
interest.  Even  Zeus,  whOSe  TIPTI  k  after  all  iinmediatefy  related  to  the  off,  &nce,  k  simply 
absorbed  mrith  the  fulfilment  of  his  promise  to  Thetis, 
211 That  Paris'  behaviour  is  basically  presented  as  an  offence  against  Menelaus  is  also 
clear  in  the.  way  Hector  accuses  him  at  r  39-56:  what  he  did  insulted  a  noble  Greek,  and 
the  consequences  concern  the  human  level;  Menelaus  is  dpijtýAcc  (52)  and  along  with 
Agamemnon  they  are  civSpEc  c'tXpTjTat(49),  who  are  involved  now  in  a  war,  a  iTýpa,  as 
Hector  says,  (50)  for  the  Trojans.  Menelaus  himself  accepts  that  the  beginning  of  the  war 
is his  conflict  with  Paris  and  Parie  own  aTTj  (f-  99-100);  the  war  is  a  matter  Of  TIPj  to  be 
settled  among  mortals,  a  matter  that  demands  the  Greek  revenM  if  Menelaus'  Ttjiý  is  to  be 
re-established  (r  351-354).  The  tenninology  is  evidently  one  that  pertains  to  the  sphere  of 
human  relations. 
By  tmnsfoTming  lhe  lheme  of  the.  TTqJan  war  from  one,  of  divine  justice  lo  one  of  a 
plain  aTlpfa  by  oner  hero  to  another,  and  thus  bringing  it  closer  to  the  main  subject  of  the 
plot,  the  poet  succeeds  once  more  in  f6cusing  on  man  himself,  his  own  responsibility  for 
misery  or  happiness,  his  reaction  to  his  responsibility.  Achilles  especially,  and  Hector  to  a 
slightly  lesser  degree,  realise  the  cruelty  of  their  own  passions,  their  limited  perception  of 
lifes  seemingly  inconsistent  demands,  as  they  are  entrapped  in  a  complex  system  of 
thought  concerning  TIpTj  and  dpm)  and  ct'&Sc  on  the  one  hand,  passion  for  life  and 
despair  at  its  incomprehensibility  on  the  other. 
There  is  a  realism  in  the  Iliadic  viewpoint,  which  seems  -at  times.  to  reach  the  limits. 
of  pessimism.  Lift  is  seen  as  a  continuous  exchange  based  on  the  principles  of  the 
Homeric  cDde  of  ethics:  mutual  recognition  of  TIWT'I,  TIPOI-C  if  Tiliq  is  neglected,  everything 
is  seen  from  this  perspective.  Impropriety  and  failure  to  meet  these  social  demands.  entail 
212 consequences  that  are  naturally  expected:  if  one's  wife  is  abducted,  conflict  is  the 
inevitable  result,  and  if  no  solution  is  reached  by  peaceful  means,  a  war  seems  very 
probable.  What  seems  to  concern  the  poet  is  life  itself,  life  in  its  course,  as  an  inescapable 
reality  which  man  creates  and  has  to  face  thereafter,  and  he  sees  that  whatever  man's 
convictions  may  be,  whatever  his  wishes  or  expectations,  life  is  uncertain,  hardly  ever 
permitting  one  to  talk  of  causes  and  effects.  Nothing  ever  reassures  man  that  gods  will  help 
him,  if  he  behaves  properly,  even  if  at  times  behaving  improperly  may  cause  their  anger, 
and  often  he  has  to  find  his  own  way  out  of  misery  to  success  and  glory.  For  the  gods  are 
distant  and  they  can  be  indifferent;  for  their  essence  is  their  immortal  power. 
A  device  that  helps  the  poet  highlight  the  distance  between  the  divine  and  the 
human  is  the  bifocal  view  of  life  Ihat  results  from  the  discrepancy  between  the  heroes' 
utterances  and  the  poet's  narration  (see  p.  149).  The  impression  created  in  this  way  is  one 
of  two  levels  of  narration,  which  seem  actually  to  correspond  to  two  levels  of  truth.  This 
time  the  issue  is  certainly  not  divine  responsibility,  and  whether  man  can  identify  or  not 
the  powers  that  determine  his  life;  rather,  the  heroes  seem  to  express  an  idea  which  can 
appear  as  totatty  inconsistent  with  the  narration,  and  actual  ty  in  conflict  witb.  it  k  si-m  pie 
and  common  way  for  the  poet  to  express  this  differentiation  is  the  use  of  the  adjective 
vintoc;  for  a  hero,  emphasising  man's  naturally  limited  knowledge  (B  38,  TT  686,1311). 
Rut  the  differentiation  is  also  evident  in  the  Avay  certain  episodes  are  unfolded  before  the 
audience;  the  heroes,  on  the  basis  of  their  opinions  rather  than  on  red  knowledge,  often 
appear  to  reach  false  conclusions  about  the  reason  behind  the  facts,  until  the  reason  is 
given  by  the  poet  in  the  third  person  narration,  presented  as  a  truth  which  remains 
imperceptible  by  the  heroes. 
213 When  Paris  is  saved  by  Aphrodite  and  the  duel  between  him  and  Menelaus  receives 
an  uncertain  end,  the  Greeks  are  sure  that,  if  the  Trojans  violate  the  oath  they  have  taken, 
Zeus  will  be  angry,  he  will  punish  them  (A  155-168,234-239)  -  an  opinion  expressed  later 
as  a  fear  by  the  Trojan  Antenor  (H  348-353),  yet,  Zeus  seems  to  pay  no  attention, 
concerned  as  he  is  with  the  fulfilment  of  his  plan.  At  A  13  Zeus  himself  talks  of  Menelaus' 
victory;  but  instead  of  punishing  the,  Trojans,  he  seems  to  be  rather  calm,  teasing  Hera  and 
pretending  to  wonder,  should  he  cause  a  fight  or  should  he  end  the  war  altogether?  Facing 
the  indignation  of  both  Hera  and  Athena,  he  finally  sends  Athena  to  cause  the  Trojan 
violation  of  the  oaths  which  he  was  supposed  to  protect  (A  70-72).  If  the  Greeks  tend  to 
believe  that  Zeus  will  sooner  or  later  be  on  their  side  because  they  were  wronged,  and  if 
the  Trojans  fear  that  Zeus  vvill  punish  them,  this  is  only  the  assumption  of  the  heroes;  it  is 
what  they  want  to  believe,  or  what  they  fear;  yet  the  poet  presents  divinity  distanced  and 
living  according  to  its  own  principles.  This  he  makes  clear  by  showing  in  parallel  the 
divine  and  the  human  world. 
That  the  distance  which  the  poet  keeps  from  his  heroes  is  a  conscious  device 
cannot  be  doubted.  Clay  sees  the  device  as  resulting  from  the  poet's  wish  to  prove  himself 
superior  to  his  heroes  as  regards  his  own  knowledge;  being  closely  associated  with  the 
Muses  (B  248-86,488-92,  cf.  Hes.  Theog.  22-34),  he  needs  to  emphasise  his  differentiation 
from  the  common  man  in  temis  of  f.  15i'Vat.  124  However,  I  would  prefer  to  see  that  this 
device  aims  more  at  our  perception  of  man's  limited knowledge  and  comprehension  of  the 
divine  than  at  our  appreciation  of  the  poet's  privileged  position.  More  important,  the  fact 
124  Clay  (1983)  11-23. 
214 that  the  heroes  often  prove  wrong  does  not  prove  the  absolute  injustice  of  the  gods,  but 
rather  their  unpredictability  and  inscrutability.  At  the  same  time,  the  antithesis  between  the 
divine  serenity  and  ever-lasting  happiness  and  the,  human  miserable  and  limited  condition 
becomes  even  starker. 
Besides,  one  should  consider  the  possibility  that  by  having  his  heroes  proclaiming 
their  belief  in  divine  justice  the  poet  can  at  times  express  what  he  cannot  in  propria 
persona.  This  is  especially  the  case  of  references  to  divine  justice  as  regards  the  outcome 
of  the  Trojan  war.  At  F  351-54  Menelaus  prays  to  Zeus  to  help  him  to  take  vengeance  on 
Paris,  referring  to  the  latter's  violation  of  gul  a.  Agamemnon  also  expresses  the  conviction 
that  Zeus  will  after  all  help  the  Greeks,  even  if  for  the  moment  he  appears  to  be  against 
them  (A  158-68).  But  of  greater  importance  are  Menelaus'  words,  first  at  F  365-368,  where 
he  calls  Zeus  O'XCCýTEPOC  OSCSV  (365),  and  certainly  at  N  620-639:  there  he  talks  of  Zeus's 
pfivic  against  the  transgressors  of  gma  and  ends  with  an  invocation  to  Zeus,  an 
exclamation  of  wonder  and  despair,  as  he  sees  that  the  god  who  is  thought  of  as  the  wisest 
of  gods  and  men,  helps  the  Trojans  -  olov  8h  av5pEoci  )(api'ýEai  uPp=6ci,  I  Tpcaoiv,  -rcSv 
I-.  I  PEVOC  alEV  CXTCXceaxov  (633-634). 
When  connecting  man's  life  with  the  gods,  the  poet  himself  sees  only  incessant 
ploys  and  plans,  deceits  and  favours,  and  above  all  he  sees  the  importance  of  Zeus's  plan. 
In  both  of  the  main  subjects  we  hear  of  Zeus's  promise,  seeing  that  this  is  the  only  reason 
behind  Zeus's  actions.  Zeus  nodded  to  the  Greeks,  as  be  nodded  to7lbetis.  The  importance 
of  this  promise  lies  in  its  inevitable  fulfilment.  This  seems  to  be  the  point  on  which  the 
poet  puts  all  the  emphasis.  Having  stripped  Zeus  of  every  special  characteristic  that  would 
215 imply  a  concern  for  special  fields  of  behaviour,  and  making  him  thus  almost  neutral  to 
external  stimuli  that  do  not  directly  concern  his  personal  TIPj,  the  poet  seems  to  prefer  the 
image  of  Zeus  simply  as  the  powerful  god  who  can  realise  his  plans  at  all  costs  and  under 
all  circumstances.  The  reason  behind  Zeus's  plan  does  not  seem  to  be  of  any  interest, 
either  for  the  poet,  or  for  man  in  general.  What  is  important  is  the  result,  the  inevitable 
plan  that  man  has  to  face  in  the  best  possible  way.  This  plan  remains  unpredictable,  or 
even  imperceptible  by  man.  By  canceling  all  the  traditional  functions  of  Zeus  as  ---sivioc;, 
'Idai 
oc  and 
"OPKIOC;  the  poct  underlines  even  more  the  fact  that  the  gods'  essential 
characteristic  is  their  unpredictable  and  inscrutable  power,  which  along  with  their 
immortality  define  the  limits  between  the  human  and  the  divine. 
3.3  Human  Responsihility 
Up  to  now,  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  in  the  Iliad  fate  is  of  immense 
importance,  either  when  connected  with  Zeus  or  when  independent.  There  may  be  no 
steady  principle  behind  it,  it  may  be  seen  as  defined  by  chance,  yet  what  is  important  is 
that  it  gives  its  name  to  facts,  and  the  element  that  is  most  emphasised  is  its  inevitability. 
Man  is  subject  to  it,  his  whole  life  seems  to  depend  on  the  demand  of  an  order  imposed 
from  without  and  against  which  he  can  do  nothing.  Furthermore,  man  is  subject  to  the 
gods'  unpredictable  behaviour.  Deceitful  and  playful,  driven  by  their  passions,  gods  can 
easily  control  human  lives,  while  man  seems  to  be  a  prey  to  their  selfish  and  superficial 
characters.  Even  Zeus,  the  ultimate  cause  of  everything,  is  not  steady  in  his  behaviour,  and 
216 even  if  he  is  not  motivated  by  his  own  feelings  to  the  extent  that  the  lesser  gods  are, 
following  a  steady  and  established  plan,  still  the  result  that  man  has  to  face  is  uncertainty. 
What  remains  to  be  seen  is  man's  reaction  to  all  these  factors,  the  consequences  they  have 
in  his  life  in  practical  terms.  Is  his  freedom  restricted,  or  is  he  still  regarded  as  responsible 
for  his  life?  What  is  believed  to  be  his  role  in  life,  his  share  in  the  outcome  of  events? 
The  belief  in  the  existence  of  divinity  is  expressed  through  a  connection  of 
everything  in  life  with  the  gods.  Divine  participation  is  an  element  of  the  narration,  simply 
because  the  gods  are  regarded  as  the  cause  of  every  situation,  of  every  event.  Their 
intervention  in  human  affairs  may  be  the  result  of  one's  prayers,  as  happens  with  Apollo, 
who  responds  to  the  prayers  of  Chryses  (A  43,458),  or  simply  a  personal  decision  on  their 
own  initiative,  based  on  the  feelings  of  the  moment,  as  happens  with  Hera  at  B  155-56;  it 
may  also  be  'external'  referring  to  a  god's  control  over  a  fight,  for  example,  by  his  actually 
participating  in  it  (e.  g.  Athena's  intervention  in  E,  or  Apollo's  in  rT),  or  'internal',  refcrring 
to  a  god's  responsibility  for  one's  feelings,  thoughts  or  dreams  (e.  g.  Zeus's  dream  to 
Agamemnon  at  B  5-15,  or  Aphrodite's  control  over  Helen's  feelings  at  F  390ff.  ).  Whatever 
the  case,  divine  intervention  is  inevitable,  a  part  of  life  itself 
One  could  certainly  say  that  divine  intervention  is  nothing  more  than  a  literary  way 
of  presenting  facts,  or  even  simply  a  device  that  helps  the  development  of  the  narration. 
When,  for  example,  Aphrodite  appears  to  Helen  and  persuades  her,  first  kindly,  but  then  by 
threats,  to  go  to  Paris  (r  390420),  we  have  a  literary  scene  involving  both  the  divine  and 
the  human  elements  and  presenting  the  goddess's  power  in  action,  which,  however,  raises 
the  question  of  the  realism  of  such  a  scene;  at  the  same  time,  the  episode  functions  as  a 
217 way  of  bringing  Helen  and  Paris  together,  of  presenting  the  couple  that  stands  as  the  cause 
of  the  war  and  of  showing  Helen's  ambivalent  feelings.  Similarly,  Hera's  intervention  at  B 
155-56  evidently  helps  the  poet  with  the  plot:  the  Greeks  are  ready  to  leave  and  the  poet 
has  to  find  a  way  to  keep  them  at  Troy,  for  this  is  what  history,  and  fate  as  well,  demand-, 
by  using  Hera,  he  accomplishes  his  purpose,  while  at  the  same  time  he  offers  a 
characterisation  of  the  goddess  whose  fervent  wish  to  destroy  Troy  defines  her  behaviour 
in  the  poem.  The  poet  uses  the  gods'  presence  or  absence  according  to  his  narrative  needs: 
Zeus  is  absent  in  N,  so  that  Poseidon  can  intervene;  Athena  and  Apollo  avoid  getting 
involved  in  the  duel  between  Hector  and  Aias  in  H,  so  that  the  duel  may  end  with  no  actual 
winner. 
However,  behind  the  literary  or  narrative  functions  of  such  scenes,  behind  this 
concrete  presentation,  one  may  detect  the  belief  in  divine  power,  even  in  an  abstract  form, 
the  belief  in  the  identification  of  cause  and  divinity.  Even  if  Aphrodite  seems  too  human  to 
be  true,  she  represents  the  force  that  leads  man  to  a  certain  behaviour,  and  thus  to  a  certain 
life.  Thus,  although  we  often  have  the  impression  that  references  to  divine  intervention 
should  not  be  taken  too  seriously  as  a  realistic  presentation  of  divine  essence,  we  should 
accept  that  these  references  are  an  undoubted  proof  of  the  pious  belief  in  the  important 
role  of  divinity  in  human  lives.  When  at  K  503  Diomedes  decides  that  he  and  Odysseus 
should  leave  after  having  killed  Rhesus  and  before  anyone  else  wakes  up,  the  decision  is 
presented  as  the  result  of  Athena's  intervention,  although  it  could  be  also  seen  as  the 
thought  that  is  naturally  expected  of  an  experienced  soldier;  yet  the  presence  of  Athena 
stresses  the  relation  between  god  and  man,  and  even  if  there  is  no  real  belief  that  Athena 
actually  talked  to  Diomedes,  man's  dependence  on  divinity  is  projected  and  we  are 
218 reminded  of  his  humble  position  in  the  world's  order.  Even  chance  events,  such  as  missing 
one's  target,  are  interpreted  as  the  result  of  divine  intervention,  confirming  divine 
presence,  125  while  of  a  similar  effect  and  function  seem  to  be  also  the  scenes  where  we 
have  almost  a  'mimcle',  a  supernatural,  in  a  way,  change,  such  as  the  healing  of  a  hero's 
wounds.  126 
Divine  intervention  certainly  underlines  man's  natural  weakness,  even  if  implicitly. 
Before  god  man  can  do  nothing-,  man  is  the  most  miserable  creature,  O*I;  UPCO'TEPOV  ... 
I 
lTdVTC,  aV  occa  TE  yatav  EITI  ITVEIEI  TE  Kai  'EP7TEt  (P  446-47);  his  limited  strength,  in  physical 
terms,  his  limited  knowledge  and  perceptive  ability  highly  differentiate  him  from  god, 
being  thus  the  reasons  of  his  frustrating  helplessness.  In  E,  in  an  episode  of  a  rather 
comical  character,  an  extravaganza  in  the  presentation  of  the  war,  Aphrodite  gets  hurt  by 
Diomedes,  and  runs  to  her  mother  Dione  for  consolation  (330-430);  Dione's  words  stress 
the  difference  between  man  and  god:  V41TIOC,  Oý&  TO'  018E  KaTa  #ba  Tu8coc  ut(k,  I 
&Ti 
paX'  oý  6qvat6c  ck  a0avdToici  pdXilTat  (406-7).  Soon  the  order  of  nature,  based  on  the 
law  of  strength,  and  reflected  in  this  relation  between  superior  and  inferior,  is  re- 
e.  stablisbed  and  confirmed  wben  Diomedes  faces  Apollo  (431-44);  the  scene  ends  vith 
Apollo's  compelling  lines  reminding  Diomedes  that  cZ  7ToTE  ýGkv  c5pcýov  I  d(8aVdTCOV  TE 
OccSv  Xapat  ipXOPE'VWV  T'  c'cvOpc&)'Trcov  (44142). 
But,  as  already  noted,  apart  from  his  limited  strength,  man's  limited  knowledge  is 
an  equally  important  indication  of  his  weakness.  Knowing  only  partly  the  truth  that  lies 
123  See  also  E  290-96,0  461-70,  Y  382-87,  Y  862-67. 
126  See  E  115-22,  E  311-17,  E  506.13,0  231-42,  TT  527-29. 
219 behind  the  life  he  lives,  man  reaches  all  too  often  conclusions  that  prove  disastrous,  thus 
being  led  to  make  mistakes.  Having  no  real  control  over  life,  he  acts  with  #pa8h)  and 
T  dTadaXiq.  Agamemnon's  mistake  lies  exactly  in  his  inability  to  control  his  selfishness 
and  in  his  blind  confidence  in  Zeus,  which,  however,  proves  to  be  only  a  false  supposition. 
When  EO#ovEcav  Nestor  gives  his  advice  to  both  Achilles  and  Agamemnon,  we  hear  that 
the  two  heroes  are  equally  wrong,  in  terms  of  social  behaviour  (A  254-84).  It  is 
Agamcmnon,  though,  who  is  later  blamed,  for  his  behaviour  proves  to  be  fatal  for  the 
Greeks  -a  result  of  his  own  limited  knowledge  and  perceptive  ability.  127 
It  often  happens,  then,  that  man  finds  himself  powerless  and  alone,  at  the  mercy  of 
gods'  decisions  -  either  when  seeking  their  help,  or  when  facing  their  enmity,  or  even  Nvhen  2-- 
the  gods  are  simply  absent.  More  important,  man  knows  that  he  cannot  totally  and 
unreservedly  rely  on  the  gods,  for  their  actions  and  reactions  are  largely  based  on  their 
feelings,  and  their  feelings  can  certainly  be  unsteady;  Athena  may  have  loved  and 
protected  Troy  in  the  past,  yet  now  she  hates  it  and  wishes  for  its  destruction;  Zeus  may 
have  promised  his  help  to  the  Greeks,  yet  now  he  stands  against  them.  Against  life's 
uncertainty,  against  the  gods'  strength  and  capricious  behaviour  man  stands  upright, 
determined  to  face  life,  for  this  is  all  he  can  do.  He  does  not  adopt  a  fatalistic  approach  to 
life,  pathetically  accepting  the  inevitability  of  what  is  to  come,  and  thus  the  futility  of 
standing  against  the  gods'  decisions.  Being  aware  of  his  inherent  weakness,  he  never 
allows  it  to  become  an  obstacle  in  his  life.  Quite  the  contrary-,  the  very  uncertainty  with 
which  he  is  constantly  faced  functions  as  a  motive,  his  weakness  almost  as  a  challenge  for 
an  endless  fight,  an  endless  attempt  to  reach  a  better  end,  to  have  a  better  control  over  his 
127  See  E648-51,  Z352-53,  H  109-11,  K350. 
220 life.  Misery  or  failure  can  only  be  temporary,  and  man  always  tries  to  find  a  way  to  escape. 
He  knows  that  the  gods"  decisions  cannot  change  -  at  least  not  easily  -  still,  he  keeps  trying 
and  hoping.  The  Greeks  continue  their  fight,  even  if  they  know  that  Zeus  is  on  the  side  of 
the  Trojans  (145-49,  A  310-19,  A  345=48,0  500-13,  P  62947),  128  and  Hector  decides  to 
face  Achilles,  although  he  senses  the  imminence  of  his  death  (X  297-305).  Besides,  even  if 
man  cannot  achieve  his  purpose,  he  can  at  least  pursue  a  glorious  death,  for  ativ 
dpicTE6stv  is  always  in  the  mind  of  the  noble  hero  (Z  208-9,  A  783-84). 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  human  participation  is  as  essential  and  important  as  divine 
participation  is,  not  in  order  that  the  gods"  plans  be  accomplished,  but  in  order  that  man's 
life  be  better  lived,  as  far  as  this  is  possible.  It  is  necessary  and  inevitable  at  the  same  time 
that  man  should  have  his  own  share  of  responsibility  for  the  life  he  leads;  however  obvious 
and  important  divine  action,  man  seems  able  up  to  a  point  to  construct  his  life,  even  if  only 
in  its  small  dctails. 
The  significance  of  man's  share  in  the  events  is  perhaps  more  evident  in  the  cases 
where  the  divine  and  the  human  element  act  together,  aiming  at  the  same  purpose.  When  a 
god  takes  part  in  human  affairs,  supporting  a  hero,  in  no  way  is  the  hero's  quality  affected 
or  questioned.  Athena  helps  Diomedes  in  E,  and  every  one  may  recognise  the  divine 
presence  in  the  hero's  ýp  i  aTr;  I  a,  yet  he  is  always  regarded  as  a  brave  and  powerful  warrior, 
and  he  never  seems  to  lose  his  self-confidence.  Actually,  it  seems,  as  Janko  notes,  that  a 
god's  help  confirms  in  a  way  the  hero's  martial  excellence.  129  Besides,  it  is  important  that 
128  For  a  sixnilar  Trojan  attitude  see  E  218-22,  Z  84-85,  e  55-57. 
1"  Janko  (1992)  on  N  434-36. 
221 in  most  of  the  cases  the  gods  simply  help  -  aprý(stv  -  and  do  not  have  total  control  over  a 
situation.  '  10  It  is  only  in  crucial  moments  that  divine  participation  goes  even  further,  that  is 
when  a  situation  is  definitely  beyond  human  control  and  only  a  supernatural  help  can  lead 
to  a  solutiom 
131 
What  normally  happens  is  that  god  and  man  have  each  his  proper  share  in  the 
action,  and  although  the  result  may  be  defined  by  divine  rather  than  by  human  will,  man 
also  participates,  even  if  unconsciously,  in  its  fulfilment  and  in  his  survival;  for  just  as  the 
gods'  participation  is  necessary  in  order  that  man  should  achieve  his  end,  man's 
participation  is  essential  too  in  order  that  life  be  advanced.  A  god's  help  is  not  enough,  and 
this  is  what  Nestor  seems  to  imply  when  talking  to  Agamemnon  at  B  367-69:  yvCaCEai  6'  d 
Kai  eECIITECTIU  IT6XIV  OýK  IIXCXTTdgEIC,  UV5pCSV  KaK6TqTl  Kai  #pa6fr 
,I  TroXipoio  -  even  if  the 
gods  act  in  favour  of  the  Greeks,  one  should  be  sure  that  they  are  not  cowards  and  that  they 
know  how  to  fight.  Besides,  the  Greeks  never  seem  to  take  Zeus's  promise  for  granted; 
they  keep  worrying  and  fighting,  for  they  know  that  real  life  may  often  belie  man's 
expectations  and  hopes.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Athena  criticises  Diomedes  at  E  809-13:  she 
offers  all  her  support  to  him,  yet  he  does  nothing,  and  in  this  way  there  can  be  no  result. 
Wvstv,  lack  of  action,  is  condemned  (A  24249),  and  man  has  to  think  for  himself  of  the 
best  possible  solution,  despite  all  the  difficulties,  and  even  if  he  is  supported  by  the 
gods. 
132 
130  See  E  470,  E  506-8,  E  511,  ()  216,  ---  361-62,0  254-57. 
131  See  A  193-98,  F  373-82,  H  268-72,0  236-42. 
132  See  III  1-  13,  N  741-44,1--  61C,  P  712-14. 
222 Man,  then,  often  finds  himself  alone,  and  often  he  has  to  decide  on  his  own. 
Doubtless,  most  of  the  times  a  god  is  to  be  found  beside  him,  controlling,  as  noted,  even 
his  thoughts,  decisions,  or  feelings,  yet  the  poet  does  not  fail  to  remind  us  that  the,  gods 
may  also  be  absent.  A  quite  strong  image  reflecting  this  belief  may  be  seen  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  poem:  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  are  getting  involved  in  the  conflict,  the 
balance  between  them  being  kept  by  Nestor;  for  a  moment  the  heroes  are  alone  with  their 
passions,  and  Nestor's  advice  passes  actually  unheeded;  Achilles,  though,  is  in  the  end 
helped  by  Athena  (A  197-217),  133  a  foreshadowing  perhaps  of  the  future  honour  he  will 
receive  from  the  gods,  while  Agamemnon,  the  one  who  will  eventually  be  blamed,  stands 
totally  alone.  Driven  by  the  nature  of  his  character,  and  thus  in  contrast  to  Achilles  who  is 
controlled,  he  does  not  realise  the  limits  of  his  knowledge,  he  does  not  make  the  right 
assumptions  and  he  decides  completely  on  his  own  to  act  as  he  acts.  This  is  doubtless  a 
crucial  moment  in  the  poem,  and  as  Agamemnon's  destruction  is  foreshadowed  at  A  205 
and  342-44,  the  fact  that  he  decides  alone  and  freely,  according  to  his  temper  and  his 
subjective  opinions,  seems  imposing;  and  it  is  interesting  that  the  poet  avoids  involving 
Zeus,  Mio  is  in  Aethiopia  (A  423-24),  so  that  when  Agamemnon  relates  his  mistake  to 
Zeus  at  T  86-89,  he  should  took  even  weaker,  his  loneliness  being  stressed  even  further. 
Similarly  absent  are  the  gods  when  Achilles  decides  to  insist  on  his  wrath  (I  315ff  ),  and 
when  Hector  decides  to  stay  out  of  the  Trojan  wall  and  fight  (X  99=130). 
133  Athena  is  sent  by  Hera,  as  we  have  seen  (209),  who  shows  concern  for  both  of  the  Greek  heroes.  Athena's 
attitude,  however,  seems  to  betray  some  degree  of  favour  towards  Achilles,  which  could  be  justified  by  the 
fact  that  Achilles  should  not  after  all  feel  that  the  goddess  is  equally  concerned  about  his  opponent  Whatever 
the  case,  Agamernnon's  loneliness  remains. 
223 Doubtless,  we  should  consider  that,  although  the  heroes  appear  to  decide  and  act 
freely,  they  are  actually  bound  to  fate.  It  is  Hector"s  fate  that  keeps  him  outside  the  wall, 
poipa  7TE8rpcv  (X  5),  while  Zeues  plan,  as  developed  at  19  473-77,  seems  to  imply  that 
Achilles  will  join  the  war  only  after  Patroclus  is  dead;  as  for  Agamemnon,  he  seems  to  be 
subject  both  to  his  own  nature  and  to  the  code  of  excellence  that  demands  the  confirmation 
of  his  Tipl).  The  question  that  emerges,  then,  is,  if  man  follows  fate  willingly  or  not, 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  how  can  we  talk  about  his  freedom? 
There  are  actually  two  ways  of  looking  at  this  question:  from  man's  viewpoint,  that 
is from  the  inside  of  life,  or  from  a  distance  that  permits  us  to  see  man  as  part  of  a  whole 
world,  of  a  process  that  is  often  accomplished  without  his  knowing.  If  we  look  at  life  from 
a  distance,  man  is  certainly  the  most  miserable  creature  (P  446-47),  and  Glaucus' 
comparison  of  man's  life  to  the  leaves  that  are  brought  down  by  the  wind,  while  new  ones 
are  born  (Z  14649),  presents  man's  helplessness  in  a  most  successful  and  vivid  way.  Man 
is  destined  to  die,  he  may  also  be  destined  to  suffer  (X  60-65,  fl  527-30),  while  he  may 
also  be  a  prey  to  the  gods'  playful  character,  to  their  mood  of  the  moment  and  their 
unpredictable  decisions.  He  is  bound  to  situations  that  have  to  be,  he  is  bound  to  his  human 
and  thus  weak  nature,  his  character  and  his  social  status.  As  noted,  Agamemnon  may  seem 
free  when  deciding  to  take  Briseis  from  Achilles,  but  this  is  after  all  the  behaviour  his 
social  status  requires  of  him  in  order  that  his  personal  Tipri  as  commander-in-chief  be 
saved,  and  it  is  the  behaviour  he  alone  can  have,  self-confident  and  proud  as  he  is. 
Sarpedon  may  seem  free  when  choosing  a  glorious  death  (M  310-28),  but  he  does  so  for 
there  is  no  alternative  for  him,  tied  as  he  is  to  this  common  fate  and  to  the  obligation  to  his 
people.  When  Achilles  finally  appears  to  have  the  privilege  of  a  choice  between  two  lives 
224 (1410-16),  this  very  privilege  is  undermined,  since  it  is fate  that  he  will  have  to  face  in  the 
end.  It  would  appear  then  that  man  seems  free,  he  may  feel  free,  yet  he  is  actually  not. 
However,  looking  at  life  from  a  distance  and  from  its  end  is  one  thing,  living  it  in 
its  course  is  another.  The  limits  in  man's  life  may  be  various  and  strong,  yet  they  are 
largely,  and  fortunately,  unknown  and  imperceptible.  Man  knows  not  his  fate,  nor  can  he 
predict  divine  participation.  If  he  is  led  by  his  fate,  if  he  is  tossed  about  like  a  plaything  by 
the  godsý  he  is  never  sure  of  that,  he  can  only  confirm  it  in  the  end;  in  the  meanwhile  he 
has  to  live,  to  make  decisions  for  himself  and  for  his  people,  to  think  and  act.  Despite  all 
difficulties,  despite  even  an  imminent  death,  man  always  hopes  and  fights;  knowing  his 
own  weakness  does  not  prevent  him  from  always  trying  for  the  best.  It  is  on  this  level  that 
we  can  talk  of  free  will,  if  we  look  at  man  as  an  individual,  having  his  own  personality  and 
life,  his  duties  and  his  fears.  It  is  in  this  way  that  Agamemnon,  or  Sarpedon  and  Hector, 
appcar  to  bc  dcciding  frccly. 
One  is  tempted  to  see  Achilles'  double  ffite  as  a  poetic  invention  that  aims  at 
emphasising  exactly  these  two  aspects  of  life;  for  although  it  stresses  fate's  inevitability,  it 
also  presents  man  as  being  capable  of  a  choice.  The  code  of  excellence  seems  to  leave  no 
place  for  choice;  if  a  hero  wants  to  be  honoured,  he  has  to  obey.  When  Achilles  breaks  this 
code,  disappointed  by  its  fake  rewards  and  pointing  out  that  happiness  is  not  to  be  found 
there,  he  is  ready  to  choose  an  altemative  life  -  and  so  be  does;  his  re-joining  the  battle 
after  Patroclus'  death  is  not  suggested  to  him  by  any  concern  for  this  code;  liberated  from 
its  bonds,  he  freely  decides  to  fight  and  die  for  the  sake  of  his  dead  friend.  It  is  worth 
noting  how  different  Hector's  decisions  are,  which,  although  freely  made,  are  of  a  more 
225 certain  course.  Doubtless,  in  either  case  the  result  is  the  same,  as  any  sense  of  freedom 
collapses  before  fate"s  commands.  Yet,  on  the  human  level  both  heroes  are  free  when 
deciding,  and  Achilles  is  even  more  so,  since  he  dares  to  stand  against  his  social  destiny. 
If  man  is  free,  be  is inevitably  responsible  as  well  for  all  the  consequences  of  his 
behaviour.  As  already  noted,  man  has  a  share  of  responsibility  even  when  he  is  supported 
by  a  god;  human  action  is  necessary  even  for  a  divine  plan  to  be  fulfilled,  and  if  this  proves 
that  man  may  at  times  be  used  by  the  gods,  it  also  shows  that  on  the  human  level  man's 
behaviour  is  judged  and  criticised,  approved  or  disapproved  of  Doubtless,  when  a  hero's 
attempts  arc  brought  to  an  end  by  a  god,  or  his  hopes  are  belied,  man  always  mentions  the 
, gods'  responsibility  for  the  unpleasant  outcome.  Yet,  it  seems  that  such  references  function 
U-- 
not  as  a  justification,  but  rather  as  an  explanation;  when  at  N  222-30  Idomeneus  refers  to 
Zeus's  helping  the  Trojans,  he  does  not  try  to  avoid  responsibility,  but  simply  to  explain 
the  Greeks'  helplessness,  to  provide  a  reason  why  they  cannot  win  despite  their  brave 
fighting.  When  Achilles  talks  of  Agamemnon's  a7  at  T  270-73,  or  says  that  Zeus  took  his 
mind  away  at  177,  he  certainly  does  not  wish  to  justify  the  Mycenean  king-,  rather,  he 
explains  how  he  could  have  made  such  a  mistaken  movement.  Mentioning  divine 
participation  in  such  cases  simply  reinforces  the  belief  in  divine  presence;  it  does  not 
relieve  man  ftom  responsibility. 
Agamcmnon's  and  Paris'  behaviour  are  of  a  particular  interest  at  this  point,  for 
although  they  are  responsible  for  the  Greek  defeat  and  the  Trojan  war  respectively,  they 
seem  to  use  divine  participation  as  an  exculpatory  justification  of  their  behaviour. 
Agamemnon's  famous  apology  in  T  begins  with  a  denial  of  responsibility,  iy6  8'  OU'K 
226 aITIOC  EIPI,  I  6W  ZEk  Kal  M6tpa  Kai  ýEPONWITK  Epivk,  I  0I  TE  t1OI  Eiv  ayopD  OEOIV 
E'PpaMov  ayptov  aTi1v  (86-88),  and  follows  with  a  presentation  of  the  workings  of  Trpicpa 
Ai6c  6uydTT-p"ATq.  T"I  ndvTacda-rat,  Jo6Xopivil(91f).  Paris,  on  the  other  hand,  replies  to 
his  brother's  accusations  of  idleness  rather  light-heartedly:  1A)  pot  56p'  ipaTa  TTP4EPS 
XPUCE'Tlf;  'A#o5tTT1,;  -  I  oý  Tot  aTr6PXT)T'  iOTI  BEC3V  ip=Ua  56pa,  I  coca  KEv  a&oI  5csatv, 
&CýV  5%  OU'K  av  TIC  'EXotTo  (r  64-66).  Neither  of  the  two  heroes  seems  to  feel  deeply 
concerned  with  his  responsibility,  to  feel  deep  and  sincere  remorse  for  his  behaviour.  Paris 
is  just  a  shallow  figure  in  the  poem,  the  only  person  apparently  who  could  be  so  careless  as 
to  cause  such  a  war.  He  does  not  accept  his  mistake,  but  more  important  he  also  insists  on 
being  the  cause  of  further  trouble,  unwilling  as  he  is  to  yield  to  the  demands  of  Greeks  and 
Trojans  alike  and  give  Helen  back  (H  361-64).  As  for  Agamemnon,  he  agrees  to  give 
compensation  to  Achilles,  for  he  realises  that  this  is  the  only  way  for  Achilles'  wrath  to  be 
appeased  -  or  seems  to  agree,  under  the  demands  of  the  Greek  leaders  and  the  army  which 
is  devastated.  Yet,  he  never  accepts  totally  his  mistake,  not  even  when  he  faces  Achilles  at 
T  77ff.;  he  only  talks  of  Zeus  and  a-al,  vvhile  the  reference  to  moira  and  Erinys  seems  to 
imply  simply  the  inevitability  of  what  happened,  as  he  says  at  T  90,  CLUa  Ti  xsv  ý4ap; 
OE6  c&a  7TdVTa  TEXEUTq.  134  If  Paris  is  the  beautiful  young  prince,  whose  beauty  makes  him 
shallow,  vain  and  irresponsible,  Agamemnon  is  the  avag,  the  superior  commander  among 
the  Greeks,  whose  pride  and  self-confidence  make  him  narrow-minded  and  self-centred. 
Avoiding  responsibility  by  talking  of  the  gods'  participation  is  well  in  accordance  with 
their  characters,  without  however,  proving  that  divine  participation  may  have  such  an 
exculpatory  role,  or  that  on  the  human  level  man's  behaviour  can  be  so  easily  justified. 
134  See  M.  W.  Edwards  (1994)  ad  Joe. 
227 In  order  that  it  becomes  clearer  that  divine  participation  does  not  relieve  man  from 
his  own  share  of  responsibility,  it  would  be  helpful  to  look  at  the  reaction  that  the  Greeks 
and  the  Trojans  have  to  Agamemnon's  and  Paris'  behaviour  respectively.  Both  heroes,  led 
by  their  passions  and  limited  ability  of  perception,  behave  in  a  way  that  has  terrible 
consequences  for  both  an-nies;  and  they  are  criticised  for  that.  Agamemnon  is  certainly 
judged  in  a  discreet  and  indirect  way,  through  the  Greeks'  insistence  that  he  should 
recognise  Achilles"  TIP4  -  the  code  of  excellence  does  not  permit  an  open  criticism  of  the 
commander  of  the  Greek  a-rmy.  The  first  negative  comment  comes  from  Thersitesý  who  is 
apupom4c,  never  able  to  control  his  words  (B  212)  and  always  criticising  the  kings, 
disregarding  the  principles  of  proper  behaviour  (13  213-14).  Thersites'  description  by  the 
poet  is far  from  flattering,  and  Odysseus,  when  reproaching  him  for  his  improper  Nvords, 
calls  him  ihe  Nvorst  of  men  among  the  Greek  army  (B  24849).  This  character,  who  is 
known  for  his  social  impropriety,  is  the  only  character  suitable  overtly  to  blame 
Agamemnon.  When  Nestor  later  talks  of  Agamemnon's  dTIPIa  towards  Achilles  (1  110- 
11),  he  is  certainly  more  careful  and  tactful  in  his  words,  always  cautious  not  to  hurt  the 
king's  vulnerable  pride;  yet  he  knows  and  makes  clear  that  it  is  Agamemnon's  behaviour 
that  caused  Zeus's  support  of  the  Trojans.  The  Greeks  alt  know  that  Zeus  is  to  be  found 
behind  the  sudden  Trojan  victory,  that  when  helping  the  Trojans  the  god  honours  Achilles; 
yet  they  never  seem  to  believe  that  Agamemnon's  mistake  was  caused  by  the  god  -  by 
contrast  to  what  Agamemnon  himself  says.  Even  when  Achilles  says  that  Zeus  must  have 
deluded  Agamemnon  (13  77),  this  is  no  more  than  a  fagon  de  parler.  135  More  importaniý 
though,  even  if  Zeus  were  indeed  the  cause  of  Agamemnon"s  folly,  what  is  of  interest  on 
the  human  level  is  not  the  cause,  but  the  result.  As  noted,  the  tendency  to  regard  divinity  as 
135  See  Kirk  (1990)  on  Z  234-36. 
228 the  ultimate  cause  does  not  serve  as  a  justification  on  the  human  level,  but  as  a 
confirmation  of  divinity's  existence;  it  comes  naturally  out  of  the  conviction  that  god  is 
always  present,  always  involved,  if  wishing  so,  in  human  lives-,  but  never  does  it  seem  to 
have  an  impact  on  the  way  social  life  is  lived,  or  social  obligations  arc  met 
Seen  as  a  fact  of  life,  Agamemnon's  aTIllia  and  Achilles'  wrath  are  nothing  but  a 
conflict  between  two  leaders,  which  has  to  be  settled,  so  that  order  and  balance  can  be  re- 
established.  As  Odysseus  says  to  Agamemnon  at  T  182-83,  ou  piv  yap  -n  vepEcallTov 
ý=Xfia  I  a*v8p'  anapiccac6at,  OTE  TtC  TTPOTEPOC  XaAcTnivD.  What  is  important,  then,  is 
not  whether  Zeus  caused  Agamemnon's  QTrj  or  not  -  which  he  obviously  did  not,  since 
according  to  the  poet  he  was  in  the  land  of  the  Aethiopians  (A  423-24)  -  but  that  once 
Agamemnon  has  made  a  mistake  he  has  to  find  a  way  to  Tedress  it.  Besides,  aTTI  is 
nothing  but  a  passion;  it  is  used  of  Agamemnon's  anger  (A  412),  as  well  as  of  Paris'  love 
(Z  356,  fl  28,  cf  --- 
216-17)  and  Patroclus'  extreme  and  blind  self-confidence  and  delusion 
(TT  695).  Certainly,  passions  are  also  believed  to  be  caused  by  the  gods,  136  yet  man  is 
believed  to  be  able  to  control  these  passions,  as  the  expression  i Foxci  v  Ougov  seems  to  imply 
(1  255-56).  Moreover,  once  Agamemnon  accepts  in  public  his  mistake  and  states  his 
willingness  to  recompense  Achilles  for  his  aTipta,  and  the  embassy  is  thereafter  sent  to 
Achilles,  Agamemnon  is  no  longer  regarded  as  responsible  for  Zeus's  lack  of  support;  now 
it  is  Achilles  and  his  unyielding  wrath  that  are  tacitly  blamed  (A  664-67,762-93);  only 
Patroclus,  Achilles'  loyal  friend,  still  finds  fault  with  Agamemnon's  behaviour  (T7  273). 
136  See  Hainsworth  (1993)  on  K  507-13  and  on  A  199. 
229 As  for  Paris,  it  is  true  that  the  war  is  attributed  to  the  gods  not  only  by  Paris,  but  by 
other  heroes  too.  Priam  talks  of  the  gods  (F  164-65,  X  59-65),  and  so  does  Achilles  too  (fl 
54748).  Athena  also  attributes  the  war  to  Aphrodite's  playful  and  deceitful  character  (E 
349,422-25),  and  similar  is  Helen's  reaction  to  the  goddess,  when  she  complains  to  her 
that  she  has  used  the  Spartan  queen  selfishly  out  of  her  love  for  Paris  (r  399-412).  When  at 
Z  349  and  57-58  Helen  talks  of  Zeus  and  the  gods,  who  decided  this  war,  we  cannot  avoid 
linking  these  lines  with  the  explanation  given  in  the  Cypria:  could  it  be  actually  that  the 
god  caused  the  war  in  order  that  some  plan  of  his  should  be  fulfilled?  The  poet  avoids 
giving  an  answer.  It  seems  that  more  important  is  the  mere  fact  that  the  war  has  been 
caused,  it  has  been  going  on  for  nine  years  now,  and  Troy  is  in  real  danger.  As  Hector  says, 
the  whole  problem  is  caused  by  Paris'  improper  behaviour  towards  two  very  powerful 
kings,  a  conflict  similar  to  that  between  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  (F  46-53).  A  noble  man 
dishonours  another  noble  man,  and  this  is  a  matter  to  be  settled  on  the  human  level  by  men 
themselves.  The  one  responsible  for  the  problem  must  be  found  and  he  then  must  put 
things  right.  The  only  difference  between  the  case  of  Agamemnon  and  that  of  Paris  is  that 
the  latter  does  not  make  amcnds  for  his  impropriety.  The  conflict  is  led  therefore  to  no 
sotution,  and  the  war  breaks  out.  Paris,  then,  is  accused  and  hated  by  both  Greeks  and 
Trojans  (r  319-23,451-53).  Even  his  elder  brother  blames  him  for  all  the  trouble  he 
caused  to  Troy  (r  39-57,97,  Z  291-95,326-31);  even  Helen,  although  talking  of  the  gods, 
and  although  responsible  herself,  does  not  fail  to  accuse  Paris  for  his  shallowness  and 
impropriety  (Z  350-53);  when  she  talks  of  herself,  she  accepts  the  improper  character  of 
her  actions  (F  24142),  yet  she  presents  herself  as  being  used  by  the  gods  (Z  349,3  56-58) 
or  as  simply  following  Paris  (r  174-75,  ef  r  447). 
230 Homeric  man  is  only  interested  in  the  obvious  and  tangible  results  of  one's 
behaviour,  in  the  consequences  it  has  on  life,  which  he  has  to  face.  What  the  Greeks  see  is 
that  Agamemnon's  behaviour  led  to  a  defeat,  a  difficulty  which  makes  them  fight  as  best 
they  can.  Similarly,  what  the  Trojans  see  is  that  Paris'  behaviour  caused  the  war,  which 
they  have  to  face  with  all  their  might,  if  destruction  is  to  be  avoided.  Whether  Paris  was 
used  or  stimulated  by  a  goddess  is  of  no  interest  after  all,  they  hate  him  just  the  same  and 
they  blame  him  for  all  the  trouble  he  caused. 
It  is  beyond  doubt  that  man  may  ultimately  be  not  as  free  or  as  responsible  as  he  is 
believed  to  be.  Paris  may  be  simply  the  external  and  superficial  cause  of  the  war,  the  real 
and  deeper  cause  being  the  gods'  will;  or  if  we  choose  to  see  no  plan  defining  the  war,  we 
may  see  Paris  being  used  by  the  gods  for  the  sake  of  some  apparently  trivial  game.  In 
either  case,  the  hero  is  proved  to  be  totally  weak,  yet  the  war  is  a  fact  of  life,  Paris  is 
related  to  it  directly,  and  he  is  inevitably  hated  and  blamed.  If  Paris  cannot  avoid  divine 
interference,  he  cannot  avoid  the  consequences  of  divine  interference  either;  and  if  he  is 
chosen,  because  of  his  character,  as  the  cause  of  the  war,  he  is  also  chosen  as  the  one 
responsible  for  it.  Paris  is  probably  a  poetic  and  literary  construction,  an  invention  that 
explains  the  war  in  human  terms,  and  he  certainly  stresses,  as  a  construction,  the  idea  of 
man's  weakness.  However,  as  noted,  this  is  the  idea  we  have  of  life  when  we  observe 
everything  from  a  distance.  All  these  considerations  have  no  actual  impact  on  man's  way 
of  living,  thinking,  acting  and  reacting.  Life  moves  with  a  speed  that  can  hardly  allow  such 
thoughts  before  a  decision  is  made,  before  a  word  is  spoken;  and  man  moves  along  with  it. 
Remorse  is  all  Achilles  feels,  although  Patroclus'  death  was  defined  by  fate;  honour  is  all 
231 Agamemnon  is  after,  although  he  is  reminded  by  Nestor  of  Achilles'  special  favour  from 
the  gods;  and  Paris  lets  himself  be  driven  by  the  passion  of  love,  forgetting  the  laws  of 
propriety  to  which  he  is  bound.  If  man  is  unable  to  grasp  the  meaning  or  the  mechanisms 
of  life,  if  he  cannot  foresee  the  consequences  of  his  actions,  still  there  is  no  excuse  for 
him;  he  has  to  put  up  with  what  he  has  made  of  life,  however  unpleasant  or  difficult  that 
may  be.  The  code  of  Homeric  ethics  and  the  pre-mature  legal  system  are  always  there  to 
check  him,  a  sufficient  proof  of  a  society  whose  members  are  believed  to  be,  or  should  be 
anyway,  responsible  and  accountable  for  their  behaviour. 
232 4 
The  Odyssey 
The  Iliad  is  generally  accepted  to  be  the  older  of  the  two  poems,  one  of  the  main 
reasons  being  that  the  Odyssey  appears  to  have  been  aware  of  the  Iliad,  while  the  reverse 
does  not  seem  to  be  equally  true.  '  Whatever  the  chronological  relation,  it  is  beyond  doubt 
that  the  two  works  are  radically  different  from  each  other  in  more  than  one  aspect  as  far  as 
their  content  and  their  perspective  are  concerned.  The  Iliad  is  usually  seen  as  the  epic 
poem  par  excellence,  capturing  in  the  most  succinct  manner  the  heroic  spirit  and 
atmosphere  that  befits  a  grand  poem  of  its  kind.  The  Odyssey,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
regarded  as  the  predecessor  of  the  later  genre  of  the  novel:  less  heroic  in  a  way,  and 
certainly  more  prone  to  the  narration  of  marvellous,  surrealistic  adventures,  it  seems  to 
retain  a  relation  to  the  world  of  the  Iliad  only  as  long  as  this  is  necessary  in  order  that  it 
can  belong  to  the  same  tradition. 
The  most  striking  difference,  then,  between  the  two  poems  is  that  they  appear  to 
represent  two  distinct  poetic  genres,  or  rather  two  sub-genres  of  epic  poetry.  This  could 
well  have  to  do  with  the  different  audience  for  which  each  poem  was  composed  and 
performed,  the  different  geographical  area  or  the  different  tradition  to  which  each  poem 
belongs,  or  simply  the  different  purpose  of  each  poet.  Each  poem's  generic  identity  seems 
1  See  p.  10,  n.  6. 
233 to  define  to  a  considerable  degree  the  development  of  the  plot;  a  typical  example,  the 
Iliadic  preoccupation  with  the  glory  of  the  warrior  is less  intense  in  the  Odyssey,  while  the 
fantastic  or  fictional  element  has  undoubtedly  a  very  limited  appearance  in  the  Iliad. 
Once  this  generic  difference  has  been  perceived  and  acknowledged,  there  appear 
other  differences  between  the  poems,  of  a  more  idiosyncratic  quality,  if  I  may  say  so.  if 
nothing  else,  the  Odyssey  is  always  refeffed  to  as  the  poem  in  which  one  can  discern  a 
development  of  moral  thought,  both  with  regard  to  its  theology  and  to  its  presentation  of 
human  interrelations.  This  idea  of  a  linear  development  will  be  presently  questioned,  in  the 
context  of  the  poem's  concept  of  divine  justice.  It  is  necessary  to  note,  however,  at  this 
point  that  the  difference  between  the  two  poems  is  more  one  of  perspective;  although  we 
are  accustomed  to  interpreting  oral  poetry  as  essentially  self-effacing,  we  have  to  consider 
that,  however  discreet  the  poet's  presence  in  the  poem,  the  very choice  of  his  subject  and 
the  very  construction  of  the  plot  are  after  all  the  reflection  of  a  conscious  purpose;  whether 
the  outlook  projected  in  a  poem  could  be  said  to  belong  to  the  poet  himself  or  to  the 
audience  for  which  he  composes  the  poem  is  obviously  of  little  importance;  what  concerns 
us  here  is  that  an  oral  poem  can  indeed  have  its  own  identity. 
The  difference  of  perspective  that  I  have  mentioned  will  perhaps  become  clear  at 
this  point  if  we  consider  briefly  the  way  that  the  plot  of  each  poem  unfolds  -a  more 
detailed  discussion  being  left  for  the  end  of  the  chapter.  We  saw  that  in  the  Iliad  the 
presence  of  fate  and  the  absence  of  divine  justice  conduce  to  our  perception  of  the  heroes' 
tragedy,  with  Achilles'  case  being  certainly  the  most  prominent.  A  conflict  is  necessary  for 
234 the  development  of  the  hero's  character,  2  but  in  the  Iliad  the  internal  conflict  is  more 
important  than  the  external:  the  hero  becomes  trapped  not  simply  by  the  decrees  of  fate,  or 
by  the  workings  of  the  gods,  but  also,  and  perhaps  most  significantly,  by  his  own  decisions; 
he  aims  at  doing  what  seems  to  be  right,  only  to  discover  in  the  end  that  life  has  proven 
him  wrong.  Suffering,  another  necessary  element  for  this  development  of  character,  is 
largely  caused  by  man  himself,  and  fate  is  fulfilled  by  man's  action  as  much  as  it  is 
fulfilled  by  the  action  of  the  gods.  The  tragic  quality  of  such  a  plot  is  beyond  doubt:  man  is 
both  great  and  small,  admirable  and  deplorable,  struggling  against  the  limits  of  his 
knowledge  and  his  mortality.  Divine  justice  can  scarcely  have  a  place  in  such  a  plot,  which 
aims  at  putting  the  emphasis  on  the  tragic  aspect  of  human  responsibility. 
None  of  these  elements  can  be  said  to  exist  as  exactly  the  same  in  the  Odyssey.  The 
conflict  now  is  external  and  manifest,  a  conflict  between  the  rights  of  Odysseus  and  the 
wrongdoings  of  the  suitors.  Good  and  evil  being  thus  clearly  defined,  there  are  certainly 
not  many  opportunities  for  evoking  human  tragedy  in  the  Iliadic  fashion.  The  focus  this 
time  is  not  on  the  hero  who  falls  gloriously,  but  on  the  hero  who  survives  and  by  doing  so 
confirms  his  powerful  existence.  Schein  has  seen  in  this  difference  the  possibility  of  a 
redefinition  of  the  idea  Of  KXEOI;:  if  in  the  Iliad  Woi;  demands  death,  in  the  Odyssey  it  is 
the  v6c-roc  of  the  hero,  his  very  survival  that  raises  him  to  the  eternal  realm  of  epic.  3  Such 
an  interpretation  obviously  views  the  poems  in  a  relationship  of  intertextuality  that  could 
21  am  referring  to  the  hero  in  general,  at  this  point,  and  not  simply  to  AcHi  les.  See  Rutherford  (1982)  146- 
147;  Nethercut  (1976)  detects  the  difference  of  the  Iliad  from  other  epics  in  the  fact  that  the  typical  journey  of 
the  hero  of  folk  sagas  into  a  land  of  mystery,  whence  he  returns  having  acquired  knowledge,  is  now 
transformed  into  an  intemal  and  psychological  journey  that  Achilles  has  to  go  through:  Patroclus'  death  is  the 
occasion  for  Achilles'  own  internal  death,  which  will  lead  to  knowledge  and  re-birth. 
3  Schein  (1996)  10-14;  see  also  Clay  (1983)107-12,184-85. 
235 be  seen  even  as  evocative  of  a  latent  antagonism;  the  possibility  cannot  be  disregarded,  yet 
I  would  tend  to  believe  that  the  development  of  the  character  through  suffering  is  more 
important  than  the  final  aim  itself,  and  therefore  the  definition  or  redefinition  Of  KXEOC  is 
only  of  secondary  importance.  4 
The  opportunity  for  suffering  and  knowledge  in  the  Odyssey  is  found  in  the  hero's 
adventures.  No  external  conflict  exists  here  in  the  sense  that  it  exists  on  Ithaca;  the  hero 
develops  through  a  series  of  experiences  from  a  self-confident,  if  not  arrogant,  warrior, 
inquisitive  and  daring,  to  a  wiser  and  more  cautious  wanderer,  whose  power  now  lies  in  his 
knowledge  rather  than  his  presumption.  5  Again  tragedy  is  absent  from  this  part  of  the 
poem,  which  seems  to  indulge  in  the  presentation  of  the  fantastic  and  extraordinary.  In  the 
scheme  of  such  a  plot,  fate  will  prove  of  minor  importance,  and  the  glorious  divine  justice 
of  the  Odyssey  will  appear  to  be  the  consequence  rather  than  the  basis  of  the  very 
construction  of  the  plot. 
4.1  Moira 
In  the  Iliad  moira  is  basically  related  to  death.  Apart  from  the  relationship  that  the 
concept  of  fate  seems  to  bear  to  the  event  of  death,  the  very  subject  of  the  poem  appears  to 
suggest  such  a  frequent  application.  Besides,  the  heroes  who  feature  as  the  main  characters 
of  the  plot,  such  as  Hector  and  Achilles,  are  heroes  who  were  indeed  killed  in  the  Trojan 
4  See  Macleod  (1983)  5. 
3  Rutherford  (1982)  150ff. 
236 war,  or  at  least  this  is  what  tradition  claims,  and  the  poet  cannot  possibly  overlook  his 
tradition.  In  the  whole  of  the  poem,  it  is  only  once  that  moira  appears  to  have  positive 
connotations,  in  the  case  of  Aeneas'  survival  of  the  war;  otherwise  moira  denotes  either 
death  or  a  lamentable  portion,  individual  or  not. 
In  the  Odyssey  moira  has  a  totally  different  function.  Doubtless,  it  retains  its 
relation  to  death,  but  only  occasionally,  and  mainly  in  its  capacity  to  suggest  the  common 
human  fate  of  death  rather  than  an  individual  lot,  while  the  main  events  of  the  plot  that  are 
said  to  have  been  defined  by  fate  refer  now  to  particular  instances  of  life  itself  Thus  we 
hear  that  Odysseus  was  fated  to  return  to  Ithaca  (E  4142,113-15;  E  286-90,  cf  c  34445), 
or,  if  seen  from  a  different  perspective,  that  he  was  not  fated  to  return  before  a  predefined 
period  of  ten  years  (tP  314-17;  cf.  a  16-18,  P  170-76),  and  that  part  at  least  of  his 
adventures  were  also  a  demand  of  fate  (s  206-7);  and  we  hear  that  the  hero's  fate  also 
demands  his  confrontation  with  the  suitors  (v  306-7).  The  two  main  story  lines  of  the 
poem,  then,  are  both  related  to  moira.  At  the  same  time,  moira  defines  events  of  no  direct 
relation  to  the  plot:  %ve  hear  that  Menelaus  was  not  fated  to  return  to  Sparta  unless  he 
sacrificed  to  the  gods  while  in  Egypt  (6  475-80);  we  hear  again  of  Troy's  fall,  which  was  to 
happen  once  the  wooden  horse  would  enter  the  city  (0  509-13);  and  we  hear  of 
Agamemnon's  unpleasant  and  unexpected  murder  (y  269,  ca  28-34).  6 
More  important,  and  as  is  obvious,  I  believe,  from  the  above  references,  moira  is 
not  used  as  indicative  of  a  negative  event,  minor  exceptions  being  always  expected.  Up 
6  There  are  certainly  many  more  references  to  moira  or  to  events  that  are  presented  as  predefined,  yet  these 
are  references  in  which  the  gods  are  also  involved,  and  I  would  wish  to  keep  them  separate  for  the  moment. 
237 until  the  moment  of  Odysseus'  return  to  Ithaca,  moira  is  the  welcome  decree  that  defines 
this  very  return.  Although  the  event  could  be  seen  in  its  negative  aspect  as  a  decree  that 
keeps  the  hero  away  from  Ithaca  for  ten  years,  the  truth  is  that  the  poet  avoids  putting  a 
stress  on  this  aspect,  the  hero's  adventures  being  presented  for  the  most  part  as  the  result 
of  his  own  personal  wish  to  wander  and  explore.  Possible  difficulties  are  also  presented  as 
caused  by  Odysseus  himself,  or  by  his  companions,  while  the  impression  of  resistance  or 
conflict  has  only  to  do  with  Poseidon's  persistent  wrath  and  persecution.  It  would  appear, 
then,  that  moira  in  the  poem  is  not  presented  as  an  obstacle  to  the  hero's  wishes,  or  as  a 
vague  restraint  against  which  he  has  to  struggle  in  order  to  gain  his  freedom,  but  rather, 
coinciding  with  his  own  plans,  it  has  a  more  positive  quality  and,  as  a  consequence,  a  less 
interesting  potential  in  terms  of  the  narrative  or  of  characterisation.  Moira  in  the  Odyssey 
is  more  discreet. 
This  could  be  seen  in  association,  first  of  all,  with  the  gods'  participation  in  the 
poem;  the  gods  of  the  Odyssey,  by  comparison  to  those  of  the  Iliad,  do  not  appear  as 
frequently  to  be  intervening  in  the  plot,  nor  do  we  find  here  all  of  the  Olympians  being 
concerned  and  involved  with  Odysseus'  fortune;  instead,  we  have  only  Poseidon  and 
Athena,  the  one  opposing  and  the  other  protecting  the  hero,  and  only  for  a  brief  moment  do 
we  hear  of  Helios  whose  wrath  causes  the  death  of  the  companions.  More  important, 
despite  their  different  aims,  Poseidon  and  Athena  do  not  come  in  conflict  with  each  other 
as  the  Iliadic  gods  do,  who,  being  divided  in  two  factions,  pursue  each  some  interest  of 
their  own;  now,  Athena  refrains  from  interfering  for  as  long  as  her  uncle  is  persecuting 
Odysseus  (v  341-43),  and  Poseidon's  action  comes  to  an  end  as  soon  as  Odysseus  reaches 
Scheria,  allowing  Athena  the  freedom  to  intervene  -  for  fate  demands  that,  once  Odysseus 
238 reaches  Scheria,  he  will  return  to  Ithaca  (ý  286-89).  As  for  Zeus,  he  is  now  more  distant 
and  even  more  dignified  than  he  is  in  the  Iliad,  and  with  Hera  being  significantly  absent, 
he  can  be  seen  in  all  his  ma  esty  in  a  more  consistent  fashion.  What  is  more  interesting  is 
that  the  plot  is  not  in  this  case  related  to  his  will;  his  consent  is  necessary,  no  doubt,  but  the 
course  of  events  do  not  form  part  of  a  plan  of  his;  standing  aloof,  he  simply  sees  that 
everything  happens  as  it  should,  giving  instructions  and  dispensing  favours  to  the  lesser 
gods. 
With  the  participation  of  the  divine  being  so  limited,  and  so  very  different,  and 
with  Zeus's  will  being  absent,  the  impression  of  predetermination  seems  to  be  weaker;  the 
gods  are  still  here,  all-powerful  and  ready  to  interfere,  but  their  actions  can  hardly  be  said 
to  have  the  power  of  moira;  even  if  these  actions  do  agree  with  moira's  decrees,  neither 
Poseidon's  nor  Athena's  will  can  create  the  impression  of  an  ineluctable  course  for  the 
plot.  Besides,  with  the  conflict  between  right  and  wrong  being  clearly  defined,  and  with 
Athena  supporting  Odysseus'  rights  so  fervently,  the  plot  appears  again  to  unfold  in  total 
harmony  with  the  hero's  wishes  and  plans,  all  supernatural  opposition  being  limited  to  the 
minimum.  Before  further  examining  how  moira  functions  in  the  general  scheme  of  the 
plot,  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  way  it  appears  in  the  text;  the  relation  to  the  gods  is 
inevitably  an  issue  also  to  be  discussed.  I  will  begin  by  briefly  noting  the  differences  in  the 
application  of  the  relevant  terminology;  these  are  only  of  minor  significance,  yet  they  are 
worth  mentioning  in  passing. 
As  noted  in  chapter  two  (70),  all  three  basic  meanings,  share,  propriety,  and  fate, 
are  present  in  the  poem;  there  are  slight  differences,  as  one  would  expect,  but  these  do  not 
239 seem  to  be  so  radical  as  to  suggest  an  important  change  or  development  of  the  idea  of  fate. 
7 
The  meaning  of  'share'  presents  no  particular  interest  at  this  point,  so  I  proceed  with  the 
two  remaining  meanings. 
The  expressions  KaT"  alcav,  ýTrip  alcav  are  absent  from  the  poem,  KaTa  pcýlpav 
being  the  standard  way  to  denote  propriety;  only  once  do  we  have  iv  potpin  at  X  54.  The 
opposite  is  OU'  KaTa  p6tpav,  with  napa  pcýtpav  occurring  again  only  once  at  g  509.8  The 
adjectives  aTtailloc  and  ivalcipoc  are  also  found  in  this  sense,  their  negative  being  again 
E'ýaifatoc.  The  obvious  formulaic  character  Of  KaTa  11&ipav,  evident  already  in  the  Iliad, 
seems  to  explain  the  gradual  loss  of  the  original  meaning  of  order  in  a  social  sense,  which 
can  be  detected  in  the  application  of  the  expression  to  almost  any  situation  that  is 
described  as  being  fitly  or  properly  accomplished.  9  For  the  most  part,  though,  the 
expression  retains  its  reference  to  an  act  of  speech  which  was  properly  made.  At  the  same 
time,  the  greater  frequency  of  the  expression  has  to  be  noted.  10  The  expressions  are 
evocative  of  the  overall  atmosphere  of  the  poem  and  along  with  the  more  extended  use  of 
terms  which  denote  propriety  in  general,  such  as  BtKatcc  or  voi'lpcov,  they  are  responsible 
for  the  consequent  emphasis  on  proper  behaviour  throughout  the  poem. 
Of  the  terms  that  appear  in  the  Iliad,  Trinpc=  is  now  totally  absent,  while  pcýlpa 
seems  to  be  used  even  more  extensively.  When  implying  predetermination,  moira  can  refer 
7  Dietrich  (1965:  222ff.  )  argues  for  a  more  technical  use  of  the  word  p6pa  in  the  Oaýssey,  this  difference, 
along  with  the  greater  frequency  of  this  application  in  the  poem,  are  for  Dietrich  indicative  of  a  further 
diminution  of  the  goddess's  status. 
8  For  the  occurrences  of  the  expression,  see  p.  72,  n.  39 
9  See,  for  example,  y  456f,  1T  395;  see  p.  74. 
10  For  all  of  the  variations  referring  to  propriety  we  have  fourteen  occurrences  in  the  Iliad  against  the  twenty- 
eight  of  the  Odyssey. 
240 again  either  to  death  or  to  life,  but,  as  already  noted,  the  references  to  death  are  now 
definitely  limited  when  compared  to  those  of  the  Iliad.  This  is  certainly  expected,  since  the 
Odyssey  revolves  round  the  theme  of  return  and  revenge,  and  has  only  a  small  interest  in 
death.  "  The  suitors'  death  is  referred  to  as  their  a"10tpov  ýpap  at  Tr  280,  and  ascribed  to 
poipa  only  at  X  413,  that  is  only  after  they  have  been  slaughtered  by  Odysseus,  although 
the  event  is  foreshadowed  repeatedly  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  poem;  12  both 
utterances  belong  to  Odysseus,  and  while  X  413  could  be  seen  as  a  reference  to  moira's 
order  which  demanded  that  the  suitors  should  die,  iT  280  looks  more  like  a  formulaic  way 
of  saying  that  their  death  is  close  -a  statement  that  Odysseus  makes  not  because  he  knows 
of  fate's  decrees,  but  because  he  is  confident  of  his  victory,  supported  as  he  is  by  Athena. 
More  interesting  are  Athena's  words  at  P  283-84,  spoken  to  Telemachus:  OU'U  TI  'tC(XCYIV 
OdvaTOV  Kal  Kfipa  jlikivav,  I  ok  64  cýt  cXE56V 
iCTIV,  SIT'  ýIlaTl  7TaVTa(;  oXcdai.  Kýp,  the 
word  denoting  mainly  the  fate  of  death  (see  p.  67),  assumes  the  power  to  evoke 
predetermination  in  the  context  of  this  utterance,  with  Athena  confirming  the  inevitability 
of  what  is  to  come. 
13 
11  Dietrich  (1965:  213)  explains  moira's  limited  reference  to  death  in  the  Odyssey  as  a  result  of  the  gradual 
fusion  of  the  original  goddess  with  the  Olympians:  'Moira  becomes  more  and  more  impersonal,  so  that  %Nith  a 
few  exceptions  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  detect  in  her  new  functions  the  original  figure.  More  important  still, 
Moira  now,  as  it  were,  enters  into  a  definite  relationship  with  the  gods  in  which  she  is  often  reduced  to  an 
expression  of  the  will  and  the  purpose  of  the  gods  ..... 
Connected  with  this  development  is  the  fact  that  Moira 
becomes  less  frequently  connected  with  death,  and  then  always,  with  one  minor  exception,  this  connection  is 
made  explicit  by  the  addition  of  0ýva`r0l;  or  ý6vot;  '. 
12  There  is  a  slight  difference  in  the  way  the  events  of  the  Iliad  are  anticipated  so  as  to  evoke  moira's  power 
on  man:  we  have  there  a  prospective  use  of  moira,  which  puts  a  different  degree  of  emphasis  on  the  restraints 
that  moira  imposes  on  man. 
13  Kr'lp  is  related  to  the  suitors'  death  quite  frequently,  see,  for  example,  P  165  (Halitherses'  prophecy),  ir  169 
(Athena  speaking),  p  82  (Telemachus),  a  155  (the  poet  );  K4P  appears  in  these  cases  mainly  as  an  event  that  is 
caused  by  a  human  agent,  and  being  combined  with  edva`r0f;  or  ýovoc  it  refers  to  death  rather  than  to  fate; 
however,  ca  414  is  of  interest:  'Ooaa,  Rumour,  wanders  the  city  of  Ithaca,  bringing  the  news  of  the  suitors' 
death,  lJVTj0T6PC0V  CTUYEP6V  6dVaTOV  Kai  Kfip'  WiTrouca. 
241 In  keeping  with  the  poem's  minor  concern  for  death,  the  application  of  pcýlpa  itself 
in  the  sense  of  death  is  limited:  we  find  the  formula  p6tip'  6XOý  KCXeEXUC71  TavTlxcyEc.; 
6ava'TOIO  four  times  (P  100,  y  237-3&--  T  144-45=  ca  134-55),  and  then  we  have  p6pa 
combined  with  edva-roc  once  (p  326)  and  once  again  in  a  rather  strange  collocation  with 
ý6voc  (ý  24).  The  fairly  common  popcipov  hpap  of  the  Iliad  appears  only  once  (K  175), 
and  the  same  happens  with  aTlaipov  hpap  (Tr  280).  Rather  more  frequent,  always 
proportionately,  is  the  use  of  116pci;,  which  retains  its  association  with  death,  the  only 
exceptions  being  the  expression  6TrEp  p6pov,  used  three  times  in  all  (a  34,  a  35,  r;  436)  and 
Heracles'  reference  to  the  descent  to  Hades,  a  fate  common  to  him  and  Odysseus  (X  618- 
19);  otherwise,  popoc  is  combined  with  OdvaToc  at  i  61=  X  409=  u  241,  while  we  find  the 
adjective  6Kýpopoc  referring  to  the  suitors  in  an  hypothetical  sentence  by  Athena  at  a  266, 
and  the  locution  KaK6V  p6pov  combined  with  the  verb  dTr6XXuc;  6ai  at  a  166.14 
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  difference  between  the  two  poems  is  that  in  the 
Odyssey  we  have  a  more  frequent  use  of  the  wordei#a-rov  (-a),  15  which  should  be  seen 
in  associationwith  the  equally  frequent  use  of  the  verb  Er'TT1KXCA1V  (-EcOat)  for  a  decision 
of  the  gods.  The  verb  is  totally  absent  from  the  Iliad,  and  it  is  worth  noting  that  now  the 
image  of  the  spinning  woman  is  related  to  alca  and  the  KX68cc  (ri  197).  The  latter  have 
often  been  seen  as  a  reference  to  an  old  figure  of  popular  belief,  a  deity  of  birth  and 
fertility,  whose  capacity  of  weaving  man's  life  was  related  at  some  point  to  moira;  the 
14  CC  0  133. 
15  Against  the  two  occurrences  of  the  word  in  the  Iliad  (E  64,0  477),  we  have  five  occurrences  in  the 
Odyssey  (S  561,1507,  K  473,  X  297,  v  172),  while  we  also  find  the  adjective  a0g#aTc<  as  an  attributive  to 
the  wine  that  caused  Elpenor's  death  (),  61);  dei#aToc  is  interpreted  as  'boundless'  and  therefore  as 
equivalent  or  parallel  to  Egatmoc  by  Dietrich  (1965:  273),  following  IL  Frankel's  interpretation  (Fesischrift 
fir  Jakob  Wackemagel,  G6ttingen  1923,28  1). 
242 view  has  not  received  general  acceptance,  however,  and  the  idea  is  mostly seen  as  another 
instance  of  the  poet's  love  or  technique  of  graphic  representation  and  imagery,  as  is  the 
case  vAth  Zeus's  scales  or  jars.  16  Whatever  the  case,  the  plurality  of  the  figures  certainly 
recalls  the  Wipat  of  fl  49,  and  it  does  seem  plausible  that  there  is  a  latent  personification. 
of  the  concept;  the  frequent  association  of  moira  with  the  gods  seems  also  to  suggest  that 
fate  is  seen  in  general  more  as  related  to  than  as  independent  of  the  gods.  It  remains  to 
examine  the  evidence  of  the  text  itself 
The  same  tension  that  we  witnessed  in  the  Iliad  between  moira  and  the  gods  is 
present  in  the  Odyssey  as  well.  On  the  one  hand,  moira  is  thought  to  be  the  cause  of 
unpredictable  and  inexplicable  changes  or  difficulties  and  the  reason  of  man's  inextricable 
link  to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  gods  are  believed  to  be  responsible  for  almost 
everything  in  life,  happiness  as  well  as  misery,  17  and  Zeus  in  particular  is  said  to  know 
jjcýpaV  T9  appopITIV  TE  KaTaOVIITCSv  avOpcýTrcav  (u  76),  18  and  to  distribute  6'XPcq  among 
people  &Tcaq  EeAllat  (;  188-89),  or  as  Helen  tells  Menelaus  at  5  236-37,  aT&P  Ozok  a'xxoTE 
aXXc,?  I  Zvk  dya66v  TE  KaKOV  TE  615Cý'  5ýVaTai  yap  c3navTa.  So,  are  the  gods  responsible 
for  moira  too?  Is  moira  another  decision  of  the  gods,  which  is  somehow  distinguished  from 
all  other  divine  decisions?  Or  should  one  believe  that  moira  is  a  totally  distinct  and 
independent  power? 
16  See  Dietrich  (1965)  289-94,  where  the  various  views  on  the  old  popular  belief  are  also  presented;  Dodds 
(1951:  20,  n.  29)  takes  KXCSOEC  to  be  different  from  the  Wipat  of  fl  49,  for  the  former  can  be  seen  as 
'personal  fates,  akin  to  the  Norris  of  Teutonic  myth,  Greene  (1944:  16)  sees  the  figure  of  the  spinning 
woman/women  in  general  as  a  'more  vivid  way  of  asserting  the  determining  influence  of  heredity,  though  it 
links  each  individual  directly  with  Fate,  not  with  his  forebears'. 
17  See  c  133-34,142,  cf.  a  267-  a  400=  Tr  129,  y  231,  s  169,11  214=  ý  198-=  p  119,  u  195,41210.  To  these 
examples  one  can  oppose  Zeus's  well-known  words  at  a  32ff,  where  the  god  makes  clear  that  mortals  have 
their  own  share  of  responsibility  for  their  misery. 
"'  See  also  a  34849,  o  488C.  u  201-3. 
243 The  same  basic  scheme  that  we  found  in  the  Iliad  is  here  relevant  too.  Zeus  enjoys 
a  privileged  relation  to  moira,  because  of  his  superiority,  while  the  lesser  gods,  although 
related  to  it,  cannot  be  identified  with  it  unless  seen  collectivelY  and  under  the  power  of 
Zeus;  at  the  same  time  moira.  retains  much  of  its  independence,  and  in  this  way  the  lack  of 
concern  for  a  consistent  system  of  thought  on  the  part  of  the  poet  is  confirmed.  One  crucial 
difference,  hinted  at  already,  is  that  now  the  relation  tends  to  be  somehow  closer  than  it 
was  in  the  Iliad.  Alongside  the  rare  Auk  aloa  of  the  Iliad  (1608,  P  32  1),  which  we  find  at 
152,  we  also  have  the  expressions  Oco6  pcRpa  (X  292),  NcSv  p6ipa  (y  269,  X  413),  5a  I  povoý 
alca  (X  61).  And,  as  already  noted,  we  find  the  verb 
iTTIKweetv 
(-cceat)  having  as  a 
subject  Zeus  (6  207-8),  the  gods  (a  17f,  y  208,6  579f,  X  139,  u  195-96)  or  the  vague 
Saipcov  (Tr  64);  the  image  of  weaving  one's  life,  and  especially  at  the  moment  of  one's 
birth,  is  directly  connected  with  fate  in  lines  T1  197-98,  a'aaa  ot  alca  KaTa  KXcSOEq  TE 
Pap6a,  I  Yelvolisivo?  viýpavTo 
Xfvo?,  OSTE  111V  TEKE  p4Tqp,  a  variant  of  the  Iliadic  a"aaa  oi 
AT=  I  y1yvo11jvc,? 
iTrivilar;  Xivc,?,  0'TS  J11V  TEKS  PTITTIP  (Y  127-28,  Mcýtpa  Kpa-rai4  at  fl  209- 
10).  It  does  not  come  as  a  surprise,  then,  that  we  hear,  for  example  of  Troy's  fall  in  terms 
Of  alca  at  6  509-13,  and  as  a  result  of  divine  action  at  6  579-80:  referring  to 
'IXIOU  OTTOV, 
Alcitious  explains,  T6v  aj  6E01  PiV  TCOýav, 
i1TEKXC3aaVT0  8'  O'XEePOV  I  aVePC&r01C,  Iva  ýGl 
KCX1  icaop'VOICIV 
Cio,  84  19 
Along  the  sanie  lines,  the  word  ec'cýaTov,  is,  as  I  said,  more  frequently  used.  Lines 
532-33  are  worth  looking  at  in  comparison  to  K  473-74:  in  the  first  case  the  Cyclops 
invokes  Poseidon,  his  father,  and  asks  for  Odysseus'  punishment;  and  if  fate  demands  the 
19  Cf-'  also  X  436-39  and  j,  190. 
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hero's  return  to  Ithaca,  ETI  01  Pelp'  ECTi  ýIOXOUC  18ESIV  Kai  IKE00at  I  OIKOV  EUKTIPEVOV  Kai  rqv 
b; 
TraTPt5a  ydTiav,  let  him  at  least  -  and  the  prayer  goes  on;  in  the  second  case,  Circe  uses 
a  variant:  d  Tot  Oicýa-r&  icm  cacaefival  Kai  tKicem  I  OTKOV 
...,  with  Oiaýa-rov  having 
obviously  replaced  pdipa.  Finally,  nothing  could  be  more  explicit  than  Penelope's  words 
at  T  592-93:  in't  ydp  Tot  &d=q  p&,  pav  E"  erjKav  I  a6ava-rot  OVIlTeIGIV  iTrI  ý615copov 
apoupav  -  two  lines  that  could  be  seen  as  a  clearer  and  more  explicit  expression  of  the  idea 
evoked  by  Zeus's  Jars  (fl  527-33). 
What  all  these  references  prove  is  that  there  is  some  direct  link  between  moira  and 
the  gods,  almost  as  if  moira  is  not  simply  fulfilled,  but  more  importantly  defined  by  the 
gods.  Alongside  this  idea  there  exists  the  more  vague  perception  of  the  relation  which 
acknowledges  the  existence  of  a  link,  which  link,  however,  remains  indefinable  and 
obscure.  This  is,  for  example,  the  aforementioned  case  of  u  75-6,  where  we  hear  that  Zeus 
0  61SEv  a'rraVTa,  I  PCýIpaV  T'  dPPOP'171V  TE  KaTaOV71TCSv  avOpco'Mov,  but  whether  knowledge 
of  moira  necessarily  entails  responsibility  for  it  as  well  is  not  clear.  Similarly,  when 
Odysseus  finally  reaches  Ithaca,  Athena  comes  to  him  (v  221  ff.  );  the  hero  complains  about 
her  absence  during  his  adventures  (314-21),  and  the  goddess  replies:  al'M'(p  iYC3  TO  JAV  Oý 
ITOT'  dMiCTEov,  aW  ivi  Oupcý  I  Tý  C,  "  VOCT'  EIC  '  'Cat;  "ITO  Tr  'VTal;  iTaipou,;  (33940), 
. 
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'but  I  simply  did  not  wish  to  oppose  my  uncle,  Poseidon'.  No  comment  is  made  on  the 
causal  relation  between  the  goddess's  knowledge  or  premonition  and  the  action  she  takes 
to  ensure  that  Odysseus  will  finally  reach  Ithaca. 
Even  more  complicated  seems  to  be  Poseidon's  relation  to  moira:  the  god  is  angry 
because  the  hero  has  blinded  his  son  Polyphemus;  he  actually  fulfils  his  son's  prayer, 
245 which  demands,  as  we  saw,  that  even  if  Odysseus'  return  to  Ithaca  is fated,  the  hero  should 
&PE'  KaKCSI;  A601,6Xicac  61TO  lTdVTac  iTaIPOUC,  I  V116C  ETC  dXX0TpjPTj(;,  EUP01  5'  EV  7TTIpaTa 
6"IM9  (t  534-35).  20  At  E  206-7,  however,  Calypso,  trying  to  persuade  Odysseus  to  stay  with 
her  at  Ogygia,  informs  the  hero  of  the  difficulties  he  is  to  find  before  him  on  the  way  to 
Ithaca:  t"t  ys  piv  v8dry;  qat  #Ect  6'aaa  Tot  alca  I  K45E*  avaTrXficat,  Trpliv  RaTpl6a  ycclav 
MoOat,  while  at  v  306-7,  Athena  warris  her  prot6gd  of  the  suitors:  ETTrco  0'  0'00a  Tot  aloa 
66POV;  E-Vt  TTOITIT0101  I  KT)86'  dvacrxiaOav  0ý  6S  TETXdpcva1  Kat  avayKo.  The  situation 
becomes  even  more  complicated  as  we  proceed  in  the  poem.  At  X  100  Teiresias'  prophecy 
is  given:  the  hero  will  reach  Thrinacia,  where  he  will  find  Helios'  cattle;  if  he  lands  there, 
he  should  avoid  harming  the  cattle;  if  the  cattle  are  harmed,  a  terrible  journey  awaits 
Odysseus  and  his  companions,  the  latter  will  be  destroyed,  and  the  hero  will  return  to 
Ithaca  only  much  later,  on  a  foreign  ship  and  having  lost  all  his  companions;  and  when  he 
finally  reaches  his  destination,  he  will  find  suitors  devouring  his  property  and  wooing  his 
wife;  and  those  he  will  kill  (104-118).  21  What  is  the  relation  between  alca,  Polyphemus' 
prayer,  Teiresias'  prophecy  and  Helios'  punishment?  Is  this  a  coincidence,  do  the 
individual  gods  act  towards  the  fulfilment  of  a  plan,  and  if  they  do  so,  is  this  a  conscious 
decision,  a  proof  of  their  obedience  to  some  superior  force  or  order?  Besides,  how  is 
Athena's  support  in  the  second  part  of  the  poem  to  be  understood  in  relation  to  fate?  Does 
Teiresias'  prophecy  imply  that  Odysseus'  revenge  is  part  of  fate,  or  is  the  assault 
accomplished  successfully  simply  because  of  the  goddess's  help? 
2'  For  Poseidon's  wrath  see  a  19-21,68-75;  t  282-96,33941,365-70,375-79;  ;  330-31;  in  270-75;  v  125- 
138,341-43. 
2'  For  ambiguity  as  an  essential  element  of  prophecy  see  Clay  (1983)  150-54,  where  it  is  also  observed  that 
Teiresias  and  Circe  cause  each  a  different  reaction  by  Odysseus,  the  former  results  in  the  hero's  'resignation  to 
the  impenetrable  will  of  the  gods',  while  the  latter's  'objective  information'  incites  the  hero's  restlessness  and 
determination. 
246 Much  of  the  confusion  is  removed  if  we  apply  Jorgensen's  principle  (see  p.  146): 
most  of  the  above  mentioned  examples  come  from  Odysseus'  own  account  of  the 
adventures,  a  fact  thatý  as  Jorgensen  himself  has  shown,  can  account  for  the  obvious 
inconsistencies.  Similarly,  the  references  to  the  gods'  or  more  particularly  to  Zeus's 
capacity  to  define  moira  as  expressed  by  means  of  explicit  verbal  associations  of  the  two 
are  mostly  part  of  the  heroes'  utterances,  relating  moira  with  the  divine  in  a  most 
indeterminate  way,  and  thus  admitting  both  moira's  non-human  origin  and  the  gods' 
superior  power.  The  poet  of  the  Odyssey  exhibits  the  same  sensitivity  as  the  poet  of  the 
Iliad  and  does  not  allow  his  heroes  more  certainty  than  real  life  allows.  There  are  certainly 
cases  in  which  it  is  the  poet  himself  who  refers  to  a  similar  relation;  at  a  16-18,  for 
example,  the  poet  begins  his  narration,  the  starting  point  being  the  moment  OTC  51)  ETOi; 
hX6E  TrEp  i  TrNolibcov  ivi  allTCSV,  I  TCý  01  i  TrEKXC3CaVTO  6COI  OTK6v5s  vica0al  I  CICIMKýQv,  while 
at  e  4142  Zeus  himself,  when  sending  Hermes  to  Calypso,  and  bidding  the  goddess  to 
F0  release  Odysseus,  concludes  co"k  yap  ot  PCýP'  ECTI  ýIXOU(;  9WEIV  Kai  Wceat  I  07KOV 
40POýOV  Kai  ifiv  cc  iTaTpi5a  yditav. 
Obviously,  the  relation  remains  ambivalent  and  frustrating,  and  the  references  to  an 
implicit  link  between  the  two  abound,  especially  since  a  large  part  of  the  poem  is  narrated 
of  lif  22  in  the  first  person,  reflecting  the  heroes'  own  assumptions  about  the  causation  e. 
22  Dietrich  (1965)  interprets  the  greater  frequency  of  such  references  as  indicative  of  moira's  gradual  loss  of 
her  personality  and  subsequent  subordination  to  or  identification  with  the  Olympian  gods;  moira  assumes  now 
a  more  moral  sense,  as  it  is  now  part  of  Zeus's  or  the  gods'  moral  order.  True,  there  is  indeed  a  possibility  that 
moira  becomes  gradually  accommodated  or  assimilated  to  the  gods,  a  fact  that  is  reflected  in  the  frequent 
locution  pcýipa  ecoG  or  BccSv  and  so  forth;  of  interest  is  also  the  appearance  of  the  KXc3eEi;  at  Tj  197:  if,  as 
Burkert  says,  abstracts  are  personified  at  some  point  to  denote  the  qualities  and  attributes  of  the  gods,  the 
presence  of  three  goddesses  could  be  seen  to  imply  that  the  function  of  predetermination  is  related  to  the  gods 
even  more.  However,  I  would  avoid  relating  moira's  moral  connotations  to  this  development,  and  I  would 
certainly  avoid  relating  this  change  to  moira's  loss  of  divine  status. 
247 Yet,  it  is  equally  important  to  note  that,  as  happens  in  the  Iliad,  the  confusion  is  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  concept  itself,  which  the  poet  is  not  interested  at  all  in  eliminating.  In 
fact,  it  would  appear  that  the  Odyssey,  although  definitely  a  much  more  complex  poem 
than  the  Iliad,  is  structured  in  such  a  way  as  to  allow  us  to  see  even  more  clearly  the  way 
in  which  moira  and  the  gods  bear  the  possibility  of  different  perspectives  for  the  poet  and 
consequently  for  a  shift  of  emphasis  according  to  the  needs  of  the  narrative.  Both  fate  and 
the  gods  are  necessary  to  the  poet,  who,  however,  uses  them  at  different  moments,  and 
certainly  without  being  interested  in  relating  the  two  forces  in  one  or  the  other  way;  for 
both  fate  and  the  gods  serve  as  equally  valid  explanations  of  life,  yet  apparently  they  do  so 
each  on  a  different  level,  since  each  force  has  different  implications  and  thus  is  capable  of 
creating  a  different  effect  on  the  audience. 
A  crucial  difference  between  the  two  poems  is  the  absence  of  Zeus's  will  from  the 
Odyssey,  in  its  place,  since  some  divine  power  must  after  all  be  responsible  for  the 
development  of  the  plot,  we  find  Athena,  whose  role  is  established  from  the  very 
beginning  of  the  poem:  she  is  the  one  who  reminds  Zeus  of  Odysseus'  unfortunate 
situation,  persuading  her  father  that  the  hero  should  be  helped  at  last  to  return  home.  Zeus 
later  (in  the  poem)  admits  that  both  Odysseus'  return  and  the  revenge  on  the  suitors  are  the 
result  of  Athena's  own  plan:  ou'  yap  8h  To6Tov  pEv  EpouXwcac  v6ov  au'T4,  I  c3c  ý  Tot 
f  KEI,  VOU(;  '06UCCEk  aTrOTICETat  E'XWv;  (E  23-24=  co  479-80).  The  way  in  which  Athena's 
plan  is  intermingled  with  the  decrees  of  moira  reminds  us  of  the  Iliad  (see  pp.  134ff.  ), 
although  now  fate  seems  to  bear  a  different  type  of  moral  connotation,  vAth  Odysseus' 
revenge  being  rightful  and  justified.  What  is  more  interesting  to  note  at  this  point  is  that 
248 Athena's  support  covers  only  part  of  the  plot,  namely  the  present;  her  absence  from 
Odysseus'  narration  is  conspicuous,  the  cause  of  the  hero's  own  complaint  (v  3  16-2  1). 
The  most  important  reason  behind  this  absence  is  certainly  the  fact  that  the 
adventures  belong  to  a  world  of  folktale  and  fiction  in  which  the  goddess  obviously  has  no 
place.  Divine  support,  always  necessary  in  epic  as  well  as  in  folk  tales,  is  provided  by 
Leukothea  (E  333-53)  and  Hennes  (K  275-306),  but  this  is  after  all  not  the  unquestionable 
support  of  a  god  who  appears  to  favour  a  hero  in  a  special  way;  rather,  it  is  the  necessary 
supernatural  aid  in  this  preternatural  world  of  witches  and  one-eyed  giants.  23 
With  Athena  and  her  plan  being  absent,  the  poet  has  no  other  means  of  imposing  a 
will.  on  his  plot  but  to  employ  moira.  The  folktale  character  of  the  adventures  hardly  allows 
us  to  regard  moira  in  this  case  as  the  explanation  that  the  poet  himself  gives  to  events  of 
the  past;  rather  it  would  appear  that  the  idea  is  used  with  a  degree  of  poetic  licence.  If 
moira.  demands  that  Odysseus  should  stay  away  from  Ithaca  for  ten  years,  no  one  can 
object  to  this  irrational  demand,  nor  can  anyone  doubt  its  inevitable  fulfilment.  But  this  is 
all  the  poet  needs  from  moira.  And  this  is  actually  all  that  moira  can  offer.  Thus,  the  focus 
is  not  on  moira  and  its  workings;  the  idea  may  prove  convenient  for  the  construction  of  a 
more  or  less  coherent  plot  and  in  order  that  the  impression  of  an  inevitable  course  be  given 
23  Interestingly,  Poseidon  is  easily  accommodated  in  this  world,  by  becoming  Polyphemus'  father,  apart  from 
providing  the  poet  with  a  force  of  opposition,  he  seems  to  be  a  significant  connecting  link  between  the  two 
worlds.  Athena's  absence  from  the  adventures  has  been  interpreted  by  Clay  (1983:  pmsim)  in  terms  of  the 
goddess's  wrath  for  the  hero:  the  goddess  felt  threatened  by  Odysseus'  extreme  cunning  and  therefore  U*Ppti;, 
almost  transgressing  the  limits  between  mortals  and  immortals.  Clay's  thesis  is  very  interesting  indeed,  yet  for 
all  that  it  is  rather  far-fetched;  for,  as  far  as  I  see,  there  is  no  reference  to  Athena's  wrath  in  relation  to 
Odysseus,  explicit  or  implicit,  nor  would  I  regard  Odysseus'  behaviour  hybristic  in  any  sense  -  at  least,  not  in  a 
sense  that  would  agree  with  Homeric  theology.  The  arguments  that  Clay  employs  are  certainly  not 
unquestionable,  yet  what  is  relevant  here  is  that  the  idea  of  Gppt4;  as  presupposed  by  her  thesis  in  the  sense  of 
a  provocation  of  dixine  wrath  does  not  seem  to  be  supported  by  Homeric  theology. 
249 and  certain  axioms  be  put,  but  its  presence  is  discreet,  kept  almost  to  the  minimum,  and 
hardly  ever  of  great  concern.  Of  great  significance  for  moira's  limited  power  to  cause  the 
tension  that  we  find  in  the  Iliad  is,  as  noted,  the  fact  that  the  hero's  will  coincides  with  it. 
Thus,  the  references  to  it  seem  like  stepping  stones  of  the  plot,  regular  reminders  of 
the  plot's  solution:  at  the  very  beginning  we  hear  of  the  gods  who  weave  the  hero's  return 
at  a  certain  point  in  time  (a  16-18),  while  the  details  of  this  event  are  given  at  r;  33-42;  we 
also  hear  at  E  286-90  of  the  conditional  decree  that,  once  Odysseus  reaches  Scheria,  his 
return  to  Ithaca  is  certain;  and  during  the  hero's  narration  of  his  adventures  we  hear  of  the 
fulfilment  of  Traktý=  Oi#=  twice,  at  1  507-12  in  regard  to  Polyphemus,  and  at  v 
172-78  in  regard  to  the  Phaeacians;  24  finally,  we  hear  at  K  330-32  that  Circe  had  been 
actually  warned  by  Hermes  of  her  meeting  with  Odysseus.  Teiresias'  prophecy,  creating  a 
sense  of  predetermination,  and  being  of  unique  authoritative  power,  seems  to  link 
Odysseus'  past  with  the  future. 
Moira,  an  impersonal  and  non-active  order,  is  again  fulfilled  by  the  gods.  Whether 
the  gods  are  responsible  for  it  or  not,  the  action  belongs  to  them.  Thus,  the  references  to 
Zeus's  or  the  gods'  intervention  seem  to  imply  man's  subjugation  to  life  and  weakness  to 
react,  but  also  to  offer  a  more  tangible,  and  thus  more  comprehensible  presentation  of  the 
forces  that  are  to  be  found  behind  life.  25  The  plot  is  thus  enriched,  becoming  all  the  more 
24  The  Phaeacians'  ending  is  also  mentioned  at  0  564-71,  where  Alcinous  recalls  that  his  father  Nausithous  had 
often  anticipated  the  punishment  that  would  come  from  Poseidon. 
25  1  am  not  referring  at  this  point  to  the  heroes'  references  to  the  gods  in  general  or  to  a  vague  god  or 
Scupwv,  but  to  the  action  of  Poseidon,  Zeus  and  Athena;  true,  Poseidon's  action  falls  largely  in  Odysseus' 
narration,  but  this  seems  to  be  an  inevitable  difficulty  the  poet  had  to  overtook,  the  result  of  his  decision  to 
have  his  hero  narrate  his  adventures  himself. 
250 elaborate.  For,  once  the  gods  are  used  in  the  plot  they  are  not  simply  abstract  forces 
defining  life;  they  are  given  human  characteristics  and  human  feelings,  and  are  involved  in 
life  as  they  pursue  their  personal  and  self-centred  aims.  Therefore,  Poseidon  may  be 
fulfilling  moira,  but  he  also  fulfils  his  promise  to  Polyphemus  (1536);  and  Zeus  is  not  only 
the  god  who  leads  Odysseus  towards  his  fate  (E  3342),  but  also  the  god  who  fulfils  Helios' 
request  that  Odysseus'  companions  should  be  destroyed  (p  385419).  If  it  is  moira  that 
demands  this  destruction,  still,  it  must  be  caused  in  some  way  and  by  one  of  the  gods,  and 
Zeus  seems  to  be  most  appropriate  for  this. 
The  question  of  the  gods'  relation  to  moira  seems,  therefore,  irrelevant:  the  gods 
may  be  seen  as  an  explanation  of  moira's  own  fulfilment,  but  also  as  a  totally  independent 
force,  which  offers  possibilities  of  a  different  kind  for  the  development  of  the  plot  in  terms 
of  action  and  reaction.  This  is  evident  in  the  way  the  three  gods  of  the  poem,  Zeus, 
Poseidon  and  Athena,  are  presented;  the  ambivalence  of  their  relation  to  fate  proves 
exactly  the  lack  of  any  concern  on  the  poet's  part  to  establish  a  more  coherent  system. 
In  the  few  instances  when  Zeus  actually  participates  in  the  plot,  his  relation  to 
moira  is  vague;  in  fact,  it  appears  that  any  interpretation  of  his  behaviour  could  be  valid. 
When  in  s  he  sends  Hermes  to  Calypso,  ordering  the  goddess  to  release  Odysseus,  he  gives 
a  brief  account  of  the  course  Odysseus  will  take  from  Ogygia  to  Scheria,  and  then  to 
Ithaca,  saying  that  the  hero's  fate  has  defined  that  he  should  return  home  rich  with  gifts  he 
will  have  received  from  the  Phaeacians  (e  3342).  Hennes  transfers  the  message  to  Calypso 
(e  43,105-15),  who  is,  however,  unwilling  to  obey  (c  11844);  but  she  has  to,  for,  as 
Hermes  says,  she  should  be  careful  not  to  cause  Zeus's  wrath  (c  14647).  Should  we 
251 believe  that  Zeus  has  actually  decided  Odysseus'  moira,  which  he  now  simply  fulfils, 
demanding  the  obedience  of  the  gods?  Or  that  he  simply  states  moira's  orders  and  makes 
sure  that  they  will  be  obeyed,  using,  even  if  indirectly,  the  threat  of  his  wrath? 
Tlis  episode  picks  up  the  sequence  of  the  opening  scene  of  the  poem.  When  the 
moment  comes  that  Odysseus  must  return  to  Ithaca  (a  16-18),  the  gods  happen  to  hold  a 
meeting,  from  which  Poseidon  is  absent  (a  22-27).  Athena  brings  up  the  question  of 
Odysseus:  he  is  held  captive  by  Calypso  at  Ogygia,  unable  to  fulfil  his  wish  to  return  home; 
why  should  Zeus  be  so  angry  with  him  (a  48-62)?  Zeus  replies  that  he  is  not  angry  himself, 
but  Poseidon  is,  whose  son  Polyphemus  was  blinded  by  Odysseus;  but  now  they  can  seize 
the  opportunity  of  Poseidon's  absence  and  help  the  hero  (a  64-79).  Athena  devises  a  plan 
(a  84-95),  and  thus  Hermes  is  sent  to  Calypso.  Calypso  sets  Odysseus  free  (c  263-68),  but 
while  the  hero  is  sailing  towards  Scheria,  Poseidon  happens  to  be  returning  from 
Aethiopia;  he  becomes  furious  with  the  gods'  change  of  mind  during  his  absence,  for  he 
knows  that  when  Odysseus  reaches  Scheria,  the  return  to  Ithaca  is  certain  -  this  is  his 
moira;  unable,  though,  to  change  what  is  fated,  he  is  determined  to  make  Odysseus' 
journey  as  difficult  as  possible  (E  282-90).  And  the  hero  is  found  in  real  danger,  until  he  is 
saved  by  another  deity,  Leukothea  (c  333-53). 
It  is  obvious  that,  if  seen  in  relation  to  moira,  the  whole  episode  of  the  gods' 
decision  on  Odysseus'  return  raises  a  series  of  questions.  All  their  decisions  are  in 
accordance  with  moira,  even  Poseidon's  actions  are  set  within  the  limits  of  moira's 
commands.  Should  one  believe  that  the  gods  fulfil  a  decision  they  made  a  long  time  ago  -a 
decision  to  which  Poseidon  objected  at  some  point  and  which  they  could  not  therefore 
252 accomplish  while  he  was  present?  Later  on,  when  Odysseus  meets  Athena  and  complains 
that  the  goddess  never  helped  him  in  the  past  ten  years  (v  316-21),  she  does  not  reply  that 
she  could  not  disobey  moira,  but  simply  that  she  did  not  vvish  to  object  to  Poseidon  (v  339- 
43).  Is  then  Poseidon's  absence  from  a  up  until  c  necessary  if  the  gods  are  to  help 
OdysseUS?  26  Or  is  it  that  they  simply  obey  moira,  and  they  would  have  to  do  so  even  if 
Poseidon  were  there,  but  then  things  would  be  somehow  more  difficult?  If  Odysseus' 
return  to  Ithaca  is fated  and  imposed  on  the  gods  from  the  outside,  why  is it  described  as 
ý[Xov  liaKdPECGI  Oscýtat(a  82)?  Is  there  a  possibility  that,  if  the  gods  object,  it  will  not  be 
fulfilled?  Is  this  why  Poseidon  talks  of  a  change  of  mind  (E  286-88)?  Also,  if  moira  defined 
that  Odysseus  should  return  to  Ithaca  after  ten  years  have  passed,  why  does  Zeus  attribute 
Odysseus'  failure  to  return  to  Poseidon's  wrath?  How  can  Poseidon  determine  Odysseus' 
course  and  subsequent  absence  from  Ithaca?  How  can  it  be  that  Zeus  appears  so  weak 
before  Poseidon's  wrath,  especially  since  Poseidon  himself  accepts  his  own  inability  to 
prevent  Odysseus'  return,  for  Zeus  has  consented  to  it  and  has  given  his  promise  (v  132- 
33)? 
It  is  fairly  obvious,  I  think,  that  when  using  the  gods,  the  poet  does  not  care  to 
analyse  their  relation  to  moira.  The  idea  that  the  gods  participate  in  human  lives  is  deeply 
rooted  in  his  thought,  and  he  exploits  this  idea  according  to  the  needs  of  his  narrative,  and 
more  important,  irrespectively  of  the  questions  it  raises  with  regard  to  moira.  The  obvious 
ambivalence  of  this  relation  in  this  episode  is  the  result  of  the  fact  that  the  purpose  of  the 
26  Clay  (1983:  46-52)  argues  that  Poseidon's  absence  is  indeed  necessary,  but  not  the  most  significant 
condition  for  the  plot  to  be  set  into  motion;  the  decisive  event  is  the  ending  of  Athena's  wrath. 
253 episode  is  certainly  not  to  prove  moira's  connection  with  or  differentiation  from  the  gods, 
but  rather  to  set  the  plot  in  motion  and  establish  the  role  of  the  gods  in  Odysseus'  life. 
Odysseus  is  all  alone  in  Ogygia,  captive  of  a  goddess.  The  time  comes  when  moira 
demands  his  return.  But  the  difficulties  that  prevented  his  return  for  so  long  still  exist.  It 
takes  an  external  action  for  this  situation  to  change  and  the  poet  attributes  this  action  to  the 
gods;  Calypso  is  the  only  other  alternative,  yet  a  change  of  mood  that  would  lead  her  to 
decide  on  her  own  to  set  Odysseus  free  would  be  very  sudden  and  certainly  inexplicable. 
Athena's  intervention  is  necessary.  At  the  same  time,  the  gods'  council  allows  us  to  see  the 
relationship  between  Odysseus  and  the  gods,  a  relationship  that  defines  the  whole  of  the 
plot,  which  is  thus  foreshadowed. 
in  the  first  part  of  the  poem,  until  the  moment  of  Odysseus'  return  to  Ithaca,. 
Poseidon's  wrath  enriches  the  plot,  as  new  trouble  is  caused  by  the  god  on  different 
occasions,  while  the  episode  at  Thrinacia  and  the  momentary  participation  of  Helios  is  a 
further  opportunity  for  the  poet  to  avoid  monotony;  27  Athena,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the 
necessary  force  for  the  development  of  the  plot  after  Odysseus  reaches  Ithaca.  Equally 
interesting,  though,  is  that  Athena's  love  for  the  hero  suggests  a  special  link  between  them, 
which  is  actually  emphasized  by  the  goddess  herself  (v  296-99):  they  are  both  renowned 
for  their  cunning  and  wisdom,  and  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  this  element  of  Odysseus' 
character  proves  of  the  utmost  importance  for  his  survival  and  final  victory,  as  well  as  for 
27  One  can  also  think  of  the  'interlude'  that  we  have  in  Demodocus'  second  song  (8  266-3  66),  which  transfers 
us  for  a  moment  to  a  divine  world  which  recalls  the  fliacý  but  is  totally  absent  from  the  Odyssey.  For  the  way 
in  which  Demodocus'  song  adapts  what  is  most  probably  a  traditional  subject  in  epic  to  the  particular  subject 
of  the  Odyssey  see  Garvie  (1994)  on  6  266-366. 
254 the  plot.  By  presenting  Athena  at  the  beginning  of  the  poem,  the  poet  establishes  this 
relation  and  foreshadows  the  sequence  of  the  plot;  but  he  also  allows  himself  to  construct 
the  Telemachy  (a-S)  and  thus  confirm  Telemachus'  role  in  the  poem  too. 
As  for  Zeus,  his  presence  is  inevitable:  he  is  the  god  who  can  demand  the 
fulfilment  of  Odysseus'  fate,  obliging  to  obedience  both  Poseidon  and  Calypso,  but  he  is 
also  the  god  whose  consent  is  necessary  before  Athena  can  realise  her  plan  of  helping 
Odysseus,  both  in  regard  to  the  hero's  return  and  in  regard  to  his  revenge  on  the  suitors. 
This  role  is  evident  in  all  of  the  cases  where  the  god  appears  in  the  plot:  at  p  385-88  he 
decides  the  destruction  of  Odysseus'  companions,  because  they  harmed  Helios'  cattle;  at  v 
14045,154-58  he  allows  Poseidon  to  turn  the  Phaeacian  ship  into  stone,  since  the  latter 
feels  dishonoured  by  the  Phaeacians'  behaviour;  at  ca  478-86  he  advises  Athena  to  avoid  a 
conflict  between  Odysseus  and  the  suitors'  relatives,  and  aim  at  a  reconciliation  instead. 
Thus,  despite  his  limited  participation  in  the  poem,  Zeus  is  always  the  father  of  mortals 
and  immortals,  ultimately  responsible  among  gods  for  life's  order. 
It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  gods'  action  may  be  necessary  for  the  fulfilment  of  fate, 
yet  it  is  developed  on  a  different  level  from  that  of  fate;  and  it  is  on  that  level  in  which  the 
gods  exist  and  act  that  the  poet  has  the  opportunity  to  pursue  a  plot  of  more  suspense 
through  conflict.  What  remains  to  be  seen  is  how  the  poet  uses  moira  and  the  gods  as 
independent  of  each  other  in  order  to  create  different  perspectives.  We  have  seen  (155ff.  ) 
that  in  the  Iliad  the  poet  similarly  prefers  the  differentiation  of  moira  from  the  gods,  for  in 
this  way  the  heroes'  own  responsibility  for  life  assumes  a  tragic  dimension.  In  the  Odyssey 
tragedy  is  avoided,  yet  the  differentiation  is  equally  effective  with  regard  to  the  emphasis 
255 put  on  human  responsibility.  For  the  hero,  or  for  man  in  general,  it  is  doubtless  of  little 
importance  whether  it  is  fate  or  the  gods  that  cause  his  trouble;  he  always  strives  for 
happiness,  hoping  to  surpass  all  difficulties,  of  whatever  origin  these  may  be.  But  for  the 
poet,  as  well  as  for  his  audience,  there  is  a  significant  difference. 
The  different  potential  that  the  idea  of  fate  seems  to  have  results  from  its  being 
impersonal  and  indefinable.  Moira  is  an  order,  the  order  of  nature  and  life,  as  defined  by 
the  well  established  limits  of  the  portion  that  is  distributed  to  each  man  or  god. 
Inevitability  is  one  of  its  essential  characteristics,  not  simply  because  the  idea  refers  to  a 
predetermined  course  of  events  that  can  by  no  means  be  avoided,  but  also,  and  perhaps 
more  important,  because  this  order  entails  a  regular  sequence  of  action  and  reaction;  seen 
in  ten-ns  of  fate,  this  order  entails  that  once  the  cause  appears  the  effect  will  follow 
inevitably  and  all  too  swiftly.  Fate,  then,  implies  an  order  of  things  against  which  man  can 
do  nothing.  More  important,  he  has  done  nothing  which  could  have  provoked  this  fate.  His 
responsibility  is  confined  to  the  way  he  responds  to  what  would  seem  in  a  different  context 
to  be  a  chance  event.  The  first  beginning  that  sets  life  in  motion  is  not  necessarily  defined 
by  man.  The  relation  between  fate  and  man  remains  cold  and  cruel  to  a  large  degree, 
impersonal  and  irrational.  The  emphasis  in  this  case  is  put  on  man's  inability  to  escape 
from  the  course  that  has  already  been  defined  for  him,  on  his  powerlessness  before  the 
unpredictable  and  inevitable  commands  of  life. 
By  comparison  to  this  order  the  gods'  action  seems  totally  rational.  As  noted  above, 
the  gods  provide  the  action  that  moira  certainly  lacks,  and  in  this  way  the  mechanisms  of 
life  appear  more  easy  to  comprehend.  This  entails  that  even  if  at  times  moira  should  be 
256 interpreted  as  a  decision  of  the  gods,  this  decision  takes  the  shape  of  a  rational 
development  that  is  in  full  accord  with  the  gods'  anthropomorphic  character.  Thus,  Zeus's 
inexplicable  hatred  for  the  Atreidai  may  be  equated  with  moira  (A  436-39,  cf.  CO  28-29, 
34),  but,  besides  referring  to  an  inescapable  reality,  it  also  presents  life  in  terms  of  human 
reasoning.  Moreover,  this  entails  that  the  use  of  the  gods  implies,  at  least  to  the  audience, 
an  idea  of  greater  human  freedom,  which  is  certainly  associated  with  man's  incessant 
struggle  and  hope.  A  total  and  absolute  identification  of  moira  and  the  gods  on  all  levels 
and  in  all  aspects  of  life  would  remove  all  hope  from  human  life.  While  moira  is 
irrevocable,  the  gods  can  be  propitiated,  can  change  their  mind,  can  intervene  at  a  crucial 
moment  and  offer  their  help.  It  is  this  belief  in  gods'  flexible  behaviour  that  helps  man  live 
life  whatever  the  circumstances. 
Exactly  as  happens  in  the  Iliad,  then,  the  poet  uses  the  gods'  participation 
separately  from  and  independently  of  moira,  for  this  enables  him  to  shift  the  emphasis 
from  man's  powerlessness  before  life  to  man's  own  responsibility  either  for  his  happiness 
or  for  his  misery.  The  importance,  then,  ties  not  in  whether  a  fact  is  fated  and  in  how  this 
fate  is  related  to  the  gods'  action,  but  in  the  aspect  the  poet  chooses  to  stress  when  talking 
of  fate  or  the  gods.  During  the  hero's  adventures  moira  is,  as  I  said,  only  discreetly  used 
and  without  the  compelling  force  it  has  in  the  Iliad,  the  idea  is  employed,  it  would  seem, 
almost  in  a  casual  way  that  does  not  bring  any  tragic  connotations  to  the  fore;  the  poet 
simply  informs  us  that  what  is  to  happen  or  what  has  happened  should  be  attributed  to 
moira.  Yet,  it  would  not  seem  impossible  that  the  poet  should  use  moira  as  the  reason  for 
Odysseus'  endless  struggles;  the  idea  may  be  latent,  but  it  is  never  developed.  Instead,  the 
hero  stands  against  a  series  of  situations  which  he  will  finally  survive,  at  times  caused  by  a 
257 god,  at  times  caused  by  the  hero  himself  The  hero  is  in  this  way  allowed  all  the  freedom  to 
develop,  and  the  emphasis  is  not  on  whether  the  hero's  development  will  coincide  with 
moira,  but  on  the  way  that  this  development  takes  place,  and  on  the  qualities  that  the  hero 
exhibits  during  his  struggles.  Throughout  the  adventures  Odysseus'  character  as 
7T0XUTP0Troq  and  TroXupTjXavcq  are  emphasized,  anticipating  at  the  same  time  the 
confrontation  with  the  suitors. 
Of  extreme  interest  are  the  cases  of  Odysseus'  companions,  Aegisthus  and  the 
suitors.  The  link  between  these  three  examples  lies  in  the  fact  that,  although  all  three  are 
vaguely  connected  at  some  point  with  moira,  the  stress  is  actually  put  on  man's 
responsibility  for  his  life  -  or  death.  In  all  three  examples  man  is  warned  against  his 
imminent  destruction,  the  result  of  his  own  behaviour,  but  despite  this  warning  he  acts 
foolishly  and  improperly  to  his  own  CoSt.  28 
The  end  of  Odysseus'  companions  is  never  actually  attributed  to  fate  in  a  direct  and 
explicit  manner.  We  are  informed  of  it  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  poem,  yet  the  poet  talks 
of  the  companions'  own  foolishness,  a6TCSV  Y&P  #STiPBG1V  dTacOaMNICIV  O'XOVTO  (a  7). 
The  warning  comes  when  Odysseus  visits  Teiresias  in  the  Underworld.  Part  of  the 
prophecy  concerns  the  companions:  if  they  avoid  harming  Helios'  cattle,  they  will  return 
safe  to  Ithaca;  but  if  they  do  harm  them,  destruction  will  come  upon  them  (X  110-15).  The 
same  words  are  later  repeated  by  Circe  (p  1374  1),  when  she  sends  Odysseus  off  her  island 
29  Warnings  exist  in  the  Iliad  as  well;  one  can  think  of  M  200ff,  where  an  eagle,  sent  by  Zeus  and  holding  a 
snake,  appears  among  the  Trojans;  Polydarnas  warns  Hector  that  they  should  retreat,  but  Hector  refuses  to  do 
so.  Different  is  the  warning  implicit  in  Phoenix'  story  about  Meleager  at  1  524-605:  although  this  is  not  a 
divine  omen,  it  is  a  form  of  warning  not  heeded  at  the  appropriate  moment;  destruction  follows,  while  for  the 
audience  this  entails  irony. 
258 and  warns  him  of  the  trouble  he  vAll  have  to  face.  For  Odysseus  this  is  still  a  warning;  as 
for  the  audience,  which  have  been  informed  already  of  the  end  of  the  companions  (a  7-9), 
a  sense  of  inevitability  is  certainly  created,  yet  one  could  hardly  talk  of  fate  at  this  point. 
The  impression  of  fate's  cruel  presence  is  created  rather  by  Odysseus'  own 
narration  of  the  episode  to  Alcinous  in  p.  The  narration  is  built  up  carefully  so  as  to  evoke 
the  impression  of  an  irrational  and  inescapable  event:  every  detail  seems  to  lead  gradually 
to  the  wrong  decision.  The  hero  narrates  how  his  companions  insisted  on  their  getting  off 
at  the  island,  despite  Odysseus'  expression  of  fear  for  an  imminent  danger  (271-94);  how 
the  winds  were  unfavourable  and  prevented  their  leaving  the  island  until  Odysseus' 
companions  were  starving  (325-32);  and  how  at  a  crucial  moment  the  gods  made  Odysseus 
fall  asleep  (338):  it  was  then  that  his  companions  decided  to  disobey  their  commander's 
orders  and  eat  Helios'  cattle.  Odysseus'  reaction,  or  rather  dramatic  narration  of  his 
reaction,  on  realising  what  happened  further  reinforces  the  atmosphere  of  an  irrational 
power;  as  Teiresias'  prophecy  is  still  to  be  fulfilled,  the  hero  talks  of  a-m  (371-73),  finding 
no  other  explanation. 
The  case  of  the  companions  seems  to  be  indicative  of  the  way  the  poet  mingles  fate 
with  human  and  divine  action,  each  idea  being  employed  for  the  sake  of  a  distinct  and 
particular  effect.  -)q  We  have  already  seen  that  Polyphemus'  prayer  at  1  528-35  involves  the 
companions'  end  as  well.  Lines  1  534-35  are  actually  a  variant  of  those  of  Teiresias  at  X 
114-15.  Yet,  if  the  poet  needs  Polyphemus'  prayer  and  Poseidon  in  i  in  order  to  construct 
the  plot,  and  if  he  needs  Teiresias'  prophecy  in  X  to  justify  the  hero's  descent  to  Hades,  he 
29  See  Clay  (1983)  5-6. 
259 does  not  need  them  in  p,  where  he  uses  Zeus  instead  (312-15,371-73),  or  the  vague 
8aipcav  (295)  or  Om  (338);  what  he  needs  at  this  point  of  the  plot  is  to  evoke  the  idea  of 
fate  as  perceived  or  as  projected  by  the  hero  himself  This  is  evident  in  the  function  of  a 
detail  that  the  poet,  or  rather  Odysseus,  adds  at  p  266-69  (=-  272-76):  Odysseus  says  that  he 
has  been  warned  not  to  stop  at  Thrinacia,  because  there  is  some  danger  waiting  for  them 
there;  in  fact,  neither  Teiresias  nor  Circe  have  given  such  a  warning;  but  this  little  detail 
I 
enhances  the  impression  that  the  companions  .'  reaction  was  caused  by  some  5afpcav  (p 
295),  an  irrational  force  that  wished  their  destruction.  The  reason  for  this  emphasis, 
however,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  companions  themselves,  for  if  it  did,  there  is  no 
obvious  reason  why  the  poet  should  avoid  connecting  their  end  with  fate  elsewhere  in  the 
poem.  The  poet  needs  fate  at  this  point  in  relation  to  Odysseus  alone  -  to  Odysseus  in  his 
double  identity  as  the  victim  and  the  narrator  at  the  same  time  of  moira's  workings.  Thus, 
on  the  one  hand,  moira  is  used  to  remind  his  audience  of  the  role  that  fate  has  in  the  hero's 
life,  creating  thus  the  impression  that  the  hero  will  inevitably  be  left  alone;  on  the  other,  it 
is  employed  by  the  poet  as  a  'literary'  means  of  suspense  used  by  the  hero  himself.  30 
In  a  strange  way,  then,  fate  seems  to  fall  upon  Odysseus  more  intensely  than  on  the 
companions.  For  the  companions  the  poet  prefers  to  put  the  stress  on  the  aspect  of  their 
own  responsibility.  Therefore,  despite  the  fact  that  divine  forces  are  said  to  prepare  their 
destruction,  suddenly  these  forces  are  withdrawn  from  the  narration,  and  the  companions 
30  Rutherford  (1986:  153)  sees  here  a  complex  problem  with  no  solution,  'an  important  part  of  Homer's  legacy 
to  tragedy:  the  omens  ignored,  the  warnings  inadequate,  defied  or  recalled  too  late'.  This  is  true;  the  case  of 
the  companions  is  the  only  one  in  the  poem  which  has  the  power  to  suffocate  both  the  heroes  and  the 
audience;  everything  leads  to  their  destruction,  and  their  foolishness  is  certainly  mitigated  or  justified  by  the 
absence  of  any  alternative.  What  I  wish  to  stress,  however,  is  the  way  in  which  the  poet  manipulates  the 
concept  so  as  to  present  the  companions  both  as  the  victims  of  an  inscrutable  fate  and  as  responsible  agents 
provoking  their  own  destruction. 
260 are  left  all  alone  to  decide  what  to  do;  and  they  decide  on  their  own  to  take  the  risk  and 
violate  their  promise  to  Odysseus,  in  full  knowledge  of  the  consequences  this  decision  may 
have  (11340-52).  Interestingly,  the  poet  does  not  confine  himself  to  narrating  their  act  of 
disobedience  and  impropriety,  but  enhances  the  idea  of  their  responsibility  by  providing 
Eurylochus'  exact  words,  which  conclude  with  the  ironical  expression  of  a  wish:  PoAop, 
aTTag  TrPO'C;  KGpa  Xavc3v  ano  Oupov  oVocai  I  1"I  6roa  cTpeýyedat  E;  co'v  Ev  v4ac,?  ip4pli  (350- 
5  1).  The  subsequent  decision  by  Helios  and  Zeus  that  the  companions  should  be  destroyed 
comes  naturally  and  not  at  all  unexpectedly. 
The  story  of  Aegisthus  and  Agamemnon  is  used  as  a  parallel  to  that  of  Odysseus 
and  the  suitors:  both  Odysseus  and  Agamemnon  face  a  threat  as  soon  as  they  return  home, 
yet,  whereas  Odysseus  manages  to  overcome  the  danger,  and  moreover  take  a  revenge, 
Agamemnon's  fate  is  to  be  killed  by  Aegisthus  and  Clytaemnestra.  Two  points  of 
comparison,  then:  the  end  of  the  heroes,  and  the  end  of  their  usurpers.  And  while  the  end 
of  each  hero  is  defined  by  moira,  the  end  of  Aegisthus  as  well  as  that  of  the  suitors  is  the 
consequence  of  their  own  behaviour.  In  the  gods'  council  at  a  26-95  Zeus  explains  how 
Aegisthus  died  6nip  p6pov  (34)  and  through  no  responsibility  of  the  gods:  for  he  paid  no 
attention  to  the  gods'  warnings  that  he  should  neither  marry  Clytaemnestra  nor  kill 
Agamemnon;  Orestes'  revenge  was  inevitable  (3543).  And  Athena  replies:  may  everybody 
who  acts  in  the  same  insolent  and  improper  way  find  a  similar  death  (4547);  and  the 
discussion  then  moves  to  the  case  of  Odysseus.  Later  on,  though,  when  Nestor  relates 
Agamemnon's  death  to  Telemachus,  he  refers  to  the  gods'  fate,  p6pa  eEcSv  (y  269),  as  the 
261 cause  behind  Aegisthus'  and  Clytaernnestra's  decision.  The  inconsistency  is  obvious,  but  it 
should  be  seen  in  tenns  of  the  effect  each  idea  createS.  31 
may  be  supposed  that  the  attribution  of  Aegisthus'  and  Clytaemnestra's  act  to 
gods'  fate  by  Nestor  emphasises  the  old  man's  pious  character,  which  is  evident  in  all  of 
it  certainly  creates  the  impression  of  Nestor's  acknowledgement  of  the  gods'  superiority 
and  acceptance  of  his  own  humble  position.  Similarly,  the  event  is  attributed  to  moira  by 
Achilles,  who  also  interprets  life  post  eventum  and  is  not  concerned  to  define  its  ultimate 
cause  with  accuracy  (ca  34).  Interestingly,  though,  moira  is  mentioned  neither  in  Menelaus' 
narration,  nor  in  Agamemnon's  own  account;  the  Atreidai  do  not  wish  to  talk  of  moira, 
and  their  account  puts  a  special  stress  on  Aegisthus'  responsibility;  Aegisthus'  insolence  is 
thus  seen  on  the  human  level  as  an  act  that  demands,  and  receives,  revenge.  The  case  of 
Aegisthus  is  mentioned  in  a  exactly  in  order  that  the  parallel  vvith  the  suitors  may  be 
drawn. 
The  responsibility  of  the  suitors  for  their  own  end  is  beyond  doubt.  It  is  emphasised 
by  constant  references  both  to  their  impropriety  and  to  their  indifference  towards  divine 
warnings.  It  is  true  that  the  very  fact  that  Teiresias  foresees  the  course  of  events  after 
Odysseus  will  have  reached  Ithaca  (X  115-20)  creates  the  impression  that  the  suitors'  death 
and  thus  Odysseus'  final  victory  are  part  of  the  latter's  moira.  . 
32  However,  even  if  fate  has 
31  Une  y  269,  aW  6TE  54  Piv  Pdipa  OEGSV  ETrE8rPE  Sapfivat,  presents  an  obvious  difficulty:  piv  could  refer 
to  either  of  the  three  characters  mentioned  above,  that  is  Agamemnon,  Clytaemnestra,  or  Aegisthus;  the 
sequence  seems  to  suggest  that  the  pronoun  refers  to  Aegisthus:  T6V  PEV  aot5o'v  ayCA)v  ...  KaXXI  TrEV  ...  TIJV 
S'  E8Awv  EOeXouoav  avrlyayev;  however,  as  Adkins  (1960a:  28f,  n.  14)  remarks,  Clytaemnestra  is  'more 
pron-drient  throughout  the  whole  passage;  the  poet  is  very  interested  in  her  (good)  character,  and  hence  is 
more  likely  to  comment  on  her  fall  than  that  of  Aegisthus';  this  solution  would  be  further  supported  by  the 
antithesis  that  exists  between  Clytaemnestra's  previous  propriety  (266)  and  the  final  act. 
32  CE  also  v  306-7. 
262 indeed  defined  these  facts,  it  is  important  that  the  poet  prefers  not  to  stress  this  aspect:  the 
references  to  fate  are  considerably  fewer  as  we  approach  the  solution  of  the  plot. 
The  absence  of  moira,  from  the  second  part  of  the  poem  seems  to  be  related  to  the 
construction  of  the  plot.  If  the  end  of  the  story  were  fated,  and  since  fate  would  not  be  a 
force  against  which  Odysseus  would  have  to  struggle,  but  a  force  that  would  lead  him  to 
success  and  happiness,  the  poem  would  lack  the  sense  of  conflict  it  now  has,  and 
everything  would  seem  incredibly  easy  -  and  very  unrealistic.  In  the  first  part  of  the  poem 
the  impression  of  action  and  reaction  is  created  by  the  struggle  of  Odysseus  against  moira, 
and  to  a  greater  extent  against  the  gods'  wrath,  resulting  in  a  journey  full  of  difficulties  for 
a  whole  ten  years;  the  same  impression  can  be  retained  in  the  second  part  only  through  the 
confrontation  with  a  different  power,  since  moira.  this  time,  if  it  really  exists,  is  on  the 
hcro's  side;  hence,  the  confrontation  of  two  human  forces,  one  represented  by  Odysseus, 
the  other  by  the  suitors.  Athena's  role  is  certainly  a  guarantee  of  Odysseus'  victory,  yet  it 
doubtless  lacks  the  sense  of  inevitability  that  moira  definitely  has. 
What  is  worth  noticing  in  these  three  examples  is  that,  although  moira  is  of  great 
importance  in  the  poem,  the  question  of  its  relation  to  the  gods  proves  pointless,  since  the 
two  forces  are  not  actually  related  in  the  plot,  but  rather  function  on  two  different  levels. 
Moira  and  the  gods  correspond  to  two  different,  yet  parallel  lines  of  action,  that  lead  to  the 
same  end,  without  the  one  rejecting  or  cancelling  the  other.  The  poet  simply  chooses  to 
adopt  the  force  that  best  suits  his  aims  each  time,  without  being  interested  in  establishing  a 
relation  between  them.  Moira  is  an  irrational  demand  of  life,  irrevocable  and  inevitable. 
But  the  gods  have  a  wider  field  of  action,  and  this  allows  the  poet  to  construct  a  more 
263 elaborate  plot  and  to  develop  the  idea  of  human  responsibility.  Thus,  apart  from  man's 
struggle  against  his  irrational  and  unpredictable  fate,  which  entails  his  final  subjugation, 
we  also  see  man  in  his  relation  to  the  gods,  the  way  in  which  he  himself  causes  their 
reaction  and  participation,  the  degree  of  his  own  responsibility  for  the  course  of  his  life. 
But  another  observation  seems  to  emerge  out  of  this  examination:  that  moira, 
however  cruel  and  powerful,  does  not  determine  the  whole  of  one's  life.  Mcýtpa,  or  fate,  is 
the  portion  that  each  person  has  in  life,  and  as  such  it  is  individual  for  each  person.  Yet, 
this  does  not  entail  that  life  is  predefined  in  all  its  details  and  all  its  aspects.  Moira 
explains  basicallY  the  irrational  element  of  life,  the  unexpected  and  inexplicable  changes 
or  difficulties,  one's  own  death  being  the  most  characteristic  example.  In  other  words  it 
functions  when  man  can  not  be  deemed  responsible  for  an  event,  which  he  can  not 
33 
control.  This  is  when  man  needs  this  force  as  an  explanation.  And  this  is  perhaps  another 
reason  why  the  poet  avoids  an  explicit  connection  of  moira  with  the  companions  or  the 
suitors:  had  he  stressed  the  role  of  moira,  their  responsibility,  even  if  not  totally  relieved, 
would  certainly  not  have  the  importance  it  now  has. 
The  view  that  moira,  does  not  define  all  of  life  leaves  enough  space  for  man  to 
decide  and  act  freely,  and  proves  that  the  belief  in  fate  does  not  entail  a  deterministic  or 
fatalistic  idea  of  life.  No  plan  is  to  be  found  behind  moira's  demands.  In  a  way,  moira  may 
be  seen  as  a  chance  event,  its  distribution  having  no  rational  basis,  and  aiming  at  no 
particular  end.  Moreover,  although  man  never  knows  his  personal  moira,  he  never  gives 
up,  for  the  belief  in  the  gods  enables  him  to  hope  that,  by  behaving  properly,  he  may  gain 
33  See  Garvie  (1994)  on  9  196-98. 
264 their  support  and  hel  P.  34  And  although  his  expectations  may  often  be  belied  and  his 
struggle  prove  fruitless,  still  a  large  part  of  his  life  can  be  formed  by  him.  Odysseus  can  by 
no  means  avoid  his  fated  absence  from  Ithaca  for  ten  years,  but  during  these  ten  years  he  is 
responsible  for  the  outcome  of  his  adventures.  And  after  he  comes  to  Ithaca,  he  is 
responsible  for  the  outcome  of  his  conflict  vvith  the  suitors,  just  as  the  suitors  are 
responsible  for  provoking  Odysseus'  revenge. 
It  has  become  clear,  I  believe,  that  in  the  Odyssey  the  concept  of  moira  itself  does 
not  differ  from  the  concept  as  found  in  the  Iliad.  35  What  differs  is  the  way  in  which  each 
poem  uses  this  concept  for  the  accomplishment  of  its  narrative  aims.  While  in  the  Iliad 
moira.  seems  to  dominate  the  whole  plot,  and  a  sense  of  inevitability  is  always  present 
along  with  the  idea  of  man's  limited  po%vcrs  of  perception,  knowledge  and  action,  the 
Odyssey  prefers  a  partial  only  use  of  the  idea.  This  is  largely  the  result  of  the  poems' 
different  subjects,  and  consequently  of  their  different  perspective. 
The  Odyssey  narrates  the  adventures  of  Odysseus  and  his  final  triumphant  victory 
and  re-establishment  of  status;  as  noted,  moira  in  the  poem  entails  his  absence  from  Ithaca 
for  ten  years,  but  also  his  safe  return  and  happiness;  thus,  it  is  not  only  an  opposing  force 
against  which  man  stands  helpless,  but  also  a  force  that,  after  a  particular  moment, 
coincides  with  the  hero's  plans  and  leads  to  their  fulfilment.  Fate,  then,  only  partly 
functions  as  a  cause  of  action  and  reaction  in  the  Odyssey;  in  the  rest  of  the  work  this 
effect  is  created  by  humans  and  gods  alone.  In  the  Iliad,  on  the  other  hand,  fate  demands 
34  This  is  certainly  an  attitude  related  to  the  human  perception  of  divine  justice;  see  p.  6  1,  n.  4,  and  pp.  167ff.. 
33  Dietrich  (1965:  327ff.  )  insists  on  the  difference;  see  p.  247,  n.  22. 
265 death,  and  death  is  the  only  case  in  which  the  gods  prove  unable  to  intervene.  One  after  the 
other  the  heroes  succumb  to  this  fate:  first  Sarpedon  (TT  433-505),  then  Patroclus  JT  786- 
857),  and  then  Hector  (X  5-366),  while  Achilles'  own  imminent  death  is  left  untold, 
lending  a  tragic  end  to  the  poem.  Man's  powerlessness  and  helplessness  before  life's 
irrational  demands  are  obvious,  and  his  hopeless  struggle  seems  to  emphasise  it  even  more. 
Fate  is  a  constant  danger,  a  threat,  an  imminent  destruction. 
However,  the  impression  of  fate's  importance  in  the  Iliad  is  also  caused  by  the 
imposing  character  of  Zeus's  plan,  which  is  connected,  or  rather  combined  with  moira.  In 
the  Iliad  the  poet  seems  to  be  employing  the  idea  of  Zeus's  plan,  just  as  he  employs 
Athena's  plan  in  the  Odyssey,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  whole  plot  to  have  been 
defined  by  moira  alone;  this  would  have  been  too  cruel  for  man,  but  it  would  also  limit  the 
poet's  opportunities  for  a  more  elaborate  plot.  Thus,  Hera  and  Athena  can  ignore  Zeus's 
orders  and,  despite  his  threats,  attempt  to  intervene  (E)  350-96);  had  that  intervention 
succeeded,  it  would  have  overturned  Zeus's  plan.  Similarly,  after  Hera  has  seduced  Zeus 
and  the  god  falls  asleep  (--  292-353),  Poseidon  seizes  the  opportunity  and,  with  Hera's 
admonition,  manages  to  change  the  course  of  the  battle,  even  if  only  temporarily  (-:  361- 
552).  In  the  end,  though,  Zeus's  plan  is  never  reversed;  the  lesser  gods  are  obliged  to 
obedience,  even  if  this  takes  the  threat  of  Zeus's  wrath  (E)  5-27,399-408,447-56;  0  14- 
33). 
However,  the  poet's  choice  of  Zeus  and  not  of  some  other  god  is  what  actually 
creates  the  compelling  impression  of  predetermination  in  the  poem  (see  pp.  117ff.  ).  Zeus 
has  the  unique  privilege  of  a  special  relation  to  fate;  he  is  the  only  god  that  is  directly 
266 connected  with  moira,  because  his  authority  and  power  allow  his  decisions  to  assume  the 
quality  of  inevitability,  which  so  characteristically  defines  the  concept  of  fate.  Certainly,  as 
happens  in  the  Odyssey,  this  relation  seems  quite  ambivalent:  one  could  choose  to  see  Zeus 
as  the  power  behind  moira,  or simply  suggest  that  the  god  merely  combines  and  adopts  his 
plan  to  moira's  demands.  Whatever  the  case,  though,  it  remains  a  fact  that  moira  and  Zeus 
are  closely  linked,  and  their  demands  are  carefully  combined  into  one  single  plan. 
The  examination  of  the  Iliadic  plot  has  shown  that  Zeus's  plan  and  moira  form 
actually  two  different  lines  of  action.  Zeus's  plan  entails  the  fulfilment  of  Thetis'  request 
(A  522-27):  he  causes  a  temporary  destruction  of  the  Greek  army  so  that  Agamemnon  may 
realize  his  mistake  in  dishonouring  Achilles,  the  favourite  of  the  gods  -a  plan  that  could  be 
said  to  be  actually  accomplished  by  the  end  of  1;  Achilles'  rejection  of  Agamemnon's  gifts 
subverts  tradition  itself,  and  now  the  poet  moves  smoothly  towards  the  idea  of  moira.  With 
the  Greek  army  still  facing  the  trouble  caused  because  of  Achilles'  wrath,  we  follow  the 
poet's  narration  towards  the  fulfilment  of  the  moirai  of  Sarpedon,  Patroclus  and  Hector, 
blended  together  as  they  are  and  forming  one  continuous  plot. 
The  two  forces  obviously  aim  at  different  ends,  yet  the  shift  from  Zeus's  plan  to 
moira  is  extremely  smooth,  almost  imperceptible,  and  the  result  is  that  throughout  the 
poem  we  feel  the  force  of  an  unquestionable  and  coercive  power  that  determines  the 
course  of  events;  everything  comes  out  as  Zeus  has  planned  and  as  moira  has  demanded; 
man  struggles  against  this  irrevocable  course,  without  ever  being  able  to  reverse  it. 
267 Obviously,  the  two  poems,  by  putting  a  different  stress  on  moira  and  using  it  in  a 
different  way,  raise  different  issues.  In  the  Iliad  moira  is  necessary  if  the  heroes'  death  is 
to  be  explained,  but  at  the  same  time  it  stresses  man's  weak  nature  and  dependence  on 
irrational  forces,  yet  also  his  tragic  grandeur  as  he  strives  against  life.  The  Odyssey,  on  the 
other  hand,  needs  moira  in  order  to  explain  life's  -  or  the  plot's  -  difficulties,  but  allows 
considerable  space  to  man,  proving  that,  even  if  man  is  inextricably  tied  to  certain  events 
of  life,  he  is largely  responsible  for  his  happiness,  as  well  as  for  his  misery.  Zeus's  words 
at  a  32ff.  exactly  stress  this  aspect  of  moira,  while  at  the  same  time  they  seem  to 
foreshadow  its  limited  role  in  the  poem. 
Yet,  it  remains  a  fact  for  both  poems  that  moira.  is  an  indispensable  part  of  life, 
even  if  its  relation  to  the  gods  is  never  actually  clearly  defined.  Man  may  be  always  trying 
to  stand  against  life,  but  he  also  knows  his  limited  powers;  more  important,  he  is  not  afraid 
or  ashamed  of  confessing  his  limits  when  believing  in  supreme  powers  that  define  and 
control  his  life.  What  man  needs  to  find  in  the  concept  of  fate  is  the  explanation  of  his  own 
weakness  totally  to  control  his  life,  the  reasoning  which  justifies  the  existence  of  such  an 
irrational  order  that  demands  suffering  and  death,  and  it  is  of  little  importance  or  interest 
whether  the  explanation  he  accepts  is  fully  consistent  with  his  ideas  on  the  gods  or  not. 
268 4.2  Divine  Justice 
Divine  justice  is  a  point  at  which  the  two  poems  seem  to  be  crucially  different. 
Even  for  those  who  see  the  Iliadic  gods  as  essentially  unjust,  the  Odyssey  seems  to  offer  a 
new  perspective  and  a  new  morality  altogether  in  the  archaic  age.  The  chronological 
relation  between  the  two  epics  is  thus  seen  as  indicative  of  a  development  in  moral 
thought,  a  further  step  being  taken  somehow  later  by  Hesiod  in  his  Works  and  Days.  36  I 
would  like  to  question  this  idea  of  linear  development;  believing  that  the  difference 
between  the  poems  is  largely  conditioned  by  their  different  subjects  and  perspective,  and 
also  that  the  religious  ideology  supporting  the  Odyssey  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  Iliad,  I 
would  wish  to  redefine  the  issue  by  asking  not  why  the  Odyssey  develops  towards  a  more 
moral  perspective,  but  why  the  Iliad,  although  aware  of  this  perspective,  disregards  or  at 
any  rate  suppresses  the  possibility. 
A  vital  difference  between  the  poems,  and  one  which  supports  the  argument  for  the 
Odyssean  morality,  is  the  fact  that  the  more  recent  poem  exhibits  a  greater  concern  for  the 
code  of  ethics  as  described  in  chapter  two.  The  ethics  of  the  poem  are  not  different  from 
that  of  the  Iliad.  The  two  poems  share  the  principles  of  piety  towards  the  gods  and  respect 
for  the  elder,  one's  guests  or  suppliants,  as  well  as  oaths;  a  new  element  is  now  the 
concern  for  beggars,  which  is  in  line  with  the  poem's  wider  view  of  life:  the  poet  seems 
comfortable  enough  to  present  us  with  details  about  the  lower  classes  alongside  the 
traditional  account  of  the  deeds  of  the  ayaBot.  The  idea  of  -riprl  is  again  of  utmost 
36  See  pp.  168ff.  For  the  view  that  Hesiod  actually  precedes  the  Homeric  epics,  as  expressed  by  M.  L.  West, 
see  p.  169,  n.  60. 
269 importance:  disregarding  another's  TIPý  can  have  terrible  consequences.  If  in  the  Iliad 
Achilles'  wrath  is  caused  by  Agamemnon's  aTipta  to  the  hero,  and  the  whole  war  by 
Paris'  CiTlpia  towards  Menelaus,  in  the  Odyssey  the  same  subject  is  to  be  found  in  the 
suitors'  offensive  behaviour  which  violates  the  principles  of  gw1a  and  thus  dishonours; 
Odysseus  and  his  home.  37 
This  difference  in  emphasis  on  proper  behaviour  is  evident  in  the  extended  use  of 
the  adjectives  Ocou8qk,  SlKaioc,  vo4pcav,  EITISIKi  EI  TI  Ec,  Evaimpcc,  or  negatively  of  the 
'Trcpýt'ak,,:,  '#ovir  38  The  poet  seems  descriptions  dTdc;  6aXci;,  6ppia'HIC,  61TEPPIOC,  Ua  -ov. 
indeed  to  be  concerned  more  with  the  qualities  that  cause  impropriety  than  with  the  event 
of  impropriety  itself  and  its  consequences.  There  is  a  polarity  resulting,  therefore,  between 
characters  of  an  essential  moral  attitude,  who  display  characteristics  of  proper  behaviour  in 
all  aspects  of  Homeric  ethics,  and  characters  of  immoral  attitude,  whose  behaviour  is 
improper  again  in  its  entirety,  a  polarity  which  is  sharp  and  distinct  and  is  used  repeatedly 
and  on  different  occasions  throughout  the  poem;  the  antithesis  between  Odysseus  or  his 
OlKof;  and  the  suitors  being  the  central  subject,  we  also  hear  of  the  Cyclops  and  the 
Phaeacians,  and  slightly  more  faintly  perhaps  of  Aegisthus  and  Agamemnon. 
More  important,  proper  behaviour  seems  to  be  especially  favoured  by  the  gods, 
since,  according  to  Eurnaeus,  oý  piv  cXsTMa  E"pya  OCOI  lldKapci;  ýiXioumv,  I  aXXa  81#KTIV 
IT  TIOUGI  Kai  alatpa  Epy'  avOpr3ncav  (g  83-84).  In  this  way  the  outcome  of  Odysseus'  conflict 
with  the  suitors  can  be  easily  interpreted  as  an  example  of  distribution  of  divine  justice:  the 
37  See  9  163-64,  Tr431,  a  144C,  T498-=X418,  ý99f,  X425. 
39  Of  equal  significance  is  the  greater  use  of  the  expression  KaTa  pcýipav;  see  p.  240,  n.  10. 
270 gods  support  the  hero  against  his  insolent  usurpers  and  help  him  re-establish  his  status  and 
his  kingship.  The  lines  which  are  believed  to  capture  this  new  perspective,  however,  are  a 
3243,  the  programmatic  speech  of  Zeus,  39  in  which  the  god  denies  responsibility  for 
human  misery:  men  accuse  the  gods,  but  the  truth  is  that  ot  5E'  Kalt  a6TOII  I  cýfimv 
dTaaOaXtBctv  LITEP  p6pov  aXyr;  '  c"Xouciv  (33-34)  -  and  the  god  continues  with  the  example 
of  Aegisthus.  'YiTEp  pOpov  is  taken  in  this  case  to  mean  the  violation  of  propriety  and  order 
rather  than  of  fate's  predetermined  courseýo  as  is  evident  from  the  combination  with 
dTacOaXiii,  and  Zeus  is  believed  to  offer  a  'divinely  sanctioned  concept  of  justice  41  which 
demands  that  foolish  and  excessive  behaviour  should  be  punished  -  although  whether  the 
gods  participate  in  this  punishment  or  not  is  not  actually  mentioned. 
Despite  all  that,  it  seems  that  any  idea  of  divine  justice  in  the  poem  is  still  quite 
limited  and  non-articulate.  I  would  not  wish  to  doubt  the  importance  that  propriety  and 
justice  have  in  the  poem,  yet  I  would  tend  to  believe  that  the  emphasis  on  moral  attitudes 
and  conduct  should  not  be  necessarily  confused  with  the  idea  of  divine  justice;  what  we 
actually  have  is  two  distinct  aspects  of  moral  thought,  the  one  pertaining  to  human 
behaviour,  the  other  to  an  almost  metaphysical  sanction  that  guarantees  morality;  although 
the  two  are  usually  related,  as  they  are  indeed  in  both  of  the  Homeric  poems  to  a  certain 
degree,  the  relation  as  found  in  the  Odyssey  is  not  yet  such  as  to  allow  the  gods  to  be  called 
just  -  at  least,  no  more  than  the  Iliadic  gods. 
39  Dodds  (1951)  32. 
40  Comford  (1912)  13-14. 
41  Bradley  (1976)140. 
271 Therefore,  I  would  not  see  the  emphasis  on  the  idea  as  a  proof  of  a  development  in 
Archaic  Greek  thought,  for  even  this  limited  concept  is  not  a  new  element,  but  it  already 
exists  in  the  time  of  the  Iliad,  even  if  the  poet  prefers  not  to  employ  it  there  for  some 
reason;  the  difference  seems  to  lie  in  the  narrative  requirements  of  each  poem:  divine 
justice,  just  like  fate,  projects  a  certain  attitude  to  life,  and  by  doing  so  it  helps  in  the 
accomplishment  of  the  poet's  narrative  aims.  The  use  of  this  idea  in  the  Odyssey  certainly 
emphasises  the  role  of  propriety  in  human  life,  but  this  is  because  propriety  is  a  crucial 
issue  in  the  poem's  development,  and  not  because  propriety  is  now  an  elaborate  concept  by 
contrast  to  what  happens  in  the  Iliad,  nor  certainly  because  the  poet  is  interested  in 
exalting  divine  justice  and  order  in  the  way  that  the  Hesiodic  Works  and  Days  seems  to  do. 
What  I  would  regard  as  an  essential  difference,  however,  is  this  new  concern  for 
beggars  and  more  generally  for  the  lower  classes.  In  the  Iliad  morality  is  seen  as  a 
necessary  mechanism  for  stability  among  equals,  the  stress  being  inevitably  put  on  the 
ideas  of  6pcT6  and  TIP4.  In  the  Odyssey  justice  or  morality  is  proven  to  be  essential  even 
between  superior  and  inferior,  the  powerful  and  the  powerless,  and  although  it  is  again  the 
proper  respect  of  limits  that  is  commended,  the  limits  are  now  defined  both  horizontally 
and  vertically  in  social  terms.  The  suitors'  U'ppic  is  basically  directed  towards  Odysseus; 
this  is  the  violation  that  causes  their  destruction;  their  negative  characterisation,  however, 
is  largely  the  result  of  their  indifference  for  the  weak  and  powerless,  surpassing  as  they  do 
the  limits  of  their  own  vital  field  at  the  cost  of  another. 
Before  examining  the  gods'  behaviour,  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  uses  of  the 
word  5IKrl  and  its  derivatives.  There  is  an  interesting  difference  to  be  noted,  which  does  not 
272 actually  relate  to  the  semantics  of  the  word,  but  rather  to  the  different  ratio  between  the 
legal  and  the  moral  application  of  the  relevant  terminology.  In  the  Iliad  the  word  was 
found  mainly  in  legal  contexts,  or  in  any  case  bearing  moral  connotations  only  very  subtly. 
The  adjective  StKatcc  is  there  limited  to  three  occurrences,  while  the  adverb  &Kafco,;  does 
not  appear  at  all.  In  the  Odyssey,  by  contrast,  it  is  the  adjective  that  is  most  frequently 
employed;  the  legal  aspect  of  the  word  is  now  limited. 
When  used  in  a  legal  context,  51KTI  is  again  associated  with  the  standard 
terminology  that  we  met  in  the  Iliad.  Thus  we  hear  of  the  dyopd  (p  432),  the  09PIOTEC  (X 
569),  the  CXfilTTPOV  (X  569)  and  we  also  find  the  reference  to  the  51KaCTT6xOC  (X  185-86). 
Similar  also  is  the  restriction  of  this  legal  sense  to  the  noun  51KTI,  although  this  time  we 
find  only  the  plural  51FKac  (t  214-15,  X  570),  and  the  verb  &KdýCA)  (X  545,547,  p  433).  AIM; 
refers  again  to  a  settlement  or  a  decision  between  two  opposing  parties,  while 
51KC'(ýCA) 
means  'adjudicate'. 
As  noted  in  chapter  two  (106),  the  moral  use  of  the  word  is  first  of  all  detected  in 
the  meaning,  'sign,  mark,  or  characteristic',  as  found  in  the  expression 
51KTI  (ECTI)  + 
genitive,  in  which  case  it  denotes  the  'manner'  or  'way'  characteristic  of  the  noun  in  the 
genitive,  e.  g.  PaciXý  yap  aV5pl  klKac.  I  ToIOUTCA)  5E  "v% EOlKa(;,  End  XoucaiTo  ýayol  TE, 
V, 
t 
056pevai  paXaKcSi;  *  Tj  yap  61KTI  E01i  yep6vTcov  (ca  253-55).  This  use  of  the  word  is  also 
restricted  in  the  Odyssey.  From  this  meaning  of  the  noun  the  adjective  &Kaioc  and  the 
adverb  &Kafcac  derive,  implying  the  person  who  behaves  according  to  the  manner 
273 expected  of  him,  that  is  properl  Y.  42  A  more  thorough  examination  is  necessary  at  this  point, 
and,  purely  for  methodological  reasons,  I  vAll  present  the  relevant  examples  in  three 
groups. 
Oý  PiV  CXE'T;  kiaE"pya  Nolt  p&apEc  ýAiouciv, 
p  6W  81KTIV  TIOUCI  Kalt  aTtotpa  E"py'  avepcýTrcov  a83-84 
C3  ýIXOI,  06K  aV  6ri  TIC  iTý  ýTJOEVTI  &Kaicý 
I  aVTIPIOIC;  EmEact  xa6aiTT6pEvoi;  XaXETralvot  a  414-15=  u  322-23 
06  y6p  KaX6vdTEPPEIV  0ý8i  81fKatov 
ýEivouc  TriXEpdXou  294f=  ý  312f 
Xcýips  8"Milvathl  TrEiTvupEvcg  av5pt  &Kato?  y  52 
f, 0  T'  OU'K  ieSXOU(Jl  &Kafcal; 
livadat  ou'5i  vicdat  Ent  #gTEP',  aMa'EKIIXOI 
KTýpaTa  8ap5dTrTOUCIV  ýITCPPIOV,  OU'S'  'E'TTI  #15C3  g  90-92 
42  Havelock  (1978:  182)  interprets  the  use  Of  SIKn  +  genitive  as  denoting  not  a  characteristic,  but  what  one  is 
supposed  to  do  or  feel,  the  genitive  being  of  reference  and  not  of  possession;  the  interpretation  explains  the 
semantic  development  in  a  way  that  puts  the  proper  stress  on  the  fact  that  61  Kn  is  not  yet  an  elaborate  concept, 
either  in  its  legal  or  in  its  moral  sense,  and  therefore  it  means  no  more  than  a  behaviour  which  is  accepted  or 
expected. 
274 B  NicTop',  Eim  TrEpIl  018E  SfKac  ý5i'  #6viv  allcov  y  244 
TC3  OV  PVT)GTýPCAW  PS'V  ga  POUX4V  TE  V60V  TE 
6#aUcav,  E7TEt  OU  TI  vo4povec  ou'5E  StKatot  281-82 
i,  Kai  ToTE  6T)  ZE61;  XUyp6V  iVt  #Wt  P45ETO  VOCTOV 
'ApyEfot,;,  E'TrElt  OU"  TI  V04POVEg;  OU'5E'  51'Katoi 
TrdVTEC  iCaV 
y  132-34 
6  IT6TTOI,  06K  a"pa  lTdVTa  V04POVE(;  065i  81fKaiot 
kav  (Dal4KCOV  ýY4TOPK  ý&  PE'60VTEI;  v  209-10 
0  A  61  Ol'y'  uppICTal  TS  Kai  CIYPIOI  OV'5i  SIPKaioi, 
ýE  ýlMgEIVOI,  Kafaýtv  v&),: 
iCTI  OEOU841;; 
;  120-2  1=  11  75-76=  v  200- 
..  11 
TipEv  ocoi  XaXETTOI  TE  Kat  a'yptot  065i  51'Katot, 
0fII  TE  ýAgSIVOI  KCCIF  GýIV  VOO(;  ECTI  eEOU5r'll;  0575-76 
jV6P'  iTTEXEýCIEGOal  tlCYC'(ATjV  ilTIE111EVOV  C'(XKT)V 
ayplOV,  OOTC  8[Kac  0  C'156Ta  OU5Tc  eiitOTa(;  t  214-15 
275 ý  Ydp  CEU  KXiO(;  oýpavo'v  Eu,  pu,  v  'I  Ka'vs  t, 
te  WC  Ti  TEU  fi  ßaCtXfiCC  (XpýpoVOC,  Ck  Te  GE0U8ýC 
C6(V8pa01V  iEV  lTOXXdl01  KM  tý61pOl(71V  daVdaaacav 
týSMIC4  dViXPOI,  eEppat  U  ydia  piXaiva 
nUPOUi;  KC(I  KPIMC,  PPIODOI  ÖE  ÖEVÖP£a  KapITCý, 
0  TIKTII  8'  E*PTr£Öa  PfiXa,  6dÄa0C3a  8E  TTapEXr.  )  iX6Gi; 
ig  Eu'IlyEall),  z, 
6PETCSOI  öi  Äaot  ýTr,  aýTOG.  T  108-14 
In  all  of  the  above  examples  the  connection  Of  51FKTJ  or  61FKa10C 
with  propriety  is 
obvious,  while  in  some  of  them  we  also  find  a  connection  of  propriety  with  the  gods.  Thus, 
51  Ka  i  oc  and  51  KCI  I'WC  seem  often  to  refer  to  proper  social  behaviour,  in  a  way  similar  to  that 
of  the  expressions  KaTa  p6paV,  KaT'  611CICXV,  KaTa  K60pov;  and  this  seems  to  explain  the 
connection  Of  81KTI  with  aTcipa  E'pya  at  ý  84.  We  have  already  noticed  (108)  the  relation  to 
customary  principles  which  are  denoted  by  the  words  Up;  and  6EPICTec 
. 
43  Thus,  g  90-92 
may  easily  be  paralleled  to  a  275-77,  since  they  refer  to  the  suitors'  insolence,  which  is 
against  all  social  principles,  and  which  is  described  as  greediness,  5ap5arrTouaiv  WrEpPtov, 
or  lack  of  #t&3.  But  even  an  appropriate  proposal  may  be  regarded  as  SlKalov  (a  414=  u 
322),  just  as  mockery  or  an  expression  of  irony  is  06  KCA6V  065i  8IKaiov  (u  294=  ý  312), 
while  Peisistratus'  characteristics  Of  &atoc  and  TrcTwupe'voc,  in  which  Athena  rejoices, 
refer  simply  to  his  table  manners  (y  52-53).  44 
43  CE  y45,  K  73-74,  g  56f,  Yr9l,  ca  284-86;  also  the  contrast  between  i'vaiatpoi  and  6t0zptaTOt  at  p  363. 
44  As  Havelock  (1978:  182-83)  remarks,  the  reference  is  not  made  to  a  universal  rule,  but  to  a  rule  about 
specifics;  however,  this  only  relates  to  the  non-conceptualised  character  of  Homeric  morality,  and  proves 
nothing  with  regard  to  the  absence  of  morality  itself.  It  is  the  character  in  its  entirety  which  is  approved  Of, 
even  if  it  appears  at  times that  the  reference  is  made  to  trivial  details.  See  also  p.  38,  n.  32. 
276 In  the  second  group  a  further  element  is  added:  the  connection  of  propriety  with 
wisdom. 
45  The  basic  unit  OU5  TI  VO  JPOVV;  OU'5i  81Katoi  is  used  for  the  suitors,  who  are  also  TI 
called  #paSEEc,  as  well  as  for  the  Greeks,  who  are  said  to  have  been  punished  by  Zeus  for 
their  behaviour,  finally,  it  is  used  slightly  varied  for  the  Phaeacians,  when  Odysseus, 
unable  to  recognise  Ithaca,  covered  as  the  island  is  in  Athena's  mist,  supposes  that  the 
Phaeacians  have  actually  deceived  him  (v  189-96). 
The  case  of  the  Greeks  at  y  132-34  doubtless  hints  at  the  gods'  reaction  to  human 
improper  behaviour  and  their  consequent  concern  for  justice:  their  interference  aims  at 
punishing  an  act  of  impiety,  46  and  thus  re-establishing  order.  Therefore,  it  could  be 
suggested  that  the  suitors'  similar  characterization  at  P  282  implies  a  similar  reaction  of 
the  gods:  the  very  end  of  the  poem,  NNith  the  suitors'  slaughter  and  Odysseus'  final  triumph, 
as  well  as  Zeus's  consent  and  Athena's  support,  exactly  proves  the  existence  of  divine 
justice  in  the  poem.  Worth  noting  at  this  point  is  that  P  282  belongs  to  Athena-Mentor,  and 
I-  is followed  by  a  programmatic  statement  by  the  goddess:  OU'5S  TI  Ticautv  OavaTOV  Kai  KT]pa 
pEXatvav,  I  ok  54  oýi  OXE66V  ECTIV,  F:  Tr'T*IilaTt  TravTac  6'Xioeat  (283-84). 
At  the  same  time  P  281-82  draw  attention  to  the  suitors'  foolishness,  for  this  is  the 
reason  behind  their  improper  behaviour;  they  are  foolish  not  because  they  cannot  sense  a 
possible  divine  punishment,  but  because  they  cannot  foresee  the  consequences  of  their 
behaviour  on  the  human  level;  in  other  words,  they  cannot  understand  that  their  insolence 
will  inevitably  be  avenged  sooner  or  later.  Just  before  Athena's  words  to  Telemachus,  an 
45  See  Garvie  (1994)  on  e  209;  Macleod  (1983)  on  fl  157;  Cairns  (1993a)  126-130. 
46  For  the  improper  behaviour  of  the  Greeks  see  S.  West  (1988)  on  cx  325-27. 
277 omen  sent  by  Zeus  is interpreted  by  Halitherses  as  a  warning  to  the  suitors:  Odysseus  will 
be  back  soon,  and  if  they  do  not  change  their  way  of  behaving,  they  vAll  definitely  be 
destroyed  (P  161-76).  Athena  simply  informs  Telemachus  that  the  suitors'  end  is  near  as  a 
result  of  their  inability  to  realise  their  insolence  and  pay  attention  to  Halitherses'  warning  - 
and  thus  the  poet  is  able  to  foreshadow  the  plot. 
47 
There  is  a  slight,  but  important,  difference  between  the  Greeks'  and  the  suitors' 
behaviour:  the  Greeks'  punishment  by  the  gods  is  inevitable  and  expected,  for  they  are 
guilty  of  impiety,  of  disrespect  and  dishonour  to  the  gods;  the  suitors'  behaviour,  on  the 
other  hand,  offends  and  dishonours  Odysseus,  which  means  that  the  dispute  belongs 
primarily  to  the  human  sphere  and  is  to  be  settled  basically  by  men  themselves.  If  the 
Greeks'  foolishness  refers  to  their  neglect  of  the  gods,  just  as  happens  with  Odysseus' 
companions  (p  377-83),  the  suitors'  foolishness  refers  to  their  inability  to  foresee 
Odysseus'  revenge,  just  as  happens  with  Aegisthus  (a  35-43).  The  difference,  then,  lies  in 
the  motivation  behind  divine  response:  in  the  first  case,  we  have  the  typical  reaction  of  the 
gods  to  an  offence  to  their  TI  P4,  in  the  second,  a  more  general  concern  for  justice,  or  at  any 
rate  propriety.  This  last  idea  has  been  seen  to  exist  in  the  Iliad  as  well  (175,  n.  68),  but 
here  it  is  applied  to  the  main  plot  of  the  poem,  reflecting  the  polarity  between  right  and 
wrong;  for,  as  noted  above,  this  is  a  polarity  that  does  not  concentrate  only  on  one  insult  or 
47  The  lines  remind  us  of  A  214-16,  where  Athena  reassures  Achilles  that  Agamemnon  will  offer  valuable  gifts 
to  him  soon,  thus  paying  due  honour.  It  is  worth  noticing  how  the  same  poetic  device  assumes  a  distinct 
function  according  to  the  subject  of  the  particular  poem, 
278 offence,  but  rather  corresponds  to  a  polarity  between  totally  good  and  totally  bad 
characters. 
48 
The  gods'  relation  to  justice  is  evident  in  the  examples  of  the  third  group  -  although 
a  83-84  from  the  first  group  is  also  relevant.  First  of  all,  a  new  element  related  to  the  idea 
of  propriety  appears  -  and  actually  an  element  that  might  have  connotations  of  a  more 
internal  quality:  at  ý  120-21  (=  tl75-76=  v  200-1=-  0  575-76)  propriety  is  connected  with 
the  fear  of  the  gods  through  the  use  of  the  adjective  Osou&JC.  It  is  very  tempting  to  see  in 
the  word  a  hint  at  divine  justice:  the  person  who  fears  the  gods  fears  their  punishment;  his 
behaviour  is  consequently  conditioned  by  this  fear.  However,  the  adjective  does  not 
exactly  denote  the  fear  of  divine  punishment  which  is  inflicted  on  man  as  a  general  rule 
following  impropriety  of  any  form;  the  second  component  of  the  adjective  is  5COC,  fear 
combined  with  respect  for  someone  superior,  and  it  appears  therefore  to  denote  piety  or  a 
proper  attitude  of  regard.  Seen  contextually,  the  word  implies  what  seems  to  be  the 
disposition  of  someone,  which  is  approved  of  in  all  its  aspects  -  another  instance  of  the 
aforementioned  polarity.  49  The  importance  of  such  an  outlook  on  life  is  obvious  at  T  108- 
1  14,  where  we  have  an  image  of  prosperity  as  the  result  of  a  king's  EU'StKta  and  Eu'wEaITI, 
which  are  themselves  the  result  of  his  being  OEou54c.  There  is  an  implicit  link  between 
48  The  suitors  are  indeed  guilty  of  violating  the  pimciple  of  gevia,  and  therefore  of  offending  Zeus  himself. 
The  truth,  however,  is  that  their  offence  is  not  presented  in  this  fight  by  the  poet,  but  has  to  do  with  their 
attitude  in  general.  One  could  say  that  the  god's  punishment  comes  in  the  end  even  if  indirectly  through  human 
agents  -  an  interpretation  that  could  be  applied  in  the  Iliad  as  well. 
49  Havelock  (1978:  191)  talks  of  the  'moralities'  of  the  poem  as  the  identification  of  conservatism  and 
propriety  with  good  things,  and  excess  and  extravagance  with  bad  things.  Burkert  (1996:  31)  refers  to  the 
adjective  eeou66i;  as  a  'mark  of  moral  distinction'  and  talks  of  the  fear  of  gods  as  an  essential  feature  of 
religion,  pro%iding  examples  from  Akkadian,  Jewish  and  Christian  texts.  Worth  noting  is  that  the  same  idea  is 
implicit  at  TT  388:  iK  &  81KrJV  EX60CO01,0CC3V  SMV  OU'K  aXEYOVTEC. 
279 human  behaviour,  divine  response  and  human  happiness,  yet  the  passage,  more  than  the 
idea  of  divine  justice,  seems  to  evoke  an  idea  of  omnidirectional  propriety.  50 
The  antithesis  between  51'Kai;  and  OCPI(3Tac  on  the  one  hand  and  ayptov  on  the 
other,  reflected  also  in  the  antithesis  between  81PKaioc,  ýAgvvoc;  and  Ocou&jc,  and  ayploc 
and  uppiaTTic  has  already  been  discussed  as  indicative  of  a  distinction  between  a  primitive 
P  and  a  civilised  world,  between  ayptov  and  d6eplaTIOV  (108).  51  If  OcauU  implies  due  ric 
respect  for  the  gods,  and  61Katoc  the  propriety  commended  by  the  oral  laws  of  Homeric 
ethics,  with  ýEvta  being  a  characteristic  example,  relevant  also  to  the  plot,  UppiaTTic  seems 
to  denote  in  this  case  an  insolent  and  offensive  behaviour,  which  results  from  the  absence 
of  principles  or  laws.  It  is  worth  noting  that  ý  120-21  refer  to  the  Phaeacians,  who  prove  to 
be  righteous  and  pious,  and  certainly  ýiXgEtvoi,  and  1  175-76  to  the  Cyclopes,  who 
represent  the  exact  opposite:  Polyphemus  claims  to  have  no  fear  for  the  gods  (1  275-78), 
and  is  according  to  Odysseus  66EPIPOTia  d6c&  (1428,  cf  1  106,189).  It  seems,  then,  that  v 
200-1  could  refer  indirectly  to  the  people  of  Ithaca,  as  if  implying  that  the  suitors,  who  are 
frequently  accused  of  ýppll; 
'52 
have  broken  all  laws  of  civilisation.  53  But  do  they 
necessarily  entail  that  their  destruction  should  be  connected  with  the  gods? 
50  This  propriety  leads  to  happiness,  but  it  also  leads  to  KXE'Oi;  (108);  it  is  interesting  that  this  optimistic 
impression  of  a  king  is  compared  to  Penelope,  the  archetype  of  the  loyal  wife;  if  for  a  woman  loyalty  is  part  of 
her  jPETý  for  a  man,  and  a  king,  apET4  seems  to  fie  in  EAM'n  and  OnyEaul,  cf  TT  542  and  y  244;  once 
more,  we  have  the  themes  of  the  Iliad  adapted  to  the  plot  of  the  Oqýssey:  morality  and  competitiveness  are 
not  incompatible.  One  can  compare  T  108-14  with  6  689-695,  where  81KYJ  eElcov  Po:  a1XrPv  is  used  obviously 
in  the  sense  of  one'  characteristic  manner,  with  no  apparent  moral  implications. 
51  See  Cairns  (1993a)  112,  n.  195. 
52  See,  for  example,  a  227,  y  205,  u  169. 
53  See  Garvie  (1994)  15. 
280 The  contrast  between  a  human,  civilised  society  of  laws  and  limits  and  the 
primitive,  subhuman  or  superhuman  world  of  the  adventures  seems  to  be  essential  to  the 
plot.  Although  it  would  appear  that  it  relates  basically  to  the  hero's  adventures,  it  is  in  fact 
successfully  integrated  into  the  remainder  of  the  plot,  becoming  almost  the  issue  between 
Odysseus  and  the  suitors.  It  forms  part  of  the  bero's  development  which  entails  that  he 
should  gradually  realise  the  importance  Of  81KTI;  this  is  primarily  the  principle  of  respect  of 
established  limits,  which  becomes  further  relevant  in  the  form  of  laws,  the  proof  for  a 
i 
society's  awareness  and  acknowledgement  of  these  limits.  The  two  aspects  seem  indeed 
inextricably  linked  in  the  poem,  and  although  the  references  to  legal  procedures  are 
limited,  it  is  obvious  that  law  and  legality  are  seen  as  the  extension  or  projection  of 
morality.  When  Odysseus  finally  reaches  Ithaca,  a  supposedly  civilised  society  of  laws, 
reality  belies  his  expectations  and  action  is  necessary  for  order  to  be  restored. 
F  To  conclude  about  6  I'Kil,  before  I  proceed: 
SM1, 
and  even  more  SO  8IKa  i  oc;  and 
5IKatczc,  are  part  of  the  moral  vocabulary,  which  is  used  in  the  Odyssey  much  more 
extensively  than  in  the  Iliad.  The  terms  are  conducive  to  the  whole  atmosphere  of  the 
poem,  which  demands  a  sharp  antithesis  between  propriety  and  impropriety,  which  helps 
the  poet  to  bring  into  relief  the  suitors'  guilt  against  Odysseus.  However,  the  terms  are 
related  to  the  gods  only  indirectly;  the  expression  61'"  OecSv  appears  only  once  at  T  42,  and 
it  denotes  simply  the  characteristic  manner  of  the  gods  -  in  this  particular  case,  their 
superior  power  which  enables  Athena  to  shed  her  ý60C  TTEPtKaMic  on  the  thalamus. 
Otherwise,  we  hear  that  the  gods  favour  81KT)  (g 84),  so  that,  if  a  connection  between  the 
two  should  be  drawn,  one  could  only  suggest  that  the  manner  of  the  gods,  the  order  that 
they  impose  on  life,  is  a  moral  order,  but  this  is  an  idea,  as  already  noted  (19  1  ff.  ),  that  does 
281 not  necessarily  imply  an  unquestionable  and  pure  divine  justice.  That  this  is  in  keeping 
0  with  the  theology  of  the  poem,  as  implied  independently  of  the  application  Of  6MI,  remains 
now  to  be  examined. 
Any  act  of  impropriety  and  any  violence  of  the  code  of  behaviour  is  primarily  a 
matter  to  be  settled  among  men.  We  have  seen  in  the  Iliad  a  case  of  a  legal  procedure 
which  aimed  at  settling  a  dispute  peacefully  and  at  the  same  time  satisfactorily  for  the 
opposing  parties  (1497-508).  But  when  a  peaceful  settlement  seems  impossible,  violence 
is  the  only  alternative;  the  Trojan  War  is  a  characteristic  example.  The  case  of  the  suitors' 
behaviour  refers  basically  to  an  aTIPI#a,  which  causes  a  dispute  that  needs  to  be  settled;  the 
suitors  have  dishonoured  Odysseus,  and  Odysseus'  reaction  is  natural  and  expected,  just 
like  Orestes'  revenge  on  Aegisthus  for  Agamemnon's  murder.  Revenge,  or  TMIC,  in  such 
cases  functions  as  a  means  by  which  order  is  re-established,  but  also  as  an  exemplum,  that 
would  divert  man  from  improper  conduct  (g  400).  54 
The  fact,  then,  that  the  suitors  are  not  51'Katoi  has  to  do  mainly,  if  not  only,  Nvith 
their  social  behaviour,  their  exceeding  their  own  limits  and  thus  dishonouring  the  king  of 
Ithaca.  Their  impropriety  entails  nothing  more  than  an  insult  towards  Odysseus,  an  aTipla 
and  an  Oppic,  part  of  which  is  to  be  found  in  their  greedy  consumption  of  the  hero's 
property.  55  The  problem  caused  by  this  behaviour  could  certainly  be  settled  peacefully,  had 
54  ,  Tiatc  is  mentioned  in  the  poem  in  relation  to  Aegisthus  (a  43;  y  195,197,203)  and  the  suitors  (a  268,  y 
205-6,  s  24,  A  118,  ý  163-64,  p  539-40,  X  168-69). 
55  The  terms  ai&ok  and  VEPECti;  are  also  extensively  used  in  relation  to  the  suitors'  behaviour;  see,  for 
example,  a  254,  P  65,  X  40.  The  suitors  can,  and  they  actually  do  (P  85-128,  Ca  125-148),  justify  their 
behaviour  on  the  grounds  of  Penelope's  indecisiveness:  as  long  as  she  gives  no  clear  answer,  they  can  indulge 
in  their  role  as  suitors;  that  Penelope  should  avoid  an  answer  for  so  long  is  necessary  for  the  suitors'  very 
existence,  in  narrative  terms;  everything  seems  to  be  properly  exaggerated. 
282 the  suitors  been  willing  to  realise  the  degree  of  their  insolence;  Telemachus'  plea  for 
recognition  of  his  rights  (P  40-79,138-45),  as  well  as  the  warnings  of  Halitherses  (P  161- 
76)  and  Mentor  (P  229-41)  prove  that  the  dispute  and  the  consequent  conflict  refer 
basically  to  a  human  relationship.  56 
But  the  suitors  pay  no  attention  to  warnings  or  expressions  of  disapproval.  Their 
unwillingness  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  society  and  follow  its  principles  leads  to  the 
natural  consequence  of  their  destruction.  Their  end  is  not  at  all  different  from  that  of 
Aegisthus,  to  which  it  is  paralleled  by  the  poet:  in  both  cases  a  wronged  hero  re-establishes 
order  by  taking  revenge.  Yet,  although  in  the  case  of  Aegisthus  the  gods  appear  to  have 
been  totally  absent,  or  even  indifferent  (a  3243),  in  the  case  of  the  suitors  the  poet  creates 
the  impression  not  only  that  the  gods  do  indeed  participate  in  the  conflict,  but  also  that 
they  disapprove  of  the  suitors'  behaviour.  And  this  is  the  point  where  the  two  poems  seem 
to  differ. 
it  is  beyond  doubt  that  the  impression  of  a  moral  attitude  of  the  gods  does  exist  in 
the  poem.  Thus,  as  noted  (270f  ),  Odysseus'  final  victory  can  be  regarded  as  sufficient 
proof  of  the  gods'  concern  for  propriety  or  even  justice;  one  could  suggest  that  the  cases  of 
Aegisthus  and  Polyphemus  have  similar  implications:  a  wrongdoer  is  punished,  and  thus 
impropriety  proves  fatal.  Even  if  the  gods  are  absent  in  both  of  these  cases,  it  could  be  said 
56  CE  Halitherses'  words  towards  the  suitors'  kinsmen  at  ca  454-62:  the  emphasis  is  put  on  their  inability  to 
check  the  suitors'  folly  and  excess.  Just  before  Halitherses,  Medon  talks  of  some  god  helping  Odysseus:  Ou 
yap  '06ucaeUk  I  a6aVdTC0V  diKrITI  6ECSV  T66C  p4caTO  9pya  (44344);  the  reference  confirms  the  link 
between  Athena's  action  and  the  suitors'  punishment  as  seen  in  the  plot  itself,  but  as  Dover  (1983:  3  8)  argues, 
each  speaker  aims at  a  different  effect  on  hig  audience,  Medon  speaking  in  prudential  terms  while  Halitherses 
in  moral  terms,  both  wishing  to  avoid  the  kinsmen's  vengeance  on  Odysseus. 
283 that  what  mattcrs  is  not  what  causcs  the  punishmcnt  of  impropricty,  but  the  veiy  fact  of 
this  punishment,  the  final  outcome  of  the  confrontation  between  good  and  evil;  for  it 
seems  that  this  outcome  confirms  the  existence,  even  if  vague,  of  order  in  life.  And  the 
poet  builds  his  narration  in  such  a  way  that  propriety  can  be  highlighted,  and  impropriety 
condemned. 
Thus,  in  crucial moments  of  the  narration  we  hear  of  Zeus's  omens,  which  appear 
as  a  consent  to  Odysseus  and,  more  important,  as  a  disapproval  of  the  suitors.  At  P  139ff. 
Telemachus  almost  threatens  the  suitors  to  leave  his  house,  and  for  this  threat  he  uses  the 
idea  of  Zeus's  punishment;  as  soon  as  he  finishes  his  speech,  two  eagles  are  sent  from 
Zeus  over  the  ayopd  (146-154);  and  Halitherses  interprets  the  omen:  indeed,  the  suitors 
must  change  their  way  of  behaving,  for  Odysseus  will  soon  be  back,  and  then  they  will  be 
destroyed  (161-176).  At  u  97-101  Odysseus  asks  for  a  sign  from  Zeus  as  a  confirmation 
that  the  gods  really  vvished  the  hero's  return  to  Ithaca  -  and  thus,  indirectly,  that  they  vAll 
help  him  re-establish  his  status:  Zeus's  reply  comes  in  the  form  of  thunder  from  Mount 
Olympus.  And  when  the  moment  comes  that  Odysseus,  still  disguised  as  a  beggar,  takes 
the  bow  and  tests  its  strings,  Zeus  sends  once  more  his  thunder,  as  if  confirming  that 
Odysseus'  Nvish  for  revenge  has  the  god's  consent  and  support,  and  the  hero's  plan  will  be 
therefore  accomplished  (ý  409-15). 
The  use  of  Zeus's  omens  obviously  enables  the  poet  to  highlight  certain  moments 
of  the  plot,  while  at  the  same  time  he  can  inform  the  audience  of  what  will  happen. 
Besides  reflecting  a  belief,  then,  omens  and  signs  can  be  indicative  of  the  poet's  technique 
of  anticipation,  and  this  is  a  device  found  in  the  Iliad  as  well  (see  p.  258,  n.  28):  at  M  200ff, 
284 and  while  the  Trojans  are  victorious,  Zeus  sends  his  eagle  among  them;  Polydamas  warns 
Hector  that  they  should  retreat  (211ff.  ),  to  which  proposal  Hector  replies,  Ek  okavok 
wvP%0  aptcToc  apuvec0ai  Trept  TraTPT"F  (243);  the  purpose  of  this  sign  is  not  to  warn  of  imminent 
divine  punishment,  although  it  is  indeed  a  warning,  but  to  create  the  irony  necessary  when 
Hector,  facing  his  death,  will  finally  recall  Polydamas'  words.  One  could  interpret  the 
signs  in  the  Odyssey  in  a  similar  fashion:  the  god  warns  the  suitors  of  a  danger  actually, 
without  necessarily  implying  divine  intervention;  Halitherses'  interpretation  seems  indeed 
to  be  susceptible  to  such  an  interpretation.  At  the  same  time,  ý  409-15,  which  prove  Zeus's 
consent,  can  very  easily  be  seen  as  the  consequence  of  Zeus's  consent  to  Athena's  plan: 
according  to  the  god,  it  is  Athena  who  has  actually  planned  Odysseus'  revenge  on  the 
suitors  (F  23-24=  ca  479-80);  Zeus  simply  gives  his  consent,  allowing  Athena  total  freedom 
of  action.  Still,  seen  contextually,  Zeus's  omens  assume  a  moral  nuance  and  reinforce  the 
impression  of  divine  justice. 
Similar  is  the  case  of  the  frequent  references  to  the  gods'  concern  for  propriety  and 
impropriety,  which,  in  the  Ody.  v.  vey,  is  realised  in  the  gods'  help  towards  Odysseus. 
According  to  what  was  said  previously  (278),  there  are  actually  two  ideas  concerning 
divine  justice:  one  which  refers  to  the  gods'  reaction  to  an  offence  against  their  TI  p4,  and 
another  which  relates  the  gods  to  a  more  general  concern  about  propriety.  It  is  in 
agreement  with  the  first  idea  that  Nestor  relates  how  Zeus  decided  a  terrible  journey  for 
the  Greeks  after  the  end  of  the  Trojan  War,  EITS1  OU  TI  VOTIPOVEI;  066S  6[Kaioi  7TdVT64;  E"cav 
(y  133f).  We  also  hear  of  ZEU'4C 
-HEtvioc,  who  paXiCITa  VEPE0015'ral  KaKa  Ewpya  (g  283-84;  cf 
P  66-67);  thus,  after  Odysseus  blinds  the  Cyclops,  he  calls  him  OXET'XIOC,  for  not  behaving 
%  es  % 
properly  to  his  guests,  and  goes  on  to  explain  the  Cyclops'  end:  -  TCý  CS  ZEU'(;  TicaTO  Kai  ot 
285 d"Mot  (1  478-79);  while  of  ZE6;  'IKETýGIOCit  is  believed  that  he  Kai  aMoui;  av8pCA3'Tr0U(; 
E#pq  Kai  TIVUTat  0'(;  TIC;  6papTU  (v  213-14).  The  second  tendency  is  represented  by  the 
interesting  view  that  the  gods  wander  on  earth  in  disguise  and  mingle  with  people,  so  that 
they  can  supervise  human  behaviour:  ('XV6PC3TTC0V  UPPIV  TS  Kai  EUVOPITIV  EýOPCSVTEI;  (p  485- 
87);  57 
this  idea  is  expressed  as  a  fear  and  a  warning  by  one  of  the  suitors:  they  should  be 
careful  when  insulting  the  beggar,  for  he  might  be  a  disguised  god,  whose  wrath  they  will 
provoke  with  their  behaviour.  Eumaeus  also  expresses  the  well-known  , 
by  now,  idea  that 
the  gods  do  not  favour  impropriety,  but  51FKTIV  TIOUCt  Kai  aTailia  E*pya  avepcýTTCOV  (g  84). 
After  Odysseus  kills  the  suitors,  Penelope,  not  believing  that  her  husband  has  returned, 
assumes  that  it  was  a  god  who  killed  them,  u'ppiv  ayaccapwoc  OupaXyia  Kai  KaKa  Epya  (qj 
63-64);  while  Laertes  believes  that  with  the  suitors'  death  the  gods'  existence  is  confirmed, 
ZE5  1TC(TEP,  h  ýa  Ch'  EOTE  OE61  KaTa  paKPO'V  wOXUPITOV,  1  691  S'TE6V  PVTJUTýPec  aTddaNov 
Gpp  IV  C"TI  cav  (ca  351-52).  58 
I  would  not  consider  that  we  have  here  two  ideas  that  correspond  to  older  and  more 
recent  elements  of  religious  thought  -  at  least  not  as  reflecting  two  stages  of  development 
57  The  line  is  very  interesting,  since  it  implies  that  the  gods  do  not  intervene  in  reaction  to  a  human  offence 
towards  their  personal  Tlpý,  but  out  of  a  concern  for  human  propriety  itself,  as  the  noun  cývoptrl  seems  to 
suggest.  Such  an  idea  could  be  said  to  reflect  quite  accurately  the  development  of  moral  thought  which  is 
often  detected  in  the  Odyssey.  However,  I  would  believe  that  TI  384-92  express  more  or  less  the  same  idea: 
Zeus  intervenes  because  men  violate  the  proper  way  of  conduct  during  a  legal  procedure,  which  after  all 
entails  a  violation  of  customs  as  well  as  the  code  of  behaviour  rather  than  of  a  well  established  system. 
Moreover,  one  could  follow  Kullmann  (1985)  in  admitting  the  possibility  that  different  ideas  concerning  the 
type  and  degree  of  divine  intervention  co-existed,  without  necessarily  proving  a  development  of  thought.  The 
difference  is  certainly  that  p  485-87.  seems  to  correspond  to  the  plot  of  the  Odyssey,  yet,  as  will  become  clear 
in  due  course,  the  intervention  of  the  gods  in  the  poem  is,  I  believe,  not  different  from  that  of  the  Iliad,  it  is 
the  plot's  different  emphasis  on  the  polarity  between  good  and  bad,  which  is  after  all  a  polarity  referring  to  the 
human  level  of  action,  that  demands  that  this  idea  should  be  brought  to  the  fore. 
58  Clay  (1983:  231ff.  )  sees  that  men  exert  pressure  on  the  gods  to  act  justly,  for  otherwise  they  will  stop 
attending  to  them;  the  gods'  justice  proves  their  existence,  which  in  its  turn  asks  for  man's  respect  and  due 
offerings.  As  noted  (211),  the  belief  in  divine  justice  is  also  a  post  eventum  interpretation  of  life;  still,  I  would 
be  sceptical  with  regard  to  the  argument  of  man's  pressure  on  the  gods. 
286 from  the  Iliad  to  the  Odyssey.  Both  ideas  exist  in  the  Iliad  as  well  (  175,  n.  68),  but  they 
are  simply  not  applicable  to  the  plot  that  the  poet  wishes  to  construct.  The  difference  is 
one  of  frequency,  then,  which  in  its  turn  is  determined  by  the  perspective  of  each  poem.  In 
the  Iliad  the  fact  that  the  gods  appear  as  indifferent  to  human  propriety  conforms  with  their 
frivolous  character  which  is  a  necessary  component  of  the  poem  if  the  difference  between 
the  human  and  the  divine  should  be  emphasised,  and  the  morally  complex  plot  of  the  poem 
be  achieved.  In  the  Odyssey,  on  the  other  hand,  the  polarity  between  right  and  wrong  is,  as 
noted,  intense,  but  more  important  operative  in  all  aspects  of  life:  the  limited  presence  of 
the  gods,  as  well  as  the  absence  of  divine  conflict  of  interest  so  characteristic  of  the  Iliad, 
also  conduce  to  the  intensity  of  this  antithesis;  the  suitors  are  so  utterly  in  the  wrong,  that 
the  gods  cannot  possibly  be  on  their  side;  the  gods  can  only  consent  to  their  destruction. 
It  is  indeed  difficult  to  say  whether  we  have  to  do  with  different  traditions  or  sub- 
genres  of  epic  poetry,  or  if  the  difference  should  be  simply  ascribed  to  the  poet's 
59 
purpose.  I  would  tend  to  opt  for  a  combination  of  the  two:  the  choice  of  a  subject  is  also 
indicative  of  the  poet's  will  -  even  though  we  do  not  normally  talk  of  poetic  will  in  oral 
epic.  Whatever  the  case,  there  is  an  obvious  difference  between  the  poems  as  regards  the 
way  in  which  the  divine  participates  in  the  plot,  and  it  is  this  difference  which  often  leads 
to  the  conclusion  of  a  linear  moral  development.  Being  accustomed  to  the  idea  of  an 
unprejudiced  and  absolute  divine  justice,  we  find  the  reference  to  the  TIP4  of  the  Iliadic 
gods  too  mundane  and  humane  to  accept  as  a  reference  to  justice;  the  Odyssean  gods,  who 
59  Lloyd-Jones  (1983:  30ff.  )  also  avoids  relating  the  differences  between  the  poems  to  their  chronological 
relation  and  to  a  schematic  idea  of  morat  development;  however,  he  traces  the  difference  in  the  Iliadic  gods' 
ability  to  bring  both  good  and  evil  ideas  on  man  (29,3  1),  by  contrast  to  the  gods  of  the  Odývssey  who  never 
inspire  evil  ideas. 
287 support  the  hero  in  his  conflict  with  the  suitors,  are  more  easily  accommodated  to  our 
perception  of  the  divine.  However,  the  idea  of  a  more  general  divine  concern  for  propriety, 
which  is  supposedly  a  basis  for  a  more  elaborate  moral  thought,  is  an  idea  which  finds  an 
application  only  to  the  central  theme  of  the  poem,  and  this  is,  as  I  said,  greatly  conditioned 
by  the  theme  itself,  outside  the  conflict,  the  gods  often  appear  in  the  typical  Iliadic  fashion, 
while  even  Athena  and  Zeus  may  prove  prone  to  such  characteristics. 
That  the  gods  of  the  Odyssey  are  not  different  in  their  behaviour  from  the  gods  of 
the  Iliad  is  evident  basically  in  the  fact  that  they  may also  be  driven  by  their  emotions, 
their  reaction  to  human  behaviour  being  seen  as  the  result  of  their  concern  for  their 
personal  TIp4  and  not  for  some  idea  of  justice;  almost  instinctively  they  follow  their 
feelings  rather  than  their  reason.  Thus,  in  the  opening  scene  of  the  poem,  in  the  gods' 
council,  we  hear  that  although  Odysseus  is  the  wisest  and  most  pious  of  the  heroes,  Trept 
pCV  VOOV  ECTI  PPOTCSV,  ITEPI  6'  pi  Occýctv  I  aOavaTO101V 
UWKE  (a  66f),  yet  he  suffers 
because  Poseidon  is  stubbornly  angry  at  him  - 
danXii;  aiEv  I..  KEXOXCaTat  (a  68f,  cf  a  20- 
2  1).  The  reason  behind  the  god's  anger,  that  is,  Polyphemus'  being  blinded  by  Odysseus,  is 
certainly  a  matter  that  concerns  Poseidon  alone,  'a  private  feud  after  the  fashion  of  the 
Olympians',  60  it  is  a  personal  dishonour,  which  no  other  god  feels;  but  if  a  personal  matter 
is  more  important  than  a  general  one,  and  Poseidon's  wrath  is  more  important  than 
Odysseus'  piety,  we  can  hardly  talk  of  an  absolute  divine  justice.  By  objecting  to 
Odysseus'  homecoming  Poseidon  does  not  express  his  disapproval  of  Odysseus'  character; 
he  simply  fulfils  his  son's  prayer,  while  at  the  same  time  he  expresses  his  anger  at  having 
been  ignored  and  re-establishes  his  own  status  and  honour  by  proving,  in  a  way,  his  power. 
60  Lloyd-Jones  (1983)  29. 
288 This  is  even  more  evident  in  his  relation  to  the  Phaeacians  and  his  reaction  to  their 
bringing  Odysseus  to  Ithaca.  Alcinous,  and  along  with  him  the  Phaeacians,  are  especially 
loved  by  the  gods  (ý  201-3,  cf  il  914,110-11,117-30,132)  and  their  behaviour  towards 
Odysseus  implies  a  people  of  propriety  and  righteousness.  61  Yet,  Poseidon  decides  to 
punish  them  for  their  not  honouring  him,  expressing  thus  his  anger  for  Odysseus  at  their 
cost;  and  Zeus  gives  his  consent:  Poseidon  should  petrify  ýthe  Phaeacian  ship,  Na 
Oaupaýczctv  a'TTCXVTCC  I  avOpconot  (v  157f).  Obviously,  the  moral  qualities  of  this  people 
meant  nothing  to  the  god,  and  certainly  they  were  not  the  reason  behind  his  decision. 
Certainly,  both  examples  of  Poseidon's  behaviour  serve  a  certain  narrative  purpose: 
Poseidon's  anger  is  necessary,  along  with  fate,  if  Odysseus'  absence  from  Ithaca  is  to  be 
explained;  and  the  event  of  the  petrifaction  of  the  ship  and  the  appearance  of  a  mountain 
around  Scheria  functions  as  an  aition,  an  explanation  as  to  why  no  one  ever  saw  or  heard 
of  this  island  again.  62  Yet,  it  is  important  that  the  idea  of  a  possible  irrational  and  selfish 
divine  intervention  does  exist. 
Similar  is  the  case  of  Athena's  love  for  Odysseus.  It  seems  to  have  no  purely  moral 
basis;  it  simply  reflects  the  special  link  between  the  goddess  and  the  hero,  which  seems  to 
result  from  their  common  characteristic  of  wisdom  (v  296-99).  Probably,  the  relation  had 
been  established  long  before  the  composition  of  our  poem,  which  entails  that  the  poet  had 
to  accept  it  and  build  his  narration  according  to  it.  But  as  happens  with  Poseidon's  anger,  it 
is  no  more  than  a  feeling  that  defines  the  whole  of  Athena's  behaviour.  Her  love  for 
61  They  are  in  fact  portrayed  in  such  a  positive  manner  that  they  are  the  only  case  of  morality  for  Gagarin 
(1987:  288). 
62  See  Garvie  (1994)  one564-70;  Hainsworth  (1988)  on  0  569. 
289 Odysseus  is  such  that  she  plans  the  revenge  on  the  suitors  and  offers  her  help  and  support 
to  the  hero,  seeing  that  all  of  the  suitors,  insolent  or  not,  guilty  and  non-guilty  of 
impropriety,  be  slaughtered,  and  along  with  them  the  maids  with  whom  they  had  slept.  Her 
anger  does  not  seem  to  spring  ftom  a  sense  of  justice  or  propriety,  but  simply  ftom  her 
love  for  Odysseus  and  her  wish  to  take  revenge,  even  if  ultimately  this  relation  is  disguised 
to  some  degree  in  the  face  of  the  poem's  demands.  63 
It  is  in  exactly  the  same  way  that  Helios  reaction  to  the  companions'  behaviour  is 
presented  in  p.  The  god  is  wroth  at  the  offence,  threatening  to  depart  for  Hades  unless  a 
punishment  is  inflicted  by  Zeus  (376-84).  Such  threats  by  a  god  closely  related  to  some 
64 
natural  phenomenon  must  have  been  part  of  tradition,  the  theme,  however,  is 
successfully  adapted  to  the  plot  which  demands  that  Odysseus  be  left  finally  alone.  The 
theology  behind  the  episode  is  totally  consistent  of  both  poems,  and  Helios'  indifference 
towards  the  companions'  extenuating  argument  that  the  offence  was  a  matter  of  survival 
recalls  Artemis'  punishment  of  Oineus  (153340,  see  p.  185). 
As  noted  (260,  n.  30),  the  case  of  the  companions  raises  a  complex  issue 
concerning  divine  responsibility:  the  gods  keep  Odysseus  and  his  companions  on 
Thrinacia,  until  they  have  no  food  and  no  means  of  survival;  at  a  most  crucial  moment, 
Zeus  makes  Odysseus  fall  asleep,  and  the  companions  have  now  the  opportunity  to 
63  Cf.  the  gods'  disposition  towards  Menelaus.  According  to  Proteus,  Menelaus  will  not  die,  but  will  be  sent  to 
Elysium  instead,  where  he  uill  live  an  eternal  and  blissful  fife;  this  decision  is  based  on  no  special  quality  of 
Menelaus,  but  rather  on  his  relation  to  Zeus,  indirectly  through  Helen  (S  561-69).  Again,  this  may  be  simply  an 
idea  that  the  poet  uses  in  order  to  accommodate  an  interesting  story  in  his  narrative,  see  S.  West  (1988)  ad 
loc.;  but  it  remains  a  fact  that  the  gods  are  presented  as  behaving  irrationally  and  with  no  steady  principles 
whatever. 
64  Cf  h.  Dem. 
290 disregard  their  previous  oath  and  eat  indeed  Helios'  cattle.  Rutherford  reasonably  asks:  is 
the  reference  to  Zeus's  aTTI  (p  372)  'a  convenient  excuse'  or  should  we  see  'a  malicious 
deity  at  work, or  a  more  complex  theological  paradox,  by  which  the  gods,  like  Jehovah  in 
the  Old  Testament,  lead  their  human  victims  into  sin?  165  1  will  not  attempt  to  solve  the 
paradox;  I  would  like,  however,  to  focus  on  a  detail  that  will  hopefully  illuminate  the 
character  of  the  Odyssean  gods  even  more:  the  detail  of  the  gods'  irrational  quality. 
There  are  indeed  a  considerable  amount  of  references  to  divine  intervention  which 
appear  to  follow  simply  a  reasoning  of  its  own,  being  therefore  unpredictable  and 
frustrating.  At  5  181-82  Menelaus  ascribes  Odysseus'  troubled  journey  to  an  irrational 
resentment  of  the  gods,  T6  PEV  Trou  peXXcv  dyaccFc0ai  Oeok  au'T6c,  I  Ok  KCIVOV  8ýCITQVOV 
I  aV&TIIJOV  010V  E'6qKEV,  just  as  Penelope  does  at  q;  210-12.  The  same  verb  dyapal  is  used  at 
s  121-22  to  describe  the  gods'  reaction  to  Eos'  love  for  Orion,  until,  as  Calypso  says, 
Artemis  killed  Orion  in  Ortygia  (E  123-24).  And  Odysseus  regards  both  the  Trojan  War  and 
Agamemnon's  death  as  the  result  of  Zeus's  hatred  (X  436-39).  Even  if  these  references 
may  not  always  correspond  to  the  truth,  one  may  detect  in  them  the  idea  that  life's 
irrational  quality  is  the  result  of  the  gods'  irrational  and  unsteady  behaviour,  the  result 
itself  of  their  human  characteristics  and  weaknesses. 
The  idea  is  common  in  the  Iliad;  it  was  earlier  attributed  to  two  factors  basically, 
which  are  closely  interrelated:  the  polytheistic  system,  which  can  indeed  account  for  the 
multiple  injustices  of  life  itself  in  terms  of  divine  response,  and  the  gods'  own  superiority 
which  endows  them  with  the  right  to  show  their  cruel  indifference  to  mankind;  a  third 
65  Rutherford  (1982)  153. 
291 1  66  factor,  the  absence  of  a  belief  in  afterlife,  seems  indeed  to  be  what  hinders  Homeric 
theology  from  reconciling  the  other  two  characteristics  with  a  more  moral  concept  of 
divinity.  Although  the  basic  plot  of  the  poem  cannot  be  supported  by  this  idea,  it  is 
inevitably  present  in  other  episodes,  confirming  the  gods'  power  -  and  along  with  that  the 
poems'  affinity. 
This  inconsistent  way  of  presenting  the  gods  proves  that  any  idea  of  divine  justice 
that  can  be  detected  in  the  poem  is  not  totally  developed,  nor  is  it  articulate  enough  to  fully 
justify  the  unreserved  or  unconditional  use  of  the  term.  What  we  find  in  the  poem  is  rather 
man's  natural  tendency  to  connect  divinity  with  propriety,  to  assume,  or  even  believe  that 
the  gods  favour  order,  and  along  with  it,  the  principles  a  society  has  set  for  its  preservation. 
Although  the  gods  can  be  forces  of  good  as  well  as  evil,  it  seems  that  their  primary 
function  is  to  maintain  order  in  life.  Thus,  they  punish  impiety,  for  it  disturbs  the  order 
reflected  in  the  idea  of  their  superiority  to  man.  And  when  it  comes  to  relations  between 
men  themselves,  they  preserve  order  by  punishing  impropriety  -  or  at  least,  so  man  wants 
to  believe,  and  so  the  poet  tells  us. 
If  justice  on  the  human  level  is  understood  as  a  fair  distribution  of  reward 
according  to  one's  merit,  an  idea  of  divine  justice  would  demand  that  justice  be  always 
administered,  even  in  cases  when  human  justice  does  not  function  for  some  reason.  Divine 
66  The  only  cases  of  retribution  after  death  are  those  of  Tityos,  Tantalos  and  Sisyphos  (X  576-600);  Tityos  is 
punished  for  committing  adultery  with  Leto,  Zeus's  wife  (576-91)  while  the  reasons  for  the  punishment  of 
Tantalos  and  Sisyphos  are  not  given,  probably  because  they  were  supposed  to  be  known  to  the  audience.  The 
accounts  in  tradition  vary,  the  common  element  being  again  the  reference  to  an  offence  to  a  deity.  In  the  Iliad 
we  have  indeed  two  interesting  passages,  r  278-79  and  T  259-60,  where  peýury  is  said  to  be  punished  in  the 
underworld  by  Zeus,  Helios,  Ge  and  Erinyes  -  again  an  offence  against  divinity.  That  the  belief  existed  in  the 
background  is  not  impossible;  but  it  is  an  idea  that  is  of  little  importance  for  the  plot. 
292 justice,  at  least  to  a  modem  reader,  seems  to  imply  a  world  order  which  is  maintained 
through  the  reward  of  righteousness  and  the  punishment  of  unrighteousness,  even  if  this 
entails  the  necessity  of  the  belief  in  afterlife,  where  violated  order  is  thought  to  be  re- 
established.  But  this  is  obviously  not  the  case  in  the  Odyssey;  even  if  the  gods  chastise 
impropriety  in  the  poem,  they  do  not  always  reward  propriety,  and  this  entails  an  only 
partial  function  ofjustice. 
Such  an  idea  doubtless  agrees  with  the  Homeric  view  on  life  and  man.  Man  is  a 
feeble  creature,  and  misfortune  can  come  to  anyone,  irrespective  of  his  behaviour-,  the  gifts 
of  life  are  distributed  by  the  gods  on  no  rational  basis,  and  life  seems  to  be  a  circle,  an 
alternation  of  happiness  and  misery,  which  man  has  to  face  with  endurance  and  humility  (a 
130-37,  cf  ;  188-89).  Besides,  even  the  cases  where  impropriety  is  punished  do  not  imply 
that  divine  justice  is  applied  from  the  outside;  the  gods  simply  help  man  in  his  own 
struggle  against  a  particular  wrongdoing,  and  this  proves  that  man  can  never  actually  rely 
on  divine  justice  alone,  if  he  wishes  to  restore  order.  Life  being  thus  seen,  'the  successful 
return  and  revenge  of  Odysseus  is  a  special  privilege,  not  a  general  law',  since  the  gods' 
'authority  in  their  support  of  the  just  cause  ... 
is  not  their  normal  or  perennial 
preoccupation'.  67 
Man  in  his  struggle  to  survive  and  preserve  his  social  status  can  always  hope  and 
believe  in  the  gods'  help;  but  life  is  iffational,  and  uncertain.  With  no  belief  in  any  form  of 
retribution  after  death,  the  idea  of  an  absolute  divine  justice  in  the  world  seems 
impossible.  All  that  remains  is  man's  necessary  strife  against  impropriety  and  the  hope  that 
67  Rutherford  (1982)  148. 
293 the  gods  may  offer  their  support.  This  is  the  idea  that  actually  exists  in  the  poem.  Homeric 
man  wants  to  believe  that  the  gods  will  object  to  impropriety,  but  he  also  knows  that 
nothing  can  guarantee  their  intervention 
. 
68  And  it  is  worth  noticing  that  the  idea  of  the 
gods'  concern  forjustice  is  usually  expressed  as  a  hope  and  a  wish  (a  376-80=  P  14145,  u 
169-71,  ý  213)  or  as  a  fear  and  a  warning  (p  66-67,  p  485-87).  Even  Athena,  when  Zeus 
talks  of  Aegisthus'  death,  replies  in  a  wish:  may  everyone  who  behaves  in  a  similar  way 
meet  the  same  end  (a  46-47). 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  any  reference  to  divine  justice  in  the  Odyssey  does  not  imply 
an  articulate  system  of  thought.  Divine  justice  is  limited  only  to  the  divine  approval,  but 
not  necessary  reward,  of  propriety,  and  the  condemnation  or  perhaps  punishment  of 
impropriety,  but  always  expressed  as  support  to  a  hero,  and  never  imposed  independently 
of  mans  own  actions.  When  it  appears  that  the  gods  interfere  and  re-establish  order  out  of 
their  own  volition,  they  do  so  because  man  has  been  impious  and  dishonoured  the  gods 
themselves;  their  personal  field  of  honour  having  been  violated,  the  gods  aim  at  restoring 
order,  which  means  that  man  should  be  reminded  of  their  superiority  and  of  his  own 
obligation  to  respect.  69 
But  if  the  idea  of  divine  justice  in  the  Odyssey  springs  naturally  from  man's  wish  to 
connect  the  gods  with  an  idea  of  propriety,  and  thus  sanction  in  a  way  the  principles  by 
which  he  lives,  and  if  fear  of  the  gods  is  nothing  but  fear  of  life  itself,  the  tendency  to  deny 
the  idea  to  the  Iliad  should  seem  even  more  absurd.  The  poet  makes  a  conscious  choice. 
69  See  Garvie  (1994)  on  ;  120. 
69  Such  are  the  cases  of  the  lesser  Aias  (8  5034),  Eurytus  (8  224-28),  Tityos  (X  576-81  -  see  p.  292,  n.  66)  and 
certainly  Odysseus'  companions  (p  377-88). 
294 It  is  true  that  Paris'  insult  to  Menelaus  is  actually  the  only  case  where  an  idea  of 
divine  justice  could  be  used.  This  is  not  only  because  Paris'  behaviour  is  improper  and 
offensive,  neglecting  all  principles  of  heroic  society,  but  also  and  mainly  because  its 
consequence  is  the  Trojan  war  itself  and  the  final  fall  and  destruction  of  Troy.  it  was 
suggested  in  the  previous  chapter  (211  ff.  )  that  the  poet's  conscious  silence  with  regard  to 
the  role  of  divine  justice  in  the  outcome  of  the  war  is  in  accordance  with  the  general 
atmosphere  of  the  poem,  which  demands  the  gods  to  retain  their  distance  from  human 
affairs  -a  distance  which  can  easily  turn  into  indifference  -  while  at  the  same  time  it 
succeeds  in  providing  a  coherent  perspective  of  human  life,  which  allows  the  audience  to 
focus  on  human  responsibility  itself 
The  poet's  choice  is  also  evident  in  the  way  he  employs  his  heroes.  No  doubt,  if  the 
poet  had  defined  Troy's  destruction  as  a  punishment  by  the  gods,  directly  or  not,  the 
conflict  between  right  and  wrong,  propriety  and  impropriety,  or even  good  and  evil  would 
demand  that  the  heroes  should  be  divided  into  positive  and  negative  characters,  as  the 
example  of  the  Odyssey  clearly  shows.  But  this  is  certainly  not  the  impression  we  get  from 
the  poem,  and  it  is  certainly  not  the  effect  the  poet  aims  at.  Both  the  Greeks  and  the 
Trojans  may  be  right  and  wrong,  or proper  and  improper  at  the  same  time.  Paris  may  have 
been  insolent,  and  his  behaviour  was  doubtless  offensive,  yet  Priam  is  pious,  and  Hector, 
as  well  as  Troy,  is  much  loved  by  Zeus  himself  This  equal  treatment  of  the  two  opposing 
parties  enables  the  poet  to  give  a  detailed  picture  of  Trojan  life  and  of  the  Trojan  attitude 
and  reaction  to  the  war.  Z,  as  well  as  fl,  seem  to  remind  us  that  in  the  event  of  a  war  both 
sides  are  subject  to  the  same  pain  and  misery,  as  the  natural  order  of  life  is  disturbed,  and 
295 both  sides  prove  man's  weak  and  fragile  existence.  By  avoiding  a  biased  treatment  of  his 
heroes,  the  poet  succeeds  in  presenting  war  as  it  actually  is,  equally  cruel  and  unrelenting 
to  all. 
Certainly,  one  could  suggest  that  Hector  is  an  equally  important  hero  to  Achilles,  or 
that  the  story  certainly  existed  long  before  our  poet,  who  simply  re-tells  well-known 
events.  Yet,  such  an  observation  disregards  the  importance  of  a  poet's  personal  and  unique 
contribution  to  a  story.  It  is  of  great  importance,  I  think,  that  the  poet  chooses  not  to  finish 
his  narration  with  the  end  of  the  war.  He  often  hints  at  it,  as  he  also  hints  at  the  just  claims 
of  the  Greeks.  Thus,  it  seems  as  if  he  is  not  actually  concerned  to  prove  who  is  right  and 
who  is  wrong,  or  whether  the  Greeks  defeated  the  Trojans  rightfully  or  not,  but  rather  to 
enlarge  a  detail  of  the  war  and  look  at  it,  isolated  as  it  is  from  the  rest  of  the  story,  without 
detecting  the  lines  that  define  its  beginning  or  its  end.  While  narrating  the  glorious  deeds 
of  the  heroes  of  the  past,  the  poet  seems  to  intrude  in  their  lives,  their  characters  and  their 
thoughts,  looking  at  one  single  event  from  both  sides. 
But  things  are  different  in  the  Odyssey.  The  story  belongs  to  tradition,  and  all  the 
poet  has  to  do  is  narrate  it  in  a  rational  and  quite  realistic  way.  70  The  poet  needs,  therefore, 
to  create  an  immense  tension  between  Odysseus  and  the  suitors,  in  order  to  justify 
70  As  equally  important  I  would  regard  the  poem's  fbMale  origins;  as  Clay  observes  (1983:  68-69),  Odysseus 
is  the  typical  folktale  figure  who  continually  tricks  and  deceives  his  opponents,  a  characteristic  which  is 
relevant  not  only  to  the  wanderings,  where  it  is  obviously  most  naturally  applied,  but  also  to  the  conflict  with 
the  suitors,  where  it  is  accommodated  as  easily  as  this  folktale  figure  is  absorbed  by  the  heroic  world  of  the 
Trojan  war.  In  this  way,  the  gods'  justice  could  also  be  seen  as  a  generic  feature  of  folktale  poetry,  according 
to  which  the  hero  is  supported  in  his  endeavour  by  superhuman  powers,  a  feature,  no  doubt,  which  has 
undergone  the  same  assimilation  process  to  the  more  rationalised  heroic  background.  The  outcome  of  the 
conflict  between  right  and  wrong  in  the  poem  is  certain  and  predictable  from  the  very  beginning,  not  Only 
because  the  subject  is  known  to  the  audience,  but  because  it  is  typical  of  its  original  genre. 
296 Odysseus'  violent  reaction  and  revenge.  71  As  a  result  of  this,  he  emphasises  the  insolence 
of  the  suitors  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  poem  and  in  various  ways,  and  the  audience  is 
thus  negatively  predisposed  towards  them  through  the  whole  narration. 
In  the  accomplishment  of  this  aim  the  idea  of  divine  justice  is  the  means  rather 
than  the  end;  for  I  believe  that  by  creating  the  impression  that  man  should  be  careful  not  to 
cause  divine  wrath,  and  by  emphasising  the  possibility  that  impropriety  may  be  punished 
by  the  gods,  the  poet  attempts  to  project  the  importance  of  propriety  itself  as  a  human 
factor  that  may  lead  to  happiness  and  prosperity:  when  behaving  properly,  the  only  thing 
one  can  be  afraid  of  is  fate  and  the  gods'  irrational  gifts  of  misery.  This,  in  a  way,  explains 
why  divine  justice  exists  in  the  poem  as  a  vague  impression  and  not  as  a  totally  consistent 
system:  the  poet  is  not  interested  in  proving  whether  the  gods  are  just  or  not,  whether  they 
preserve  order  or  not;  rather  he  seems  to  be  using  an  idea  of  his  background  in  order  to 
enhance  the  tension  between  his  heroes.  If  a  moral  should  be  drawn  from  the  poem,  it 
seems  that  it  would  refer  to  the  consequences  propriety  has  on  the  human  level,  and  not  on 
the  relation  of  the  gods  to  propriety,  which  demands  man's  fear. 
Still,  the  poet  does  use  the  idea  of  the  gods'  concern,  and  he  does  give  the  outcome 
of  the  conflict;  but  he  seems  to  be  using  these  ideas  according  to  the  aims  he  has  set  each 
time.  It  is  at  crucial  moments  of  the  poem  that  the  poet  implies  the  possibility  of  divine 
punishment,  as  if  in  order  to  foreshadow  what  is  to  come.  At  P  282-83,  he  highlights  the 
suitors'  foolishness,  showing  the  actual  reason  for  their  destruction:  even  a  divine  sign  is 
not  enough  to  make  them  realise  the  degree  of  their  insolence.  At  v  201-2  the  poet  in  a  way 
71  Cf  EustaNus'  (1878.47)  charactefisation  of  the  poet  as  ýAo6ucmk. 
297 prepares  us  for  the  conflict:  Odysseus'  adventures  have  not  come  to  an  end  yet;  what  the 
hero  has  to  face  is  as  difficult  as  the  trouble  he  encountered  during  the  past  ten  years.  And 
at  ý  413  the  poet  projects  the  moment  when  Odysseus'  plan  of  revenge  begins  at  last  to  be 
realised. 
But  as  happens  Nvith  moira,  the  poet  uses  the  idea  of  divine  justice  only  as  long  as  it 
is  helpful  to  him.  The  use  of  this  idea  certainly  enables  the  poet  to  stress  proper  social 
behaviour.  But  one  should  be  extremely  cautious  before  accepting  that  Odysseus'  final 
victory  is  indeed  the  result  of  divine  justice,  and  more  important,  that  the  gods  of  the 
Odyssey  are  just.  The  irrational  quality  of  life,  as  experienced  and  presented  by  the  poet, 
explains  why  a  totally  consistent  system  that  would  talk  of  divine  justice  and  order  is  not 
applicable.  It  may  be  that  the  gods  prefer  righteousness,  but  nothing  can  guarantee  that 
they  behave  justly  themselves,  and  this  is  a  privilege  that  only  they  can  enjoy:  if  man  has  to 
be  moral  because  he  is  mortal  and  weak,  the  gods  are  certainly  not  subject  to  the  same 
principle;  they  have  to  fear  nothing,  neither  pain  nor  time,  and  quarrels  can  be  easily 
turned  into  ajoyous  feast. 
4.3  Human  Responsibility 
In  the  Odyssey  we  have  the  story  of  one  single  hero,  the  king  of  Ithaca  who  fights  at 
Troy  for  ten  years,  until,  by  the  means  of  his  cunning,  the  Greeks  win  the  war  (5  271-89,0 
494,  X  230);  who  after  the  end  of  the  war  and  during  his  journey  home  faces  a  series  of 
adventures  that  prevent  him  from  attaining  his  end;  and  who,  when  he  finally  reaches 
298 Ithaca,  has  to  face  the  threat  of  insolent  usurpers.  The  hero  is  ITOX&POTTOC  Odysseus, 
72 
who  succeeds  not  only  in  surviving  these  difficulties,  but  also  in  triumphantly  re- 
establishing  his  status  and  his  kingship.  Obviously,  such  a  plot  demands  a  stress  on  human 
responsibility,  since  it  actually  presents  man's  struggle  and  final  victory  in  life. 
Doubtless,  man  is  not  an  absolute  master  in  his  life.  Whether  it  be  moira,  or  the 
gods,  he  often  has  to  face  unexpected  difficulties  that  underline  his  limited  powers  of 
control.  The  acknowledgment  of  his  dependence  on  the  gods  is  obvious  in  the  expression 
TaýTa  6ccSv  iv  yo6vacl  KE-ITat  (a  267  =  400  =  it  129),  but  also  in  the  heroes'  tendency  to 
attribute  everything  in  life  to  the  gods  -  either  as  a  vague  force,  or as  separate  deities,  each 
with  a  particular  field  of  power.  Thus,  we  hear  that  Zeus  is  ultimately  responsible  for  life, 
dXXd  Tr08I  ZEk  CXITIOC,  Ck  TE  51'6COCIV  6'iTca(;  iegXDaiv  (a  34849;  cf  ý  188-189)  and  in 
a  merciless  manner  (u  201-3);  or  that  Aphrodite  caused  Helen's  aTq  (5  261-64)  and  Hera 
helped  Iason  (p  72);  while  the  references  to  Oc6c,  Not  or  5aipczv  abound  in  the  poem. 
73  it 
does  not  come  as  a  surprise,  then,  when  Odysseus  says  that  man  is  the  most  feeble  creature 
on  earth,  OU'5EV  dKI5V6TCP0V 
yd-ia  Tpi#t  avOpcSTroio  (a  130),  for  happiness  is  not  steady, 
but  rather  changes  easily  into  misery  when  the  gods  wish  so  (a  132-34). 
72  According  to  Clay  (1983:  29ff)  TrOXýTPWTU;  is  a  'particularised  epithet'  which  can  relate  either  to  the 
hero's  wanderings  or  to  his  agile  mind;  among  the  many  TroXu-  epithets  that  are  used  of  the  hero  (e.  g. 
TrOXUTXTIPWV,  IT0XUTX=,  Tr0XUTrev0r'j-;,  iToXupTiXavoc,  TroXýprrrt,;  ),  this  is  the  only  one  which  is  morally 
neutral  and  emotionally  obscure;  being  placed  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  poem  (a  1),  it  is  seen  by  Clay  as 
decisive  for  the  audience's  perception  of  the  hero:  Odysseus  is  not  the  morally  superior  hero,  but  the  hero  who 
survives  by  means  of  his  mental  dexterity;  cf.  Rutherford  (1982)  146-147.  This  is  indeed  the  basic  quality  of 
Odysseus,  and  even  in  his  conflict  with  the  suitors  his  cunning,  along  with  his  wisdom,  is  of  extreme 
importance.  However,  there  is  an  indirect  relation  between  wisdom  and  propriety,  for  which  see  p.  277.  For  a 
similar  ambiguity  in  the  very  name  of  the  hero,  see  Clay  (1983)  54ff. 
73  See,  for  example,  for  references  to  Okk  y  231,6  364,  K  141,157;  to  eEoi,  a  235-36,6  360,  s  169,  o  178,  p 
148-149,4;  258-59;  to  6a  1  Pcov,  6  274-75,  K  64,16  1,  it  194-955,  p  446. 
299 Nevertheless,  even  if  divine  intervention  limits  man's  actions  and  power  of  control, 
man  does  not  easily  resign.  The  very  fact  that  life  is  irrational,  that  nothing  is  steady  and 
certain,  and  also  that  man  cannot  totally  rely  on  the  gods  for  the  fulfilment  of  his  plans, 
since  their  actions  are  often  incoherent  and  unpredictable,  demands  man's  incessant 
attempt  to  control  life  as  much  as  he  can.  Certainly,  there  are  moments  when  man  is 
almost  paralysed  before  life,  as  happens  with  Odysseus  who  cannot  leave  Ogygia,  despite 
his  immense  wish  to  return  to  Ithaca,  or  when  Odysseus  has  to  face  Circe,  and  it  takes 
Hermes'  help  for  him  and  his  companions  to  escape  the  goddess's  trickery  (K  275-306).  74 
This  doubtless  shows  that  only  up  to  a  point  can  man  actually  succeed  alone.  But  what  is 
important  is  that  even  in  such  cases  man  struggles  to  survive,  despite  his  knowing  that  his 
struggle  may  prove  fruitless.  Besides,  man's  struggle  also  contains  his  hope  that  a  possible 
hostility  of  the  gods  can  be  appeased  (6  570-71);  it  is  only  in  isolated  moments  that  man 
appears  to  be  facing  irrevocable  and  inevitable  difficulties. 
Life,  then,  demands  man's  incessant  caution  and  alertness,  it  is  an  inexplicable 
alternation  of  happiness  and  misery,  and  happiness  again,  which  has  to  be  endured,  yet  not 
in  a  passive  manner,  but  rather  through  man's  ability  to  appreciate  what  he  has  and  pursue 
what  he  has  not.  The  way,  then,  that  man  faces  life,  the  decisions  he  makes,  and  the 
behaviour  he  adopts  largely  define  the  course  of  his  life.  Odysseus'  companions  are 
destroyed  because  of  their  impropriety,  G#Tiplpiv  dTacea),  finctv  (a  7),  just  as  Aegisthus 
(a  34)  and  the  suitors  are  (X  317=  416).  Impropriety  is  connected  with  foolishness,  since 
an  act  of  impropriety  results  from  man's  inability  to  foresee  the  limits  of  his  power  and  the 
consequences  of  his  actions.  Polyphemus  and  Odysseus'  companions,  as  well  as  the  suitors 
74  CC  also  the  case  of  Leukothea's  intervention  at  s  333-53. 
300 are  all  characterised  as  foolish  (1  361,  K  27,  K  231=  257;  p  282,  iT  278),  a  characteristic 
which  is  further  stressed  when  the  poet  talks  of  warnings  that  have  been  neglected.  By 
contrast,  Odysseus  is  TroXupiXavoc  and  TrOXUTPOTroc.  During  the  narration  of  his 
adventures,  his  acts  often  justify  this  characterisation,  as  they  also  do  in  the  second  half  of 
the  poem,  in  his  conflict  with  the  suitors.  Thus,  at  r;  219-24  Odysseus  states  that  he  is 
prepared  to  face  any  difficulty  as  long  as  his  wish  to  return  home  will  be  fulfilled;  this  is 
certainly  the  attitude  of  a  determined  man,  who  is  unwilling  to  resign  before  all  hope  and 
strength  is  removed  from  him.  This  determination  is  obvious  in  the  Polyphemus  episode: 
when  Odysseus  is  found  imprisoned  in  the  Cyclops'  cave,  he  does  not  stay  idle,  simply 
waiting  for  something  to  happen,  but  plans  their  escape  in  a  most  cunning  manner  and 
defeats  Polyphemus  by  means  of  his  wisdom  (  1408,414;  cf  1  420,422,424,445,  p  211,  u 
20-21). 
A  first  presentation  of  Odysseus'  wisdom  and  cunning  is  given  by  Menelaus  and 
Helen  (5 240-59,271-89),  where  no  divine  intervention  is  mentioned;  this  is  particularly 
interesting  for  it  shows  not  that  the  hero  was  actually  alone  in  Troy  and  without  Athena's 
support,  but  that  what  is  important  on  the  human  level  is  the  result  of  one's  own  actions 
and  behaviour.  Similar  is  Agamemnon's  reaction  to  the  suitors'  slaughter:  although 
Amphimedon  talks  of  divine  help  towards  Odysseus  (co  182),  what  seems  to  matter  for 
Agamemnon  is  Odysseus'  own  share  of  responsibility  in  the  outcome  of  the  conflict;  thus, 
he  calls  the  hero  TroXup4xavoc  (ca  192)  and  attributes  the  victory  to  his  very  apSTIJ  -  by 
apgTq,  certainly,  meaning  his  prowess  (co  193). 
301 This  certainly  proves  that  human  action  is  necessary  and  is  doubtless 
acknowledged  as  such  even  when  the  gods  do  not  act  against  a  hero,  but  rather  in  his 
favour.  Such  are  the  cases  of  double  determination,  which  abound  in  the  poem,  since 
divine  participation  in  the  plot  is  inevitable.  75  In  Odysseus'  case,  from  ý  onwards,  with  the 
exception  of  books  i  up  to  p,  it  is  Athena's  intervention  which  defines  the  plot  -  and  along 
with  it  life.  Certainly,  there  are  details  when  the  poet  seems  to  be  consciously  connecting 
the  facts  with  the  goddess,  and  purely  for  narrative  reasons:  when,  for  example,  Athena 
causes  Nausicaa's  meeting  with  the  hero,  we  see  how  the  poet  transforms  a  folktale  motif 
76 
and  a  chance  event  into  a  divine  plan  (;  1-47).  But  it  remains  a  fact  that  the  goddess's 
participation  is  necessary  for  the  development  of  the  plot.  She  sees  that  Odysseus  is  well 
received  by  the  Phaeacians,  who,  then,  offer  gifts  to  him  and  send  him  safely  to  Ithaca  (v 
310-5);  she  disguises  the  hero  as  a  beggar,  so  that  no  one  may  recognise  him  while  he  is 
preparing  his  plan  of  revenge  (v  189-93,398403);  she  makes  Penelope  decide  on  the  bow 
contest,  an  event  that  will  allow  Odysseus  to  take  more  action  (ý  1-4);  she  makes  the 
suitors  even  more  arrogant,  in  order  to  infuriate  Odysseus  even  more  (a  158M,  a  346-48=  u 
284,86). 
But  even  if  the  goddess  seems  to  control  these  events,  Odysseus'  action  is 
necessary  too;  for  the  impression  that  we  have  in  the  end  is  that  of  Odysseus'  shrewdness 
and  bravery,  which  seem  to  be  reinforced  rather  than  diminished  by  Athena's  support. 
Thus,  Odysseus  himself,  despite  his  knowing  Athena's  love  and  his  being  certain  of  her 
future  help,  accepts  his  own  responsibility,  the  necessity  of  his  own  participation  (p  601). 
75  See,  for  example,  a  305,  P  405-6  (=  y  29-30=  1137-38),  y  26-28,8  274-75,  o  216,21,7T  259-61,0  153-56. 
76  See  Garvie  (1994)  on  ý  25-40. 
302 From  v  onwards  we  witness  the  way  in  which  the  hero  and  the  goddess  act  together  for  the 
accomplishment  of  their  plan  (v  386,  Tr  282f.,  295-98,  T  1-2=  51-52,  u  392-94).  It  is  only  in 
extreme  cases  that  Athena  seems  to  take  total  control  of  the  situation  and  intervene  in  an 
almost  supematural  way  (a  346-48=  u  284-86,  u  345-58,  X  205-6,255-56-=  272-73  - 
contrast  0  192-94). 
The  importance  that  the  subject  of  human  responsibility  has  for  the  poem  becomes 
even  more  evident  when  we  consider  that  the  heroes'  main  and  recurrently  mentioned 
characteristic  is  their  wisdom  -  or  negatively,  their  foolishness.  The  outcome  of  the 
conflict  on  the  human  level  results  from  Odysseus'  cunning  and  wisdoM,  77  and  at  the  same 
time  from  the  suitors'  foolishness  that  leads  them  to  impropriety.  Besides,  it  seems  of  great 
significance  that  the  first  speech  of  the  poem  belongs  to  Zeus,  who  denies  total 
responsibility  for  man's  misery:  at  times  it  is  man  himself  who  causes  his  own  destruction, 
even  against  fate,  6TrEp  p6pov,  by  not  behaving  properly,  aflaw  CiTaoýaXillow  (a  32-34). 
Interestingly,  as  happens  vvith  propriety,  the  poet  distinguishes  the  heroes  as  wise 
and  unwise  in  exactly  the  same  way  and  in  exactly  the  same  analogy.  This  further 
underlines  the  connection  between  these  two  qualities:  propriety  is  not  simply  an  inherent 
disposition  or  outlook  on  life,  but  also,  or  mainly,  a  decision  for  which  man  is  responsible 
and  which  may  lead  either  to  happiness  or  to  destruction.  Propriety,  therefore,  seems  to 
result  from  one's  ability  to  perceive  and  comprehend  life  and  act  according  to  the  situation 
77  For  the  importance  OfpfiTIC  in  the  poem  see  Clay  (1983)  89ff. 
303 he  is  involved  in  each  time;  and  therefore,  wisdom  and  propriety  can  detennine  the  life  of 
one  single  person  or  even  of  a  whole  groUp.  78 
It  would  appear,  then,  that  on  the  human  level  the  punishment  or  even  destruction 
of  a  wrongdoer  is  inevitable:  the  suitors  are  responsible  for  causing  Odysseus'  revenge, 
just  as  happens  with  Aegisthus.  Even  if  one  chooses  to  see  the  suitors'  end  as  the  result  of 
divine  justice,  still  they  are  responsible  for  having  provoked  the  gods'  wrath.  Thus,  in 
either  case  man  largely  defines  his  life  on  the  basis  of  his  decisions  and  behaviour.  The 
fact  that  the  poet  is  quite  vague  as  regards  the  idea  of  divine  justice  is  perhaps  a  proof  that 
he  is  not  particularly  interested  in  it;  what  matters  is  to  project  propriety  as  a  way  of  living, 
seen  from  the  aspect  of  its  result:  propriety  leads  to  happiness,  but  the  gods'  relation  to  it, 
either  when  order  is  preserved  or  when  it  is  violated,  is  never  actually  explained  clearly. 
It  is  true  that  by  comparison  with  the  Iliad,  the  Odyssey  gives  an  impression  of 
more  human  freedom  of  will,  and  consequently  of  more  freedom  of  action.  This,  I  believe, 
is  the  result  of  two  main  factors.  First,  in  the  Iliad  more  gods  are  involved  in  the  plot, 
creating  the  impression  that  man  is  often  an  object,  a  plaything  in  the  hands  of  superior 
powers,  who  use  him  for  the  accomplishment  of  their  own  personal  plans  and  the 
satisfaction  of  their  selfish  pride.  In  the  Odyssey,  on  the  other  hand,  divine  participation  is 
limited  to  the  actions  of  Poseidon  and  Athena;  more  important,  the  gods  are  not  opposed 
one  to  the  other,  but  their  plans  develop  in  different  moments  of  the  plot:  Athena  takes 
79  See  T  109-14;  also  the  example  of  Amphinomus  (iT  398-99)  and  Leodes  (ý  14647),  who  are  punished  since 
they  do  not  abandon  the  suitors'  company,  even  though  they  are  not  insolent  themselves;  see  Havelock  (1978) 
169. 
304 over  as  soon  as  Poseidon  withdraws  from  the  plot,  obliged  as  he  is  to  obey  moira.  Thus, 
man's  dependence  on  the  gods  seems  less  harsh:  man  may  be  weak,  but  he  is  not  tossed 
about  by  the  gods  for  no  obvious  reason;  his  problems,  when  related  to  the  gods,  are  the 
result  of  his  own  actions. 
Second,  the  different  role  that  moira  has  in  each  poem  determines  the  idea  about 
man.  In  the  Iliad  moira  is  a  compelling  power,  that  allows  little  space  to  man  for  decisions 
and  choices;  even  Achilles,  who  appears  to  have  the  unique  privilege  of  a  choice,  is  in  the 
end  bound  to  his  death  in  an  utterly  cruel  manner.  But  in  the  Odyssey  the  role  of  moira  is 
limited:  it  may  demand  the  fulfilment  of  certain  events,  yet  it  does  not  define  the  whole  of 
the  plot,  permitting  us  to  see  that  man  can  decide  freely  and  construct  his  life. 
Yet,  despite  this  difference,  the  two  poems  seem  actually  to  share  the  same  attitude 
towards  life:  however  strongly  bound  to  his  fate  and  however  limited  by  his  own  nature, 
man  never  gives  up  and  always  hopes,  even  if  this  entails  a  continuous  struggle  against 
life;  this  attitude  forms  his  actions,  and  even  if  behind  these  actions  some  god  is  also  to  be 
found,  man  is  never  relieved  from  his  own  responsibility,  for  what  actually  matters  is  the 
result,  and  not  the  cause  that  lies  behind  it. 
305 oncIusion 
Like  caryatids 
our  lifted  arms 
hold  up  time's  granite  load 
and  defeated 
we  shall  always  win. 
Miroslav  Holub 
Both  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  focus  on  man.  Through  the  experiences  of  single 
heroes  we  seem  to  gain  the  opportunity  for  an  insightful  exploration  of  life's  own 
potential.  Conflicts  and  wars,  suffering  and  pain  are  the  necessary  material  of  a  narration 
that  allows  the  general  to  emerge  out  of  the  particular.  The  divine  or  the  unknown  'other', 
at  times  in  the  form  of  moira,  at  times  in  the  form  of  the  more  personal  gods,  constantly 
interacts  with  the  human,  providing  the  explanation  as  well  as  the  reassurance  necessary 
for  life  to  be  comprehended  and  lived. 
Each  poem  approaches  life  in  a  different  way.  The  ideological  and  theological 
background  is  essentially  the  same  for  both  works,  yet  the  perspective  we  gain  is different 
each  time.  This  difference  may  be  seen  as  symptomatic  of  the  different  subject-matter  of 
each  poem,  but  at  the  same  time  it  conveys  a  different  attitude  to  life  in  general;  form  and 
content  are  difficult  to  tell  apart,  as  the  choice  of  the  former  seems  to  define  the  essence  of 
the  latter  and  vice  versa.  The  manner  and  degree  of  interaction  and  interrelation  between 
the  human  and  the  divine  significantly  determine  the  outcome,  further  underlining  the 
difference. 
306 The  Odyssey  gives  the  impression  of  greater  human  freedom:  moira  and  the  gods 
are  employed  only  as  long  as  this  is  necessary  for  the  plot  to  be  advanced,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  for  the  religious  explanation  to  be  given  on  the  other;  Zeus  disclaims  responsibility  for 
human  suffering  at  a  32ff,  introducing  us  thus  into  a  divine  world  which  stands  detached 
and  aloof,  and  the  hero  of  the  poem  is  TrOMTki:  and  TTOXUPýXavoc;  Odysseus,  who 
survives  both  his  adventures  and  his  usurpers  by  means  basically  of  his  11fiTic.  Even  the 
idea  that  the  gods  do  not  favour  improper  behaviour  among  men  fur-ther  underlines  man's 
own  responsibility:  the  misery  or  suffering  caused  by  the  gods  is  their  reaction  to  man's 
own  impropriety,  and  not  a  whimsical  decision  made  on  the  spur  of  the  moment. 
The  atmosphere  of  the  Iliad  is  doubtless  more  suffocating.  Moira  looms  over  the 
plot  and  is  gradually  fulfilled  despite  the  struggle  of  the  heroes,  innocent  as  they  are  and 
ignorant  of  the  future,  and  this  double  perspective  of  ours  enhances  the  impression  of 
human  frailty  and  helplessness.  The  gods'  constant  intervention  in  and  interference  with 
human  affairs,  and  more  important,  Zeus's  powerful  and  irrevocable  will,  further 
contribute  to  the  atmosphere.  Man  stands  once  again  alone,  this  time,  however,  not  against 
the  concrete  and  definable  dangers  of  life,  but  rather  against  life's  irrational  and 
incomprehensible  elements.  His  strength  and  his  victory  come  not  through  his  survival,  but 
through  his  glorious  death,  the  immortal  death  which  defies  this  very  human  frailty. 
There  is  no  development  of  thought  between  the  two  poems  to  be  detected.  The 
Homeric  world  is  more  coherent  than  it  appears  at  first  sight.  The  perception  of  the  human 
and  the  divine  is  essentially  the  same  in  both  works,  but  whereas  in  the  Iliad  the  gods' 
immortal  bliss  is  exaggerated,  thus  bringing  human  tragedy  into  sharp  relief,  in  the 
307 Odyssey  the  two  exist  in  a  relation  of  less  tension;  and  whereas  the  Iliad  is  like  a 
suppressed,  silent  war  cry  of  pain  at  the  moment  of  a  vanishing  triumph,  the  Odyssey  is  the 
acquiescent  wisdom  of  the  much  travelled  man  who  knows  that  the  barrier  between  the 
human  and  the  divine  is  inviolable,  and  the  sense  of  equilibrium  gained  through  this 
knowledge.  No  one  would  subscribe  any  more  to  the  view  expressed  by  'Longinus'  that  the 
Odyssey  is  the  poem  composed  in  the  poet's  old  age,  lacking  the  power  and  the  passion  of 
the  'youthful'  Iliad,  yet,  it  is  true  that  the  idea  seems  to  evoke  the  difference  between  the 
two  poems  in  a  most  succinct  manner;  this  is  a  difference  of  perspective,  of  'philosophy', 
if  I  may  say  so,  not  necessarily  indicative  of  a  development  in  moral  thought.  The  self- 
effacing  character  of  epic  poetry  may  account  for  our  insecurity  as  regards  the  poet's 
identity.  yet  by  no  means  does  it  entail  the  absence  of  identity;  and  it  is  the  very  identity 
that  each  poem  has  that  seems  to  ask  for  a  self-conscious  composer;  the  idea  that  the 
poems  are  simply  the  haphazard  result  of  successive  compositions  cannot  be  disproved, 
but  it  cannot  be  justified  either. 
308 Bibliography 
Adkins,  A.  W.  11  (1960a),  Merit  and  Responsibility  (Oxford) 
(I  960b),  "'Honour"  and  "Punishment"  in  the  Homeric  Poems',  BICS  7:  23-32 
(1971),  'Homeric  Values  and  Homeric  Society',  JHS  91:  1-14 
(1972),  'Homeric  Gods  and  the  Values  of  Homeric  Society',  JHS  92:  1-19 
(1987),  'Gagarin  and  the  "Morality"  of  Homer',  CP  82:  311-22 
Andersen,  0.  (1997),  'Diomedes,  Aphrodite  and  Dione:  Background  and  Function  of  a 
Scene  in  Homer's  Iliad,  CM48:  25-36 
(1976),  'Some  Thoughts  on  the  Shield  of  Achilles',  SO  51:  5-18 
Babut,  D.  (1974),  'Xenophane  critique  des  poetes',  AC  43:  83-117 
Bartosiewiczova,  J.  (1977-1978),  'Moira  -  Die  Funktion  des  Schicksals  in  der 
homerischen  Geschichten%  GLO  9-10:  3-15 
Bassett,  S.  E.  (1923),  'The  Proems  of  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey',  AJP  44:  339-48 
--  (1934),  'The'ApapTfa  of  Achilles',  TAPA  65:  47-69 
Bradley,  E.  M.  (1976),  "'The  Greatness  of  his  Nature":  Fire  and  Justice  in  the 
Odyssey',  Ramus  5:  137-148 
Burkert,  W.  (1985),  Greek  Religion:  Archaic  and  Classical  (Oxford,  Engl.  tmnsl.  by  I 
Raffan) 
---(1992),  The  Orientalizing  Revolution:  Near  Eastern  Influence  on  Greek 
Culture  in  the  Early  Archaic  Age  (Cambridge,  Mass.  -  London) 
-  (1996),  Creation  of  the  Sacred.  -  Tracks  of  Biology  in  Early  Religions 
(Cambridge,  Mass.  -  London) 
Caims,  D.  L.  (1993a),  Aidos.  The  Psychology  and  Elhics  of  Honour  and  Shame  in 
Ancient  Greek  Literature  (Oxford) 
---  (1993b),  'Affronts  and  Quarrels  in  the  Iliad,  Papers  of  the  Leeds 
International  Latin  Seminar  7:  155-67 
(1996),  "Hybris,  Dishonour,  and  Thinking  Big',  JHS  116:  1-32 
Calhoun,  G.  M.  (1937a),  'The  Higher  Criticism  on  Olympus',  AJP  58:  257-74 
----  (1937b),  'Homer's  Gods:  Prolegomena',  TAPA  68:  11-25 
309 ---  (1960),  "Homer's  Gods  -  Myth  and  Marchen,  AJP  60:  1-28 
Chantraine,  P.  (1952),  Ta  notion  du  divin  depuis  Hom6re  jusqu,  A  Platon',  in 
Entretiens  sur  Pantiquite  classique,  i  (Vandceuvres  -  Gen&ve) 
--  (1968),  Dictionnaire  Itymologique  de  la  langue  grecque  (Paris) 
Clark,  A  E.  (1986),  'Neoanalysis:  A  Bibliographical  Review',  CW79:  379-391 
Clay,  J.  S.  (19  83),  The  Wrath  ofAthena:  Gods  and  Men  in  the  Odyssey  (Princeton,  New 
Jersey) 
Comford,  F.  M.  (1912),  From  Religion  to  Philosophy.  A  Study  in  the  Origins  of 
Western  Speculation  (London) 
Davies,  M.  (1981),  'The  Judgement  of  Paris  and  Iliad  Book  XXIV',  JHS 101:  56-62 
Davison,  J.  A.  (1967),  review  of  Dietrich  (1965),  Gnomon  39:  88-90 
Dickie,  M.  W.  (1978),  'Dike  as  a  Moral  Term  in  Homer  and  Hesiod',  CP  73:  91  -101 
Dietrich,  B.  C.  (1965),  Death,  Fate  and  the  Gods:  The  Development  ofa  Religious  Idea 
in  Greek  Popular  Beliefand  in  Homer  (London) 
---  (1977),  'Aspects  of  Myth  and  Religion',  AC  20:  59-71 
Dodds,  E.  R.  (195  1),  The  Greeks  and  the  Irrational  (Berkeley,  Los  Angeles) 
Dover,  K.  J.  (1983),  'The  Portrayal  of  Moral  Evaluation  in  Greek  Poetry',  JHS  103:  35- 
48 
Edwards,  M.  W.  (1994)  (ed.  ),  The  Iliad.  -  A  Commentary,  v  (Cambridge) 
Else,  G.  F.  (1949),  "God  and  Gods  in  Early  Greek  Thought',  TAPA 
- 
80:  24-36 
Emlyn-Jones,  C.,  Hardwick,  L.,  Purkis,  J.  (1992)  (edd.  ),  Homer:  Readings  and  Images 
(London) 
Finley,  M.  I.  (1978),  The  World  of  Odysseus  (London,  second  edition) 
Fisher,  N.  R.  E.  (1976),  'Hybris  and  Dishonour:  F,  G&R  23:  177-193 
(1979),  'Hybris  amd  Dishonour:  Il,  G&R  26:  32-47 
Frisk,  H.  (1960,1970),  Griechisches  etymologisches  WOrterbuch,  i,  ii  (Heidelberg) 
Gagarin,  M.  (1973),  Dike  in  the  Works  and  Days',  CP  68:  81-94 
(1987),  'Morality  in  Homer',  CP  82:  285-306 
(1992),  "The  Poetry  of  Justice:  Hesiod  and  the  Origins  of  Greek  Law", 
Ramus  21:  61-78 
Garvie,  A.  F.  (1994)  (ed.  ),  Homer:  Odyssey  Books  VI-VIII  (Cambridge) 
Gaskin,  R.  (1990),  'Do  Homeric  Heroes  Make  Real  Decisions?  ',  CQ  40:  1-15 
Gaunt,  D.  M.  (1976),  'Judgement  and  Atmosphere  in  Epic',  Ramus  5:  59-75 
310 Gould,  J.  (1973),  'HIKETEIA',  JHS  93:  74-103 
--  (1985),  'On  Making  Sense  of  Greek  Religion,  in  P.  E.  Easterling,  J.  V.  Muir 
(edds),  Greek  Religion  and  Society  (Cambridge) 
Greene,  W.  C.  (1944),  Moira:  Fate,  Good,  and  Evil  in  Greek  Thought  (Cambridge, 
Mass.  ) 
Griffin,  J.  (1980),  HomeronLifie  andDeath  (Oxford) 
(1986),  'Homeric  Words  and  Speakers',  JHS  106:  36-57 
(1995)  (ed.  ),  Homer,  Iliad  Book  9  (Oxford) 
Hainsworth,  J.  B.  (199  1),  The  Idea  ofEpic  (Berkeley  -  Los  Angeles  -  Oxford) 
(1993)  (ed.  ),  The  Iliad.  A  Commentary,  iii  (Cambridge) 
Havelock,  E.  A.  (1969),  'Dikaiosune;  An  Essay  in  Greek  Intellectual  History,  Phoenix 
23:  49-70 
--  (1978),  The  Greek  Concept  of  Justice:  From  Its  Shadow  in  Homer  to  Its 
Substance  in  Plato  (Cambridge,  Mass.  -  London) 
Heubeck,  A.,  West,  S.,  Hainsworth,  J.  B.  (1988)  (edd.  ),  A  Commentary  on  Homer's 
Odyssey,  i  (Oxford) 
Heubeck,  A.,  Hoekstra  A.  (1989)  (edd.  ),  A  Commentary  on  Homer's  Odyssey,  ii 
(Oxford) 
Janko,  R.  (1992)  (ed.  ),  The  Iliad*  A  Commentary,  iv  (Cambridge) 
Jones,  P.  V.  (1996),  'The  Independent  Heroes  of  the  Iliad,  JHS 116:  108-18 
Jorgensen,  0.  (1904),  Das  Auftreten  der  G6tter  in  der  Bfichem  t-p  der  Odyssee', 
Hermes  39:  35  7-82 
Kirk,  G.  S.  (1962),  The  Songs  ofHomer  (Cambridge) 
--------  (1985)  (ed.  ),  The  Iliad.,  A  Commentary,  i  (Cambridge) 
(1990)  (ed.  ),  The  Iliad.  A  Commentary,  ii  (Cambridge) 
Konstan,  D.  (1999),  'Altruism'  (American  Philological  Association  Presidential 
Address,  Dallas,  Texas,  http:  //NvNvw.  apaclassics.  org/Publications/Pres 
Talks/KONSTAN.  html) 
Kullmann,  W.  (1985),  'Gods  and  Men  in  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey',  HSCP  89:  1-23 
Leach,  A.  (1915),  'Fatalism  of  the  Greeks',  AJP36:  373-401 
Lee,  D.  J.  N.  (196  1),  'Homeric  KTIp  and  others',  Glotta  3  9:  191-207 
Lesky,  A.  (1961),  Gwliche  und  menschliche  Motivation  im  homerischen  Epos, 
Sitzungsberichte  der  Heidelberger  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  4:  5-52 
(Heidelberg)  [translated  as  '  Divine  and  Human  Causation  in  Homeric  Epic,  in 
311 D.  L.  Cairns  (2001)  (ed.  ),  Oxford  Readings  in  Homer's  Iliad  (forthcoming, 
Oxford)] 
Lloyd-Jones,  H.  (1983),  The  Justice  ofZeus  (Berkeley  -  Los  Angeles  -  London,  second 
edition) 
(1987),  'A  Note  on  Homeric  Morality',  CP  82:  307-3  10 
Long,  A.  A.  (1970),  'Morals  and  Values  in  Homer',  JHS  90:  121-139 
Lord,  A.  B.  (1968),  'Homer  as  Oral  Poet',  HS  72:  1-46 
MacDowell,  D.  M.  (1976),  'Hyhris  in  Athens',  G&R  23:  14-31 
----  (1978),  The  Law  in  Classical  Athens  (Ithaca,  New  York) 
Macleod,  C.  W.  (1982)  (ed).,  Homer:  Iliad  BookMV  (Cambridge) 
McAuslan,  I.,  Walcot,  P.  (1998),  Homer  (Oxford) 
Merchant,  P.  (197  1),  The  Epic  (London  -  New  York) 
Morrison,  J.  V.  (1997),  'Kerostasia,  the  Dictates  of  Fate,  and  the  Will  of  Zeus  in  the 
Iliad',  Arethusa  30:  273-296  * 
Nagy,  G.  (1996),  Homeric  Questions  (Austin,  Texas) 
Nethercut,  W.  Rý  (1976),  'The  Epic  Journey  of  Achilles',  Ramus  5:  1-17 
Pack,  R.  A.  (1939),  'Fate,  Chance  and  Tragic  Error',  AJP  60:  350-56 
Palmer,  L.  R_  (1950),  'The  Indo-European  Origins  of  Greek  Justice',  TPS  (Oxford), 
149-168 
Papanoutsos,  E.  (1970),  ýYOI  J  (Athens)  K17 
Parry,  A.  (1966),  'Have  We  Homer's  Iliad?,,  YCS20:  177-216 
Powell,  B.,  (1997),  'Homer  and  Writing',  in  1.  Morris,  B.  Powell,  (edd.  ),  A  New 
Companion  to  Homer  (Leiden  -  New  York  -  K61n)  3-32 
Richardson,  N.  (1993)  (ed.  ),  The  Iliad.  A  Commentary,  A  (Cambridge) 
Rodgers,  V.  A.  (1971),  'Some  Thoughts  on  A&rj',  CQ  21:  289-301 
Rubino,  C.  A.,  Shelmerdine,  C.  W.  (1983)  (edd.  ),  Approaches  to  Homer  (Austin, 
Texas) 
Russo,  J.,  Femandez-Galiano,  M.,  Heubeck,  A.  (1992)  (edd.  ),  A  Commentary  On 
Homer's  Odyssey,  iii  (Oxford) 
Rutherford,  R.  B.  (1982),  'Tragic  Form  and  Feeling  in  the  Iliad,  JHS  102:  145-160 
----  -  --  (1986),  'The  Philosophy  of  the  Odyssey',  JHS  106:  145-162 
--------  (1991-1993),  'From  the  Iliad  to  the  odyssey',  BICS  38:  37-54 
Schein,  S.  L.  (1996)  (ed.  ),  Reading  the  Odyssey  (Princeton) 
312 Snell,  B.  (1953),  The  Discovery  ofthe  Mind:  The  Greek  Origins  OfEuropean  Thought 
(oxford,  engl.  transl.  by  T.  G.  Roseruneyer) 
Valk,  M.  H.  A.  L.  H.  van  der  (1949),  Textual  Criticism  ofthe  Odyssey  (Leiden) 
Veyne,  P.  (1988),  Did  the  Greeks  Believe  in  their  Myths?:.  4n  Essay  on  the  Constitutive 
Imagination  (Chicago  and  London,  Engl.  transl.  by  P.  Wissing) 
Vlastos,  G.  (1947),  'Equality  and  Justice  in  Early  Greek  Cosmologies',  CP  42:  156-178 
West,  M.  L.  (1999),  'The  Invention  of  Homer',  CQ49:  364-382  - 
Westphal,  J.  (1996)  (ed),  Justice  (Indianapolis/Cambridge) 
Willcock,  M.  M.  (1964),  'Mythological  Paradeigma  in  the  Iliad,  CQ  14:  141-154 
------  -  (1970),  'Some  Aspects  of  the  Gods  in  the  Iliad',  BICS  17:  1-10 
Williams,  B.  (1993),  Morality  (Cambridge) 
--  (1994),  Shame  and  Necessity  (Berkeley  -  Los  Angeles  -  London) 
Wyatt,  W.  F.  Jr.  (1982),  'Homeric'ATn',  AJP  103:  247-76 
Yamagata,  N.  (1994),  Homeric  Morality  (Leiden  -  New  York  -  Koln) 
313 